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A HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE
WORK OF CHRIST

A
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF THE
WORK OF CHRIST

IN ITS ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT

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*Vexilla regis prodeunt
Fulget crucis mysterium*

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MODERN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

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
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CHAPTER III

THE CONDITIONS OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

§ 1. THE COMPLETION OF THE PROTESTANT SYNTHESIS

THE further development of the doctrine of the work of Christ in the Protestant churches is marked by (*a*) the general acceptance of the doctrine of the twofold obedience of Christ, as taught in the "Formula of Concord," (*b*) the tendency more and more to bring the whole material of the doctrine (including the twofold obedience) under the conceptual scheme of the threefold office. The historical order of treatment indeed remains, but is separated from the doctrine of Christ's work and becomes the doctrine of His two states, that of humiliation or exinanition, and that of exaltation. To the state of exinanition were reckoned Christ's conception, birth, education, conversation upon earth, passion, death, and burial. To the state of exaltation belong His resurrection, ascension, and return to judgment. The position of the descent into hell was a matter of controversy. The "Formula of Concord" (ix.) followed Luther in taking it literally, and the later Lutheran theology renewed the patristic doctrine of Christ's descent into hell to announce His victory over the devil; thus it was included in the state of exaltation. The Reformed theologians on the other hand reckoned it to the state of exinanition, interpreting it, partly of the separation of Christ's soul from His body in death, partly of His desolation on the cross.¹

¹ Cf. Lipsius, "Dogmatik,"³, p. 480.

It is usual to call the orthodox theology of the seventeenth century, in which all these developments took place, with a somewhat depreciatory significance, the Protestant scholasticism. This theology is indeed a scholasticism, in so far as the Lutheran theologians from Gerhard and the Reformed from Keckermann onwards begin to make fresh use of the mediaeval schoolmen and their methods, as also of their great master in philosophy, Aristotle. Nevertheless, this return to scholasticism is made with a full consciousness of the difference that separates the Protestant from the mediaeval theology, nor is there any intention of allowing to Aristotle the same degree of influence as he has in the Middle Ages. Moreover, the current depreciation of the Protestant scholasticism is by no means fully justified. As over against the freer theology of the sixteenth century, that of the seventeenth undoubtedly shows an increased formalism, which sometimes seems to make the form an end in itself: on the other hand there is also a real advance in the thinking out and systematizing of the implications of the theological principles of the Reformation.

It will be convenient, before considering the more highly elaborated and complicated forms of the doctrine of the threefold office, and the conditions under which these have come to be, first of all to obtain a clear notion of the broad outline of the doctrine which is the starting-point of all further developments and is common to the theology of both Confessions. This we may sufficiently do by studying the classical and very succinct presentation of the doctrine in the "*Loci Theologici*" (1610-1625), of the Lutheran theologian, Gerhard (A.D. 1582-1637).

Gerhard's general theological principles are as

follows:¹ He distinguishes natural and supernatural theology. Natural theology arises partly from man's innate knowledge of God, partly from his contemplation of the creation. Since the Fall, however, the power of natural reason is diminished. Supernatural theology is based upon revelation. Its only adequate and proper principle is Scripture; the articles of faith are not its principle but are derived from Scripture. The property of principles is to be first and unmediated, true, incorrigible, self-evident, irrefutable, and indemonstrable. All these properties belong to Scripture alone. Reason is no second theological principle. Though there are some things, which to a certain degree can be known by natural reason, it cannot rise to the mysteries of faith properly so called. The matter of theology is then the truths revealed in Scripture. Its chief end is the glory of God, its mediate end the salvation of man. The object and subject about which it turns is man in so far as he is to be brought to eternal felicity.

The doctrine of the threefold office is found in Tom. i. loc. iv. cap. viii.

(187) "The office of Christ is threefold—prophetic, priestly, and kingly. The prophetic office is that by which Christ revealed to us the will of God concerning our salvation, which indeed He executes, first by Himself publishing the Gospel, i.e. the secret counsel of God concerning the redemption of the human race, and by purifying the law from the corruptions of the Pharisees; next by establishing the ministry of teaching in the Church: here also belongs the institution of the sacraments."

(189) "The priestly office of Christ is that by which, interposing Himself between man and God, He recon-

¹ See "Proemium de natura theologiæ" in the "Exegesis sive uberior explicatio," prefixed to his "Locī," ed. 1657.

ciled the whole human race to God, making satisfaction to the Divine law, and interceding with God ; whence the parts of the priestly office are two, satisfaction and intercession. Satisfaction is that by which He paid to God a price sufficient for the sins of the whole human race, and obtained for it righteousness and eternal life ; which satisfaction is to be seen first in the fulfilment of the Divine law, next in the payment of the due penalties of sin—it is commonly spoken of as His active and passive obedience, each of which is a part of the priestly office of Christ.”

(191) “The kingly office of Christ is that by which He governs all things in heaven and earth, and above all His Church.”

(193) “This kingdom is regarded as belonging either to this life or the next. In this life it is called the kingdom of power or of grace : the kingdom of power is Christ’s general empire over all things, to wit, His government of earth and heaven, the subjection of all creatures to Him, and His dominion in the midst of His enemies, whom He represses and punishes. The kingdom of grace is His special work of mercy in the Church, viz. the mission, illumination, and confirmation of apostles, evangelists, pastors, and teachers : the gathering of the Church by the preaching of the Gospel, and the dispensation of the sacraments, the regeneration, sanctification and quickening of believers, the application of His merit, the protection and conservation of the pious under the cross and their deliverance, the pouring out of various gifts, etc.”

(194) “In the next life Christ’s kingdom is called the kingdom of righteousness and glory, which is seen in the resurrection of the dead and the universal judgment both of the wicked to damnation and of the elect to eternal life.”

In the above doctrine we have now to recognize not only the characteristic Protestant form of the doctrine of the work of Christ, but a conception, which so truly corresponds to the fundamentally synthetic character of Protestant theology that it is a synthesis also of the whole of Christianity. It not merely corresponds to the synthesis of law and Gospel and to the synthetic view of the subjective process of redemption, in which the gift of the Spirit and faith, justification and sanctification are all one; but it also is in reality the same synthesis with each of these others. The whole and the parts, macrocosm and microcosm, are here equal to one another: it is the same synthesis in all cases, only that it is regarded under a different aspect. The *schema* of the threefold office successfully expresses in the one doctrine of the work of Christ the whole of Christianity, and that as neither the Greek Fathers nor the mediaeval schoolmen were able to do. For in the view of the Greek Church the work of Christ needed to be supplemented by our works; and in the mediaeval view, though it procured sacramental grace which made our works possible, it still ultimately needed the same supplement. But in Protestantism Christ is all and does all; and the doctrine of the threefold office succeeds in so stating the work of Christ as to show this. His work as Prophet, Priest, and King is complete, and leaves no room for anything which is not simply itself in another form.

It is to be observed that what has been said as to the completeness with which the doctrine of the threefold office expresses the Protestant synthesis applies to the doctrine as a whole, and has regard to the balance and mutual co-operation of its parts. It is not meant that the doctrine is a final or perfect statement of Protestantism. Not to speak of the figurative character

of the Old Testament types which supply the individual heads of the doctrine, the idea of satisfaction, which it includes, is inherited, though not without modification from the patristic and the mediaeval theology. It will later appear that for these reasons Protestant theology has not settled down to the doctrine of the threefold office as a final statement of Christianity. Nevertheless it is to be recognized that in this doctrine Protestant theology reaches, if not a final, yet a relative, conclusion, in so far as in the doctrine as a whole we have the perfect reflex of the fundamental Reformation doctrine of justifying faith. Kaftan well says of the doctrine of the threefold office :—¹

“ In the setting here given the doctrine of satisfaction obtains a relation to the faith of the individual corresponding to the evangelical knowledge of salvation. The prophetic office continually comes to mediate accomplishment in the Church through the ministers of the Word. And the chief content of the Word is that we now through Christ have a gracious God. The high-priestly intercession and royal dominion of Christ in the kingdom of grace are living present facts, by which faith assures itself of the grace of God in Christ. With all this therefore even in the objective doctrine of salvation the bridge to faith is built.”

As regards the point by point comparison of the new synthesis with the older Greek and mediaeval syntheses, the priestly office corresponds to the mediaeval satisfaction and merit, the kingly office to the mediaeval headship of Christ, both offices together to the Greek recapitulation of the race in Him. The doctrine of the prophetic office, however, differs from the Greek Logos doctrine and the mediaeval doctrine of the law, which are its nearest equivalents, not only in that it includes

¹ “ Dogmatik,” ², 1901, p. 501.

and indeed centres in the doctrine of the Gospel, but also in that the Protestant theology, following Luther, teaches that Christ brings no new moral law. As Gerhard puts it, He merely "purified the law from the corruptions of the Pharisees" (loc. cit. 187).

It may finally be pointed out that for us, in the difficult and complicated study in which we have been engaged all through the mediaeval and Reformation periods, the attainment of the doctrine of the threefold office marks an alleviation of our task. Inasmuch as this doctrine is a microcosm of the whole evangelical theology, so far as in future we are concerned with this type, it will no longer be necessary to pursue the complementary studies of the doctrines of law and Gospel, of justification, and of the sacraments, which we were compelled to follow in our previous work in the endeavour to bring out the real significance of the formal doctrine of the work of Christ in the Middle Ages, and again to mediate the way from the total mediaeval to the total Protestant point of view. So far as the evangelical doctrine of the threefold office or its practical equivalent henceforward obtains, formal doctrine and real significance coincide. Only therefore where the evangelical view does not fully obtain will it be necessary still to follow the more extended form of treatment ; elsewhere we may henceforth limit ourselves to the formal doctrine of our subject only.

§ 2. INTERNAL CONTROVERSIES

The further development of the doctrine of the work of Christ in Protestant theology depends partly on the interconfessional controversies between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches, partly on their external controversies with Socinianism and Arminianism.

As regards the interconfessional controversies, we

have to note the disputes as to the Person of Christ and as to the extent of the work of Christ. We may take the latter point first. The uniform teaching of the Lutheran Church is that Christ's satisfaction was both a sufficient and efficacious satisfaction for the sins of all men. The Reformed, on the other hand, at least from Beza onwards, show a distinct tendency to restrict the satisfaction of Christ, or at least, if not its sufficiency, yet its efficacy, to the elect. Quenstedt, "*Systema*," pars II. cap. iii. memb. 2, sect. 2, qu. 7, quotes Beza, "*Respons. part. 2, ad acta Colloq. Mompelg.*," as follows :—

"I say again, and profess before the whole Church of God, that it is false, blasphemous, and wicked to say that Christ, whether as regards the Divine plan, or as regards the effect, suffered, was crucified, died, and made satisfaction no less for the sins of the damned and those adjudged to eternal judgment than for the sins of Peter, Paul, and all the saints."¹

A mediating position was taken up by the Reformed School of Saumur, who taught a hypothetical universality of redemption, i.e. that Christ died for the sins of all men, and efficaciously satisfied for the whole world in the plan of God, so that all should be saved, though only on condition of faith.

Passing on to the controversy on the Person of Christ, we note that while the Lutherans and the Reformed alike accepted the Creed of Chalcedon, they interpreted it differently. Their divergence on this point originated out of the dispute between Luther and Zwingli as to the Lord's Supper. Luther attempted to justify his doctrine of consubstantiation against Zwingli

¹ Quenstedt (*loc. cit.*) even finds traces of the same tendency in Calvin, who says, e.g. in his Commentary on Col. i. 20, that Christ has not made peace for the ungodly, though the benefit of His redemption is offered to them.

by teaching a real *communicatio idiomatum* between the Divine and human natures in the Person of Christ, in virtue of which Christ's human nature shares in the ubiquity of His Divine nature. Zwingli would only admit a verbal *communicatio idiomatum*, or, as he called it, an ἀλλοίωσις. In his "Fidei Ratio" (§ 1) he lays great stress on the conservation by each nature of its own properties.

Zwingli has at this point set the pattern for the doctrine of the Reformed Church. Calvin also, though differing from Zwingli in his view of the Supper, followed him as regards the *communicatio idiomatum*. He too holds merely a verbal *communicatio*.¹ The "Formula of Concord," on the other hand, in fixing the Lutheran doctrine rejects the Zwinglian view as Nestorian,² and subscribes to the doctrine of a real *communicatio* as taught by Luther.

The point at which the Christological controversy affected the doctrine of the work of Christ was the question of Christ's fulfilment of the law. The Lutherans taught that the God-man in virtue of the *communicatio idiomatum* was altogether above the law, so that His fulfilment of the law was an entirely voluntary and supererogatory self-humiliation. The Reformed on the other hand regard Christ as being, as regards His humanity, under the law like other men.

In connexion with this last difference may be suitably mentioned as partly, though by no means altogether conditioned by it, the doctrine of the Reformed theologian Piscator, who in his "Theses theologicæ," Vol. III, 1618, opposed the inclusion of Christ's active obedience in the satisfaction of Christ.³ Piscator had

¹ "Inst." II. 14, 2.

² *Vide supra*, Vol. I, p. 89.

³ Cf. Baur, "Die Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung," pp. 352 ff. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. pp. 248 ff.

been preceded in his form of teaching by a Lutheran divine Karg, who wrote under the name of Parsimonius, but Piscator's name is always connected with the controversy.

Piscator admitted that the meritorious cause of justification was the obedience of Christ. It was not, however, His active fulfilment of the law, or His active obedience, but only His endurance of suffering and death in obedience to a special mandate of the Father, or His passive obedience. Though Christ according to His Divine nature was the Lord of the law, according to His human nature He was subject to it both by reason of His creatureliness, and, in virtue of His special position as an Israelite, by reason of the covenant between God and His people. Christ then shared the duty of active obedience with the people of God ; but if He was as an individual thus bound to the fulfilment of the law, He could not in this respect be the substitute of man.

Piscator further taught that according to the definition of justification given by Paul in Rom. iv. 6, 7, the imputation of righteousness and the forgiveness of sins were one and the same. Thus his final conclusion was that the obedience for the sake of which God justifies us, imputes to us righteousness and forgives our sins, was Christ's passive obedience only ; though he admitted that Christ's active obedience was a necessary pre-condition of His saving work.

Piscator further argued dialectically against the doctrine of the twofold obedience as follows :—

(1) If Christ's active obedience is the meritorious cause of justification and the forgiveness of sins, then His passive obedience was unnecessary, and God was unrighteous in exacting it.

(2) If Christ's active obedience be imputed to us, then we are as free from obedience to the law, as we are

free from its curse, because Christ has been made a curse for us. This, however, is impossible, since we are eternally bound to obedience to God as our Creator, Redeemer, and Lord.

(3) Since the imputation of righteousness and the forgiveness of sins are the same, if we are justified by the imputation of Christ's active righteousness, then our sins are forgiven because of it, which is contrary to Heb. ix. 22.

(4) If both Christ's active and passive obedience were necessary to complete the satisfaction made for us, then His holiness only obtained part of our redemption, and was therefore imperfect.

(5) The law obliges either to obedience or to punishment, not to both. If then Christ by His death has freed us from punishment, there was no need that He should fulfil the law for us.

Finally, Piscator urged that Scripture everywhere clearly testifies that Christ died for our sins, but nowhere says that He lived a holy life for us.

Piscator's doctrine is interesting, because of its renewed application of dialectic to the doctrine which had been growing up on the basis of Luther's new intuition in the Protestant Church. For a time the power of this intuition had quieted the critical reason, which had attained such striking development in the later Middle Age. But now as the intensity of the vision begins to fade, the critical reason once more awakes and applies itself to the fresh formations of doctrine. Piscator's criticism indeed only goes a part of the way: he only finds one element in the new doctrine irrational and superfluous. The orthodox Maastricht¹ speaks of him as "in all things else an excellent theologian". We

¹ "Theologia," v. 18, 36.

have next, however, to study the doctrine of the man in whom the critical reason was once more fully awake, and who applied the whole energy of his great logical acumen to the destructive analysis of the new orthodoxy.¹

¹ Quenstedt occasionally includes in the polemic of his "Systema" the Anabaptists and the mystics Schwenkfeld (A.D. 1490-1561) and Weigel (A.D. 1533-1585), who represent a movement of complete opposition to the developing Protestant orthodoxy, already before Socinus, within the sphere of the Reformation itself. The Anabaptist movement was, as Ritschl says ("Justification and Reconciliation," 1. E.T. p. 290), "as guiltless of theology as it well could be". Schwenkfeld and Weigel, however, with kindred spirit, present more definition of idea. They pursued the mystical tendency, which had during the Middle Ages accompanied the development of scholasticism (cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 350, n. 2), towards a doctrine of salvation independent of history, like the Christian Gnosis of Clement and Origen (*ibid.* pp. 51 ff.). But whereas the Mediaeval mystics, like these Fathers, had only aimed at supplementing the ecclesiastical doctrine by an esoteric teaching, Schwenkfeld and Weigel (1) definitely opposed the Protestant doctrine of Scripture by the teaching that the true principle of revelation was the inner Word, of which Scripture was only the external vehicle; (2) they opposed the Protestant doctrine of justification by a doctrine practically identical with Osiander's (*ibid.* p. 414 ff.), in which the historical work of Christ was reduced to a mere presupposition of the real justification which takes place through the essential indwelling of Christ in the heart. Weisse ("Philosophische Dogmatik," 1. p. 214 ff.) has observed that these mystics anticipated in an intuitive and non-scientific way the religious doctrine of modern idealism (cf. Kant and Hegel, *infra*, p. 208 ff.). But what Troeltsch says of Anabaptism ("Die Kultur der Gegenwart," I, iv. 1, p. 516) applies to them also; the time was not ripe for them, and they were not ripe for the time. Socinus, on the other hand, without their vision, had the science they lacked. The mystical doctrine was handed on to later times by Böhme (A.D. 1575-1625), and above all by the Quakers.

CHAPTER IV

SOCINIANISM

§ 1. SOCINUS

SOCINIANISM is to be understood as the product of a union between the humanism of Erasmus and the logical criticism of the school of Duns Scotus, effected in a mind liberated by the Reformation from the authority of the Church, but unsubjugated by Luther's new religious principle of justification by faith.

On the positive side Socinus (A.D. 1539-1604), like Erasmus and the Apologists, regarded the content of Christianity as essentially the knowledge of God, the moral law, and the promise of immortality. The doctrine of the Apologists, however, followed by Erasmus, according to which this content is naturally given in human reason, was abandoned by Socinus. For him the moral law only was given in reason, while the knowledge of God and the promise of immortality were mere matter of revelation. Nor is this revelation given, as the Apologists had taught, in the Old Testament. It came first by Jesus Christ, and is contained only in the New Testament. The proof of the authority of the New Testament is historical, and lies simply in the veracity of its writers. The idea of a *testimonium spiritus sanctus* is altogether discarded.

It is then from the point of view of this general conception of Christianity that Socinus interprets the New Testament in detail, making use of an exegesis some-

times rather arbitrary to reduce all modes of Apostolic teaching to the same standard. It is, however, to be admitted on the other hand that Socinus not infrequently gives the true interpretation where the previous exegesis was wrong, and that he also correctly brings out the existence in Scripture of passages genuinely supporting his point of view.

The negative side of Socinianism, the keen dialectic derived from the mediaeval scholasticism, is applied as a solvent to the system, which Socinus found competing with his own for recognition as the true doctrine. This is not mediaeval Catholicism, nor yet Lutheranism, but owing to the peculiar sphere of Socinus' labours, the Reformed or Calvinist system.

In the first place, in the anthropology Socinus disallows the Augustinian doctrines of original sin and of predestination, both of which Calvin had adopted. Socinus conceives man as invariably a free moral agent : he is moreover naturally mortal, and immortality is offered to him only as the reward of obedience to the Divine law. Thus the anthropological presuppositions are adapted to the moral scheme of Christianity which Socinus adopts.

Then, next, the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Person and work of Christ, and of justification undergo criticism with a view to the same end. Socinus attacked above all the doctrines of the Godhead of Christ and of His satisfaction for sin. In his Christology Socinus simply drew the conclusions which Duns and the Nominalists had already indicated, and were restrained from adopting only by the external authority of the Church. Harnack says :—¹

“ What the Nominalists had stated as an hypothesis, that God could even redeem us by means of a man, is

¹ D.G. III., p. 791.

here, now that the authority of the ecclesiastical tradition has gone, accepted as the actual fact. . . . Christ is a mortal man, who has become immortal, though no ordinary man, since He was from the first God's only-begotten Son by the miraculous conception, and was sanctified by the Father, and sent into the world, equipped with Divine wisdom and power, and was finally raised to a power equal to God's own."

While therefore Socinus renews the moral view of Christianity of the Apologists, he replaces their Logos doctrine by an adoptionist Christology. He explained the peculiar possession of a unique revelation by Jesus by the curious theory that He had at the beginning of His ministry been carried up to heaven, there to receive it. "Faustus Socinus quotes for this Jn. III. 16, VI. 38, 62, compared with Jn. III. 21, VIII. 28, XVI. 28. He interprets all passages referring to pre-existence of this rapture." ¹

We proceed to the doctrine of Socinus on the work of Christ. Both his positive doctrine and his criticism of the Calvinist orthodoxy are contained in his great polemic treatise, "*De Jesu Christo Servatore*," composed in answer to a Reformed pastor Covetus, of whose presentation of the doctrine of the work of Christ all that needs to be said is that it confines itself practically to the doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and of justification by faith.

Socinus begins (*pars* I. *cap.* i.) by disputing (with Scripture proofs) the orthodox conception of the Divine justice. That justice of God, which belongs to Him as an essential quality, is not opposed to mercy but "may be called under another name righteousness and equity . . . to which justice is opposed not mercy but wicked-

¹ Schneckenburger, "*Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien*," 1863, p. 46.

ness and iniquity". There is a justice which is opposed to mercy, and that twofold, as there is a twofold mercy. A twofold justice: there is one mode which God always shows in destroying the wicked, another by which He sometimes according to His law punishes sinners, not completely reprobate, but unrepentant, or again even the repentant, "the promise of His mercy, by which He has voluntarily in a certain way bound Himself to us, being excluded". A twofold mercy: there is one mode, by which He pardons the repentant, another that prevents sinners with offers of grace. The former of these modes of each attribute, again, God always shows, the latter He sometimes exhibits at His free will. Now, neither of these modes of justice can be exercised at once with the mode of mercy opposed to it upon the same subject at the same time. For the former justice and mercy require contrary subjects, the one the impenitent, the other the penitent, and they bring about contrary effects, the one destroying, the other saving. The latter pair have the same subject, but their effects are different; so that they cannot coexist at the same time. One offers grace, the other abandons to ruin. "By the former God gives up much of His right, by the latter He clearly maintains His right." In Scripture this Divine justice, which is opposed to mercy, bears other names, wrath, fury, indignation, vengeance, etc.; while the name of justice is reserved for God's essential quality of righteousness and equity, which is shown equally in mercy and severity, in both through the keeping of the Divine Word. Vengeance indeed, like mercy, is not an essential quality of God, but simply an effect of His will. Both are subordinate to the true justice of God in carrying out His decrees. Thus the penalties of sin depend simply upon the Divine will, and may be remitted at pleasure. "For God can, especially since He

is Lord of all, abandon as much of His rights as He pleases." Nor are sinners constituted such by the commission of sin; but it depends simply upon the will of God whether He elects to regard them as such.

It is evident at once that these positions of Socinus with respect to the arbitrary will of God are drawn immediately from Duns: some repeat almost exactly his words in "Op. Oxon." iv. Dist. 14, qu. 1.¹ The illustration of the idea by the legal position of God as *omnium dominus* also is not new: it is found in Thomas, "Summa Theol." III. 46, 2, ad 3.² What on the other hand is new is the correct statement that the Scriptural idea of God's righteousness includes its manifestation not only in punishment but in mercy.³ This idea, however, finds only an inadequate expression when Socinus identifies it with equity, which as the further development of his doctrine shows really amounts to the reduction of God's position with regard to man "to the standard of equality between private persons, or of a relation regulated by 'reasonableness,' such as holds good only in the ethical relations of private life".⁴

In cap. ii. *seq.* follows the positive doctrine of Socinus. Salvation proceeds from the mere will of God in pardoning sinners, but is made known by Christ, the only further condition being our faith and obedience. Hence Christ is in the first place our Saviour, not because He procures salvation, but because He makes it known. He is our Saviour also (cap. iii.), because He confirms the truth which He preaches, not only by miracles but also by the shedding of His blood, which in a certain way bound God to us as if in a covenant, and finally by

¹ Cf., for example, the words in § 7: "God's being offended or angry is nothing but His will to punish . . ."

² *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 281.

³ Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," p. 15.

⁴ Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 70.

His resurrection "the chief point and, as it were, foundation of the whole faith" (cap. v.). A comparison of all this with the positive doctrine of Duns (III. Dist. 20) reveals a most striking accord of thought.¹

Again, Socinus says (cap. iv.) that Christ is our Saviour because He is our example. We can imitate Christ, for imitation only means a general resemblance. Just as Duns had said (III. Dist. 19) that to say that the life of Christ was so excellent "that it had a certain infinity"² was a hyperbole, so Socinus asserts that the orthodox view that Christ's virtue differs from ours, as heaven from earth, is hyperbolically stated. The rule, "that he is said to do justly, whose works are for the most part just," is agreeable both to Scripture and to ethics. God accepts those who correspond to it as just, having regard to our frailty, and not standing on His legal rights.³

In cap. vi. Socinus still further teaches that Christ is our Saviour, because to Him as man is committed the power of giving eternal life; and in capp. vii. viii. he concludes the first part of his work with an explanation of the mediatorship of Christ. It means that He was an ambassador between God and us; but, as the Scripture teaches, He reconciles us to God and not God to us.⁴

Pars II. is given up to a discussion of the Scripture proofs of the orthodox doctrine. In the first place "redemption" in the Scriptures is simply a metaphor for deliverance (cap. i.). It is often used both in the Old and New Testaments without any thought of a price being implied. Even where, however, the death of Christ is spoken of as the price of our redemption,

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 319.

² *Ibid.* p. 308.

³ Cf. Duns iv. Dist. 15, qu. 1 (*supra*, p. 316).

⁴ Cf. Lombard, III. Dist. 19 (*supra*, p. 221).

this is only by analogy (cap. ii.). Our redemption is our deliverance from sin and its penalties. In both cases the death of Christ operates to redeem us in so far as it is an example of obedience, leads us to trust God, and gives us hope of deliverance from punishment. If it is asked (cap. iii.) why, since it is the resurrection rather than the death of Christ which is our deliverance, yet His death rather than His resurrection is spoken of as the price of our redemption, the answer is that His death, in view of what it cost, offers the more natural analogy to the price of redemption.

Again (cap. iv.) when it is said that Christ bore our sins, Mt. viii. 16, 17 shows that "to bear" can mean to take away. Moreover, that Christ died "for us" (cap. viii.) means, not that He died in our stead, but that He died on our behalf.

Finally, with (cap. ix.) Socinus begins a long discussion of the proof from the Old Testament sacrifices, whose results are thus summarized by Fock.¹

"The Socinian doctrine admitted indeed that an analogy exists between the Old Testament sacrifices and the sacrifice of Christ: the analogy was not however between it and them all, but only between it and the annual great sacrifice of Atonement, when the High Priest entered into the Holy of Holies. As, however, in that case the slaughter of the sacrificial animal was not regarded as the sacrifice proper, but only as the introduction to the sacrifice, and the latter was rather first accomplished when the High Priest entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood, so also the death of Christ is not properly the sacrifice, but only the introduction to the sacrifice, and this is then first offered when Christ has entered heaven (the Epistle to the Hebrews was appealed to). Besides, those sacrifices also, which

¹ "Der Socinianismus," 1847, p. 635.

were a shadow of the sacrifice of Christ, had by no means the purpose of making satisfaction to God for sins, but were only conditions established by God, under which He would forgive sins. The proper principle of the forgiveness of sins is therefore always the Divine will, and the sacrifice is merely an accidental condition, to which the realization of that will is joined. The relation is made yet clearer, when it is added that the Old Testament sacrifice was only intended as the means to the forgiveness of lighter sins. It is, however, still maintained that grave sins could be forgiven, and this could naturally then only happen by a volition of the Divine grace, for which God had at least entered into no express covenant, as is the case in Christianity. Thus therefore there lies in the relation of the Old Testament sacrifice to the sacrifice of Christ in no way a sufficient motive for the dogma of satisfaction."

Having thus dealt with the Scripture proofs, in pars III. Socinus criticizes the satisfaction theory of the Protestant theology. He begins from the position already advanced in pars I. cap. i. that God is not to be thought of as Judge but as Lord and Sovereign, or as resembling a private creditor, so that He can freely forgive without requiring satisfaction. Both punitive justice and pardoning mercy are mere effects of His will. If the first resided permanently in Him, He could never forgive at all : if the latter, He could never punish.¹ Both those modes of behaviour are finite quantities : the one destroys the other. The mercy that resides in God is beneficence, as His

¹ Cf. Thomas, "Summa Theol." III. 46, 1, 3, where the difficulty is stated that neither mercy nor justice appears to require satisfaction ; since the nature of mercy is to forgive freely, while justice has eternal punishment as its natural result. (Thomas, of course, disallows the objection, saying that Christ's satisfaction was agreeable to both mercy and justice.)

essential justice is righteousness and equity. Socinus complains justly that the Orthodox make much of the Divine justice in the doctrine of the Atonement, nothing in that of predestination. Then he argues that "punishment is due not to offenders, but to the State" (cap. i.). Consequently, on the principle of the "*sum cuique*" of Justinian's "Digest," the mere judge cannot forgive, but the State can, unless some one else is injured thereby; for this principle does not include the rendering of evils, except so far as they are for the benefit of others. It is a different case from the punishment of the innocent. Here both the State and the injured party are affected, in the pardon of the guilty the State alone. To interpret "*sum cuique*" otherwise would lead to absolute confusion, for it would prove that debts could not be remitted, the justice of which no one doubts. And what is true of the supreme earthly power is more unreservedly true of God, who is absolutely supreme. From the beginning of His dealings with men (pars III. cap. ii.) He has pardoned without satisfaction, innocence of course (i.e. habitual innocence) being required as a condition. *A fortiori* therefore this must hold good under the New Covenant, which is especially the time of grace. How can God be munificent, if He require satisfaction from human nature in Christ? If it be said in giving His Son to make satisfaction, this gift is unnecessary: true liberality would have shown itself in free pardon.

Remission and satisfaction are also contrary in their very idea. The translation of an obligation to a new debtor is not remission but novation. Nor is liberation the same as remission. Liberation ends obligation by payment. Remission is essentially the solution of an obligation without any satisfaction. Pardon (*condonatio*) is even more radically opposed to satisfaction.

Then Socinus teaches, in full agreement with Duns,¹ that God is all the more liberal, in that He not only pardons, but gives His Son to draw us from sin when satisfaction was not necessary. The orthodox theory makes God appear both sordid and cruel. Nor did God give Christ to show His hatred of sin and make it hateful to us. For this the punishment of sinners and the offered reward of eternal life would have sufficed. Finally, Socinus adds that if the satisfaction theory were true, it would have been clear in the Scriptures.

Having thus demonstrated that satisfaction is not necessary, and that its idea conflicts with that of grace, Socinus now proceeds (cap. iii.) to criticize the theory that Christ's death constitutes a satisfaction for our sins. If satisfaction were necessary, it must be personal. Eternal death, the penalty of sin, is not transferable like a debt of money. Even in human law punishments are not transferable, or are so only in cases where a special relation exists between the parties, and Christ is in no way related to us more particularly than any one man is related to another. Besides the idea is folly also ; it is neither strict justice nor mercy in the sense in which these are effects of the Divine will, and it conflicts with true justice and wisdom.

But further, one death cannot satisfy for many (here again Socinus follows Duns²) ; nor, again, as the orthodox teach, can one man fulfil the law for many. Thus the theory breaks down in another essential point.

Again (cap. iv.), Christ's suffering could not have constituted a satisfaction, for the penalty of sin was eternal death, and He rose from the dead. Nor does the theory of the infinite value of Christ's sufferings hold. Firstly, the principle of respect of persons is

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 319.

² *Ibid.* p. 310.

not equitable. Next, in this case there is no proportion between His sufferings, so short as they were, and those which sinners must have endured. Finally, the quality was different: Christ did not suffer, as Calvin says,¹ the pains of the damned. Socinus also repeats the scholastic objection, that if Christ's Deity gives an infinite value to His sufferings, so much need not have been required.²

Again, Christ suffered as man, for God is impassible. Hence His sufferings cannot possess infinite value. Even to admit the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* could only yield them a verbal, not a real infinity, whence could only follow a verbal, not a real salvation. Suppose even that the Divine nature suffered, only that which is essential in God is infinite, in which passion is not included. If, again, an infinite time were converted into an infinite extent of punishment, Christ should have suffered infinitely for each and every man.

Again, there can be no satisfaction, unless He who satisfies and those for whom satisfaction is made are of one nature and race. It is said indeed that Christ is true man, but this is not enough. He must satisfy *as man*. If, however, the capacity to satisfy depends on the Divine nature, He cannot do so.

Once more, it is said that satisfaction is paid to the Divine nature. Here is an absurdity: one cannot satisfy oneself. Nor does the doctrine of the Persons in the Trinity help. If the Son satisfies the Father, who satisfies the Son? Besides, what has He to give which is not the Father's? He cannot give His own incommunicable properties; there is left only what He has in common with the Father. Hence, if Christ be Everlasting God, He cannot satisfy.

¹ "Inst." II. 16, 10.

² Cf. Thomas, "Summa Theol." III. 46, 6, 6.

Now (cap. v.) Socinus comes to the other side of the orthodox doctrine, Christ's vicarious performance of the law. Christ was *obnoxius legi*, as others were, and could not therefore satisfy for others by His obedience.¹ Nor does the fact that He voluntarily assumed the obligation make any difference, for this was in view of a reward. Calvin² denies what Paul³ as well as the schoolmen teach, that Christ merited for Himself. But in denying this he really denies that He merited as man at all, for as man He had much to gain. And this is the fact. As being under obligation Christ could not merit as man, and all that the Divine nature could do was to help Him to obey, for where there is obligation there is no proper merit. The Divine nature itself could no more obey than suffer, nor can the dignity of Christ's Person make any difference in the matter. Merit, however, can exist in a sense less strict, where there is obligation because of a promise. "And so in this way Christ may rightly be said to have merited both for Himself and us." Nothing could more clearly show the fundamental agreement between Socinus and Duns than this passage. *Meritum secundum promissionem* is indeed exactly the Scotist *meritum secundum acceptationem*. Socinus adds (cap. vi.) that a theory of acceptance is, however, in spite of Calvin's divergence towards it, contrary to the orthodox belief.

Socinus comes finally (cap. vii.), after thus discussing the passion of Christ and His obedience, to His death. This need not be regarded as a satisfaction for sin. Ps. LXIX. 4 is not to be understood as assigning a juridical cause for Christ's death (cap. ix.). Socinus here criticizes (cap. viii.) the orthodox position that death is always the result of sin, and rejects as unjust the

¹ Cf. Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," II. xi.

² "Inst." II. 17, 6.

³ Phil. II. 8, 9.

doctrine of the imputation of Adam's guilt. He teaches that temporal death is natural to man as such ; the wages of sin is eternal death, which Christ did not suffer. And (cap. x.) the imputation of our sins to Christ would have been unjust, for imputation of others' guilt is only equitable where there is an imitation of their sin.¹ Imputation, Socinus continues, is not a mere matter of the Divine will, for it involves the rights of individuals, and demands a sufficient cause, in fact desert (*meritum*). So also punishment depends not simply upon the will of God, but on desert. Christ, however (cap. ix.), died not because He was in any way bound to die, but simply because God and He willed it. Further (cap. x.), that the death of Christ was not exacted as a penalty for sin is shown by the fact that a reward was given to Him. Moreover, if His death had been penal, it could not have been an example for us. It is then to be viewed, not as punishment, but as *affliction*.

In pars iv. Socinus criticizes the Protestant doctrine of the imputation of Christ's satisfaction through faith. His satisfaction (cap. ii.) is not imputed to us as a satisfaction for our sins. For either satisfaction has already been made before this imputation, or, if it do not exist before imputation, then there is no satisfaction to be imputed. Nor can it be imputed for justification, for it constitutes justification.

Nor can this imputation be explained as acceptilation. Acceptilation signifies in Roman law the dissolution of an obligation by mere words. But this excludes a real payment. Even if the word be used less strictly for acceptation, still this latter can find no place where full payment is made. Nor can imputation even be

¹It is noteworthy that this position is reproduced exactly from Thomas, II. 1, qu. 87, 8, where also the same Scripture passages are quoted, viz. Exod. xx. 5; Ezek. xviii. 20.

maintained with the sense of application. If it be said that satisfaction was made with the tacit condition, if we should believe, this is not the orthodox doctrine.

Again (cap. iii.), the doctrine of the application of the satisfaction of Christ is absurd. If we are to believe in it, it must already have been made, or else we believe what is false. Socinus declares that the whole doctrine of satisfaction is an invention of the schoolmen, and is full of absurdities.

He touches further (cap. v.) on the imputation of Christ's righteousness. If satisfaction has been made, nothing further can be necessary. This doctrine is a proof of the unsatisfactoriness of the orthodox view ; the difficulty was felt that the Scriptures require holiness, whereas the orthodox view did not, and therefore it was fabricated to cover over the deficiencies of the latter.

But the crowning absurdity (cap. viii.) is the idea that by belief in Christ's satisfaction His righteousness is imputed to us ; there is no connexion whatever between these matters.

In fact, the Protestant idea of faith is quite wrong ; faith is not (cap. xi.) the belief that by the death of Christ our sins are blotted out, but rather (cap. xi.) obedience to Christ and God and belief in the truth of Christ's message. This justifies, because by it we live justly, and God in His benignity does not impute sin, that is, He forgives the sins of our frailty.

In the remainder of pars iv. Socinus seeks to show that his and not the orthodox is the Scriptural view of justification by faith. He ends his great criticism with the consciousness that he has abundantly confuted the received view, and maintained his own. Indeed, human ingenuity could hardly go farther in devising

fresh criticism. The above abstract, however, only gives an imperfect conception of the work of Socinus, which must be studied in detail, if its full force is to be felt.

In Socinus' "*Themata de Officio Christi*"¹ the doctrine is substantially the same as the positive doctrine of his "*De Servatore*," but it is stated in terms of the threefold office. It is most important for the knowledge of the Christian religion (1) to understand truly the nature of Christ, but still more important rightly to determine His office "since in this most of all consists the knowledge of Christ, without which we cannot obtain eternal life". The office of Christ (2) is twofold, that which He performed on earth, and that which He performed in heaven. The former (3) is the prophetic office, the latter the kingly, along with the priestly. Christ (4) is frequently called Prophet and King in Scripture, Priest also expressly in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

"The Prophetic Office consists in this, that He both perfectly revealed to us the will of God the Father, and also confirmed it" (5). This will is contained (6) in the New Covenant, which Christ established with men. This differs (7) in many things from the Old Covenant. It differs extrinsically (8); it was not made with Jews only, but has a universal scope. It differs intrinsically (9), firstly as regards precepts, secondly as regards promises. 10-31 describe the difference as to precepts. This consists (*a*) in the abolition of the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Mosaic law; (*b*) in the reinterpretation and perfecting of its moral precepts. Socinus lays great stress on this point, referring at length to Mt. v.-vii. The difference further consists (*c*) in the addition of new moral and ceremonial precepts. "The moral are to deny oneself, to take up one's cross, to imitate Christ"

¹ "*Opera Omnia*," 1656, I. pp. 775 ff.

(29). The one ceremonial precept is the Lord's Supper in memory of His death.

Socinus next treats of the difference as to promises. "We say therefore that the New Covenant has brought to us the clearest promise of life eternal: then next, the promise of the forgiveness of all sins, so far as this can be distinguished *per viam intellectus*, as it is said, from the promise or the obtaining of eternal life: lastly, the promise of the Holy Spirit, to be obtained by all believers. Since the Old Covenant lacks and lacked all these, and offered an earthly felicity, the superiority of the New Covenant can be easily recognized at this point" (32-33).

In 34-37 Socinus deals with the confirmation of the will of God by Christ. This took place (35) by His holy life, His miracles, and His death at the behest of the Father. His death (36) manifests to us the love of the Father, and so makes us sure of whatever is promised under the New Covenant, which is the reason why the blood of Christ is called the blood of the New Covenant and He Himself the faithful witness. Again the resurrection, which could not take place without Christ's previous death, assures us of our own resurrection and of the obtaining of eternal life, if we obey Christ. The resurrection (37) makes us sure of our salvation in a twofold way. We see in it how God delivers those who trust in Him from the most cruel death. It shows us Christ clothed with all authority in heaven and death, and able to save us from death. Thus we are assured of His power to save us, as we are by His death of His love towards us, and we are secure of eternal life, promised us by Him. The above is the true reason of Christ's death (38): the doctrine of satisfaction is untrue. Redemption, accordingly (39), is not to be understood as redemption by a price from an angry

God, but implies simply God's love in delivering us from sin and death. The term redemption is used in Scripture "not in a strict sense, but metaphorically". We have (40) already redemption from the bondage of sin, and await that from death.

41-43 treat of justification. "The manifestation and confirmation of the Divine will by Christ begets in us a lively faith, on account of which we are justified, i.e. are delivered from the guilt of our sins" (41). "This faith is nothing else than to obey the commandments of Christ in the hope of obtaining life eternal" (42). Justification is only by faith (43), not by works. Justification by works, as spoken of in Scripture, if rightly understood, means the same thing as justification by faith.

44-46 deal with the kingly office. This consists (45) in Christ's sitting after His resurrection at the Father's right hand and being clothed with all authority, so that He is able in everything to help us. The priestly office (47) is only to be distinguished from the kingly office *per viam intellectus*. When we view the heavenly Christ (48) according to His kingly office, we contemplate His power; when we view Him according to His priestly office, we contemplate His willingness to save us. He does not, however (49), in any strict sense intercede for us.

The priestly office (50) was not assumed till Christ had passed into the heavens. "Wherefore also we maintain that His expiatory sacrifice was not accomplished on the cross, but is even now being accomplished and achieved in heaven, where Christ is, and where He continually cleanses us from our sins by keeping us back by His word and Spirit from the sins themselves, and defending His own from all evils, so far as they are the real penalties of sins" (51).

Socinus concludes (52) by emphasizing once more

that an exact understanding of the offices of Christ is most necessary ; an error here is far more dangerous than on the question of His nature.

The "Themata" enable us usefully to compare the doctrine of Socinus with the Protestant synthesis. He admits a real prophethood and a real kingship of Christ, but no real priesthood. If he appears to accept the doctrine of justification by faith, it is only an appearance inasmuch as he gives his own interpretation both to faith and justification. Faith is obedience to the commandments of Christ in the hope of the reward of life eternal. It justifies, because God naturally approves such an attitude, and "if a man does what in him lies" does not exact more. Justification by faith thus becomes only a modification of justification by works. Finally, the Lord's Supper is no means of grace either in the Catholic or the Protestant sense, but the one ceremonial precept of Christianity. Baptism Socinus tended to regard as a merely temporary rite for the reception of Jewish and heathen proselytes in the first days of the Christian Church.¹

There is no doubt that Socinus marks a turning-point in the history of the doctrine of the work of Christ. What Duns and the Nominalists did for the Catholic, Socinus has done for Protestant doctrine ; he has demonstrated its irrationalism. This was naturally not difficult to do, inasmuch as the Protestant doctrine contains all the irrational elements of the Catholic doctrine, combined and fused in Luther's intuition with the even more irrationalistic non-Catholic doctrine, justification by faith. The unity of the Protestant doctrine depends upon this intuition : it is psychological, not logical. When therefore the fundamental intuition and psychological basis is wanting, as in the case of

¹ Schneckenburger, *op. cit.* p. 59.

Socinus, the synthesis depending upon it can no longer maintain itself.

Socinus, however, has not merely applied the critical method of Duns and Occam ; he has also as a jurispudent made use of legal arguments, and most important of all he has investigated the Scriptural basis of Protestantism by means of the humanist exegesis. The result is, that, while he has undoubtedly underestimated and even falsified the amount of genuine points of contact for the orthodox theory in the New Testament, he has on the other hand for the first time in the history of Christian doctrine clearly established (*a*) the degree in which terms like "redemption," etc., are in Scripture limited by their context, so that they cannot be strictly pressed ; (*b*) the fact that much of the orthodox doctrine is not Scripture, but a development from Scripture ; and (*c*) the existence in Scripture of other points of view besides these leading to the orthodox doctrine. Perhaps this last point is the most important of all. The Socinian doctrine is to be understood above all as a return from the Logos Christology to the more primitive Messianic (adoptianist) doctrine, which is clearly visible in passages like Acts II. 22-36, III. 13-26, v. 30-31, x. 36-43, XIII. 23-39, and which has also left traces of itself even where it has been superseded by the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence.¹ In this primitive Christology Jesus appears as first in His earthly life the Prophet of the Kingdom of God, and afterwards as being, in reward of His obedience in suffering even unto death, invested with the Messianic dignity by His resurrection. Socinianism is in part the revival of this primitive view : on the other hand it is no mere revival, but is conditioned by the subsequent history of doctrine. It finally establishes a type of Christianity, which we have already

¹ Cf. Rom. I. 4 ; Phil. II. 5-11 ; Heb. II. 9, v. 7-10.

referred to in dealing with Anselm as being opposed to the Pauline mysticism with its sequel in the Irenæan doctrine of recapitulation. Throughout the history of Western Christianity, in Ambrose, Augustine, Lombard, Duns, we can trace the view of Christ as an individual man, who merits glory for Himself, and is an example to others. This view, however, was continually repressed by the weight of ecclesiastical tradition on the side of the view that Christ is no mere individual, but the Second Adam and the summary of the race. With Socinus at last tradition gives way, and the view formerly repressed by it holds the field. Other important elements, however, enter into combination with this Christology to make Socinianism. Amongst these may be mentioned especially the Scotist doctrine that God is arbitrary will, and the doctrine going back through Biel to Alexander,¹ that God accepts him who does what in him lies. The positivism of Socinus, according to which the promise of immortality belongs to the Christian revelation alone, is also the natural consequence of the positivism of Duns and the Nominalists, which, basing itself upon authority, tended to reduce rational theology to a minimum.

To sum up our results : upon the basis of the primitive Christian Messianic doctrine Socinus has developed, by the aid of theologumena derived from Duns and other schoolmen, a theological synthesis, which agrees with the doctrine of the Apologists as to the moral and religious content of Christianity, but not as to the principle of revelation, in that the Apologists present Christianity as a natural, Socinus as a positive, religion.

¹ See for Alexander, *supra*, Vol. I, p. 254. Biel taught that a man could, apart from grace, love God above all things, and that such natural love of God might serve as a *meritum de congruo* to obtain the infusion of grace (cf. Loofs, D.G.⁴, p. 615).

On the other hand the superstructures of Pauline origin, which orthodox Catholicism and Protestantism viewed as the positive Christian revelation beyond the religion of reason, Socinus regards as error and abandons to logical criticism. Christianity therefore is finally presented by him, as by the Apologists, as a religion of law and promise. A qualifying principle of grace is, however, recognized in the form of the doctrine of God's absolute sovereignty, which is inherited from Duns Scotus.

CHAPTER V

THE ARMINIAN THEOLOGIAN

§ 1. ARMINIANISM

ARMINIANISM is most properly to be understood as a *via media* between Socinianism and Calvinism. Its derivation on the one hand from the school of Erasmus is plain enough. It was in attempting to refute the views of the humanist Coornheert (d. A.D. 1590), that Jacob Arminius (d. A.D. 1609), the founder of the new school, was himself converted to a disbelief in Calvinism. Though the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists centred in the question of predestination, yet this was by no means the sole point of difference between Arminianism and Orthodoxy. The Lutherans, like the Arminians, held that Christ had died not for the elect alone, but for the whole world, yet their community of doctrine on this point marks no real unity between Lutheranism and Arminianism. On the contrary the first principle of Arminianism is in reality a respect for human reason leading to a disbelief in the view common alike to Lutherans and Reformed, that it is so totally corrupt that it must bow absolutely before Divine revelation. The Arminians believed in the Scriptures as the foundation of theology, but on historical grounds, not on the basis of any *testimonium spiritus sancti*; and moreover the Scriptures were to be rationally interpreted. Their great theologian, Limborch (A.D. 1633-1712), says :—¹

¹ "Theologia Christiana," I. 12, 4.

“From these things it appears what is the key by which the obscure meaning of Scripture is to be unlocked; viz. indisputably Scripture itself and right reason. Scripture, indeed, in so far as it is everywhere agreeable to itself, and nowhere contains any contradiction: it is therefore to be so explained, that it may harmonize with itself in all points, and that the sense of the more difficult may be drawn out by means of the plainer passages. Right reason; in so far as it is no less from God than Scripture, and is implanted in us as a light, by whose aid we can distinguish the true from the false. For it is not to be believed that Divine revelation can at all conflict with right reason, or that anything can be philosophically true which is theologically false. For, since reason is no less from God than revelation, if these were to conflict with one another, God would be in opposition to Himself. The one light cannot be contrary to the other, but the one is greater than the other. Revelation does not destroy, but perfects reason, to the degree that, what reason alone did not perceive, that it may clearly perceive on the advent of revelation.”

This passage clearly shows the tendency of the Arminian exegesis. Its work was to remove whatever in Scripture might be a stumbling-block to reason. Hence the Arminians are almost as much opposed as Socinus to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, the negative presupposition of Calvinism.

“Here it is especially two conceptions of the traditional ecclesiastical doctrine which the Arminians oppose, in the first place, that of an implication by means of imputation of Adam’s posterity in his guilt through the Fall, nextly that of a total corruption proceeding from the Fall. Against the former conception it is clearly objected that one who was born 1000 years later could

not sin along with Adam, and that the transgression of another can be imputed to no one, who has not expressly empowered him to act.¹ As to the other point, the idea of freedom, from which Arminianism set out in its opposition to the doctrine of predestination, did not allow of any thought of a total corruption. . . . Doubt was not cast upon the actuality of corruption, but it was explained through the idea, that after original innocence was lost in Adam, his children were born after his subsequent nature, and were thus created less pure than he, only that they, instead of his natural instinct for good, bring with them into the world a tendency to evil.”²

As regards the doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ the older Arminians were essentially orthodox ; the later theologians, however, approximated more to Socinianism, preferring, however, rather to remain by the simple assertions of the creed without speculation. Limborch says that the dogma of the union of God and man in one person is naturally inexplicable, being without analogy (III. 12, 4).

The Arminian doctrine of the work of Christ seeks a middle way between Orthodoxy and Socinianism. There are, however, two different types. The one is the school doctrine represented by Limborch, and amounts essentially to a return to the Scotist doctrine of acceptilation ; the other is the new and important theory of the jurist Grotius.

§ 2. LIMBORCH

In his “*Theologia Christiana*,” III. xv. *seq.*, Limborch discusses the work of Christ under the formula of the threefold office.

“The misery hanging over the human race was, as

¹ Limborch, III. 3, 20.

² Schneckenburger, *op. cit.* p. 14.

we said before, the dominion of sin and eternal death. The dominion of sin Christ destroyed by the prophetic office, eternal death by the priestly office, for indisputably by it He has both destroyed the guilt of sin and absolved us from guilt. Both of these things He undertook by the kingly office, for He both prescribes the rules of holiness and provides us with the powers and gifts of the Spirit : by all of which we may resist the snares of sin and the temptations of the devil ; and by His almighty power He actually delivers us from the bonds of death and brings us into a state of happiness ; although neither is the priestly office excluded from our deliverance from the power of sin ; for by offering Himself as an expiatory sacrifice, He also redeemed us from the dominion of sin " (xv. 1).

The prophetic office was imposed upon Christ by God, and He was equipped by the Father with all things needful for declaring His will. The performance of this office included (1) the announcement of the doctrine of the Gospel, and what belongs to it, (2) the confirmation of that doctrine.

The announcement of the Gospel was partly made by Christ on earth, but is partly made by Him now through His Spirit given to His ministers. The latter point properly belongs to the kingly office, but is treated here to avoid repetition.

" The doctrine of the Gospel is the revelation of the final and most complete Divine will, concerning the eternal salvation of men and the manner of obtaining it " (xvi. 3). Like all other covenants made by God with men the Gospel contains both precepts and promises. It contains precepts in the strict sense. The contra-Remonstrants (i.e. the Calvinists), who practically identify the work of Christ with the priestly office, and teach that Christ made full satisfaction for sins, and

also performed the law in our stead, maintain that the Gospel properly contains no precepts, but only repeats those of the law, the performance of which God does indeed from the point of view of the law require of the elect, but which He so accomplishes by the grace of His Spirit, that the precepts are really no more than promises. This view, however, entirely overthrows all necessity of obedience, and puts an end to all zeal for holiness. "For if Christ does not properly demand obedience from men as the condition of obtaining eternal salvation, but wills to effect it in them, what necessity is there of offering what God does not demand? What anxiety can there be to do that which God Himself promises that He will do in man?" (xvi. 4).

Limborch here enters on the controversy between Socinus and the orthodox as to whether Jesus only purified the law from the corruptions of the Pharisees or whether he added to it.¹ He maintains that mystically, or in its ultimate intention, i.e. sanctity of life and eternal felicity, apart from the question of clearness of expression, the old law is one with the new law; but as to clearness the new law both as regards the ceremonial and the moral precepts is superior to the old. It has fewer ceremonial precepts, and those only with a view to the cleansing of the soul. The moral precepts of the old law also had faults which Christ removed, while He added new precepts never expressed in the old law at all. Moreover, Christ's doctrine was not adapted to the needs of the Jewish state in particular, but was universal in its scope.

The promises of Jesus Christ are especially (1) the forgiveness of sins, (2) the gift of the Holy Spirit, (3) the resurrection from the dead. These with the pre-

¹ *Supra*, pp. 7, 27.

cepts compose a doctrine, beyond which none more perfect is to be expected.

As a prophet Jesus also foretold the future, and prayed for the people and the future happy extension of the Divine word. His fulfilment of the prophetic office was marked by His zeal, His freedom and authority in teaching, His wisdom and eloquence, and the clearness of His doctrine.

The continuation of Christ's teaching was (1) by His miracles, (2) by the testimony of Holy Scripture, (3) by the holiness of His doctrine, (4) by the holiness of His life, (5) by His bloody and shameful death.

"It is the mark of a true prophet to lay down His life for the doctrine which He announces by the will of God, and to undergo all kinds of adversities at the hands of men. . . . The death of Christ was therefore, as it were, a seal and confirmation of the covenant, and His blood, as it were, the blood of a covenant sacrifice, by which the New Testament was sealed and guaranteed" (XVII. 19).

At this point the difference between the law and the Gospel becomes clear. They agree (1) in their author, viz. God; (2) in that "both contain a certain mutual agreement between God and men, in which God demands obedience of man, on the performance of which He promises man a reward" (XVII. 20). But there are also various differences:—

(1) The mediator of the one was Moses, of the other Christ.

(2) One was guaranteed by the blood of beasts, the other by that of Christ Himself.

(3) The Gospel surpasses the law, both as regards precepts and promises. The Gospel has fewer ceremonial precepts, while it perfects the law in its moral

aspect. The promises are not temporal, but eternal, and not in figure only, but in all plainness.

(4) As regards efficacy, the law could not check sin, the Gospel does this.

(5) As to amplitude, the Gospel is not for Israel only, but for the world.

(6) As to duration, the Old Testament was temporary, the New Testament is eternal.

The prophetic office began with Christ, it was continued by the Apostles, its end is the evangelization of the world.

In cap. xviii. Limborch comes to the priestly office. This was imposed by God on Christ. God, who had of His own accord shown Himself placable, appointed Christ as Priest, by whose mediation He might be fully reconciled to men. Was this by any necessity of His nature, that He might make satisfaction to His vindictive justice? The question might well be dispensed with: why should we ask what God could have done, when we know for certain what He has done? But, as the question has been asked, it is to be maintained "that God was constrained by no necessity of nature to punish sin, nor therefore can He be said to have been constrained by any necessity of nature to demand satisfaction for the sins which He was to remit. Nay, rather, the Scriptures everywhere preach the gratuitous love of God, and His most free decree, as the source of salvation, whence proceeded, not only the sending of Christ into the world for our redemption, but also the remission of sins itself, now that the sacrifice of Christ has been offered" (xviii. 4).

Nor does this make the passion of Christ superfluous. "God in accordance with His supreme wisdom chose this way of bringing men to salvation as the fittest, as the most suited to the illustration of His glory, and the con-

version of men from their sins to a zeal for holiness. By the grievous passion of His Son, which He has demanded for the redemption of the human race, He indeed showed His wrath against sin ; no effect of which would have been seen had no expiatory sacrifice come between : and thus He manifested Himself as a just judge and a rewarder of unrighteousness. At the same time He wished to quicken men to zeal for holiness, seeing that they might easily infer that they can hope for no pardon for their sins, for whose expiation God demanded the bloody death of His only-begotten and beloved Son, unless they seriously say farewell to them and give themselves over wholly to the practice of sanctity. God wished besides that Christ Jesus should be our leader, who by His sufferings might unlock heaven, since He wished us to proceed to heavenly glory through sufferings ; so that it might be clear to us that the entrance into heaven is open to us also through sufferings ” (XVIII. 5).

The function of the priestly office is (1) oblation, (2) intercession. Benediction, which some add, seems to be comprehended under these two heads, as it is the end of both. Christ's oblation is that in which He offered Himself to the Father as a sacrifice and expiatory victim for our sins. It took place partly on earth, partly in heaven.

“ It took place on earth, when He delivered Himself, in order to obey the command of the Father, of His own accord and freely to a bloody and accursed death, and shed His own precious blood as if the price of our redemption ; which obedience even unto the death of the cross the Father regarded with such favour, that He accepted that blood from the hand of His Son, as if a payment in full for our sins, and allowed Himself to be

moved by it to bestow on us complete remission of sins" (xix. 2).

"It was perfected and consummated in heaven, because He opened heaven by His blood, which had before been closed, and so entering heaven through His own blood took it, as it were, into the Holy Place, and presented it to God His Father" (xix. 3).

Hence those think too meanly of the death of Christ who regard it merely as the preparation for His oblation, which took place in heaven, and think that the office of priest is not to be attributed to Jesus Christ while on earth.¹ Though Christ is not in so many words called in Scripture a priest on the earth, yet sacerdotal functions are nevertheless attributed to Him in this state, in that His death is viewed as a sacrifice.² But the appearance of Christ alive again from the dead in heaven, and His presentation or offering of Himself before His Father, is the consummation of His sacrifice.

Limborch refutes the arguments in favour of the Socinian view, drawn from the Old Testament sacrifices, where the slaying of the victim was only the preparation for its oblation in the sanctuary:³ he says that the parallel between the Old and New Testaments is not complete. Finally, he answers the question: If the death of Christ is the beginning of His offering, and His appearance in heaven is the consummation of it, why is the remission of sins ordinarily ascribed in the New Testament to the death of Christ alone? The answer is that the oblation in the heavens obtains all its efficacy from the death of Christ. The grounds of this efficacy

¹This is of course directed against Socinus (cf. *supra*, p. 19), but also against the older Arminian theologian Curcellæus, who here stood nearer to Socinus. Cf. Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," i. E.T. p. 315.

²Eph. v. 2; Mt. xx. 28, xxvi. 27.

³*Supra*, p. 19.

are : (1) the will of God, which appointed this death and nothing else to be a ransom for the sins of men ; (2) the dignity of Christ's Person, as the Son of God ; (3) His sinlessness ; (4) His perfect obedience ; (5) the extremity of His sufferings.

The second part of the work of Christ as Priest is His intercession. This is not the prayer of Christ's earthly life, which belongs to the prophetic office, nor is it a humble supplication to the Father, which would be inconsistent with Christ's royal power ; it is therefore nothing but Christ's continual presence before the Father and His application of the forgiveness procured by the offering of His blood. The term intercession is therefore only a figure of speech, and what is implied under it is, strictly speaking, nothing but the continuation of Christ's oblation. Christ's intercession is not, however, to be confounded with the kingly office, for in His intercession Christ deals directly with God, not with men.

Limborch proceeds to define his position by a criticism of the doctrine of the priestly office, as stated by Socinus on the one hand and the contra-Remonstrants on the other. The Socinian doctrine allows Christ no proper priestly office at all, for all that it admits belongs really to His prophetic and kingly work. But Scripture plainly assigns to Christ a priestly office, and not merely that of King or Prophet, the difference being that the Priest deals with God on behalf of men, the King and Prophet with men on behalf of God. Again, Scripture represents Christ's death as a sacrifice, propitiation, and ransom, of all which things Socinus gives no satisfactory explanation. His doctrine makes the death of Christ simply that of a martyr and the confirmation of the truth He preached ; and, while this is a true point of view, it is not the whole truth of Scrip-

ture. On the other hand, the contra-Remonstrant doctrine of the priestly office has no firm foundation in Scripture. Both merit and satisfaction are unscriptural terms, and as a consequence, "since they thus nowhere exist in Scripture, but have been devised by men, no one is bound to the meaning of them, any further than it can be furnished from the phrases of Scripture, to elucidate the sense of which they have been applied" (xxi. 1).

The doctrine that the merit of Christ consists in His obedience is both unscriptural and irrational. If Christ satisfied the law for us, then God can demand from us nothing further, not even that we should in faith apprehend His merit. But as a matter of fact both faith and holiness are required for eternal salvation. Again, the idea that satisfaction is an exact payment of the penalties of sin is equally unscriptural and irrational, which appears as follows:—

(1) The death of Christ is spoken of in Scripture as a sacrifice, but sacrifices are no plenary satisfactions for sins, but merely the condition of forgiveness.

(2) Christ suffered eternal death, neither extensively in time, nor intensively, since He never despaired under the Divine wrath. But eternal death was the penalty due to our sins.

(3) If Christ had paid the penalty in full, there would have been no room for grace.

(4) Nor under these conditions could God have demanded from us faith and obedience.

Having thus dealt with Socinus and the contra-Remonstrants, Limborch gives his own doctrine, "which is midway between these two extremes".

"Our Lord Jesus Christ was a true sacrifice for our sins, and one properly so called, in that He bore the severest anguish and the accursed death of the

cross, and afterwards was raised from the dead, and entered by His own blood into the heavenly sanctuary, there presenting Himself before the Father ; by which His sacrifice He appeased the Father, who was angry with our sins, and reconciled us to Him. And so He bore for us and in our stead the extremest suffering, and turned away from us the punishment we had deserved " (xxii. 1).

If now it be asked what exactly was the evil which Christ bore in our stead, the answer is as follows : It was not the punishment which we had deserved for our sins, as has already been shown. But He bore extreme misery and a bloody death in our stead, which was in place of the suffering that we ought to have borne. Not that there was a strict equivalence, since we had deserved eternal death. " But because, though innocent, He took this suffering upon Himself, His sacrifice was so acceptable to God, that He was moved by it to receive us into His grace " (xxii. 2).

Thus the price which Christ paid was paid according to the estimation of God the Father (xxi. 8).

The Divine acceptation of Christ's sufferings for our salvation is further to be understood from the dignity of Christ's Person, as both the eternal Son of God and as the noblest of men (xxii. 5).

In a certain sense therefore Christ may be said to have been punished in our stead, and moreover " in this sense to have made satisfaction to the Father in our stead, and to have merited righteousness for us, in so far as He satisfied, not the rigour of the Divine justice, but the will of God, at once just and merciful " (xxii. 2).

This view, says Limborch, does not make light of the sufferings of Christ ; but on the other hand it allows for the free grace of God. He further explains his

doctrine by saying that what Christ merited for us was the removal of God's wrath, not faith and regeneration. Christ calls us to these, and supplies us with the Divine grace to this end ; but He did not merit them, or we should have had them by right, instead of their being laid upon us as a duty. Limborch defends his doctrine against Socinus by saying that the sacrifice of Christ involved no cruelty on God's part, seeing that God had the right of giving Christ to death, as He has absolute rights over every man. Moreover, the Socinians themselves teach that God gave Christ to death as a prophet to confirm the truth of His message. There is therefore no further difficulty in His being given to death as a sacrifice, especially as He Himself also gave Himself willingly.

In cap. xxiv. Limborch proceeds to the kingly office. Christ is King as God, but also as man. His Kingdom as man began at His birth, reached a higher manifestation in His ministry, but culminated in His resurrection, ascension, and sitting at the right hand of the Father. The functions of Christ's Kingship (cap. xxv.) are :—

(1) His calling men to participate in His Kingdom, the first act of which was the bestowal of the Holy Ghost on the Apostles, that they might be His ministers for this purpose ;

(2) The giving of laws for those called into His Kingdom, in that He demands faith and repentance or holiness of life ;

(3) His judicial power, partly exercised now, partly in the world to come.

In all these functions may be observed a difference from those of Christ's priesthood. The priestly functions are exercised towards God, the kingly towards man.

The above account of Limborch's doctrine of the work of Christ may be completed by a note as to the

Arminian conception of justification by faith and of the sacraments. In opposition to the orthodox doctrine that in justification Christ's righteousness is imputed to the believer, the Arminians pressed the Scripture phrase that faith was imputed for righteousness (Rom. iv. 3, 5).

"The Arminians therefore teach instead of the *per fidem* of the orthodox system a *propter fidem*. That God remits sins to men *propter fidem* is not indeed, as with the Socinians, a mere matter of His good pleasure, but the sacrifice of Christ also in a certain way comes in as a middle term. Careful regard must, however, be had to the object of faith. This is not merely the sacrifice of Christ, or Christ as making satisfaction, but it is the whole Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King, i.e. Christ, in so far as He has given precepts, promises, and threatenings. On account of this relation of justifying faith the same is in its essence already obedience, as with the Socinians, and therefore never appears as justifying, except in so far as works are united with it and are included in it."¹

The sacraments are regarded mainly as precepts, and only as means of grace in so far as obedience is exercised in regard to them.

Arminianism, as represented by Limborch in his attempt to mediate between Socinianism and the Protestant orthodoxy, shows an interesting reversion in many points to the mediaeval type of doctrine. Socinus had conceived Christianity as a religion of law and promise, qualified only by God's sovereign grace. Limborch thinks of it as law and promise, qualified by the forgiveness of sins upon the basis of Christ's sacrifice. There is, however, no strict satisfaction, nor is satisfaction absolutely necessary, but it is merely, as with

¹ Schneckenburger, op. cit. p. 22.

the schoolmen, God's chosen way of salvation, which is marked, however, by many points of fitness. By thus abandoning the claim that satisfaction is necessary, Limborch obviates, just as Duns had done before him, the force of the arguments proving its irrationality: Socinus himself had admitted that the Scotist form of the doctrine of Christ's merit was unexceptionable.¹ It is, however, a fresh point that Limborch, while not disputing, as does Socinus, that there is a Scriptural basis for the orthodox doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and merit, nevertheless remarks upon the difference between the implications of Scripture and of these juristic terms: this observation, due to the historical sense of the humanistic exegesis, carries him beyond the mediaeval circle of thought. Finally, while the Arminian and the mediaeval theology agree that the faith which justifies includes love, there is the great difference between them, that the mediaeval sacramentalism is altogether abandoned by the Arminians. Duns and the Nominalists had indeed prepared the way for this, in that they had reduced the giving of grace through the Sacraments to a mere arbitrary Divine decree.²

§ 3. GROTIUS

The theory of Grotius (A.D. 1583-1645), at once a jurist and a theologian, is one of the most important in the whole history of our doctrine. In his "Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus of Siena" (1617), he uses both his exegetical and his juristic science to meet the Socinian criticism of the orthodox doctrine: at the same time he puts forward on the basis of his exegesis

¹ *Supra*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.* Vol. I., pp. 325, 343.

and jurisprudence a new theory, which very substantially modifies the orthodox position. He commences (cap. i.) with a statement of what he conceives to be the position to be defended.

“The Catholic view is as follows : God, moved by His goodness wonderfully to do us good, in view of the hindrance of our sins, which deserved punishment, determined that Christ voluntarily of His own love towards men should endure the severest torments and a bloody and shameful death to pay the penalty for our sins, that, without harm to the manifestation of the Divine justice, through the intermediary of true faith, we might be delivered from the punishment of eternal death.”

This thesis Grotius proceeds to expand in detail in scholastic form and to defend point by point from the Scriptures :—

(1) “The first efficient cause of the matter of which we treat, is God.”¹

(2) “The cause which moved God, is firstly mercy.”²

(3) “Secondly, it is our sins as deserving punishment.”³

(4) “The second efficient cause is Christ Himself, in His willingness.”⁴

(5) “The cause which moved Christ was His *φιλανθρωπία*.”⁵

(6) “The matter is both Christ’s torments before death, and especially His death itself.”⁶ The repeated emphasis in Scripture on the death of Christ shows the inadequacy of the view of Socinus, which assigns to it no special and peculiar effect in our salvation.

(7) “The form is the payment of the penalties for

¹ Jn. III. 16, etc.

² *Ibid.* IV. 25, etc.

³ *Ibid.* xv. 13, etc.

⁴ Rom. v. 8, etc.

⁵ Jn. x. 18, etc.

⁶ Is. LIII. 5; Col. I. 22, etc.

our sins.”¹ For death is the penalty of sin. Grotius admits that man was not naturally immortal: nevertheless he was created for immortality, and only failed of this destiny because of his sin.

(8) “The end of the whole . . . is twofold, without doubt a dispensation of the Divine justice, and, as far as we are concerned, remission of sins, that is our liberation from punishment.” Grotius appeals to Rom. III. 25-26, and attacks the Socinian view of the Divine justice.² The Divine justice of which Paul speaks is righteousness, which has different effects in relation to different objects. Both as regards good and evil deeds its effect is retribution, but this in the case of evil deeds is punishment: the latter is an exercise of the essential justice of God, as He is called just in view of it.³ It is true that justice often means truth, often also equity, but not in the case of the punishment of sins. “The end of punishment is the manifestation of retributive justice in regard of sins.”

Grotius also examines the explanations given by Socinus of the connexion between the death of Christ and the remission of sins.⁴

(1) He regards Christ’s death as a testimony to the preaching of the remission of sins. This reverses the correct order: it makes the remission the cause of Christ’s death instead of *vice versa*. Again, it makes Christ’s death only a martyr death. Besides, even the historical cause of His death was not the preaching of remission, but His assertion that God was His Father; and the testimony to His preaching consisted rather in His miracles.

(2) Socinus says that by His death Christ obtained

¹ 1 Pet. II. 24.

³ Rev. XVI. 5, 7.

² *Supra*, p. 15 f.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 17 f.

the power to forgive sins, but this is not a Scriptural point of view.¹

(3) He regards Christ's death as an example, which is correct. But the passages, which so speak of it, are quite distinct from those which connect it with the remission of sins.

(4) Socinus says that the death of Christ is a great persuasion to faith. But in itself it is rather the reverse : it is more the resurrection, which persuades to faith, as Socinus indeed admits ; and if the death be no more than a moment in the process of the resurrection, how is the Scriptural insistence upon it to be explained, especially in connexion with the remission of sins, with which the resurrection is not closely associated in the Scriptures ?

In this way Grotius clears the ground by disposing of the positive theory of Socinus. Cap. ii. commences his own theory, by discussing the general relation between God and man. The question is not merely one of forgiveness, behind this lies the question of punishment. Here God must be considered as *rector*, or supreme governor of the world. To inflict punishment or to liberate from punishment is the act of a *rector* as such. This being admitted, it may be granted to Socinus that God is not to be viewed in this matter simply as a judge ordained under the law. For a judge cannot liberate the guilty from punishment, even by transferring it to another : not because it is in itself unjust, but because it is not in accordance with the law, whose servant he is. Equity may indeed be exercised by a judge bound to a rule ; clemency properly belongs only to the supreme governor.

¹Grotius refers to "De Servatore," I, cap. vi., where Socinus teaches that Christ, as a man exalted to heaven, has the power to confer eternal life, and all promised goods. Cf. also "Themata," § 51 (*supra*, p. 29).

Socinus, however, though defining God as the supreme sovereign (*summus princeps*), views His relation to man otherwise than as *rector*. He regards Him as the offended party, and again as creditor, and yet again as Lord ; though in reality these are all different points of view.¹ Against such doctrine Grotius now advances three points :—

(1) To punish is not within the competency of the offended party as such. If God punishes as sovereign, it is not as the offended party. The sovereign punishes, even when the offence is not against himself.

(2) The offended party has naturally no right of punishment. In fact he has not even the right to compel punishment : he is not really in this regard a creditor. Grotius supports this position by the following important argument :—

“ It is well known that right is twofold, natural or positive : wherefore also every debt must arise from the one source or the other. Natural right consists in the adjustment of things among themselves ; of such a character therefore also is natural debt. But positive right is that which originates from the free act of the will : it is twofold, contract and law. Contract is the effect of the power which anyone has over himself and his own affairs ; while law is the effect of the power which anyone has over another and his affairs. . . . By nature therefore nothing is owed or can be owed to me by reason of your action, except equality as regards property, that is, that however much I lack because of you, I should receive just as much : this may be called in a word indemnity or restitution.”

But this is a very different case from that of punishment. “ The cause of your natural debt is firstly and in itself not the wickedness of the act, but that I lack

¹ *Supra*, p. 20.

something : for even if my lack be from no fault of yours as in the case of a deposit, none the less I am owed restitution. On the other hand the cause of punishment is just the wickedness of the act, not that I lack anything." From this argument, then, it follows that the right of punishment does not belong to the offended party by the law of nature. Nor is there any positive law (*jus constitutum*) which gives this right ; nor yet any reason why such a law should be made.

(3) "The right of punishment in the governor is neither the right of absolute sovereignty nor the right of the creditor." For their ends are different. That of the right of sovereignty or of the creditor is the good of the individual to whom it belongs : that of the right of punishment is the common good. The end of every punishment is simply to maintain and exemplify order. Again, it is never unjust to yield one's private right, nor is anyone called just for exercising it. The reverse is the case with the right of punishment. The difference of the cases is also shown by the fact that the virtue, which yields private right, is different from that which remits punishments : one is liberality, the other clemency.

But when it is said that punishment is owing, does not this imply a creditor ? No : it merely implies the idea of fitness in the abstract. If there is anything in the case that answers to the idea of creditor, it is the public good, of which the governor is the servant.

Finally Grotius argues that the Scripture words ἀφίεναι (*dimittere*) and χαρίζεσθαι (*condonare*) imply neither the right of the sovereign nor of the creditor. In cap. iii. he proceeds from the examination of the nature of the case to inquire into the rule obtaining in it. Since God is to be regarded as governor, His action must be in general that of jurisdiction. It is not there-

fore, as Socinus thinks, a question of acceptilation,¹ for that is not an act of jurisdiction ; in other words, acceptilation is an affair, not of public, but of private right. More particularly, however, the act in question can be regarded either with a view to, or apart from the Divine sanction. The latter is the ethical aspect of the matter. It is in itself right that sin should be punished ; and from this point of view the act becomes the punishment of one for the sake of the impunity of another. The former is the legal side. From this point of view the act is one of dispensation, which may be defined as "the act of the superior, by which the obligation of a law, that still stands, is removed with reference to some particular persons or things". The sanction is in this case Gen. II. 17, i.e. "every sinner must bear the penalty of eternal death".

The Divine act is therefore not the execution of the law ; for then no sinner would escape eternal death. Nor yet is it the abrogation of the law ; for an abrogated law has lost its obligation, yet unbelievers remain subject to the law. Nor again is it the equitable interpretation of the law ; such interpretation shows some fact or person never really to have been within the purview of the law : here, however, all men without exception are by nature children of wrath and subject to the penalty of the law. It remains then that the case can only be one of the relaxation or dispensation of the law.

¹ Socinus nowhere says that God's remission of sins for Christ's sake is to be thought of as *acceptilation* : he, moreover, directly denies the fitness of this legal term to explain and justify the Protestant doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness or merit (*supra*, p. 25). The agreement of Socinus with Duns' doctrine of the *acceptation* of Christ's merit (*supra*, p. 24) is a different matter : there has been, however, in the history of doctrine much confusion between *acceptation* and *acceptilation*. See further on this point my article "Acceptilation" in *Hastings' "Dictionary of Religion and Ethics,"* Vol. I, pp. 61, 62.

The question then arises, "Whether the above penal law is relaxable?" Grotius replies:—

"Some laws are either absolutely or by presupposition irrelaxable. Those are absolutely irrelaxable, whose opposite in the very nature of the case involves an immutable wickedness. . . . Such laws, again, are irrelaxable by presupposition, as are established by a fixed decree, which Scripture calls τῆς βουλῆς ἀμετάθετον or ἀμετανόητον, such as the law of the damnation of those who will not believe in Christ.¹ All positive laws, however, are absolutely relaxable: nor must one take refuge in a hypothetical necessity proceeding from a fixed decree, where there is no mention of such a decree."

Grotius proceeds to meet the objection that his positions conflict with the unchangeableness of God. "Law is not anything interior in God, or even the will of God, but a certain effect of His will. But it is most certain that the effects of the Divine will are changeable." Promises indeed may not be broken, because they establish a right on the part of the promiser; and therefore God is the faithful promiser. But is there anything in the above-mentioned penal law which stands in the way of a relaxation? There is first the objection "that it is naturally just that the guilty themselves should be punished with a penalty answering to the offence, and that this consequently is not a matter of free will, or relaxable". Grotius replies that not every negation of what is just is unjust; nor is everything that is called natural strictly such.

"That he who has offended deserves punishment, and is in consequence punishable, follows necessarily from the very relation of sin and the sinner to the superior, and is properly natural. But that every

¹ Heb. III. 18.

sinner should be punished with such punishment as corresponds to his fault, is not simply or universally necessary, nor properly natural, though agreeable enough to nature. Whence it follows that there is no obstacle preventing the law ordaining this from being relaxable." There are, nevertheless, grave reasons against relaxation : (1) there is the danger of lessening the authority of the law ; (2) the law itself, though not absolute, is fitting. It follows, therefore, not indeed that the law is not to be relaxed, but that it is not to be done lightly. In the case before us, however, there is most serious reason for relaxation : " For if all sinners had been given over to eternal death, two most beautiful things would have perished altogether from the universe, on the part of men piety towards God, and on the part of God the manifestation of His chief beneficence towards men ".

Cap. iv. takes us to the ethical aspect of the question. Grotius groups the objections of Socinus under three heads : (1) those that infer that what we maintain was done was unjust ; (2) those that deny that there was any reason for such action ; (3) those that deny that what we assert was done at all.

Under (1) there are two points : the injustice may be (*a*) in the matter, viz. the sufferings of Christ, or (*b*) in the form, which is punishment.

(*a*) needs no discussion. Socinus admits that it is not in itself unjust that Christ should suffer, and the mere fact that the Scripture records that He did suffer conclusively proves the same.

(*b*) is dealt with, as follows :—

"I maintain that it is not simply unjust or contrary to the nature of punishment, that anyone should be punished for the sins of others. When I say unjust, it is clear that I speak of such injustice as rises out of the nature of things, not what depends on positive law,

that the Divine freedom may in no way be impaired." Grotius quotes Scripture instances of the transference of punishment in support of his contention.¹ Socinus indeed objects that in Scripture there are no cases of the punishment of the innocent for the guilty. Nevertheless, if some were punished for the sins of others, it makes no difference as to the point at issue whether they had sins of their own ; they were punished without regard to their guilt. "If, however, anyone can be punished in so far as he is innocent, the innocent also can be punished." The distinction which Socinus draws between punishment and affliction,² Grotius dismisses as a mere quibble.

Further, however, Socinus demands at any rate that there be a bond between the guilty and the punished, and denies that there is any such bond between us and Christ.³ Not only, however, is it true that "one man is not alien to another," but there is a bond between Christ and us far beyond this general connexion : He is the Head and we are the members.

Grotius now lays down the following proposition : "It is to be observed that it is essential to punishment that it be inflicted for sin, but not equally essential that it be inflicted on the sinner himself". This position he illustrates by the analogies of reward, favour, and revenge, which are all transferable without ceasing to be what they are.

Besides, if it were contrary to the nature of punishment to be inflicted on one who has not sinned, this would be a case, not of injustice, but of impossibility. Moreover, "injustice is properly not an accident of a relation (such as punishment), but of an action (such as is the matter of the punishment)". This explains "why it is not equally free to all to punish anyone for

¹ Exod. xx. 5, etc.

² *Supra*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.* p. 22.

another's sin, as it is to reward or favour him for another's merit or good deed. For the act involving reward or favour is a beneficent act, which by its nature is allowed to all. But the penal act is a hurtful act, which is not granted to all, or against all. Wherefore in order that a punishment be just, it is required that the penal act itself fall within the authority of the punisher, which may happen in three ways, either by an antecedent right of the punisher, or by a just and valid consent on the part of him whose punishment is in question, or through his offence. When in these ways the act is lawful, there is nothing to prevent its then being ordained for the punishment of the sin of another, if only there be some bond between him who sinned and the one to be punished."

Socinus admits the transference of penalty in money penalties, but says that the reason is that money is transferable, and so money paid by one for another can be regarded, as if it had been first given to him, and then paid by himself: corporal punishment, however, is not thus transferable. The argument of Socinus, however, would prove that no one could be rewarded for the merit of another, nor an unwilling surety be compelled to pay for a defaulting debtor. The distinction he draws is therefore not correct. Grotius further proves against Socinus that corporal punishment was regarded as transferable by ancient law and custom: he particularly notes instances where sureties were admitted in cases of capital punishment. If in general Roman law did not allow sureties for capital punishment, this was because such transactions were regarded not altogether as unjust, but as hazardous. Neither was the rule absolute, nor do modern lawyers so regard it.

Finally Grotius sums up:—

"To bring this question to a conclusion, we do not

here inquire whether any judge may inflict on anyone any penalties whatever of another's crime. For the law of the superiors takes away this power from the inferior judges. Nor do we inquire whether the highest authority among men may do this with regard to any penalty and any person. For sometimes the Divine law or natural reason stands in the way. But we do exactly inquire whether an act, which is in the authority of the superior, even apart from the consideration of another's offence, may be arranged by the superior for the penalty of another's fault. That this is unjust is denied by Scripture, which shows that God has often done this ; by nature, since it is not proved to forbid it ; plainly also by the *consensus Gentium*. . . . There is therefore nothing wrong in this, that God whose is the highest authority in all matters not in themselves unjust, and is Himself subject to no law, willed to use the sufferings and death of Christ to establish a weighty example against the immense guilt of us all, with whom Christ was most closely allied, by nature, by sovereignty, by surety."

Indeed this act was not only just, but wise, as the examination of its cause will show.

This cause Grotius discusses in cap. v. It might have been one passing our understanding, nay the will of God had alone been sufficient cause ; for things just in themselves God wills because they are so, but other things are just, because He wills them. But as a matter of fact God has plainly revealed the cause. It must, however, be prefaced, that Socinus is unjust in asking that such a cause shall be adduced, as will show that God could not possibly have acted otherwise. "For such a cause is not required in what God does freely." Grotius appeals to the classical text, "Aug. De Trin." XIII. 10, 13.

Besides, Socinus himself advances no necessary cause of Christ's death : on the contrary the causes that he gives have no vital connexion with it. Scripture, however, shows a sufficient cause, both for God's will to remit eternal punishment, and not to do so otherwise than by the punishment of Christ. God's will to forgive has its cause in the Divine goodness to man ; moreover, if men had been left to despair of eternal felicity, religion would have perished. The cause, why God laid punishment upon Christ, is shown by those Scriptures which speak of Him as delivered up, suffering, and dying for our sins. It was "that God would not remit sins so many and so great without making a conspicuous example". This was because of His hatred of sin which appears in His wrath : it was also because of His regard for the authority of the law.

God, then, in His love to men, willed to spare those who believe on Christ, at the same time setting up an example against their sins, and choosing in His wisdom the way to display at once various of His attributes, viz. both His clemency and severity, or His hatred of sin and His respect for the law. But besides testifying to the Divine hatred of sin and acting as a deterrent, the sacrifice of Christ reveals the love of God, who thought so much of sin that He gave His Only-begotten Son to bear its penalties for us.

Grotius is now in a position further to correct Socinus' view of the Divine justice. What resides in God is retributive justice, on the other hand punishment is an effect of His will : there comes in between the attribute and its effect the free will guided by wisdom.

Again we see how very different a matter is the remission of sins from the mere abandonment of a private right. It is not true, as Socinus says, that the State commits no wrong in forgiving the guilty, unless

at the same time it interferes with the right of some individual, or breaks a Divine law¹: on the contrary relaxation must have a sufficient cause, being not an act of absolute sovereignty, but an act of government, which must be directed to the preservation of order.

Again Socinus says² that beside the will of God and Christ no cause can be given for Christ's death, unless it be that He merited to die. The answer is that His death was merited, but impersonally: it was merited by our sins. The transference of the penalty of sin to Christ, however, was an act of the Divine will, not caused by the merit of Christ, who was sinless, but by His extreme fitness to be a penal example, both because of His peculiar union with us, and of the dignity of His Person.

Cap. vi. proceeds to the question, whether God willed to punish Christ. Scripture proves this (Rom. iv. 25, etc.). When Socinus argues that God has forgiven sin apart from Christ;³ so far as temporal punishment is in question, it is to be remembered that what is delayed is not abandoned; as regards eternal punishment, there is no proof that there is any remission apart from Christ. Promises of forgiveness under the New Covenant, such as Jer. xxxi. 34, are quite consistent with Paul's doctrine that propitiation is through the blood of Christ.

Socinus, however, has brought objections from the inconsistency of remission and pardon with satisfaction.⁴ In the first place, remission is as applicable to punishment as it is to debts; but the former case is one of public, the latter one of private law. Next, Socinus is wrong in saying that remission is inconsistent with any previous payment.

"That this may be understood, we offer a description of the remission of the due (*debitum*), which includes

¹ *Supra*, p. 21.

² "De Christo Salvatore," III. 9. Cf. *supra*, p. 25.

³ *Supra*, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*

under it two species, viz. debt (*creditum*) and punishment. . . . To remit a due therefore is the act of a creditor or governor, liberating the guilty from the obligation of his punishment or debt. . . . The destruction of an obligation is in law called liberation. This may be preceded, but cannot be followed by payment; for no act can take place concerning what no longer exists. Liberation therefore sometimes happens when some payment precedes, sometimes apart from all payment. But one kind of payment in itself liberates, another kind not in itself. The payment of a thing, clearly the same as was in the obligation, in itself liberates. It is, however, the same thing, whether the guilty person himself pays, or whether another pays for him with the intention that he should be freed: a point which requires to be observed, since if anyone pays the same thing with a different intention, no liberation takes place. Where, therefore, the same thing is paid either by the debtor, or by another in the name of the debtor, no remission takes place; for the creditor or the governor takes no action with reference to the due. Wherefore, if anyone has paid the penalty which he owes, there will here be liberation, but no remission. . . . Another kind of payment, however, does not in itself liberate, for instance, if something other than is in the obligation be paid. But it is necessary for an act of the creditor or the governor to come in also, which act is rightly and usually called remission. Such a payment, however, which can be either admitted or refused, has, when admitted in law, the special name of satisfaction, which is sometimes opposed to payment in the strict sense.¹ And hence is to be sought the real reason, why the substitute for corporal punishment cannot by paying the

¹ Grotius here refers to Justinian's "Digest," 46, 3, 52: "Satisfactio pro solutione est".

penalty at once liberate the guilty person ; for this delay happens firstly and in itself, not because another pays (that indeed does not hinder liberation, since that is the intention of the payer), but because he pays something other than is in the obligation. For what is in the obligation is the suffering of the offender. . . . Wherefore that from the punishment of one may follow the liberation of another, an act of the governor must intervene. For the law orders that the offender himself be punished. This act with regard to the law is relaxation or dispensation, with respect to the debtor remission."

Liberation here, then, takes place not by the substitution of a new obligation (*novatio*), or of a new debtor (*delegatio*), nor yet by the acceptance of a mere verbal payment (*acceptilatio*). This last term belongs to the sphere of private law only, and Socinus is quite wrong in bringing it in here.¹ What takes place is exactly what he denies to be possible, remission preceded by satisfaction. It does not matter whether this precedence is in fact or in the Divine decree ; these are the same with God. Socinus is wrong in saying that by satisfaction all debt (*debitum*) is at once removed ; this is to confuse satisfaction and strict payment. As it has already been shown, the creditor or the governor has still to admit the satisfaction. Hence a further condition can be imposed along with the admission of a satisfaction as ground of remission ; as God indeed has done, in requiring faith in Christ.

Grotius goes on to deal with the difficulty caused by the Scripture command to forgive as God forgives.² Does not this imply that He forgives without satisfaction ? Grotius replies that God's forgiveness is not completely parallel to ours. God is judge, we are pri-

¹ See note 1, p. 54.

² Cf. Mt. xviii. 21-35.

vate individuals ; hence it does not follow that if we are bidden to forgive freely, God must do the same. Next Grotius comes to the arguments drawn by Socinus from the liberality of God.¹ First the word is out of place ; clemency rather is the virtue displayed in remission. But Socinus argues that his view shows God doubly liberal, firstly, in the free pardon of sins, and secondly, in the free gift of Christ ; whereas the orthodox theory, making the latter necessary in order to the former, loses one half of this grace. In answer Grotius points out a double beneficence (he will not use the word liberality) implied by the orthodox view, and that a greater than Socinus can adduce ; first in the pardon of sins, when, as the death of Christ shows, that meant so much to God ; and, again, in giving Christ to die for us.

But further Socinus declares that the orthodox view makes God sordid and grasping : on the contrary it shows His regard for His law. Nor is it right to say that this view makes God cruel. That the sufferings of Christ serve for a satisfaction, makes them no greater : on the contrary it shows their cause, and so rids God of the imputation of cruelty. Grotius adds that while so far he has confined his attention to Christ's satisfaction by His sufferings, he does not mean to exclude the value of His actions also to this end.

The rest of the work, capp. vii.-x., contains an examination of the Scriptural basis of the idea of satisfaction. Lest it be thought that the dispute is only as to a word, Socinus objects not merely to the term satisfaction, but to the thing itself, however expressed.

“And thus he repudiates no less than the word satisfaction all these phrases, Christ by His death reconciled God to us, Christ freed us from the hands of Divine

¹ *Supra*, p. 21.

justice, giving His blood to God as the price of our redemption, Christ made compensation for our crimes by His obedience, Christ worthily merited that God should grant us the remission of sins, Christ by the loss of His life placated for us the anger of God " (cap. vii.).

Even as regards the term satisfaction itself, there is, however, no difficulty in finding its equivalent in Scripture, though expressed in Greek, Hebrew, or Syriac phraseology. " Thus when Scripture says that Christ was delivered up to death, and bore our sins, i.e. the penalties of our sins, and shed His blood for the remission of sins, all this is in Latin suggestively expressed by the word satisfaction " (*ibid.*).

Passages to the foregoing effect have been referred to in the course of the previous argument (capp. i.-vi.). But there are besides four classes of passages with the same significance : (1) those that signify the turning away of wrath ; (2) those which speak of redemption by the paying of a price ; (3) those which speak of substitution ; (4) those which ascribe to the death of Christ expiatory power.

Grotius urges under the first head, 1 Jn. ii. 2 ; iv. 10 ; Rom. iii. 25, etc., and argues that the idea of propitiation according to classical usage implies the turning away of wrath, and that this is the natural meaning in Scripture, where sinners are said to be under the wrath of God ;¹ also that reconciliation is not, as Socinus imagines, of us to God only, but since God was wroth with us, also of God to us. Under the second head Grotius presses the force of Mt. xx. 28 and 1 Tim. ii. 6 ; 1 Pet. i. 18 ; 1 Cor. vi. 20 ; vii. 23, and points out that Scripture actually makes mention of the price of our redemption. Under the third head he lays special emphasis on the substitutionary force of *ἀντί* in Mt. xx. 28, but argues that

¹ Jn. iii. 36.

ὑπέρ also often according to its context means "instead of," 2 Cor. v. 14, etc. Finally, under the fourth head he argues that the sacrificial language of the New Testament, whether interpreted by Hebrew or classical usage, implies substitution and satisfaction.

Grotius has no difficulty in showing throughout that Socinus is arbitrary in denying the force of these Scriptures in favour of the doctrine of satisfaction. But on the other hand, he himself has hardly realized the full strength of what Socinus says as to the figurative character of Scripture phraseology. It is clear that it is far from logically precise, when two theories of satisfaction so different as the orthodox Protestant doctrine and Grotius' own can each claim to be Scriptural.

The Grotian theory of satisfaction stands out from other theories of the work of Christ by its completely juristic character. It is the work, not merely of a theologian employing juristic ideas, but of a jurist dealing with theology. The legal knowledge of Grotius has enabled him, on the basis of the Roman law to which Socinus appealed, to point out in his arguments some technical errors ; just as he has been able in some respects to correct the Socinian exegesis. But it is to be observed that the most damaging criticisms of Socinus upon the orthodox theory, those based on the impossibility of proving an equivalence between the penalties of sin and the death of Christ, Grotius does not attempt to meet at all. On the contrary, while professing to defend the Catholic faith against Socinus, he puts forward altogether a new conception of Christ's satisfaction, thus tacitly abandoning the orthodox idea as irrational. He does not adopt the method of Duns, followed by Limborch, and, admitting the irrationality of the idea of strict satisfaction, fall back upon the mere will of God, or at least upon a certain fitness in the method He chose,

as a sufficient explanation. In order once more to establish the rationality of satisfaction, he appeals to the philosophy of law, of which he was a distinguished exponent, to give to the idea a completely fresh meaning: on the basis of Rom. III. 24, 25, he develops the thought that the death of Christ is to be understood as a penal example, which God establishes in order to honour the law, while yet pardoning sinners. This penal example, then, is what Grotius means by satisfaction: how different the idea is from that of the Protestant orthodoxy may be seen in that Grotius says that, no strict satisfaction being implied, a further condition of salvation can be demanded of men, viz. faith. Thus indeed Grotius escapes the contradictions which Socinus has shown to lie in the Protestant idea of satisfaction, but he does so at the expense of the evangelical idea of faith, which by the Reformers is conceived as no extra condition, or legal demand, or work, but as pure receptivity: here Grotius shows himself a true Arminian, and nearer to the Catholic than to the Protestant view.

As the theory of Grotius is of the greatest importance, as a really fresh view of the work of Christ, we inquire into the origin of the philosophy of law applied by him to the subject. It may be found almost in entirety in Thomas Aquinas: behind him, however, lie Aristotle and the Roman jurisprudence. We may begin with Aristotle. For him, as for Plato before him, the idea of the State as an organism is fundamental. The State is founded, not simply upon community of place and a compact of mutual forbearance, and for the sake of mutual exchange: these conditions must exist, but do not in themselves constitute a State, which is a community, whose end is the εὖ ζῆν of all its members, and is complete in itself.¹ Consequently the State must not

¹ "Pol." III. 9.

be governed for the good of the ruler : this is a perversion of its fundamental idea. The State is right *κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*, when its aim is the common profit.¹ Kingly government is the best form of rule. The perfect king is one who is self-sufficient and superabundantly furnished with all that is good : his aim is therefore not his own advantage, but that of his subjects.² The special quality of the ruler consequently is prudence, of which statesmanship is only another form.³ The legislator must specially have a care for the stability of the State ; as it is the nature of a bad disposition to love change.⁴ Laws must be maintained as long as possible.⁵ Aristotle admits, however, that laws cannot be framed to meet all cases.⁶ As to the origin of right in general, Aristotle lays down the following important distinction ("Eth. Nic." v. 10) :—"Of that which is just as between citizens, part is natural (*φυσικόν*), part is conventional (*νομικόν*). That is natural which has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting or rejecting it."

In the Roman jurisprudence the *jus naturæ*, which is immutable and the expression of eternal reason, is distinguished from the *jus civile*, the mutable law peculiar to any State, enacted for its own government : to the Roman jurists the *jus civile* is, of course, first and foremost the law of Rome.⁷ We find also in the Roman jurisprudence the maxim of public utility as the end of legislation in those matters not defined by the law of nature. "Law (*jus*) is spoken of in various ways : one, in which what is always fair and good is called law, as

¹ "Pol." III. 6.

² "Eth. Nic." VIII. 10.

³ *Ibid.* VI. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.* VII. 14.

⁵ "Pol." III. 16. Ritter and Preller, "Historia Philosophiæ Græcæ et Romanæ," 4, 1869, p. 325.

⁶ "Pol." III. 11 ; "Eth. Nic." v. 10.

⁷ Cf. Gaius, "Inst." I. 1 ; Justinian's "Digest," I. 3, 32, 1.

is the law of nature : the other, what is profitable (*utile*) to all or most in some State, as is the civil law.”¹ This maxim is specially applied to changes in the laws : “ In establishing new arrangements there should be an evident utility, to cause a departure from that law which has long seemed fair ”.²

We find also in Roman law the notion of a penal example. Cf. D. 48, 19, 6, § 1 : “ Which is to be done, that being deterred by the example, they may offend the less ”. So again D. 16, 3, 31 : “ For he who has publicly deserved ill, ought also to labour in want, that he may be an example to others to deter them from ill deeds ”. I cannot, however, find that this idea was ever applied to qualify the exercise of pardon by the Emperor, as Grotius applies it to the Divine forgiveness. The difference is natural ; for Grotius here limits the conception of authority more than would have seemed fit to the Roman jurists. The exercise of pardon by the Emperor was thought of by them as so absolutely unconditioned, that maxims for its direction would have seemed out of place. Socinus rather is exactly in agreement with Roman law when he makes the exercise of pardon a part of the *jus domini*. Yet it is to be observed that Roman law knows the idea of the reverence of the legislator for his own law. “ It is a speech worthy of the majesty of the ruler for the prince to profess himself bound by the laws : to such a degree does our authority depend on the authority of the law, and in truth it is more than empire for royalty to submit to the laws.”³

The two streams of the Aristotelian philosophy and the Roman jurisprudence unite in the political philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. According to him (cf. *supra*,

¹ D. I. 1, 11 ; cf. I. 1, 1, § 2 ; I. 1, 7, § 1.

² D. I. 4, 2.

³ Cod. IV. Theod. et Valent.

Vol. I, p. 266) law is the dictate of reason ("Summa Theologica," II. 1, 90, 1). There is consequently an eternal law in which the Divine law that governs the universe expresses itself (II. 1, 91, 1). In this eternal law the rational creature as such participates (II. 1, 91, 2): this participation constitutes the law of nature. Besides this there exists a human law, which consists of deductions from the first principles of the law of nature, supplying particular determinations in cases which it leaves indeterminate (II. 1, 91, 3). This human law as humanly established (*humanitus posita*) is called positive law (II. 1, 95, 2 and 3). Beyond the law of nature and of man there is also the Divine law, directing man to an end above nature (II. 1, 91, 4).

The law of nature, so far as it participates in the eternal law, is immutable, i.e. it is immutable in its first principles (II. 1, 94, 5); but its particular applications are capable of change, so that human law is always mutable (II. 1, 97, 1). The end of all law is the common good (II. 1, 90, 2). As the dictate of reason, it must tend to the ultimate end of man's being, which is happiness or beatitude: "Wherefore it is necessary that law should especially have regard to that order, which consists in beatitude. Again, since every part stands in order to the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect, but one man is a part of the perfect community, it is necessary that law should peculiarly have regard to order with a view to the general happiness" (II. 1, 90, 2). Thomas refers to Aristotle, "Ethic." v. 1 and "Pol." I. 1.

Since human law is mutable, it might seem therefore that it is always to be changed when any improvement in it is possible. But Thomas says: "Human law is rightly changed, in so far as by its change care is exercised for the common advantage (*utilitati*). Yet the

change of the law in itself involves some harm to the common welfare, because custom is of most avail to make laws observed. . . . Wherefore, when the law is changed, the constraining power of the law is lessened, in so far as custom is overthrown: and therefore human law ought never to be changed, unless in some other point as great a recompense is made to the common welfare as the loss which it suffers at that point. This happens when some very great and obvious advantage proceeds from the new statute, or because it is a case of the greatest necessity" (II. 1, 97, 2). Thomas refers in this context both to Aristotle, "Pol." II. 6 and to D. I. 4, 2. In II. 1, 97, 4 he discusses a further point, "whether the governors of the people (*rectores multitudinis*) have the power of dispensation in the case of human laws". He says: "Dispensation properly imports the tempering of some common principle to individual cases. . . . Now it happens sometimes that a precept, which is for the good of the people for the most part, is not suitable to such and such a person or case: because by it either some greater good is prevented, or even some evil brought about . . . therefore, he whose it is to rule the people has the power of dispensation in human law, a power which depends upon his authority, so that, to wit, with regard to the persons and cases where the law fails, he should give liberty for the non-observance of the precept of the law." Thomas says again (ad 3): "Natural law . . . cannot admit of dispensation: but in the case of other precepts, . . . sometimes man is the instrument of dispensation. . . . As regards the Divine law, however, every man is in the same position which a private person occupies with regard to the public law, to which he is subject: wherefore just as with human public law, none has the power of dispensation

but he from whom the law has its authority, or one to whom he has entrusted it : so with the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none has the power of dispensation but God, or one to whom He has especially entrusted it."

Further, in II. 2, 67, 4 Thomas discusses whether a judge may lawfully remit a punishment (*poenam relaxare*). He says :—

"The judge is prevented for a twofold reason from freeing the guilty from punishment : firstly, from the point of view of the accuser, to whose right it sometimes pertains that the guilty should be punished, for instance, because of some injury committed against him, to undo which right is not within the arbitrament of any judge, for every judge must render to each man his own right : he is prevented in a second way from the point of view of the State, whose authority he exercises. It pertains to the good of the State that ill-doers should be punished : yet in this regard there is a difference between the inferior judges and the supreme judge, to wit, the Emperor, who has entrusted to him the public authority in plenary measure : for the inferior judge has not the power to free the guilty from punishment in opposition to the laws imposed on him by his superior . . . but the Emperor, who has the plenary power in the State, if the injured is willing to overlook the offence, may lawfully forgive the guilty, if it seem to be without hurt to the public advantage."

It is clear that we have in the three sources just described, viz. the Aristotelian philosophy of the State, Roman jurisprudence, and the political philosophy of Thomas, the very circle of ideas which we have found in Grotius. Direct references, moreover, both in his "Defensio" and in his famous work "De Jure Belli et Pacis," where his political philosophy is developed, make clear his indebtedness in each case. See especially

“De Jure Belli et Pacis,” Prolegomena, 42, 45, 52, 53 ; Lib. I. cap. I. 3, 2 ; cap. I. 9, 2 ; cap. I. 14, 1. Note also the reference to Thomas and to Duns in the note on cap. I. 10, 1 : it may be observed that Duns (“Op. Oxon.” III. Dist. 37, qu. un.) agrees with Thomas that God can dispense with all but the law of nature, though he differs from Thomas as to the content of the latter (cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 321). The agreement of Grotius with the doctrines of Thomas as to natural and positive law, dispensation and relaxation, is so close that it may be fairly said that the originality exhibited by Grotius in his “Defensio” consists in applying these ideas, developed in another connexion by Thomas, to the subject of the work of Christ. The result, however, is to produce a theological view very considerably different from the scholastic doctrine of the work of Christ, which is based on the view, which Socinus follows, that God is to be thought in the matter simply as Sovereign (*princeps*), and which develops the consequences of this view in a thorough-going way. Thomas says that “God has no superior ; He Himself is the supreme and common good” (III. 46, 2), and argues therefore that His relation to man is one of private law. Duns, admitting that a legislator ought to seek in all things the common good, denies that this rule touches God, “seeing that here the good of the Legislator is simply better than that of the community, whereas in the general case it is not so” (IV. Dist. XIV. qu. 2). On the other hand, Grotius, granting with the schoolmen and Socinus that God is *princeps*, maintains nevertheless that the common good is the end of His action, and so the relation of God to man is one of public law. He does not, like the schoolmen, regard the good of the universe as subsumed in the private good of God, but views it as something independent of Him, an external end towards which He works, though in harmony with His nature.

CHAPTER VI

THE FINAL FORM OF THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

IN order to exhibit the doctrine of the work of Christ in the completed form, which it took in the seventeenth century, in view of both the interconfessional controversies and those with the Socinians and Arminians, I select the names of Quenstedt (A.D. 1617-1688)¹ as representative of the Lutheran, and of J. H. Heidegger (A.D. 1633-1689)² for the Reformed orthodoxy. Gass³ calls Quenstedt "the high-water mark of (Lutheran) dogmatism," and speaks of his system as a "pre-eminent work" summing up all its predecessors: "the personal element disappears in the common spirit which he served". Of Heidegger Schweizer⁴ says that he "works up the entire treasure of the previous (Reformed) dogmatic in an outstanding manner". In particular, Heidegger makes use in reasonable measure of the federal method of Cocceius,⁵ which distinguished the economy of Divine redemption into two different covenants or modes of religion: "(1) the covenant of nature or of works, i.e. the relation of man to God apart from the ideas of redeeming revelation and grace, as it was realized in its purity before all fall into sin, and though weakened is ever still present; (2) the covenant of grace,

¹ "Theologia didactico-polemica sive systema theologicum," 1685.

² "Corpus theologiæ Christianæ," 1700.

³ "Geschichte der Protestantischen Dogmatik," I. p. 357.

⁴ "Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche," I. p. 133.

⁵ Cocceius (A.D. 1603-1669) developed his principles in his book, "Summa doctrinæ de fœdere et testamentis Dei" (1648).

from the Fall onwards the only redeeming, truly saving mode of religion, moving through the threefold dispensation before the law, under the law, after the law or under the Gospel ".¹

§ 1. QUENSTEDT

According to Quenstedt the general object of theology, i.e. the systematization of doctrine, is religion.

"The Christian religion is the method of worshipping the true God, prescribed in the Word, by which man, ravished from God by sin, is led to God by faith in Christ, as God and man, to be reunited to God, and to enjoy Him for ever." ²

The sum of true religion is contained in the creeds. Besides the six œcumenical creeds of the Ancient Church (Apostolic, Nicene, Constantinopolitan, Ephesian, Chalcedonian, Athanasian), Quenstedt recognizes the various Lutheran symbols summed up in the "Formula of Concord".

In theology, however, the sole principle of knowledge is Scripture,³ not human reason or natural theology.⁴ Human reason since the Fall is corrupt, and is out of count as the principle of knowledge in things supernatural. An organic use of reason ⁵ is admitted for the interpretation of Scripture; but no metaphysical principles are allowed in theology except by way of illustration or of secondary proof.

In cap. v., after the definition of an article of faith as a particular point of revealed doctrine, an important distinction is drawn between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith. Those are fundamental

¹ Schweizer, I. p. 104.

² "Systema," pars I. cap. II. sect. 1, Thesis 1.

³ Cap. III. sect. 2.

⁴ Porisma 2.

⁵ In Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, etc.

which cannot be unknown or denied without the loss of salvation. Those, again, are primarily and absolutely fundamental which must be known : secondarily and less fundamental are those which must not be denied.

Quenstedt adopts the distinction, which goes back to Alexander,¹ of the fundamental articles into antecedent, constituent, and consequent. The constituent articles are the very saving faith itself, viz. the doctrines of God's love to men, the universal merit and satisfaction of Christ, and its appropriation in the individual.² The antecedent articles are the necessary presuppositions of this saving faith, such as that the Divine revelation is true : the consequent articles are the various implications of saving faith. Amongst these last Quenstedt places the kingly office of Christ, and the efficacy of the Word and sacraments.

This doctrine of principles is interesting (1) because of the distinction drawn between theology and religion ; (2) because of its endeavour to simplify and unify theology by reducing it to the saving faith and its implications. Zwingli and Calvin had introduced the idea of religion into theology as a principle of unity : with them religion is implicit theology, and theology explicit religion. In Quenstedt, however, appears the notable idea that theology or the system of doctrine is a means to the end of religion, or the true worship of God. Quenstedt, it is true, again identifies religion with the creeds, and so after all tends to make religion a less explicated form of theology : nevertheless in making a distinction between the two, he prepares the way for important future theological developments. Further, his notion of fundamental articles, and especially of absolutely fundamental or constituent articles, which are the very saving faith itself, is also a noteworthy advance in the endeavour

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 156.

² *Thes.* 7.

to understand Christianity synthetically : we cannot but see in this movement towards a central truth the natural outcome of the Protestant principle. It was thoroughly in accordance with the highly synthetic character of Protestantism, that Quenstedt should resume the ideas of Alexander as to antecedent, constituent, and consequent articles, with more opportunity of carrying them out to a successful issue. That, however, he includes the doctrine of the kingly office among the consequent articles, instead of in the *fides salvifica* itself, shows that a further theological advance in the synthetic comprehension of Christianity is still necessary.

Quenstedt's doctrine of the work of Christ is contained in "Systema," pars III. cap. III. membr. 2, and contains two parts, a didactic (sect. 1) and a polemic (sect. 2).

Christ's office, which in general is described as mediatorial, is the function, belonging to the whole Person of the God-man, by which Christ has executed, and still executes in both natures, operating together, all things necessary both for the obtaining and the application of our salvation.

Quenstedt lays great stress throughout on the fact that it is the God-man in both His natures, who is the subject of the mediatorial office. Accepting the division of the office of Christ under the three heads of Prophet, Priest, and King, he repeats in each case that the office is to be understood of the God-man in both natures.

"The prophetic office is a function of Christ as God-man, by which He has most sufficiently revealed to us by the counsel of the Most Holy Trinity the Divine will concerning the redemption and salvation of men, with the serious intention that in general all may come to a knowledge of heavenly truth."¹

¹ Thes. 3.

From this prophetic office is called in Scripture Prophet, Evangelist,¹ Master, Rabbi, Teacher, Bishop, etc.

The efficient cause of this office as regards its institution and the approval and destination of Christ for it, is the whole Trinity. The Father sent the Son to reveal Him ; the Son undertook the revelation ; the Spirit anointed Him for the purpose.

The subject-matter of His revelation is, primarily, the truth of the Gospel with a view to the obtaining of faith and salvation by means of it, and, secondarily, the truth of the law, which is necessary to the leading of a holy life. With regard to the law, Christ had to give its true sense, and rescue it from the corruptions of the Pharisees.

Christ's revelation of the Divine will has been made, partly immediately, partly mediately. Immediately, so far as Christ taught the Church Himself, and trained His disciples as the future teachers of the Church. Mediatly, so far as Christ has made use of the vicarious service of the Apostles and their successors in the Christian ministry.

The end of the prophetic office is the bringing of all men to the knowledge of heavenly truth. An accidental result has been the blinding and hardening of some, the fault of which, however, is entirely with them, not with the Prophet and His work. The Calvinist doctrine, that the blinding and hardening of men other than the elect was directly intended by God, who withheld from them the grace necessary to believe the Gospel, is warmly repudiated by Quenstedt, who calls it "an impious and execrable gloss and opinion".²

"The priestly office is the function of Christ as God-man, by which He, according to the eternal counsel

¹ Is. LXI. 1.

² Thes. 13, Observ. 5.

of God and the undertaking made by Himself, subjected Himself in time for our sakes, in our stead, and for our advantage, to the law of God, and by the perfect fulfilment of it, and endurance of its every penalty, offered to the Divine justice a perfectly satisfactory obedience, and delivered us from the wrath of God, the curse of the law, sin, and all evils, which obedience He still exhibits to God the Father, and by His intercession obtains for us all necessary goods.”¹

From the priestly office Christ is called in Scripture Priest, Salvation, Saviour, Jesus. The cause constituting Him a priest is the whole Trinity, but peculiarly the Father.

The priestly office has, then, two parts, viz. Christ's expiatory sacrifice, and His intercession. It was undertaken because of the sin of man, which stank in God's nostrils. Its end is the glory of God and the salvation of men, and its effects are (1) the reconciliation of God and sinful man, (2) our redemption from bondage to the devil, and (3) our redemption from sin, both as regards its guilt, which is removed in justification, its slavery, which is taken away in sanctification, and its inherence, for the removal of which, however, we still have to hope.

Quenstedt next discusses the two parts of the priestly office in detail. First comes the expiatory sacrifice, or as it is termed in theology the satisfaction, “by which Christ most perfectly satisfied for all the sins of the whole world and merited salvation”.² Then follows the intercession, by which He seeks the application of the salvation won.

It is admitted that the word satisfaction is not to be found in the Scriptures ; but its equivalents are

¹ Thes. 14.

² *Ibid.* 23.

abundantly evident. Such are, payment for the robbery of the Divine majesty (Ps. LXIX. 5), bearing of our sins (Is. LIII. 4), ransom (Mt. XX. 28 ; 1 Tim. II. 6), propitiation (1 Jn. II. 2 ; Rom. III. 24, 25), reconciliation (Rom. v. 10, 11 ; 2 Cor. v. 18), redemption (1 Pet. I. 18, 19 ; 1 Cor. VI. 20 ; Gal. III. 13), and finally offering, expiation, sacrifice for sins, etc.

Quenstedt proceeds in an important discussion next to distinguish satisfaction and merit.

“The satisfaction and merit of Christ are not equivalents. For (1) the former compensates an injury done to God, expiates iniquity, pays a debt, and most fully delivers from eternal punishments ; the latter restores us to a state of Divine good will, and acquires for sinners a gracious reward, or the grace of forgiveness of sins, justification, and life eternal.

“(2) The former stands as the cause, the latter as the effect. For merit originates out of satisfaction. Christ made satisfaction for our sins, and for the penalties which they had deserved, and thus merited for us the grace of God, the remission of sins, and life eternal.

“(3) Satisfaction was made to God, the Three in One, and to His justice, not to us, though it was made on our behalf. But Christ merited, and by His merit acquired somewhat, not for the Trinity, but for us.

“(4) The acts of exinanition, such as the fulfilment of the law, the passion and death, etc., are at once satisfactory and meritorious ; but the acts of exaltation, such as the resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at God’s right hand, are acts, not satisfactory but meritorious only, i.e. Christ did not make satisfaction for our sins by rising again and ascending into heaven, but by that very thing He merited for us eternal life and unlocked heaven.

“(5) Finally, satisfaction arises out of debt, but merit

is a work entirely unowed and free. To it then by opposition corresponds reward or remuneration. Nevertheless all theologians do not observe this distinction, but include in the term merit also the satisfaction of Christ.¹”

Satisfaction was made to God, the Three in One. For the whole Trinity was wroth with men for their offence, and because of the immutability of the Divine justice, the holiness of the Divine nature, and the truthfulness of the Divine threatenings, could not without satisfaction forgive sins or receive men to grace. The old objection, therefore, that no one can satisfy himself is here of no avail. For the Father being offended, the Son was offended also, nor is there any difficulty in the idea that the offended Son out of mercy should reconcile sinners to the Father.

God is therefore not to be thought of, as the Socinians represent Him,² as a mere creditor, but as a most just Judge, who, according to His absolute justice, demands strict satisfaction. The redemption, made to show the Divine justice,³ proves that the penalty must either be exacted from sinners or from Christ their Surety. If God could forgive sins without satisfaction, there would have been no need of such a redemption price.

Quenstedt follows Anselm⁴ very closely in his view of the infinity of sin. “The infinite God was offended by sin, and because sin is an offence, injury, and violation of the Infinite God, and is, so to speak, a Deicide, it has, in consequence, a certain infinite wickedness, not indeed formally (for considered in itself it can be greater or less) but objectively, and deserves infinite penalties; and so far also demanded an infinite price as satisfaction, which Christ alone could offer.”⁵

¹ Thes. 26.

² *Supra*, p. 20.

³ Rom. III. 25.

⁴ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 170.

⁵ Thes. 31.

It is to be observed that by "objectively" Quenstedt here means, according to the scholastic usage, "ideally". He goes on next to refute the scholastic doctrine that God, since He has no superior, could by His absolute power forgive sin without satisfaction. Such absolute power can neither stand (1) with the nature of God, which must be wroth with sin; (2) with His truth, in that He said to Adam, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die"; (3) with His holiness, which must oppose sin; (4) with His justice, which cannot remit sin without punishment.

Christ, then, made satisfaction for all sin, alike original and actual, past and future, venial and mortal, even the sin against the Holy Spirit. He also satisfied for all the penalties of sin, whether temporal or eternal. We are therefore freed by Him not only from punishment, but also from the wrath of God, the curse of the law, the power of the devil and, finally, from hell and eternal death. The devil had the power of death as our executioner. Although, then, temporal death still remains for us to undergo, we are delivered from the fear of it, seeing that it is no longer to be regarded as the punishment for our sins, Christ having endured for us both temporal and eternal death.

The satisfaction which Christ made, He made for all sinners without exception; for God truly and seriously wishes all men to be saved, even those who remain unsaved. This, the Lutheran doctrine, Quenstedt fortifies against the Calvinists with many Scriptures (Is. LIII. 6; Mt. XX. 28; Rom. VIII. 32; 2 Cor. XIV. 15; Heb. II. 9; 1 Tim. II. 6; Jn. I. 29; 1 Jn. II. 1, 2; Rom. XIV. 15; 1 Cor. VIII. 11; Heb. VI. 4; 2 Pet. II. 1), which prove that Christ died equally for the elect and the non-elect. The last four texts distinctly refer to His dying for the reprobate.

“The means, by whose intervention the satisfaction was made, is the ransom consisting in the whole obedience of Christ, which includes (1) the most exact fulfilment of the law, (2) the endurance of the penalties deserved by us, the transgressors, or the most bitter passion. For by His doing, Christ expiated the sin, which man had most unjustly committed, and by His suffering bore the penalty, which man was justly to suffer. Hence the obedience of Christ, performed in our place, is usually called twofold: the active, which consists in the most perfect obedience to the law, and the passive, which consists in the most sufficient payment of the penalties which awaited us.”¹

Both parts of the obedience of Christ were necessary that man might not only be freed from the wrath of God, but also might possess in the imputed righteousness of Christ a righteousness with which to stand before God. The distinction between the active and the passive obedience is, however, not so exact, but that the passive obedience includes the active. Bernard rightly says that Christ’s action was passive and His passion active.²

The satisfaction of Christ was then a most exact and sufficient payment of all that we owed. Our debt was paid in full. There was no acceptance.

“This payment of our whole debt, freely undertaken for us by Christ, and imputed to Him in the Divine judgment, was not sufficient from the Divine acceptance. For neither did God in this satisfaction of His free grace accept anything, which was not such in itself, nor did He abate anything of His right in the exaction of the

¹ Thes. 37.

² Cf. “Sermo De Passione Domini” (Feria iv. Hebdomadæ sanctæ), 11: “Et in vita passivam habuit actionem, et in morte passionem activam sustinuit, dum salutem operaretur in medio terræ”.

penalty due from us and undertaken by our surety ; but what the strictness of His justice demanded, all that Christ in His satisfaction endured ; so that He felt the very pains of hell, though not in hell, nor for ever. There is seen indeed a certain temperament of mercy with the Divine justice, and a certain kind of relaxation of the law, in so far as the Son of God Himself offered Himself as surety to make satisfaction, in that the satisfaction offered by Him was accepted as if it were ours, and in that another person was substituted in the place of the debtors, yet all this derogates nothing from the satisfaction itself.

“ The satisfaction of Christ is therefore most sufficient and perfect of itself and of its own intrinsic infinite worth ; which worth arises (1) because the Person making satisfaction was the Infinite God, (2) because the human nature by the Personal union was made partaker of the Divine and Infinite Majesty, wherefore its passion and death was valued and reckoned of the same worth and price, as if it belonged to the Divine nature.”¹

The aim of the satisfaction on God’s part was on the one hand the manifestation of His justice and on the other the exhibition of His mercy. On our part it was the acquisition of perfect righteousness, eternal redemption, and salvation.

Finally, the period during which Christ made this satisfaction was from the first moment of His exiniation to the end of the three days of His death. All the acts of Christ during this time were satisfactory. His imprisonment for nine months in the Virgin’s womb, His hunger, His thirst, etc., were all endured for us and for our sakes.

The second part of the priestly office is Christ’s intercession. Here Quenstedt insists against the Cal-

¹ Thes. 39, 40.

vinists that Christ makes intercession, not only in His human nature, but in both natures. The God-man moreover, pleading His sacrifice, is our sole Intercessor. He makes intercession especially to God the Father, as the Source of the Trinity, the other Persons, however, as one with the Father, not being excluded. The object of His intercession in general is all men. But there is a distinction. He does not intercede for those who have died impenitent, being rather their Judge; but only for those who are alive, whether the elect or the reprobate, with a view to their salvation. More peculiarly, however, Christ intercedes for the elect with a view to their sanctification and increase in spiritual blessings.

The foundation of Christ's intercession is the satisfaction and universal merit of the Intercessor. The form of it consists, however, not merely in the presentation of this merit, but in actual entreaty, though in a manner befitting Christ's Divine dignity.

The end and aim of the intercession is on God's side the manifestation of His glory, and on the side of men the obtaining of salvation and all the blessings won for them by the passion and death of Christ.

The intercession of Christ, moreover, began before the world was, in that He was ordained from eternity as our Priest. Nor will it terminate with the end of the world, but will continue to all eternity—Christ being for the elect an eternal Priest.

Christ in His kingly office rules over all creatures not only as God, according to His Divinity, but also as man, according to His exalted humanity. From this office He is called in Scripture, King, Mighty One, Lord. According to it He rules over all creatures in His Kingdom of power, grace, and glory. Christ is the universal King, with no limit to His sway. It is one and the same power, which He exercises according to

His Divine nature and according to His human nature, though the mode is varied. Christ's Divine Kingship is eternal, by His eternal generation ; His human Kingship is in time, by the personal union of His humanity with His Divinity, its plenary exercise being in the state of exaltation.

The end and aim of the kingly office is the glory of our King and the salvation of all men. Its duration differs, according as we look at it from the Divine or the human side. Christ's Divine Kingship began when there were subjects to be ruled over ; His human Kingship commenced with the first moment of the union of the two natures in Him, its plenary exercise, however, with His exaltation.

In His Kingdom of power Christ rules as God-man : from it He is named in Scripture Lord, the Mighty God, with the government upon His shoulder. In it He rules over all creatures. This Kingdom begins as regards Christ's Divine nature with the creation : as regards His human nature its plenary exercise begins with His exaltation. "The Kingdom of power is ordained to the end of the Kingdom of grace. The Messiah rules over the whole earth, but He rules also over His covenanted ones, empurpled with His blood, and delivered from the Kingdom of Satan." ¹

The Kingdom of grace is administered by a three-fold hierarchy, (1) in the Church by the ministry, (2) in the State by the magistrates, (3) in the family by parents. Besides, in our common life every Christian is a bearer of this Kingdom.

The Word and the Sacraments are the instrument whereby this Kingdom of grace is exercised. Its object is according to the Divine will all men, but especially believers.

¹ Thes. 77.

“For by the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments the King Messiah earnestly invites all men to participate in the benefits won by His passion and death, and to repentance, and, if they obey, receives them, justifies and sanctifies them, and by His Spirit rules over the justified, or believers, and defends them against all enemies, and that with all power, all instance, all grace.”¹

The form of this Kingdom is an absolute monarchy. The kingly acts of Christ consist :—

(1) in the appointment of Apostles, Evangelists, and Teachers of the Church, and their illumination, extraordinarily by the Spirit at Pentecost, and ordinarily by the Word ;

(2) the gathering of the Church by the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments ;

(3) regeneration and justification ;

(4) renovation and sanctification ;

(5) the bestowal of various gifts ;

(6) the protection of believers ;

(7) rule in the midst of His enemies, especially by overthrowing their designs, condemning them to hell, and governing even their consciences.

The place of this Kingdom of grace is the world. Its plenary exercise begins with Christ's exaltation. It will be terminated in form, though not in substance, by the end of the world.

In His Kingdom of glory the God-man is called in Scripture the King of Glory. He has this Kingdom from the Father, as He has His others. It is called in Scripture the Kingdom of God. In it Christ uses as His ministers, not only the angels, but the elect, who are His assessors in the last judgment. The subjects of the Kingdom are the good angels, and so far as the purpose of God goes, all men without exception. But

¹ Thes. 80.

only those, who believe and persevere to the end, can become citizens of this Kingdom. In it Christ rules gloriously, to the praise of the Divine power, wisdom, mercy, and goodness, to the increase of joy in the angels, the fulfilment of the promises to believers, and the confusion of the devils and the damned. The place we do not know, though it truly exists. The consummation of the Kingdom of glory will be at the general resurrection of the dead, when all the elect shall be gathered and put in possession of their heavenly inheritance. Of this Kingdom there shall be no end.

The above is the content of the didactic section of Quenstedt's doctrine of the threefold office. The polemic section, which follows, is divided into ten questions dealing with particular controversies. In qu. 1 Quenstedt argues against Osiander, Stancarus, Lombard,¹ and Piscator,² that Christ is Mediator according to both natures; inasmuch as both natures were necessary to the mediatorial office. In qu. 2 he repudiates the Socinian doctrine,³ that Christ was caught up into heaven to receive a Divine revelation, as utterly without basis in Scripture and unnecessary. Qu. 3 discusses whether Christ perfectly fulfilled the law in our place. Quenstedt here argues against Piscator and Socinus.⁴

Piscator objects against the orthodox doctrine, that Scripture clearly says that Christ died for us, nowhere that He lived a holy life for us. Quenstedt quotes in reply Mt. v. 17; Rom. viii. 3, 4; Jn. xvii. 19, and says further that His holy life is most closely connected with His death.

Again, Piscator and Socinus assert that Christ as man was bound to obey the law, and therefore offered His active obedience for Himself. Quenstedt replies:

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, pp. 221, 414, 417.

² *Ibid.* p. 15.

³ *Supra*, p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 10, 11, 24.

(1) Christ is Lord of the law.¹ (2) If He were a mere man, the above argument would be true ; but His obedience is not merely the obedience of His human nature, but that of His Divine-human Person.

Again, Piscator says that Christ's death was unnecessary, if He satisfied for us by His life. Otherwise we have to admit that He only imperfectly satisfied by His life,—which means that His holiness was imperfect. Quenstedt answers that Christ needed to make satisfaction both for our guilt by His active, and for our punishment by His passive, obedience. He further says that the fallacy is one of division. Christ's active and passive obedience are two distinct parts of one whole obedience, which is destroyed if either is taken away.

Once more, Piscator urges that the law obliges either to obedience or to punishment, but not to both. Christ, however, has freed us from punishment : there was therefore no need that He should fulfil the law for us. Quenstedt replies that Piscator's dilemma is true, for the case of man before the Fall, but not for that of fallen man : of him the law demands, both obedience, in that he is a rational creature, and punishment, because of sin.

Piscator also argues that, if Christ fulfilled the law for us, then we need not obey it. The answer, however, is that Christ did indeed free us from the claim of the law to obedience, yet gives us His Spirit whereby we spontaneously obey it.

Socinus objects, that one can no more fulfil the law for another than he can bear corporal punishment for another.² The answer is, that this is true of private, but not of public, persons.

Finally, Socinus argues, that Christ would have needed to fulfil the law as man as many times over as there were sinners to be saved.³ Quenstedt admits this

¹ Mt. XII. 8.

² *Supra*, pp. 22-24.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 22.

objection to be valid, if it were not for the Divine decree otherwise, and for the unique position of the God-man.

Qu. 4 discusses, whether Christ as a Prophet increased the moral law with new precepts and thereby made it more perfect. Quenstedt affirms with Gerhard¹ against the Romanists, Socinians, and Arminians,² that He only purified the law from Pharisaic corruptions, and explained it, or unfolded its content. Hence Christ is not a second Moses.³ The Socinian view, both of the precepts and the promises of the Old Testament, limiting their scope to the present life, is false.

The subject of qu. 6 is : whether Christ, in our place, and for our sins, truly and fully satisfied the Divine justice by His death. Here, besides attacking the Scotist doctrine of the acceptation of Christ's merit and the general Romanist doctrine that Christ's satisfaction needs to be completed by ours, Quenstedt deals with Socinus and the Arminians, and even includes the Calvinists in his condemnation, so far as they give place to the Scotist doctrine.⁴ Socinus, however, has the chief place among these adversaries : Quenstedt handles him as follows : First come the usual Scripture proofs, much as in Grotius, "Defensio" : Mt. xx. 28 ; 1 Tim. ii. 6 ; Is. liii. 4, 5 ; Ps. lxix. 5 ; 2 Cor. v. 21 ; Gal. iii. 13 ; 1 Jn. i. 7 ; Rom. iii. 25 ; Col. ii. 14 ; Rom. v. 10. Next follows a refutation of the enervation of these proof-texts by Socinus : Grotius is here freely utilized. Quenstedt repeats that if the word satisfaction is not in Scripture, the thing is abundantly evidenced. Finally, we have a reply to the Socinian dialectic, of which we must carefully set out the chief points :—

(1) It is said by Socinus that God can freely forgive,

¹ *Supra*, p. 3.

² Jn. i. 17.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 27, 39 ; Vol. I, pp. 250, 267.

⁴ Cf. Calvin, "Inst." ii. 17, 1.

just as we can.¹ Quenstedt first introduces the old scholastic distinction between the absolute power of God and His power with order. Next, he points out that in the latter case, which is what concerns us, God is to be thought of not as a private person, but as the Judge of the whole world. As to the argument that God is not the Judge, but the Supreme Lord of the world, Quenstedt feels the force of it, but says that we must go by Scripture.

(2) As to the difficulty which Socinus makes, about the punishment of one for another,² Ezek. XVIII. 4, 20 refers to strict law, not to the equity of the Gospel, which depends upon a special Divine decree.

(3) Socinus objects that the innocent at least cannot be punished for the guilty.³ This objection is valid, if applied to the case of mere man, or of human judgment. But it is worthless, if applied to the Divine salvation.

(4) Socinus says that no one can be punished for the sins of another, unless those sins are the meritorious cause of the punishment, which is not the case with Christ, Who only died by occasion of our sins, not for them.⁴ Scripture, however, teaches otherwise.

(5) According to Socinus Christ did not undergo the debt we owed, this being eternal death.⁵ The answer is, that He did undergo it qualitatively, in that God deserted Him.

(6) Socinus says that remission and satisfaction are contrary in their very nature.⁶ God, however, is said to remit sins, not in that He receives no satisfaction, but that He does not receive it from us.

(7) The Socinians urge that the guilt of sin still remains unless we believe: therefore Christ cannot have

¹ *Supra*, p. 20.

⁴ *ibid.*

² *Ibid.* pp. 22, 25, n. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 25.

⁶ *Supra*, p. 21.

satisfied for it.¹ The answer is, however, that we must distinguish between the obtaining of salvation and the application of the salvation won.

Qu. 7 deals with the interconfessional controversy whether Christ died for all men, expiated the sins of all, and won for all salvation and eternal life.² Quenstedt divides his Calvinist adversaries into three classes: (1) the rigid, who say absolutely that Christ satisfied only for the elect; (2) the less rigid, who say that Christ satisfied sufficiently for all, efficiently for the elect only; (3) the School of Saumur,³ Amyraut,⁴ Cameron,⁵ etc., who teach hypothetic universalism, that Christ died for all, if only they believe, presupposing however, an absolute decree of election restricting the gift of faith. Here, in the first place, Quenstedt urges the Scripture proofs for universal redemption, already set out in his didactic section. He points out against the School of Saumur that Scripture nowhere speaks of universal redemption "on condition of faith". Besides, what is the object and cause of faith cannot have faith as its condition. As to the strict Calvinist restriction of the "all," for whom Christ died, to the elect only, there is no warrant for it.

Next Quenstedt refutes the arguments of the Calvinists. They urge that Christ would not pray for the non-elect:⁶ it is not therefore possible that He

¹ Quenstedt refers to Schlichthing, "Comm. in Rom." III. 24. Cf. also *supra*, pp. 25, 26, for somewhat similar arguments on the part of Socinus himself.

² *Supra*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Moses Amyraut (Amyraldus, A.D. 1596-1664), one of the chief doctors of the School of Saumur.

⁵ John Cameron (A.D. 1579-1625). "The liberalism that distinguished the famous School of Saumur points back to him as its author" (Maury, in "Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche,"³, III. 690).

⁶ Jn. XVII. 9.

would die for them. The answer is, that we must distinguish between general and special petition: Christ refused to make the latter only. Again, the Calvinists say that those for whom Christ died, He reconciled to the Father, and those for whom He won reconciliation, have not their sins imputed. Scripture, however, does not so teach. The Calvinists object that, if Christ died for all, He died even for those already damned, which was vain. Quenstedt replies that it was not vain, for they could when alive have apprehended Christ's merit. Once more, the Calvinists urge that God was unjust if He demanded payment twice, first of Christ, then of unsaved sinners. The answer is that the latter pay for their further sin of unbelief. Finally, it is said that Christ is only half a Redeemer, if He acquires salvation, but does not apply it. The fault, however, is not in Him but in us.

The eighth question is, whether Christ by His obedience merited anything for Himself. Here Quenstedt attacks Lombard,¹ Thomas,² Socinus,³ and others. That Christ merited only for us follows not only from the dignity of His Person, but from the *communicatio idiomatum*, whereby His human nature (except so far as our redemption required) lacked nothing. Besides, if He merited worship for Himself, how then could He have been worshipped in His earthly life? Moreover, as His merit and satisfaction are really one, if He merited for Himself, then He also satisfied for Himself, which is absurd. Besides, as He transfers the fruit of His merit to us, He can have nothing for Himself. As to the name above every name, He had it already by right. Quenstedt repeats against the Romanists the argument of Calvin,⁴ that they confound the relation of antecedent

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 217.

² *Ibid.* p. 277.

³ *Supra*, p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 436.

and consequent with that of cause and effect. To the Socinian argument, that if Christ did not merit for Himself He could not merit for us, he replies that He could do this, just because He was not mere man, but God.

Qu. 9 discusses, whether one drop of the blood of Christ would have sufficed for our redemption.¹ Quenstedt says that the phrase has no doubt a pious meaning. One drop of Christ was indeed intrinsically of infinite worth. Nevertheless Scripture alone can teach us as to the actual requirements of God.

The tenth and final question is, whether Christ even now intercedes in heaven for us. Quenstedt argues against Socinus² that Christ truly intercedes: in opposition to the Socinian argument, that Christ as Lord of all needs not to pray, he points out that Scripture does not oppose, but couples, His Lordship and His intercession.

§ 2. HEIDEGGER

Heidegger's doctrine of principles is contained in his "*Corpus theologiæ Christianæ*," loc. I., "Of theology in general". He admits the existence of natural theology after the Fall, repudiating the Socinian view³ that there is no natural theology. Revelation, however, is necessary for salvation.

"Revealed theology is the doctrine concerning God, as reconciling sinful man to Himself in Christ, and as He is by the same to be duly known and worshipped: it is sought from God, as He reveals it in His word, and is framed with sincere purpose, as in His sight, for the salvation of sinful man and the glory of the name of God" (14).

The sum and essence of Christian theology (which Heidegger identifies with religion) is defined as follows:—

¹ Cf. Luther, "Comm. in Gal." I. p. 195 (quoted above, Vol. I, p. 378).

² *Supra*, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.* p. 13.

“ That without doubt is the true and saving theology and religion, which teaches the true God by proceeding from the true God, i.e. from His indubitable revelation ; . . . next, which elicits and sets forth out of the inmost secrets of the Divine will, as disclosed by revelation, that only means, which every right conscience can judge to be suitable to reconcile the sinner to the angry and just Judge and inexorable Punisher of sin by due satisfaction of His justice, and finally unfolds from the same revelation the worship, worthy of the one and only God Who sanctifies the sinner, and alone pleasing to Him ” (16).

Theology moreover has a fundamental article. Christ Himself is the foundation of our faith (49), but only as He is believed (50). The fundamental article, therefore, which is one, though differently expressed in various parts of Scripture (51), is this, that Christ is the Saviour of the world (52). Since, however, this statement saves not by the mere sound of words, but by its meaning, it implies the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, sin, the law, the Spirit, and the resurrection of Christ and ourselves.

We have therefore in Heidegger, as in Quenstedt, the attempt to reduce Christianity to an essential faith and its implications, though in a somewhat different way. Theology and religion are, however, not distinguished.

Heidegger's doctrine of the threefold office is contained in loc. XIX. Like Quenstedt he defines the office of Christ in general as mediatorial.

“ That office is a mediation between God and man ; or that function of the Mediator, Jesus Christ, which, according to the will of the Father and the unction of the Holy Spirit, He voluntarily undertook to reconcile and save the sinners who had been given to Himself, and, according to both His natures, alone accomplished and accomplishes ” (2).

Such is the general definition ; where already at the very beginning of the doctrinal statement the special Calvinistic point of view is indicated, in that Heidegger says that Christ undertook His work to save those sinners who had been given Him, i.e. the elect.

The next discussion is that of the Scriptural names describing the mediatorial office. These are innumerable. The chief of them, however, besides the name "Mediator" are "Jesus" and "Christ" or "Messiah". Jesus means Saviour. Christ or Messiah signifies anointed. Whereas Quenstedt restricts the name Jesus to the priestly office, and Messiah to the kingly office, Heidegger follows Calvin who applies both names to the office of Christ as a whole before its division into its several parts, and who indeed saw in the name Christ according to its significance, "the anointed," the common unity of the kingly, priestly, and prophetic offices.¹ There is no doubt that Calvin and Heidegger here express more truly than Quenstedt the Protestant synthesis. Quenstedt's separation of the offices here is parallel with his mistake in reckoning the doctrine of the kingly office among not the fundamental, but the consequent articles.

To continue with the statement of Heidegger : the cause of the mediatorial office is the entire Trinity, but each Person operates in a distinct way. The Father, who is the source not only of the Godhead, but also of all its operations, sent the Son into the world to save sinners. To the Holy Spirit is assigned the anointing of Christ with the necessary gifts for His work, though not so as to exclude the operation of the Father, Who also Himself anointed the Son by giving Him His Spirit. Finally, the Son Himself undertook the mediatorial office, and in His own Person carried it out.

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 430.

This office, moreover, He undertook and executed according to both natures. "For, just as after the Incarnation there are two natures in the Son of God, and two principles of action in one hypostasis : so the operations of both natures concur in the work of mediation, and the results produced by those operations are attributed to both natures " (15).

Heidegger warmly repudiates the view of Lombard, Thomas, and Stancarus¹ that Christ is Mediator only according to His human nature. Especially noteworthy is his treatment of the time-honoured argument drawn from Augustine in favour of this view.²

"It is mere nonsense, not reason, to object that the Mediator, as the mean, ought to be at a distance from God, and so cannot be the Mediator according to His Divinity. For by the same reason He could not be the Mediator according to His humanity, and so could not be Mediator at all. For, as the mean, He must also be at a distance from men. But it is enough that, as God-man, and as performing the mediatorial office, He is at a distance from both God and man. For neither God as such, nor yet man separately, is God-man. And the Mediator is distinguished from God, not according to the nature of His Godhead, but according to the dispensation of His office ; just as He is distinguished from man not according to His humanity, but according to the dispensation and relation of the mediatorial office. If Christ cannot be Mediator according to His Godhead, because no one can be a mediator with Himself or for Himself ; then neither can He be Mediator according to His humanity, since no one, for whom He acts as

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, pp. 221, 274, 417.

² Cf. Augustine, "Conf." Lib. x. 42, 67 : "Now the Mediator between God and man ought to be partly like God, partly like man ; lest being wholly like man, He might be far from God ; or being wholly like God, He might be far from man, and so could not be a Mediator".

Mediator, is the same with Him. It is therefore quite one thing to be the Son of God and another to be Mediator ; one thing to be offended as God, another to act as Mediator as God-man " (17).

The work of the Mediator is the reconciliation of man and God, not a mere leading of man to the love of God, as Socinus imagines, but first of all the reconciling of God to man, and only then of man to God.

" For God, not being first reconciled, is so far from what man can love that He rather, as the Judge, Who curses the sinner and threatens him with death, cannot but be dreaded and hated. . . . But when man is reconciled by the blood of Christ, then at length that reconciliation becomes an argument to persuade men of the love of God and a reason for loving Him, thanking Him, and glorifying Him " (23).

Moreover, in this matter of reconciliation the merit of Christ's work must not be separated from its efficacy, as is done by the Remonstrants,¹ " so that they, as regards the actual reconciliation and salvation of men, leave little or nothing to Christ the Mediator " (24). The Remonstrants assign to the merit of Christ one object, viz. all men and every man ; to the efficacy of His work another object, viz. those only who believe and persevere in faith. In this way, however, they altogether overthrow and destroy the idea of merit.

" For they take away (Christ's) merit, since they deny that Christ has merited for anyone the remission of sins, the Holy Spirit, and eternal life, and persist that He has only obtained for the Father the right and the power of compassionating men, and of prescribing to them conditions of salvation such as He will ; asserting, moreover, with a rough and harsh voice, that the merit

¹ The Arminians were so called from their manifesto, the " Remonstrance " of 1610.

of Christ has not regard to men immediately, and that without injury to it all men can be damned, if no one will observe the prescribed conditions; whilst they deny its efficacy, in that they make calling, faith, and new obedience so depend upon the choice of man, that the will of man alone is the cause why some only repent and believe, and others do not; so that this alone and not the grace of Christ is efficacious unto salvation, and this efficiency has reference to salvation, not to faith, since it follows upon, and does not precede, faith inborn without the merit and efficacy of Christ" (24).

Such views, Heidegger declares, work like a gangrene in the Christian religion, make Christ as Mediator a pauper, and crucify Him afresh. On the contrary, the very essence, and the chief glory and fundamental article of Christianity, is that Christ is Mediator and Saviour completely and indivisibly by both merit and efficiency.

"He is Saviour by merit, in that He has obtained salvation for us by His blood;¹ by efficiency, in that He bestows the salvation, which He has obtained, and preserves it, when once bestowed" (25).

The efficiency is the end or fruit of the merit: without it Christ would have died in vain. Neither therefore is the merit wider than the efficiency or the efficiency narrower than the merit. If the efficacy of Christ's merit were left in the hands of men, Christ might lose all fruit of His merit. But, on the contrary, "righteousness, the forgiveness of sins, and salvation flow to us from the merit of Christ, as the proper effect from the proper cause; and for whom Christ has merited the forgiveness of sins, the Holy Spirit, and life eternal, to those same He grants and applies these gifts" (25).

The office of Mediator is common to every condition of the Church after the Fall. But Christ was in one way

¹ Acts xx. 28.

Mediator before the Incarnation, and is Mediator in another way after it. Before the Incarnation Christ was Mediator by His future merit. Merit belongs to the order of moral causes, which can operate before they are actually existent. Thus before the Incarnation Christ was Surety and Intercessor for the elect. After the Incarnation, in the state of exinanition Christ was Mediator and Saviour by present merit, and is now in the state of exaltation, Saviour by past merit.

The office of the Mediator, as the title Messiah shows, is threefold, Prophetic, Priestly, and Kingly; for these three orders of men, prophets, priests, and kings, were anointed under the Old Testament. The reason of the threefold office is that Christ, as Prophet, must instruct us by His doctrine concerning salvation, as Priest, must acquire it through His blood by satisfying the law, and as King, must bestow it, when acquired, by His Spirit. The order of the execution of the offices was that named above. First Christ was Prophet in His earthly ministry, then Priest on the cross, now He is King in heaven. But the order of the Divine purpose is different. Here the kingly office comes first, as the end of Christ's mediation, since God before all things gave to Christ as King many brethren to bring to glory. Then follows the priestly office, as the next means to this end, since in this way it was given to Christ to bring in righteousness. Last of all follows the prophetic office, in that it was given to Christ to announce righteousness, salvation, and glory, to the end of the obedience of faith.

"The prophecy of Christ is that, whereby He fully and clearly revealed the will of God concerning our salvation, as it was immediately manifested to Him" (28). Heidegger differs from Quenstedt in making the prophetic office begin under the Old Testament. Christ

even then began His work, as the angel of Jehovah appearing to the patriarchs, and revealing the Divine will of salvation. But the chief work of His prophetic office began with His Incarnation, and that indeed from His conception, in inspiring the evangelical canticles that proclaimed His advent among men. Heidegger here repudiates, as unscriptural and as diminishing the glory of Christ in His prophetic office, the notion of Socinus¹ that He needed in the time of His fasting to be caught up into heaven to receive a Divine revelation. The public performance of Christ's work, however, began with His baptism. In the first place, there was an explanation of the true righteousness required by the law. Christ was no new lawgiver, but a teacher and prophet expounding the law.

"Although He brought in a law of faith, and commanded obedience to it, and so far is called Lawgiver, and moreover enjoined legal precepts and the practice of charity, besides inscribing the law of faith and of the love of God on the hearts of believers; yet He was by no means properly called a lawgiver, bringing in a new law of works, by whose performance sinful man might avail to obtain righteousness and salvation. For otherwise there would have come into being a new God, a new worship, a new God of Israel" (34). Christ came properly, not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it by making satisfaction to it. Heidegger here opposes the Roman teaching that Christ is a lawgiver, also the similar doctrine of Socinus.

Christ indeed commanded not a few things belonging to the love of God and our neighbour, on which the whole law hinges. But His precepts were not exactly new, but were an exposition of the existing law, which moreover He enforced by His example. His precepts

¹ *Supra*, p. 15.

were therefore at once old and new. Even the precept of self-denial and bearing the cross was not altogether new, witness amongst other examples the conduct of Moses as illustrated in Heb. xi. 25, 26. Christ certainly in His sermon on the mount vindicated the law from the corruptions of the Scribes and Pharisees; but He was far from wishing to add to the old law a new one.

The principal parts of Christ's teaching, however, have to do with the Gospel. Above all things He preached the coming of the Kingdom of God, repentance, and faith. His message especially included the doctrine of the saving grace and mercy of God towards sinners, and that of the sacraments instituted by Himself, as seals of the covenant of grace, and again, that of the Church, etc.

Along with Christ's prophetic doctrine went a Divine efficacy, which was still continued, when after His exaltation He sent the Spirit from heaven, and taught the Church. Christ, moreover, confirmed His message by His miracles, His example, and His martyr-death. Yet Christ is not, as the Socinians think, Saviour in virtue of His prophetic office alone, apart from the priestly and the kingly offices, which give the prophetic office its solid basis. The priestly office especially is the soul of the work of Christ.

"The Priesthood or priestly office of Christ is that, by which He, as being constituted by the Father a Priest, by means of the obedience of His exinanition even unto the death of the cross, in offering Himself up by the Eternal Spirit, made perfect satisfaction to God the Father for the sins of those who were given Him, and continually intercedes with the Same for us" (55).

The external condition of Christ's Priesthood is, that He is an eternal Priest after the order of Melchizedek, appointed by oath: the internal condition is that

He was righteous, and had that righteousness, or merit, which the law demands as the basis of a right to life. He is Himself both Priest and Victim; He was in particular an expiatory victim both for sin and for guilt. His sacrifice, like those of the Old Testament, has three parts: (1) the voluntary offering of Himself as a victim, (2) His death, (3) His presentation of His sacrifice in heaven. By His voluntary offering up of Himself Christ won faith for His Gospel, and gave an example of obedience to God and love to men, of hope of the promise of glory, and of humility and patience. By it also He won power over men and grace in the eyes of the Father, enabling Him to exercise a powerful advocacy with God for men. The second part of Christ's sacrifice, His death, is the expiation of our sins and the satisfaction to God for them.

"For God, in that He is of the utmost clemency and mercy, willed to save certain sinners: and in that He is of an equal justice, willed not to save them without the expiation of sin, or the demonstration of His righteousness in punishing sin: and indeed could not do so, since the righteousness, which punishes sin, is natural to Him. . . . Besides, by the Gospel the law or the ordinance of the law is not abrogated, nor without involving the mutability of God could it be. . . . For the law of works, threatening the sinner with death, and promising life to the obedient, could not be otherwise ratified than by an infliction of death on the sinner, or on Him who took the place of the sinner, and by the grant of life to none but the obedient, or to Him who took the place of the obedient, and performed the ordinance of the law" (65).

Heidegger now expends much time in showing that the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction is Scriptural, bringing forward the usual proofs from the death of Christ being called a sacrifice, redemption, ransom, etc. He

attacks the Socinian view, that redemption is to be understood as a metaphor.¹ If there is salvation without satisfaction, God has given His law in vain ; His holiness, His wisdom, and His veracity all suffer. "In a word God would in this way simply have denied Himself" (74). Again, Christ would appear to have done no more than any just man, and to have shed His blood in vain, having suffered the penalty of sin without result. Finally, we should have no confidence to appear before the throne of grace in view of the justice of God, who cannot bear to look upon sin. The ends which Socinus attaches to the death of Christ are not according to Scripture :—

(1) That the death of Christ is a proof of the forgiveness of sins.² On the contrary Scripture makes it the cause of forgiveness. Moreover, Socinus makes Christ's death no more than a martyr's, whereas Scripture makes it unique. Again, Christ's miracles were sufficient proof of the forgiveness of sins : it is the singular eminency of His death, that it is the cause of remission.

(2) That Christ by His death has obtained the right of pardon.³ This reason Socinus himself overthrows by admitting that Christ possessed it in His lifetime.⁴ Besides the Scripture words, expiation, redemption, etc., do not point in this direction.

(3) That in the death of Christ is given us an example of patience and obedience.⁵ This is indeed a secondary end of the death of Christ, but does not rank as the primary end.

¹ *Supra*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

³ Cf. *ibid.* p. 51, n. 1.

⁴ In "De Servatore," II, cap. vi., Socinus says that one reason why Christ is said to have taken away our sins (cf. *supra*, p. 19), is that He, as Mediator, in His lifetime, forgave sins by the authority committed to Him by the Father. Socinus refers to Mt. ix. 6 ; Mk. ii. 10 ; Lk. v. 24.

⁵ *Supra*, p. 18.

(4) That Christ's death persuades us to faith, or hope of attaining eternal life, which is necessary to obtain the remission of sins.¹ This reason is absurd. "For how can the so bloody death of a most innocent man in itself avail to persuade us that the highest joys are prepared by God for those who live holily?" (76). Socinus himself shows the absurdity of his doctrine, by attributing our persuasion to faith directly to the resurrection, which, however, required that death should precede it. But if this were the meaning of Scripture, it would refer the forgiveness of sins to Christ's resurrection, ascension, and sitting at the right hand of the Father, rather than to His death. The frequent linking of the remission of sins with His death, however, shows that the connexion between them is a close, not a distant, one.

But the Socinians say that satisfaction is nowhere mentioned in Scripture, and is impossible.² As to the former point, it is true that Scripture nowhere uses this forensic word to describe Christ's work. "But the importunity and sophistry of enemies compelled the Church to make use of it to signify the voluntary payment of the penalties which we owed, made for us by Christ as our Surety" (78). If the word be not in Scripture, the thing is there. As to the impossibility of satisfaction, although God could not punish the innocent against his will for the sins of the guilty, there is absolutely nothing to prevent God from punishing him instead of the guilty, where substitution is willingly undertaken. Again, the law forbids the justification of the guilty in himself, but not in view of the expiation of sins by a surety. Moreover, when Christ had undertaken this vicarious satisfaction, He could not, in view of His obedience, suffer eternal death like the damned. The law justifies every one that obeys it, and glorifies every-

¹ *Supra*, pp. 17, 28.

² *Ibid.* p. 22.

one who is just. Justice, therefore, presupposing the decree that some should be saved, required that Christ's obedience should be rewarded, and that He should obtain righteousness and life for those for whom He obeyed. He did not therefore undergo eternal death, but, as God, conquered death, and, as just and obedient, obtained His reward. All the Socinian talk about God's absolute power is mere folly. God's absolute power can do what it will, but not what is unworthy of Himself. If God denies His justice, He denies Himself. He is no private creditor, but Ruler of the universe, and to Him as such belongs the law of punishment, which is not that of absolute sovereignty, to punish or leave unpunished, as He pleases. He is a Judge, and must do justice, punishing the guilty and rewarding the meritorious. But it is said that, if God as Ruler and Judge could so far relax His law as to admit a substitute to make satisfaction, then He could relax it so far as to do without satisfaction altogether. Heidegger, however, unlike Quenstedt,¹ will not admit that there is any relaxation of the law at all in vicarious satisfaction. He calls this a preposterous opinion, and a clear betrayal of the cause.

"There is therefore to be recognized in the transference of punishment to Christ as Surety no relaxation of the law, but its execution ; because, since Christ took our place in bearing punishment, not being separated or divided from us, but most closely joined with us, as Brother appearing on behalf of His brother, . . . whatever He did and suffered for the sake of our salvation, we, as if one with Him, are held to have done and suffered " (81).

Christ's obedience and death are therefore ours. "In Him we underwent the punishment of sin : in Him we fulfilled the righteousness of the law, are absolved

¹ *Supra*, p. 84.

from sin, are pronounced just, and the heirs of life. But by whom? By God, as the just Lawgiver and Judge, not in opposition to, but in agreement with the law, which is eternal, immutable, and irrevocable" (81). There is thus the most absolute satisfaction of God, even in the bestowal of grace.

Finally, the free remission of sins is not opposed to the reality of Christ's satisfaction. "For it is not simply gratuitous, but with the condition of satisfaction, not indeed on the part of the sinner himself, which alone is incompatible with the grace of forgiveness, but on the part of Another, Christ the Surety" (83).

In order to complete the account of Heidegger's doctrine of the obedience of Christ, we may at this stage conveniently turn to loc. XI., "Of the covenant of grace," where he explains the necessity and possibility of Christ's obedience, active as well as passive. Christ as our Surety undertook that obedience to the law, which the first Adam owed through undertaking the covenant of works and then violating it. As the Son of God, Christ was subject to no law, but could nevertheless bind Himself to do that which was necessary in order to an efficacious fulfilment of the law by Himself as Mediator. As regards His Divinity, this work was nothing unworthy of God. But since the obedience of the Mediator was a work of the God-man, the concurrence of the Divine nature in it gives infinite worth to the finite obedience of the man. Again, this very obedience, so far as it is subjection under the law, is the work of the Son of God Himself, emptying Himself and taking the form of a servant in obedience to the Father. To sum up, Christ's exinanition and the efficacy added to His obedience is the work of His Deity: His subjection under the law of the love of God and of His neighbour is the work of His humanity: His complete obedience

availing for salvation is the work of His Person, each nature performing its own part in communion with the other. Moreover, the obedience of Christ had to be consummated both by doing and suffering. Since sinful man was bound both to obedience and to undergo punishment, it was demanded of Christ, as the Mediator taking the sinner's place, that He should both do for man what belongs to the law, and suffer for the transgressor of the law that with which the law threatens him.

"This obedience, then, which was to be consummated both in doing and suffering, had to be purely vicarious; so that Christ had neither to fulfil the law for Himself, nor to die for Himself" (18). It is no difficulty, that Christ, as man and as a creature, owed God obedience and subjection. He did not owe it, like Adam, under the covenant of works, as the condition of obtaining eternal life, but, like the angels and the saints in heaven, under no legal condition. Thus His assumption of Adam's place was purely gratuitous.

Such is the doctrine of the twofold obedience as stated in loc. XI. : we shall now return to loc. XIX., and take up the argument at the point where we left it. Heidegger proceeds to distinguish between satisfaction and merit, inasmuch as Christ both made satisfaction to the Father, and merited life for us. "Merit, in general, is a work which is fittingly followed by a reward" (84). Moreover, merit, in the strict sense, is to be understood as a work that obtains some good, not by mere grace and promise, but by justice, according to the measure of its worth and the rule of strict equivalence. A work to which some good is promised out of proportion to its intrinsic worth (as, for instance, the work of Adam, if he had perfectly performed the law) may be called *meritum ex pacto*. But merit, in the strict sense, attaches to Christ's works

alone, not indeed to those which were merely natural, but to those which were moral and freely undertaken by Him out of love to God and His neighbour even unto death. Here all the conditions of merit, in the strict sense, are found. Christ's works of obedience were of His own, as the works of the God-man. They were unowed, being freely undertaken by Him as our Surety. They have, on account of the dignity of Christ's Person, an exact equivalence with the reward which they have obtained.

This last point is further worked out as follows : " Although this merit (of Christ) is not infinite extensively, in so far as all goods are not included within its ambit, since at least He did not merit for Himself, at the instant of His conception, the hypostatic union and the vision of the Word ; yet His merit is infinite intensively, since it is so great that it cannot be exhausted or equally compensated by any finite reward " (85). It is to be reckoned in view of the innocence, holiness, and obedience of His human nature, and of the eminency of that nature, not in itself, but as united to the Word, but above all in view of the dignity of the Person of the God-man, Whose holiness, as being truly God, is infinite.

" This dignity of Christ's Person cannot but add much to the value of His obedience and to the acceptability of the same with God, so that it was far more as regards merit and acceptability that this One should suffer, than if the whole human race together had undergone eternal punishment. Yet the value of the merit arises, neither from Christ's obedience alone, nor from the dignity of His Person alone, but from both, and from the right of the Son, Whom the Father loves, in Whom alone He has good pleasure, and Whose glory He seeks, and from the right of the righteous Servant, without exclusion also of

His death, in which was the crown and consummation of His obedience" (85).

To take away Christ's vicarious satisfaction, however, is to take away His merit also. The Socinians, Ostorodorus¹ and Veidovius,² profess to acknowledge the merit of Christ "in so far as by His obedience He obtained for Himself glory and heavenly power, and in consequence obtained for us, who believe, eternal salvation, and by His work purchased it as a reward,³ yet so that this merit is not opposed to the grace of God, but subordinate to it". Heidegger, however, insists that Christ's merit is merit, in the strict sense. The connexion between His obedience and our eternal salvation is no loose one, as the Socinians imagine, but of the closest. Christ merited at once for Himself as Head, and for us as His body, glory and life eternal. Apart from this connexion there was no need for Christ, who was rich, by His work to acquire heavenly power as a kind of reward.

As to the subordination of Christ's merit to the Divine grace, Calvin,⁴ taking the word grace loosely, rightly says that "if anyone wishes to oppose Christ simply and by Himself to the Divine grace, there will be no room for merit"; for without grace there would be no gift of Christ, nor acceptance of His merit by God for human salvation. But as far as concerns the merit of Christ's obedience, there is here no grace nor overlooking of imperfection on God's part, but strict justice.

Finally, neither does it take away the merit of Christ that we assert that He has made satisfaction to God, though we recognize that there is no room for merit in the payment of a debt. For He made satisfaction,

¹ Ostorodt, d. A.D. 1611.

² Phil. II. 9; Is. LIII. 12.

³ Woidowski, d. after A.D. 1619.

⁴ "Inst." II. 17, 1.

not to His own creditor, but to another's, paying a debt for others, in which kind of case satisfaction and merit well agree together.

The effects of Christ's satisfaction and merit were as follows :—

(1) Above all, that He manifested the holiness of God as the Justifier of the ungodly without unrighteousness.

(2) He established the gospel of justification by faith, manifesting the love of God, Who gave His Son to die for us.

(3) Besides, He obtained reconciliation with God, and

(4) Deliverance from sin, from the writing over against us, and from bondage to rudiments, together with peace between Jews and Gentiles.

(5) Beyond all this, He merited, for those for whom He made satisfaction, the Holy Spirit, regeneration, and faith.

The Romanists are therefore not much better than the Socinians, in that they limit the effect of the satisfaction of Christ to the removal of original sin and of actual sin before baptism, moreover of mortal sin, but not venial sin, after baptism, and as far as concerns the guilt of sin and the obligation of eternal punishment, but not as concerns that of temporal punishment; in that they also assert that for what remains men must make satisfaction for themselves; and in that they deny that Christ in His soul suffered the pains of hell, so as to free us from the tortures of hell.¹

The Remonstrants² also all but abolish the satisfaction and merit of Christ, asserting that Christ died, in order that God the Father might have the right to con-

¹ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 220, 221, 226, 284, 290.

² *Supra*, p. 98, n. 1.

tract with us anew, on what terms He pleased, concerning forgiveness and justification. But while Christ's obedience and death stand, there can be no other way of obtaining justification; and those, who are justified thereby, are not justified by any legal contract, but purely by grace; and, being united to Christ by faith, are regenerated and purified in heart.

Heidegger goes on to uphold, against the Remonstrants, the limitation of the work of Christ.

"For whom Christ made satisfaction, for the same He offered Himself and died, bore their sins, and bought and redeemed the same for Himself by His own precious blood. For these are parallel phrases in Scripture" (91).

Entirely nugatory is the distinction, that Christ merited, sufficiently for all, but efficiently only for a few. Although in itself the merit of Christ is infinite, yet in the counsel of God it was only paid for those for whom it effected salvation. What kind of efficiency or merit is that which does not produce salvation? What kind of application is it, which is merely in potency and not in act, until the further condition of faith has been realized? The result is, that, if men do not believe, Christ's merit goes for nought.

In dealing with the Scriptural arguments for a universal satisfaction, Heidegger first emphasizes the passages in which Christ is said to have died for His friends,¹ or for His sheep, or for many; he then urges that, where Christ is said to have died for all, the sense must be that He died for all the elect. This, he says, is quite clear from the context in such a passage as 2 Cor. v. 15-19. He points out that in Rom. xi. 32; 1 Cor. xv. 22, "all" can only refer to those who are Christ's.² As regards the argument from passages in which Christ is said to have died for the reprobate, Heidegger takes

¹ Jn. xv. 13.

² Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 23.

them one by one and gives them a different sense. 2 Pet. II. 1 refers to not a real redemption, but to an external calling and external inclusion in the Church only. In Heb. x. 29 ἐν ᾧ ἡγιασθη refers to Christ, not to the unbeliever. Rom. XIV. 15 does not imply the ruin of those for whom Christ died, but only their attempted ruin.

As regards the argument that Christ died for all, because all are bound to believe in Him, Heidegger says that, while the non-elect are bound to believe the truth concerning Christ, to believe in Him belongs to the elect only. Finally, Heidegger appeals to Christian experience. The foundation of our consolation is to know that Christ died for us; but if Christ died for some who are to be damned, we do not know that we are included in the benefit of His death. It is not in virtue of our common humanity, but of our faith, that we have communion with His death.

The third part of the sacrifice of Christ is the offering in heaven of the sacrifice slain on earth, in that Christ appears before the Father for us, pleading His blood, interceding, and making propitiation.

Christ indeed had already prayed on earth, both for Himself and for others; but His intercession in heaven is altogether of another quality. He no longer falls on His knees, using strong crying and tears, and making deprecatory supplication to an angry Father; but, presenting His sacrifice, He demands in the strength of it, that His heritage be given Him. It is therefore intercession or prayer in a figure, not in the strict sense (though that is not unbecoming Christ as man). It consists in Christ's perpetual advocacy for those who have been given Him.

The Socinians overthrow this heavenly intercession equally with the merit of Christ: (1) in that they deny

its basis in Christ's sacrifice on earth, (2) in that they confound it with the Kingship of Christ.

"The Kingly office of Christ is that whereby He governs His Church by His Word and Spirit, and defends and preserves it against all enemies" (98).

The Kingly power deserved to be conferred on Christ, because He had obtained it by His death, and had acquired for Himself as His payment a people for His own possession. It belongs to Christ as Mediator and Saviour of His body. Christ possesses as God, in common with the Father and with the Holy Spirit, an essential Kingdom over all creatures, whom God made by the Word alone, and by the Word preserves and governs. As God-man and Mediator He has a personal Kingdom over the Church or the elect only, in whose hearts He operates by the efficacy of His Word and Spirit. Nevertheless, Christ's mediatorial Kingdom, if regard is had to the fulness of power, which He possesses in it over heaven and earth, differs from His essential Kingdom, not in fact, but in idea only. In it also He is of one substance with the Father; nor can He exercise His personal Kingdom over the Church apart from His essential Kingdom over the world. This personal Kingdom, moreover, Christ even as God maintains not outside of or against, but according to the will of the Father. As God and Mediator, He can do all He will. But He wills nothing, but what is pleasing to the Father. Thus, in that Christ reigns, God does not retire from the throne of His Majesty, or give over His Kingdom to Christ.

Christ performs His office of King differently as God and as Man. As God, He rules in His own right to the edification, protection, and glorification of the Church. He rules as Man, not as Lord of the World, but as the mandatory of the Father, using a finite and

dependent power. The Socinians are inconsistent, in that they assign to Christ a dependent power, but make Him use it with an independent will. On the contrary, the will of God and Christ are one.

Christ's Kingdom is not of this world, nor after the manner of this world, but is inward, spiritual, and heavenly. It has a heavenly origin in the Divine Wisdom. Its concern is with heavenly things. Its law is spiritual, written on the heart by the Spirit of God. Its worship is spiritual: its subjects are spiritual men. Its goods are heavenly and spiritual; and its means, the Word of God, His Spirit and faith, are all spiritual. Even its enemies are spiritual, viz. Satan and his Kingdom, over whom Christ triumphs by His cross.

Finally, the Kingdom of Christ is eternal; as Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Not even in heaven, after the end of the world, will Christ give up His mediatorial Kingdom. The action of the Mediator will indeed cease to be by merit, as His merit will have done its work; but He will still bestow the gift of life upon His people.

The Socinians corrupt the doctrine of the kingly office, in that they make Christ God's Colleague under the New Testament dispensation only, whereas, according to them, under the Old Testament dispensation God ruled alone.¹ To recite such opinions is to refute them.

§ 3. THE LUTHERAN AND THE REFORMED DOCTRINES COMPARED

We now proceed to institute a comparison between the Lutheran and Reformed doctrines of the work of

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 15, 31, on the Socinian substitution for the Logos doctrine of an adoptionist Christology.

Christ, as illustrated by Quenstedt and Heidegger respectively.¹

(1) It is the common doctrine of both Confessions that the mediatorial office is exercised in both natures. Against Lombard, Stancarus, and Piscator they unitedly assert that the office of Christ is *theanthropic*. Nevertheless the greater stress which the Reformed theology lays on the humanity of Christ manifests itself throughout the entire doctrine of His office in various important ways.

(2) As regards the prophetic office, there is a noteworthy agreement between the Confessions as to its fundamentally evangelical character. Both Lutherans and Reformed, in opposition to the patristic, mediaeval, Socinian, and Arminian idea of Christianity as a new law, assert the practical perfection of the decalogue, and regard Christianity on its moral side as no more than a re-affirmation and true interpretation of the same.

On the other hand, the difference between the Confessions in the conception of Christ's Person² comes out in their respective ideas of the efficacy of His teaching. The Lutherans think of it as flowing directly from His Divinity; whereas the Reformed lay stress on the confirmation of His teaching by His holy life and example, and also by the sending of the Spirit into the hearts of believers.

(3) In both Confessions the priestly office, and especially that part of it which is occupied with the work of satisfaction, holds the centre of the field. The *locus de satisfactione* is invariably treated with great care and at great length. The general view of the satisfaction as a

¹ See also Schmid, "Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche," ⁶, 1863, pp. 284-312; Schweizer, "Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche," II. 1847, pp. 356-412; Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. pp. 234 ff.

² *Supra*, pp. 8-9.

temperamentum misericordiae et justitiae is the same in both Confessions. Both Lutherans and Reformed in general assert an absolute necessity of satisfaction ; both trace this necessity to the Divine justice, and in opposition to the Socinian view state that in this question God must be regarded, not as *dominus*, but as Governor and Judge. Quenstedt and Heidegger well illustrate the above statements : there is, however, in some few Reformed theologians a tendency to follow Calvin¹ in making the necessity of satisfaction depend ultimately on the Divine decree.² It is to be remembered also that even Quenstedt in one place³ allows the distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*. In general, however, the antithesis to Socinianism causes a return to the extreme Anselmic doctrine of an absolutely necessary satisfaction. So in another place Quenstedt reduces the distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata* to nothing.⁴

Nextly, however, whatever weakening there may or may not be among the Reformed on the point of the absolute necessity of satisfaction, the Reformed as well as the Lutherans equally assert its infinite value and sufficiency, and also its perfection and sole sufficiency, so that no other satisfaction needs to be added to it or even grounded upon it. The later theology of both confessions adopts more and more the exact Anselmic doctrine as regards the infinity of Christ's satisfaction. It obtains its infinite value from His Divine nature, and is the exact equivalent of the infinity of sin. Moreover, both Lutherans and Reformed, with a view to exhibiting the equivalence of the sufferings of Christ with the punishment which ought to have been suffered by sinners, maintain

¹ "Inst." II. 17.

² Ritschl, op. cit. pp. 243 ff.

³ Loc. cit. sect. II. qu. 7. Cf. *supra*, p. 91.

⁴ Sect. I. Thes. 31. Cf. *supra*, p. 82.

the doctrine that He bore on the cross the very pains of hell.

The great and controversial difference between the two Confessions is of course as to the extent of Christ's satisfaction. The controversy was mainly fought out on grounds of Scripture, whence texts could be brought on both sides. In reality, however, the settlement of the question turned on the theological difference, that the Reformed allowed the doctrine of predestination at this point a controlling influence over the doctrine of the work of Christ, which the Lutherans did not. The Reformed were from the first more possessed of a systematic interest in theology than the Lutherans. While the Lutherans were content to preserve the experimental and anthropological standpoint of the doctrine of justification by faith, the Reformed preferred to view all things from the ultimate or Divine standpoint, and their method is, not anthropological, but strictly theological. Schweizer has said that the doctrines of justification and of predestination are the mid-points respectively of the Lutheran and the Reformed statements of the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism.¹

It may here be pointed out in connexion with this difference that the Reformed theology is in general marked by a greater confidence in reason than is the Lutheran, as may be clearly seen in a comparison of the way in which Quenstedt and Heidegger treat the Socinian objections to the doctrine of satisfaction. While Heidegger throughout maintains the rationality of the doctrine, Quenstedt again and again admits that Socinus would be right, were it not for the Divine decree.

As regards the matter of the satisfaction, there is a general agreement that it consists in both the active and

¹ "Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der reformirten Kirche," 1854 f. i. p. 16.

passive obedience of Christ. Nevertheless there is a considerable difference between Lutherans and Reformed in their way of stating this common doctrine, a difference which is the result of their different attitude to the doctrine of the Person of Christ. The Lutherans regard Christ as the God-man as altogether above the law. Hence His active, as well as His passive, obedience is purely vicarious. For the Reformed, Christ as man is under the law, consequently the vicarious character of His active obedience has to be maintained in a different way. They teach that since Christ only became man for our sakes, His individual fulfilment of the law pertains to His satisfaction and merit just as much as does His suffering and death.

Finally, both Confessions agree in consequence that Christ merited only for us and not for Himself, and disallow the doctrine of Lombard and Socinus on this point.

(4) As regards the kingly office there is a difference between Lutherans and Reformed, which follows from their difference in Christology. The Reformed exclude from the Kingly office of Christ as Mediator the Kingdom of power, as it is defined by the Lutherans, i.e. the dominion of the Logos over the world before and independently of the Incarnation.

Schneckenburger (quoted by Schweizer, "Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche," II. p. 410) thus points out the difference between the two opposing views: For the Reformed "there can be no talk of the absolute coincidence of the Divine government of the world in general with the Kingdom of Christ, in the sense that the Lutheran system speaks of it as *regnum potentiae*. Christ as Logos shares in the government of the world, but as God-man He exercises over the world a power which is merely finite. Not what belongs to

nature as such, but what has in some degree become the Church, has been delivered over to His Mediatorship." Christ's gracious sway over the Church includes a victorious dominion over its enemies, such as in the Bible is generally connected with the Messianic office. This is the *regnum potentiae* in the Reformed sense.

So much then for the comparison of the Lutheran and Reformed scholasticism. If, in conclusion, we ask what it is in both, that carries the whole view of the threefold office, and maintains it against the acutest Socinian dialectic, the reply is that it is Luther's new intuition, the fundamental conviction that Christianity is not partly law and partly grace, but rather a union of opposites, a religion which is all grace, and yet has law in its bosom. It is this conviction which makes the orthodox scholasticism not only impervious to all Socinian attacks, but also resistant even of such a modification of Socinianism as Arminianism. It is not reason, but the *fides salvifica* as warranted by Scripture, which supports the tremendous fabric. The greater confidence in reason which Heidegger exhibits over against Quenstedt moves after all only within the presuppositions of the *fides salvifica*. Quenstedt is merely more conscious throughout that his doctrine rests upon an antinomy.

CHAPTER VII

THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND

§ 1. HOOKER AND PEARSON

IN contrast with the theology of the Continent that of the Church of England was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries little systematic, but rather Biblical and patristic. Of the Anglican theology of the sixteenth century Gass says as follows :—¹

“It was accustomed to find its office concluded in the exposition, defence, or proof of the Biblical material, without recognizing as necessary as a final operation its scientific appropriation. The scientific factor therefore did not maintain the balance with that of Biblical learning. Again, it has already been pointed out that along with this Biblical standpoint was united an extraordinary veneration for ecclesiastical antiquity, and at times also an unlimited idea of the splendour of the Apostolic age. The conviction, that Protestantism aims only at removing inherited errors and abuses, without attempting anything new, finds far sharper expression in the English than in the German Church. Its literature lays the greatest stress on the predicate of Catholicity and on the praise of agreement with the first centuries.”

The Church of England, in fact, retained in her liturgy a special connexion with the past, such as no Continental Protestant Church possesses, and it was

¹ “Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik,” III. p. 301.

precisely round about this point of contact with antiquity that the theological controversy of the sixteenth century chiefly turned. When Protestantism was re-established under Elizabeth, many of those who had been exiles on the Continent during the Marian persecution, returned with the idea of bringing the Church of England into line with the Protestantism of the Continent. The question was, not primarily of doctrine, but of polity. While the conservative party wished to retain the liturgy and the Episcopal system connected with it, the Puritans, as they were called, wished to remodel the Church according to the Presbyterian discipline instituted by Calvin at Geneva. The great work of Anglican theology in the sixteenth century is consequently a defence of the existing institutions of the Church of England. It is the famous "Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity" of Richard Hooker (A.D. 1553-1600), whose primary purpose is to repel the Puritan attack upon the Anglican system. Hooker's appeal is to reason and to ecclesiastical antiquity. His general position, which is based on the mediæval scholasticism, especially upon Thomas, is that man is under a system of law imposed by God. There is first the natural law which leads him to imitate God's goodness. This, however, in view of sin is insufficient, and God has therefore added in Scripture the supernatural law of faith in Christ; faith that is not without, but includes, hope and love.¹ Scripture, however, does not altogether displace reason. "The Scriptures which contain the supernatural light, presuppose the existence of a natural light. . . . In the use of this natural light we should not despise the judgment of grave and learned men. Here we learn a reverence for antiquity, and the order established by those who have lived before us."²

¹ "Eccles. Polity," I. 11.

² Hunt, "Religious Thought in England," 1870 f. I. p. 59.

Upon these principles, then, Hooker defends the Anglican system ; his doctrine of the work of Christ is naturally introduced in the exposition of the Sacraments, as their basis. In accordance with his esteem for antiquity both the Incarnation and the Sacraments are interpreted along patristic lines, though the influence of the schoolmen, in particular of Thomas, is also unmistakable.

“The use of Sacraments is but only in this life, yet so, that they here concern a far better life than this, and are for that cause accompanied with grace which worketh salvation. Sacraments are the powerful instruments of God to eternal life. For as our natural life consisteth in the union of the body with the soul, so our life supernatural in the union of the soul with God. And forasmuch as there is no union of God with man, without that mean between both, which is both ; it seemeth requisite that we must first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the Sacraments do serve to make us partakers of Christ ” (“ Eccles. Polity,” v. 50).

Hooker, therefore, begins with the Incarnation : if we ask for the cause of this incomprehensible mystery, it “ seemeth a thing unconsonant that the world should honour any other as the Saviour, but Him whom it honoureth as the Creator of the world, and in the wisdom of God it hath not been thought convenient to admit any way of saving man but by man himself ” (51). Again, if it be asked, why the Son, rather than the Father or the Holy Ghost, became incarnate : “ Could we, which are born the children of wrath, be adopted the sons of God through grace, any other than the natural Son of God being Mediator between God and us ? ” (*ibid.*). Yet the necessity of the Incarnation was not absolute. “ The world’s salvation was without the Incarnation of the Son a thing impossible ; not simply impossible, but

impossible, it being presupposed that the will of God was no otherwise to have it saved than by the death of His own Son " (*ibid.*).

The Incarnation then took place that Christ might offer a sacrifice in human nature for us, and also that as man He might after His death continue to intercede for us, and rule over us.

" Taking to Himself our flesh, and by His Incarnation making it His own flesh, He had now of His own, although from us, what to offer unto God for us. And as Christ took manhood, that by it He might be capable of death, whereunto He humbled Himself ; so, because manhood is the proper subject of compassion and feeling pity, which maketh the sceptre of Christ's regency even in the kingdom of heaven be amiable, He which without our nature could not on earth suffer for the sins of the world, doth now also, by means thereof, both make intercession to God for sinners, and exercise dominion over all men with a true, a natural, and a sensible touch of mercy " (*ibid.*).

Such is the first summary account of the work of Christ given by Hooker, representing Him as Priest and King. It is not, however, Hooker's whole theory ; but requires to be supplemented by passages scattered through the following chapters on the Incarnation and the Sacraments, in which the central thought is the ancient patristic idea of the communication of salvation to humanity, involved in the very Incarnation itself. In the Incarnation the Person of the Lord was united, not to a single man, but to humanity in general.

" It pleased not the Word, or Wisdom of God, to take to itself some one person amongst men, for then should that one have been advanced, which was assumed, and no more ; but wisdom to the end that she might save many, built her house of that nature which is common unto

all, she made not this or that man her habitation, but dwelt *in us* " (52).

Both the natures indeed were with their properties in Christ distinct ; yet the human nature derives sundry advantages from its union with the Word. As Hooker puts it, following Thomas (" Summa Theol." III. 7, 1) :¹ " Christ is by three degrees a receiver : first, in that He is the Son of God : secondly, in that His human nature hath had the honour of union with Deity bestowed upon it ; thirdly, in that by means thereof sundry eminent graces have flowed as effects from Deity into that nature which is coupled with it. On Christ, therefore, is bestowed the gift of eternal generation, the gift of union, and the gift of unction " (54).

The gift of union and the gift of unction are the fruits of the Incarnation. " The union therefore of the flesh with Deity, is to that flesh a gift of principal grace and favour. For, by virtue of this grace, man is really made God, a creature is exalted above the dignity of all creatures, and hath all creatures else under it " (*ibid.*). While the person of the Son of God attained nothing by assuming human nature except " to be capable of loss and detriment for the good of others," human nature was exalted in the Incarnation by union with the Divine nature. " The very cause of His taking upon Himself our nature, was to change it, to better the quality, and to advance the condition thereof, although in no case to abolish the substance which He took ; nor to confuse into it the natural forces and properties of His Deity. . . . For albeit the natural properties of Deity be not communicable to man's nature, the supernatural gifts, graces, and effects thereof are " (*ibid.*).

Finally, the grace of unction replenished both the

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 274. The correspondence is not exact.

soul and body of Christ with all things necessary to the economy of salvation which He had undertaken.

We have next to see how the supernatural gifts, graces, and effects of the Incarnation become the property of a special Divine offspring among men. This takes place, firstly, by predestination.

“We are by nature the sons of Adam. When God created Adam, He created us; and as many as are descended from Adam have in themselves the root out of which they spring. The sons of God we neither are all nor any one of us otherwise than only by grace and favour. The sons of God have God’s own natural Son as a second Adam from heaven, whose race and progeny they are by spiritual and heavenly birth. God therefore loving eternally His Son, He must needs eternally in Him have loved and preferred before all others, them which are spiritually sithence descended and sprung out of Him” (56).

To this union with Christ by predestination must be added, however, a union by actual sacramental incorporation into the Lord.

“Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth us not without our actual and real adoption into the fellowship of His saints in this present world. For in Him we actually are by our actual incorporation into that society which hath Him for their Head, and doth make with Him one Body (He and they in that respect having one name); for which cause, by virtue of this mystical conjunction we are of Him, and in Him, even as though our very flesh and bones should be made continue with His” (*ibid.*).

As a consequence, then, of such sacramental incorporation in the body of Christ we are saved by union with Him, and participation in the benefits which human nature in Him receives from union with the Deity.

“Adam is in us an original cause of our nature, and of that corruption of nature which causeth death ; Christ as the cause of original restoration to life. The person of Adam is not in us, but his nature, and the corruption of his nature derived unto all men by propagation ; Christ, having Adam’s nature as we have, but incorrupt, deriveth not nature but incorruption, and that immediately from His own person, into all that belong unto Him. . . . That which quickeneth us is the Spirit of the Second Adam, and His flesh that wherewith He quickeneth. That which in Him made our nature uncorrupt, was the union of His Deity with our nature. And in that respect the sentence of death and condemnation, which only taketh hold upon sinful flesh, could no way possibly extend unto Him. This caused His voluntary death to prevail with God and to have the force of an expiatory sacrifice. The blood of Christ, as the Apostle witnesseth, doth therefore take away sin, because “Through the eternal Spirit He offered Himself unto God without spot”. That which sanctified our nature in Christ, that which made it a sacrifice available to take away sin, is the same which quickeneth it, raiseth it out of the grave after death, and exalted it unto glory. Seeing, therefore, that Christ is in us as a quickening Spirit, the first degree of communion with Christ must needs consist in the participation of His Spirit” (*ibid.*).

But union with Christ affects the body also.

“For, doth any man doubt, but that even from the flesh of Christ our very bodies do receive that life which shall make them glorious at the latter day ; and for which they are already accounted parts of His blessed body ? Our corruptible bodies would never live the life they shall live, were it not that here they are joined with His body which is incorruptible, and that His is in ours as a cause of immortality, a cause by

removing through the death and merit of His own flesh that which hindered the life of ours" (*ibid.*).

Moreover, Christ both purges away sin and renews men to holiness and immortality; the latter is His primary work, but cannot be done without the other.

"This much no Christian man will deny, that when Christ sanctified His own flesh, giving as God and taking as man the Holy Ghost, He did not this for Himself only, but for our sakes, that the grace of sanctification and life, which was first received in Him, might pass from Him to His whole race, as malediction came from Adam unto all mankind. Howbeit, because the work of His Spirit to these effects is in us prevented by sin and death, possessing us as before; it is of necessity that as well our present sanctification unto newness of life, as the future restoration of our bodies, should presuppose a participation of the grace, efficacy, merit, or virtue of His body and blood; without which foundation first laid, there is no place for those other operations of the Spirit of Christ to ensue."

Finally, Christ dwells in men by different degrees. All partake of Him, working as the Creator and Governor of the world by providence; not all partake of Him in a saving way. And amongst those who do thus partake of Him, there are degrees of grace. But, wherever He is savingly partaken of, there is both imputation of His righteousness and real habitual infusion of His grace.

"Thus we participate Christ, partly by imputation, as when those things which He did and suffered are imputed unto us for righteousness; partly by habitual and real infusion, as when grace is inwardly bestowed while we are on earth, and afterwards more fully both our souls and bodies made like His in glory."

The above extended quotations were necessary in order to show the full range of Hooker's doctrine, which

contains within it considerably different elements. It is clear that the fundamental stratum is derived from the patristic theology: yet there are elements in it which take us beyond the Fathers. The doctrine of Christ's grace and merit comes from the schoolmen, and Hooker to a certain extent follows them in translating the patristic mysticism into their more rational theory, which, treating Christ as an individual, endeavours to show how the results of His work accrue to others, a point which the patristic doctrine, taking His humanity as not individual but universal, regarded as needing next to no explanation.¹ Finally, in the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness we have the legacy of the Reformation. In the end, however, the general impression left is that of the massive and unanalytic patristic theory; the elements which take us beyond this appear as mere superficial additions to it, which hardly alter the total effect. There is no doubt that Hooker felt himself substantially in harmony with the Fathers in his view of the work of Christ, and cared little to go beyond them in the attempt either to clarify or to supplement their theory. We may say, then, that the classical theology of the Church of England began its course with what is to all intents a return to the patristic doctrine of the subject. This result is important, as it gives the key to much that is interesting in the later development of Anglican theology.

In the seventeenth century the inheritance of Hooker begins to be divided between the High Church party on the one hand and the Latitudinarians, the precursors of the Deists, on the other hand. Hooker's appeal was at once to antiquity and to reason, and these two schools appropriated each one of these fundamental elements of his theology. The High Church party emphasized the agreement of the Anglican Church with antiquity, and

¹ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 184, 236 f., 245 f.

kept along the lines of the patristic theology, as reintroduced by Hooker. On the contrary, the Latitudinarians kept the appeal to reason, and carried it to results which Hooker had not contemplated. In the seventeenth century, however, systematic theology is still in the background in the Church of England. Gass¹ says of the Anglican theology of this century as follows: "We may say that Biblical research and the science of ecclesiastical antiquities, Apologetics, Polemics, Patristics along with the writing of monographs on Church history, are those studies in which English theology excelled. A dogmatic literature in the narrower and proper sense even now came into being only in a small degree, and the reasons of this want are clear from the ecclesiastical and scientific conditions. The whole efforts of the Church were from the beginning onwards directed to the establishment and defence of the faith and the polity; in this work and in the scholarly appropriation of material on all sides theological keenness exhausted itself."

The most famous Anglican dogmatic work of the period is in fact not a systematic theology, but in agreement with the genius of the Church of England an "Exposition of the (Apostles') Creed," viz. the well-known work of Pearson (d. A.D. 1686).² He, though he took the part of the Prayer Book against the Puritans, was not an extreme Churchman, but was thought by the Puritans to have some sympathy with them.³ While, therefore, in his great work the patristic learning and tradition of the English Church are fully exhibited, it is not surprising to find that his theology is largely dependent on the Protestant theology of the Continent.

¹ Op. cit. III. p. 303.

² The first edition of the "Exposition" appeared in 1659.

³ Hunt, op. cit. pp. 295, 307, n. 2.

It is natural that, in accordance with the plan of Pearson's book as an exposition of the Creed, the material of the doctrine of the work of Christ is introduced in connexion with the different articles of the Creed, particularly in the form of reasons why they should be believed. First of all (Art. II.), under the head of the words, "And in Jesus Christ," the doctrine of Christ's Messiahship is unfolded, which leads on to that of His threefold office as Prophet, Priest, and King. This is developed, as it is by Calvin,¹ in connexion with the meaning of the name Messiah. Under the Old Testament prophets, priests, and kings were anointed, and the Divine administration of the people of Israel consisted in these three functions, the prophetical, the regal, and the sacerdotal. In the Messiah, in whom the old dispensation came to an end, the three functions are united, so that Jesus was anointed at once as Prophet, Priest, and King. Such is Pearson's doctrine in full agreement with Calvin: it is characteristic, however, that he supports it by patristic references, the most important of which are to Eusebius.²

The significance of the three offices is further explained as follows:—

"Again: the redemption or salvation which the Messiah was to bring, consisteth in the freeing of a sinner from the state of sin and eternal death into a state of righteousness and eternal life. Now a freedom from sin in respect of the guilt could not be wrought without a sacrifice propitiatory, and therefore there was a necessity of a priest; a freedom from sin in respect of the dominion could not be obtained without a revelation of the will of God, and of His wrath against all ungodliness, therefore there was also need of a prophet: a translation from the state of death unto eternal life is

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 429.

² *Ibid.* p. 441, n. 1.

not to be effected without absolute authority and irresistible power, therefore a king was also necessary."

There follows a more detailed development of the doctrine under each of the three offices, from which I select three additional quotations :—

(1) "The prophetic function consisteth in the promulgation, confirmation, and perpetuation of the doctrine containing the will of God for the service of men."

(2) "When Jesus had given Himself a propitiatory sacrifice for sins, He ascended up on high, and entered into the Holy of Holies not made with hands, and there appeared before God as an atonement for our sin. Nor is He prevalent only in His own oblation once offered, but in His constant intercession."

(3) "This regal office of our Saviour consisteth partly in the ruling, protecting, and rewarding of His people ; partly in the coercing, condemnation, and destroying of His enemies. First, He ruleth in His own people by delivering them a law in which they walk ; by furnishing them with His grace, by which they are enabled to walk in it. Secondly, He protecteth the same, by helping them to subdue their lusts which reign in their mortal bodies ; by preserving them from the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil ; by supporting them in all their afflictions ; by delivering them from all their enemies, whether they were temporal or spiritual enemies."

Under the words "His Only Son," Pearson brings in the Divinity of Christ as the ground of His making adequate satisfaction for the sins of men. Here he virtually writes out Anselm's argument.

"If we be truly sensible of our sins, we must acknowledge that in every one we have offended God ; and the gravity of the offence must needs increase proportionably to the dignity of the party offended in respect of the offender ; because the more worthy any person is,

the more reverence is due unto Him, and every injury tendeth to his dishonour : but between God and man there is an infinite disproportion ; and therefore every offence committed against Him must be esteemed as in the highest degree of injury. Again : as the gravity of the offence beareth proportion to the person offended, so the value of reparation ariseth from the dignity of the person satisfying ; because the satisfaction consisteth in a reparation of the honour which by the injury was eclipsed ; and all honour doth increase proportionably as the person yielding it is honourable. If, then, by every sin we have offended God, who is of infinite eminency, according unto which the injury is aggravated ; how shall we ever be sure of our reconciliation unto God, except the Person who hath undertaken to make the reparation be of the same infinite dignity, so as the honour rendered by His obedience may prove proportionable to the offence and that dishonour which arose from our disobedience ? This scruple is no otherwise to be satisfied than by a belief in such a Mediator as is the only-begotten Son of God, of the same substance with the Father, and consequently of the same power and dignity with the God whom by our sins we have offended."

Belief in the Divinity of Christ is therefore necessary for the confirmation of our faith concerning the redemption of mankind : it is also necessary "to raise us to a thankful acknowledgment of the infinite love of God, appearing in the sending of His only-begotten Son into the world to die for sinners".

We can, says Pearson, never make an adequate return for the love of God, unless we have the proper sense of its infinity, which is impossible apart from the recognition of the infinite dignity of Christ.

The conception of Christ, through the Holy Ghost, by the Virgin Mary (Art. III.), was necessary to His sinless-

ness, which again was necessary that He might be a sacrifice for sin.

Christ's sufferings (Art. iv.) were necessary "for the redemption of lapsed men, and their reconciliation unto God ; which was not otherwise to be performed than by a plenary satisfaction to His will"; they were also necessary that Christ "might purchase thereby eternal happiness in the heavens both for Himself the Head, and for the members of His body. They were, once more, necessary to make Him our compassionate High Priest and our example in suffering."

Christ's death (*ibid.*) by crucifixion proclaims that He bore the curse for us, and cancelled it. "The death of Christ is the most intimate and essential part of the mediatorship, and that which most intrinsically concerns every office and function of the Mediator, as He was Prophet, Priest, and King."

It was necessary, as regards the prophetic office, that Christ should die in order to the confirmation of His doctrine. As regards the priestly office, His death was necessary, both as a satisfaction for sins, and as qualifying Christ for His High Priesthood. As regards the kingly office, it was necessary, that Christ might overcome the principalities and powers, and that He might win the name above every name.

Christ's descent into hell (Art. v.) is explained as meaning that His soul, being separated from His body, passed into the places below, where the souls of men departed are. This Christ undertook to satisfy the law of death ; but because there was no sin in Him, and He had fully satisfied for the sins of others, God did not leave His soul in hell, thus giving security of never coming under the power of Satan to all those who belong to Him.

Christ's resurrection (*ibid.*) is necessary as the ground of our faith in His Divinity, as manifesting our justifica-

tion, and as the confirmation of our hope. His ascension (Art. VI.) also confirms our faith and hope, and exalts our affections heavenward. His sitting at the right hand of God (*ibid.*) manifests His regal power, and also His gracious intercession.

To sum up the results of this exposition of Pearson's teaching: it amounts practically to Calvin's doctrine of the threefold office with the addition of the Anselmic theory of satisfaction. Pearson helps us to realize the existence of another line of tradition in Anglican theology besides that of Hooker.

§ 2. OWEN

Fairbairn has distinguished the Anglican doctrine from the Puritan doctrine, which was opposed to it, by designating the former as *institutional*, the latter as *theological*.

"The earliest controversies in the English Church may be said to have been between two conceptions—whether the actual Church ought to be brought into harmony with the ideal, or whether the actual was not the ideal Church. This of course involved a difference of ideals rather than of actuals: the ideal, in the one case, was theological and abstract, a society constructed according to the mind and will of God; but in the other case it was political and concrete, the society which the wisdom of the past had created and the piety of the present was bound to preserve and administer."¹

The Puritan theology is, therefore, not bound by the existing institution, its polity and creeds, but, on the contrary, like the Calvinistic theology of the Continent, which it closely follows, aims at a systematic construction of the faith, on the basis of the revelation given in the Scriptures. It was, above all, the idea of absolute

¹ "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," ⁵, p. 180.

predestination, which dominated the greatest of the Puritan theologians, John Owen (A.D. 1616-1688), whose treatise on the work of Christ, "The Death of Death in the Death of Christ" (1647), is entirely consecrated to the complete subjugation of the doctrine to this idea. Owen's treatise is one continuous attack upon the doctrine of universal redemption as taught by the Arminians. Included in the polemic, moreover, are the various schools of Calvinism which had in some degree modified the extreme vigour of its predestinarian doctrine, above all, the School of Saumur with its hypothetic universalism.¹ It is to be observed that while not only the Puritans, but also the Anglicans, had in the Elizabethan era followed Calvin as regards predestination, in the seventeenth century Arminianism had largely become the doctrine of the Anglicans, while the Puritans remained in general true to Calvinism, though with some it was a modified Calvinism.

Owen argues that Christ's work is to be understood from its end or purpose. "By the end of the death of Christ we mean in general, both,—first, that which His Father and Himself intended in it; and, secondly, that which was effectually fulfilled and accomplished by it."² As to the first point, Scripture declares that the end of Christ's work intended by God Himself was the saving of sinners, not indeed of all sinners, but of those who believe, and constitute the Church. As to the second point, the effect and actual product of Christ's work is reconciliation with God, justification, sanctification, adoption, and future glory.

"Thus full, clear, and evident are the expressions in the Scripture concerning the ends and effects of the death of Christ, that a man might think every one might run

¹ *Supra*, p. 8.

² "The Works of John Owen," Vol. X, Edin. 1842, p. 157.

and read. But we must stay : among all things in the Christian religion, there is scarce anything more questioned than this, which seems to be a most fundamental principle. A spreading persuasion there is of a general ransom to be paid by Christ for all ; that He died to redeem all and every one,—not only for many, His Church, the elect of God, but for every one also of the posterity of Adam. Now, the masters of this opinion do see full well and easily, that if that be the end of the death of Christ which we have from the Scripture asserted, if those before recounted be the immediate fruits and products thereof, then one of these two things will necessarily follow :—that either first, God and Christ failed of their end proposed and did not accomplish that which they intended, the death of Christ being not a fitly-proportioned means for the attaining of that end (for any cause of failing cannot be assigned) ; which to assert seems to us blasphemously injurious to the wisdom, power, and perfection of God, as likewise derogatory to the worth and value of the death of Christ ;—or else, that all men, all the posterity of Adam, must be saved, purged, sanctified, and glorified ; which surely they will not maintain, at least the Scripture and the woeful experience of millions will not allow. Wherefore to cast a tolerable colour upon their persuasion, they must and do deny that God or His Son had any such absolute aim or end in the death or bloodshedding of Jesus Christ, or that any such thing was immediately procured and purchased by it, as we before recounted ; but that God intended nothing, neither was there anything effected by Christ—that no benefit ariseth to any immediately by His death but what is common to all and every soul, though never so cursedly unbelieving here and eternally damned hereafter, until an act of some, not procured for them by Christ (for if it were, why have they it not all alike ?),

to wit, faith, do distinguish them from others ” (pp. 159, 160).

The above lengthy quotation practically sums up the whole substance of Owen’s book. Against the Arminian position he advances the argument, that its inevitable implication is that Christ’s work has in reality done nothing at all, since it has actually and effectively saved no one. This argument is put in many ways and from many points of view, but the different forms which it takes always come back to the same essential point.

After naming the Trinity as the agent in the work of Christ, and assigning to each Person His proper part in it (cf. Quenstedt and Heidegger), Owen distinguishes, as its two parts, Christ’s oblation and intercession.

“ By His oblation we do not design only the particular offering up of Himself upon the cross an offering to His Father, as the Lamb of God without spot or blemish, when He bare our sins or carried them up with Him in His own body on the tree, which was the sum and complement of His oblation and that wherein it did chiefly consist ; but also His whole humiliation, or state of emptying Himself, whether by yielding voluntary obedience unto the law, as being made under it, that He might be the end thereof to them that believe,¹ or by His subjection to the curse of the law, in the antecedent misery and suffering of life, as well as by submitting to death, the death of the cross : for no action of His as Mediator is to be excluded from a concurrence to make up the whole means in this work. Neither by His intercession do I understand only that heavenly appearance of His in the most holy place for the applying unto us all good things purchased and procured by His oblation : but also every act of His exaltation conducing thereto, from His resurrection to ‘ His sitting down at the right hand

¹ Rom. x. 4.

of the Majesty on High, angels and principalities and powers being made subject unto Him' ” (p. 179).

Having thus defined what he means by these parts of the work of Christ, Owen next lays down the proposition, that although they are to be distinguished in fact and in their immediate issues, yet they are not so to be separated, “as that the one should not have any respect to any persons or anything, which the other also doth not also in its kind equally respect ” (p. 181).

“The sum is, that the oblation and intercession of Jesus Christ are one entire means for the producing of the same effect, the very end of the oblation being that all these things which are bestowed by the intercession of Christ, and without whose application it should certainly fail of the end proposed to it, be effected accordingly ; so that it cannot be affirmed that the death or offering of Christ concerned any one person or thing more, in respect of procuring any good, than His intercession doth for the collating of it : for, interceding there for all good purchased, and prevailing in all His intercessions (for the Father always hears His Son), it is evident that every one for whom Christ died must actually have applied unto him all the good things purchased by His death ” (*ibid.*).

Christ then neither offered Himself nor interceded for any but the elect. All attempts to make a distinction to the effect that He offered Himself, and interceded in a general way for all men, but particularly for the elect, Owen meets by the inquiry as to the intention of Christ, and whether it was or was not carried out. It cannot be but that in Christ's work intention and execution exactly correspond ; thus all such distinctions as the above-mentioned come to the ground. As regards the texts of Scripture proposed in favour of his opponents' views, they must be understood with reference to this general

and dominating consideration of the correspondence between the intention and the effect of Christ's work.

These arguments bring us to the end of Book I of Owen's treatise. In Book II he returns to treat more fully and directly of the subject of the end of Christ's work, which was at the first announced as the turning-point of the whole consideration, and has been the immanent principle of the argument thus far.

What is this end? The supreme end of the death of Christ is the glory of God and the manifestation of the Divine justice and mercy. The subordinate end is the salvation of the elect. Jesus in His work sought neither His own nor His Father's good. He did not enable God to exercise mercy as He could not otherwise have done. Owen here accepts the Scotist position that the necessity of Christ's satisfaction was contingent upon the Divine decree to manifest His glory by the way of requiring satisfaction, and refers with approval to the classical statement of Augustine, "De Trinitate" (XIII. 10, 13).¹ It is, however, to be noted that in a subsequent treatise, "De Divina Justitia" (1653), Owen changed his view on this point, and accepted the absolute necessity of satisfaction, arguing against Twisse and Rutherford, who still maintained the Scotist position.

In the treatise at present before us, however, accepting the Scotist doctrine, Owen goes on to argue that, apart from this liberty of God to show mercy as He pleases, there are other reasons why the end above assigned is impossible. "That cannot be assigned as the complete end of the death of Christ, which being accomplished, it had not only been possible that not one soul might be saved, but also impossible that by virtue of it any sinful soul should be saved" (p. 207). It cannot be that the end of the death of Christ was a mere salva-

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 131.

bility, not salvation. The opponents distinguish between the *impetration* or obtaining of blessings by the oblation of Christ, and the *application* of these blessings:—the first was general, just as Christ's merit was universal: the second is particular. Owen states the views of his opponents under three heads:—

“First, some of them say that Christ, by His death and passion, did absolutely, according to the intention of God, purchase for all and every man, dying for them, remission of sins and reconciliation with God, or a restitution into a state of grace and favour; all of which shall be actually beneficial to them, provided they do believe. So the Arminians.

“Secondly, some, again [say], that Christ died for all indeed, but conditionally for some, if they do believe, or will do so (which He knows they cannot do of themselves); and absolutely for His own, even them on whom He purposeth to bestow faith and grace, so as actually to be made possessors of the good things by Him purchased. So Camero,¹ and the divines of France, which follow a new method by him devised.

“Thirdly, some distinguish of a twofold reconciliation and redemption—one wrought by Christ with God for man, which, say they, is general for all and every man; secondly, a reconciliation wrought by Christ in man unto God, bringing them actually into peace with Him” (p. 222).

The “divines of France” are of course the School of Saumur: the third opinion is that of T. More, put forward in his book “The Universality of God's Free Grace” (1643).

Owen meets all these views with equal opposition; they all, he says, come to the same thing, viz. “that in respect of impetration Christ obtained redemption and

¹ Cameron, cf. *supra*, p. 92, n. 5.

reconciliation for all ; in respect of application, it is bestowed only on them who do believe and continue therein " (p. 223). Owen admits that the distinction between impetration and application is a real one : the paying of the price differs from the freeing of the captives. But the distinction has no place in the intention and purpose of Christ, which includes both equally. There is indeed a condition of the application to us of the benefits of Christ's death, viz. faith, but this very condition is part of His purchase : He has procured for the elect the gift of faith along with all other blessings. Owen admits indeed that the value, worth, and dignity of the ransom which Christ gave Himself to be, and of the price which He paid, was infinite and immeasurable. But His intention and the Father's, with regard to the paying of it, was the salvation of the elect and nothing else ; and this is what has to be considered. The whole distinction between impetration and application, as used by the opponents, is irrational. It is contrary to reason " that a ransom should be paid for captives upon compact for their deliverance, and yet upon the payment those captives not be made free and set at liberty " (p. 233).

Owen asks with regard to the condition of faith, which the Arminians leave to be performed by man, whether it is in his power to perform the condition or not.

" If it be, then have all men power to believe, which is false ; if it be not, then the Lord will grant them grace to perform it, or He will not. If He will, why do not all believe, why are not all saved ? If He will not, then this impetration, or obtaining salvation and redemption for all by the blood of Jesus Christ, comes at length to this :—God intendeth that He shall die for all, to procure for them remission of sins, reconciliation with Him, eternal redemption and glory ; but yet so that they shall never have the least good by these glorious things,

unless they perform that which He knows they are no way able to do, and which none but Himself can enable them to perform, and which concerning far the greatest part of them, He is resolved not to do" (p. 234). Again : "This condition of faith is procured for us by the death of Jesus Christ, or it is not. If they say it be not, then the chiefest grace, and without which redemption itself (express it how you please) is of no value, doth not depend on the grace of Christ as the meritorious procuring cause thereof ;—which, first, is exceedingly injurious to our blessed Saviour, and serves only to diminish the honour and love due to Him ; secondly, is contrary to Scripture : Tit. III. 5, 6 ; 2 Cor. v. 21, ' He became sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him '. And how we can become the righteousness of God, but by believing, I know not. . . . This whole assertion tends to make Christ but a half mediator, that should procure the end, but not the means conducing thereunto. . . . For a close of all ; that which in this cause we affirm may be summed up in this : Christ did not die for any upon condition, if they do believe ; but He died for all God's elect, that they should believe, and believing have eternal life. . . . Salvation, indeed, is bestowed conditionally, but faith, which is the condition, is absolutely procured" (pp. 234, 235).

Book III contains further arguments against the universality of redemption. The following are the most important :—

The main difference between the old covenant of works and the new covenant of grace, is that under the former God required the fulfilment of the condition prescribed, but under the latter He promises Himself to effect this condition in those with whom the covenant is made. Only some, however, are brought into this new covenant of grace : the blood of Jesus Christ, therefore,

inasmuch as it is the blood of the new covenant, can only apply to them. Again, for whom Christ died, He died as sponsor in their stead. He therefore freed them from anger, wrath, and desert of death: there was no other reason why He underwent death, than thus to free them. It is evident then that He did not die for all, inasmuch as all are not delivered.

Once more, it is clear, in view of the following arguments, that Christ has not satisfied justice for all :—

(1) “For whose sins He made satisfaction to the justice of God, for their sins justice is satisfied, or else His satisfaction is rejected as insufficient. . . . But now the justice of God is not satisfied for the sins of all and every man . . . for they that must undergo eternal punishment themselves for their sins, that the justice of God may be satisfied for their sins, the justice of God was not satisfied without their own punishment, by the punishment of Christ; for they are not healed by His stripes” (p. 247).

(2) “Christ by undergoing death for us, as our surety, satisfied for no more than He intended so to do. So great a thing as satisfaction for the sins of men could not accidentally happen besides His intention, will, or purpose. . . . But now Christ did not intend to satisfy for the sins of all and every man, for innumerable souls were in hell, under the punishment and weight of their own sins. . . . Now shall we suppose that Christ would make Himself an offering for their sins whom He knew to be past recovery? . . . To intend good to them He could not, without a direct opposition to the eternal decree of His Father, and therein of His own eternal Deity” (pp. 247, 248).

Owen also argues from the ideas of redemption and reconciliation. “Universal redemption, and yet many to die in captivity, is a contradiction irreconcilable in itself”

(p. 258). The reconciliation of God to us and of us to God must answer one another, or there is no perfect reconciliation : " How can it be, if peace is made only on the one side ". It is therefore apparent that the redemption and reconciliation, achieved by Christ's work, if they are to be real, must be particular.

Next follow arguments from the ideas of satisfaction and merit. Owen discusses carefully the meaning of both words, and in particular examines the Grotian conception of satisfaction ; though he only aims to use the two ideas in subordination to his main purpose of combating the notion of universal redemption.

The word " satisfaction " indeed is not found in the Latin or English Bible with application to the death of Christ. Nevertheless the thing is there, as all admit, except " the wretched Socinians ".

" Satisfaction is a term borrowed from the law, applied properly to things, thence translated and accommodated into persons ; and it is a full compensation of the creditor from the debtor " (p. 265).

" Personal debts are injuries and faults ; which when a man hath committed, he is liable to punishment. He that is to inflict that punishment, or upon whom it lieth to see that it be done, is, or may be, the creditor ; which he must do, unless satisfaction be made. Now there may be a twofold satisfaction :—First, By a solution, or paying the very thing that is in the obligation, either by the party himself that is bound, or by some other in his stead. . . . Secondly, By a solution, or paying of so much, although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which by the creditor's acceptation stands in lieu thereof " (p. 265).

Now Grotius denies that the payment made by Christ was *solutio ejusdem*. His reasons are : (1) Such a solution, satisfaction, or payment, is attended with actual

freedom from the obligation ; (2) When such a solution is made, there is no room for remission or pardon.¹

But the first reason cannot be granted. It is a *petitio principii* ; and is indeed the exact opposite of the conviction which for Owen is fundamental, and has dominated his whole argument. He will only admit that there may be time between the procuring of freedom by Christ's work and the actual receiving of it by the sinner. As to the second reason, "the satisfaction of Christ, by the payment of the same thing that was required in the obligation, is in no way prejudicial to that free, gracious condonation of sin so often mentioned" (p. 268).

"God's gracious pardoning of sin compriseth the whole dispensation of grace towards us in Christ, whereof there are two parts :—First, The laying of our sin on Christ, or making Him to be sin for us ; which was merely and purely an act of free grace, which He did for His own sake. Secondly, the gracious imputation of the righteousness of Christ to us, or making us the righteousness of God in Him ; which is no less of grace and mercy, and that because the very merit of Christ Himself hath its foundation in a free compact and covenant. However, that remission, grace, and pardon, which is in God for sinners, is not opposed to Christ's merits, but to ours. He pardoneth all to us ; but He spared not His only Son, He bated Him not one farthing. . . . Remission, then, excludes not a full satisfaction by the solution of the very thing in the obligation, but only the solution and satisfaction by him, to whom pardon and remission are granted. So that notwithstanding anything said to the contrary, the death of Christ made satisfaction in the very thing that was required in the obligation" (pp. 268, 269).

¹ *Supra*, p. 62.

The satisfaction made by Christ "was a full, valuable compensation, made to the justice of God, for all the sins of all those for whom He made satisfaction by undergoing that same punishment which, by reason of the obligation that was upon them, they themselves were bound to undergo. When I say the same, I mean essentially the same in weight and pressure, though not in all accidents of duration and the like; for it was impossible He should be detained by death" (p. 269).

There is according to Scripture no relaxation of the punishment, but only a commutation of the person. God's relation to the satisfaction of Christ must be considered in a twofold way. With regard to us, He is the party offended and the creditor: with regard to Christ He is the supreme Governor and Lawgiver, "who alone had power so far to relax His own law, as to have the name of a surety put into the obligation, which before was not there, and then to require the whole debt of that surety" (p. 270). There are, then, two elements in God's action in the matter: first, an act of severe justice as a creditor, requiring His full debt at the hands of the debtor; secondly, an act of sovereignty, translating the punishment from the principal debtor to the surety given by His own free grace. Grotius says¹ that "the right of punishing in the rector or lawgiver can neither be a right of absolute dominion nor a right of creditor; because these things belong to him, and are exercised for his own sake, who hath them, but the right of punishing is for the good of the community" (p. 271). This reasoning, however, is not applicable to God, whose only end can be His own glory: indeed the good of the community itself is nothing different from this. Again Grotius says,² "Punishment is not in and for itself desirable, but only for community's sake. Now the right

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*

of dominion and the right of a creditor are in themselves expetible and desirable without the consideration of any public aim" (*ibid.*). Owen's answer to this is that, apart from the fact that desirability has nothing to do with the Divine actions, some acts of dominion are in themselves as little desirable as any act of punishment, as for instance the annihilation of an innocent creature, which Grotius will not deny but God may do. Grotius also says:¹ "Anyone may without any wrong go off from the right of supreme dominion or creditorship; but the Lord cannot omit the act of punishment to some sins, as of the impenitent" (*ibid.*). God, replies Owen, may, by virtue of His supreme dominion, omit punishment without any wrong or prejudice. He imputed sin to Christ, where it was not; and may equally impute no sin, where it is. Other arguments of Grotius less important are also dealt with, and then Owen closes his discussion by showing that the doctrine of satisfaction maintained by himself militates against the idea of universal redemption. The sacrifice of Christ being an exact equivalent for the sins of those for whom it was offered as satisfaction, and the only relaxation of the law being in His substitution as surety for them, it inevitably follows that God's justice has no claim against those for whom satisfaction has been made, or in other words, that those who are to all eternity to be punished for their sins cannot have been included in the satisfaction.

There is yet one more discussion relative to satisfaction. Owen meets the objection that election makes satisfaction unnecessary. The elect are already the objects of God's love, and therefore need no satisfaction, but only the knowledge of God's favour. The reply is

¹ *Supra*, pp. 53, 55.

that God's love in election is but a purpose of favour ; satisfaction is the means of its being made actual.

We pass on to what is said of merit. Owen declares that this subject has really been considered under the head of impetration ; nevertheless he adds some observations on the use of the term. The word " merit," like the word " satisfaction," is not to be found in the New Testament. Yet the idea is there with reference to the work of Christ. " Christ, then, by His death, did merit and purchase, for all those for whom He died, all those things which in the Scripture are assigned to be the fruits and effects of His death " (p. 287).

The following argument against the doctrine of universal redemption is then added : " If Christ hath merited grace and glory for all those for whom He died, if He died for all, how comes it to pass that these things are not communicated to and bestowed upon all ? Is the defect in the merit of Christ or in the justice of God ? " (p. 288).

Book IV begins with a discussion of the Scripture testimonies urged in favour of universal redemption. Owen's method is to speak of all such passages as " general and indefinite expressions," and to limit them by the logic of his theory, and by those other passages which agree with it. The book ends with a discussion of some particular arguments urged by the opponents.

(1) That which every one is bound to believe is true ; but every one is bound to believe that Jesus Christ died for him ; therefore it is true that Jesus Christ died for him. Owen's reply is simply to deny the minor premiss.

(2) The doctrine of particular redemption fills the minds of sinners with doubts as to whether they should believe or not, when God calls them to do so. Owen answers that a man is not bound to believe that Jesus Christ died for him in particular, before he believes in

Christ. The command of God to believe is enough to remove all doubts and fears.

(3) It is argued, that the doctrine of universal redemption more exalts God's free grace and the merit of Christ. Owen's reply to this is that the grace that is not effectual is no grace ; nor is Christ's merit enhanced by assigning to it a fruit which is a lie.

(4) It is argued, that the doctrine of universal redemption has more of consolation in it. On the contrary, says Owen, to know that all are capable of salvation is no real consolation, but only to believe that we are saved. Consolation in fact is not for unbelievers, but only for believers, whose comfort is in that which distinguishes their position from that of unbelievers.

One cannot close Owen's treatise without feeling admiration for its strong, nervous English, its forcible logic, and its deep religious feeling. Macleod Campbell has expressed the view that, if the idea of strict satisfaction be granted, Owen's logic in favour of the doctrine of particular redemption is unanswerable.¹ If then the result be untenable, the inference is that the premiss itself needs revision.²

¹ "The Nature of the Atonement," ², 1867, p. 59.

²Cf. Macleod Campbell, loc. cit. : "That cannot be the true conception of the nature of the atonement which implies that Christ died only for an election among men".

PART IV

MODERN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY



CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

§ 1. THE ENGLISH DEISM

No new movement of thought ever begins absolutely unprepared. To a certain extent the most modern theology has its roots in the past. There are no absolute divisions in time or in the history of thought any more than there are between county and county and parish and parish. Nevertheless we may say that modern theology begins with the Deist movement in England.¹ The result of this movement was on the one hand a new philosophy of religion, and on the other the historical criticism of the Scriptures and of the traditional ecclesiastical religion. It is these together that are responsible for modern theology.

The new philosophy of religion was indeed only a modification of the doctrine of the Apologists. It began with the recognition of natural religion, the five points of which are defined at the very outset of the Deist movement by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (d. A.D. 1648), as follows:—²

- (1) That there is a supreme God.
- (2) That He is to be worshipped.
- (3) That piety and virtue are the principal parts of His worship.

¹ For the Deist movement see especially Troeltsch, "Deismus," in "Realencyclopädie für Theologie und Kirche," iv. p. 533.

² Cf. Shedd, "History of Christian Doctrine," 1872, i. p. 192.

(4) That man should repent of sin, and that, if he does so, God will forgive him.

(5) That there are rewards for the good and punishments for the evil, partly in this and partly in a future state.

Lord Herbert held that these natural religious ideas are innate, or given in the very nature of man: they are "common notices" (common notions). This is practically the same thing as the doctrine of the Apologists that the work of the Logos in every man is to reveal God and His law, with the promise of immortality: there is, however, added to the Apologetic scheme in the natural religion of Lord Herbert the essentially Christian doctrine of the Divine forgiveness of sins. The general theory of the Deists concerning historical Christianity is the same as that of the Apologists, viz. that it is a republication of the religion of reason. While, however, the Apologists taught that the pure natural religion had been obscured by the demons who had seduced men to idolatry, the Deist doctrine now ascribed the advent of idolatry and superstition to the devices of the priests, who thus take the place of the demons as the corrupters of mankind. And, further, the Deists taught that when once Christianity had brought the religion of reason to light again, the priests had once more corrupted it, and so produced the doctrinal system of the Church with its irrational mysteries. All this was already maintained by Lord Herbert, and was later on enshrined in the famous catchwords "Christianity not Mysterious," the title of a work by Toland (1696), and "Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature," the title of the famous so-called "Bible of Deism," the work of Matthew Tindal (1730).¹

¹ Cf. Pfleiderer, "Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie," ², 1893, pp. 108-11, 119-22.

What led the Deists to this reassertion with modifications of the doctrine of the Apologists was the search for a philosophy of religion, which might on the one hand rescue the mind from the perplexity caused by the conflict of confessions since the Reformation, and on the other hand harmonize with the view of the world required by the ever-increasing results of modern science.

There was, however, another problem to be faced. Could it actually be shown historically that Christianity was nothing but a republication of the religion of reason or of nature? Attention to this question led to the attempt to evaluate Christianity as a historical phenomenon, the method adopted being that of the criticism of the original sources of our knowledge of it in the New Testament. I shall attempt to exhibit these critical movements by a reference to John Locke and Thomas Chubb.

§ 2. LOCKE

Locke (A.D. 1632-1704) denied the existence of any innate ideas in man. However, he held that the being of God and the duties of natural religion were demonstrable by reason. "But the articles of the Christian religion belong to another sphere. They come by revelation. They are received by faith, and have nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge. Revelation depends upon the veracity of God."¹

There is, however, a chasm to be bridged between the original revelation and the revelation in the individual believer. "God's veracity is not to be doubted, but we must be certain that it is God who speaks. It is the province of reason to discover the certainty or probability of what is proposed. Christianity is not an

¹ Hunt, "Religious Thought in England," II. p. 185.

immediate revelation. It is only traditional, and proposed to us through the testimony of others. Locke says that those to whom revelation is immediate may have a certainty equal to that of knowledge, but not those who have it through testimony. . . . In another place Locke says that though the Scripture be infallible, yet 'the reader may be—nay, cannot but be—very fallible in the understanding of it'. The will of God clothed in words is subject to all the uncertainty connected with human language and the human understanding."¹ Such are Locke's general principles: we have now to see how he applied them in detail.

In his book "The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures" (1695) the famous philosopher endeavours to mediate between the orthodox Protestant theology and the purely rationalistic religion of the Deists.

"To understand what we are restored to by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the Scripture shows we lost by Adam. This I thought worthy of a diligent and unbiassed search: since I found the two extremes that men run into on this point, either on the one hand shook the foundations of all religion, or on the other hand made Christianity almost nothing. For, whilst some men would have all Adam's posterity doomed to eternal infinite punishment for the transgression of Adam, whom millions had never heard of, and no one had authorized to transact for him or be his representative; this seemed to others so little consistent with the justice or goodness of the great and infinite God, that they thought there was no redemption necessary, and consequently that there was none, rather than admit of it upon a supposition so derogatory to the honour and attributes of that Infinite Being; and so made Jesus Christ noth-

¹ Hunt, "Religious Thought in England," II. p. 186 f.

ing but the restorer and preacher of pure natural religion.”¹

What Adam lost by his fall, says Locke, was simply bliss and immortality. “The state of paradise was a state of immortality, of life without end, which he lost that very day that he ate. . . . Death entered then and showed his face, which before was shut out and not known” (p. 3). This and nothing else is the teaching of the New Testament. The sentence of death pronounced on mankind because of Adam’s sin is to be understood as referring to the death of the body only. Death here means neither eternal misery, nor the corruption of human nature in the posterity of Adam. The New Testament does not teach that corruption seized on all because of Adam’s transgression; but every one’s sin is charged upon himself only. Nor can it strictly be said, that in losing immortality the posterity of Adam are punished for his offence. For in taking away from them immortality, God took something to which they had no right: it was a pure gift of His bounty to man. Still merely to lose bliss and immortality is enough to cause man to be spoken of as lost. “Adam being thus turned out of paradise and all his posterity born out of it, the consequence of it was, that all men should die, and remain under death for ever, and so be utterly lost” (p. 8).

From this estate of death Jesus Christ restores all mankind to life by His resurrection; that so by Adam’s sin they may none of them lose immortality, if only they merit it by their own righteousness. “For righteousness, or an exact obedience to the law, seems by the Scripture to have a claim of right to eternal life”² (p. 8). On the other hand those who transgress the law duly merit

¹ Ed. London, 1810, pp. 1, 2.

² Locke refers to Rom. iv. 4; Rev. xxii. 14.

death like Adam, and Scripture assures us that all have sinned ; so that it follows that no one can by his own righteousness attain to eternal life and bliss.

“ This being the case, that whosoever is guilty of any sin should certainly die and cease to be, the benefit of life restored by Christ at the resurrection would have been of no great advantage, (forasmuch as here again death must have seized upon all mankind, because all had sinned : for the wages of sin is everywhere death, as well after, as before the resurrection,) if God had not found out a way to justify some, i.e. so many as obeyed another law, which God gave, which in the New Testament is called ‘ the law of faith ’¹ and is opposed to the ‘ law of works ’ ” (pp. 11, 12).

As to the law of works, Locke follows the traditional doctrine : it is in part the eternal moral law, which, however, was repromulgated by Moses, and is not abrogated by Christ ; but above and beyond this it is in part positive ordinance, such as the command to Adam not to eat of the tree of knowledge, or again the ceremonial and political part of the law of Moses : this positive part never possessed more than a limited and temporary obligation.

The law of faith differs from the law of works as follows : “ The law of works makes no allowance for failing on any occasion. . . . But by the law of faith, faith is allowed to supply the defect of full obedience, and so the believers are admitted to life and immortality, as if they were righteous ” (p. 15). The moral law, however, remains presupposed by the law of faith ; or else this dispensation would have no meaning. Only the Jewish ceremonial law is abrogated by the Gospel.

So far Locke’s doctrine is closely allied to that of the Socinians and Arminians. Now comes his own

¹ Rom. III. 27.

peculiar contribution, in which, however, he is still very much on Socinian lines, except that instead of the complicated Socinian theology, which though it differs *toto coelo* from that of orthodoxy, still retains its form, he proposes a highly simplified and reduced "lay" theology. The one and only demand of the law of faith is the belief that Jesus is the Messiah. The tremendous structure of the orthodox dogmatic is replaced by this one solitary proposition. It is a veritable return *ad fontes*.

In order to establish his doctrine Locke adduces as evidence simply the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. From these it is clear that the only article of faith demanded by Jesus, while He was upon earth, was that of His Messiahship: it is equally plain that this was the one fundamental article of the primitive Church. If now it is said that to believe upon Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, is but a historical, and not a justifying or saving faith, the reply is, that men may make what distinctions they please, but they must have a care how they deny that to be a justifying faith, which our Saviour and His Apostles have declared to be so, and have made the condition of eternal life. If, again, it is urged that this faith is no different from that of the devils, who confessed in His lifetime that Jesus was the Messiah, and yet were not saved thereby, the answer is once more that God never offered them this way of salvation, and besides, even if they did thus believe, they did not perform a second condition required by the covenant of grace, viz. repentance. "Repentance is as absolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith; and as necessary to be performed as that" (p. 149). It means "not only a sorrow for sins past, but (what is a natural consequence of such sorrow, if it be real) a turning from them into a new and contrary life" (p. 151).

Such then according to Locke is the scheme of redemption as stated in the New Testament. He now undertakes to show its rationality. Adam was created in the likeness or image of God, part of which was immortality. This, however, he lost for mankind by the fall. Christ, therefore, who was, as the Son of God, naturally immortal, recovered it for mankind by becoming incarnate, dying, and by His own power rising again. As Christ was sinless, His death can only be interpreted as for others. Hence it demanded a reward, which God gave Him in assigning to Him, as Messiah, an everlasting Kingdom. This Kingdom, however, He could not have without subjects; and to supply these God promised immortality to those who would accept Jesus as the Messiah, and repent of their sins, turning for the future in sincere obedience to the Divine law. They should then have their sins forgiven, and their faith in the Messiah should supply the defects of their obedience, so that they might be made capable of eternal life.

In accordance with these views Locke proposes to reduce the doctrine of the work of Christ simply to the one scheme of the kingly office. "The faith required was to believe Jesus to be the Messiah, the anointed, who had been promised by God to the world. Amongst the Jews (to whom the promises and prophecies of the Messiah were more immediately delivered) anointing was used for three sorts of persons at their inauguration, whereby they were set apart for three great offices, viz. of priests, prophets, and kings. Though these three offices be in holy writ attributed to our Saviour, yet I do not remember that He anywhere assumes to Himself the title of a priest, or mentions anything relating to His priesthood; nor does He speak of His being a prophet but very sparingly, and once or twice, as it were, by the by; but the gospel, or good news of the

kingdom of the Messiah, is what He preaches everywhere, and makes it His great business to publish to the world " (pp. 163, 164).

From our Saviour's Messiahship is to be explained what theology had previously reckoned to His prophetic office. "Thus we see our Saviour not only confirmed the moral law, and, clearing it from the corrupt glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees, showed the strictness as well as obligation of its injunctions; but, moreover, upon occasion, requires the obedience of His disciples to several of the commands He afresh lays upon them, with the enforcement of unspeakable rewards and punishments in another world according to their obedience or disobedience" (p. 177).

Locke now deals with the position of those outside the Christian revelation, a problem which Deism had brought much to the fore. The Jews before Christ were justified by believing on a Messiah to come, just as Christians are by believing on a Messiah that has come. As to the rest of mankind Locke accepts the Deist view. "God had, by the light of reason, revealed to all that would make use of that light, that He was good and merciful. The same spark of the divine nature and knowledge in man, which making him a man showed him the law he was under as a man, showed him also the way of atoning the merciful, kind, compassionate Author and Father of him and his being, when he had transgressed that law" (p. 193).

This leads naturally to the questions:—What need was there of a Saviour? What advantage have we by Jesus Christ? Locke replies as follows:—

(1) We cannot expect completely to understand the Divine wisdom. "We know little of this visible, and nothing at all of the state of that intellectual world, wherein are infinite numbers and degrees of spirits out

of the reach of our ken or guess ; and therefore know not what transactions there were between God and our Saviour, in reference to His kingdom. We know not what need there was to set up a head and a chieftain in opposition to the ' prince of this world, the prince of the power of the air,' etc., of which there are more than obscure intimations in the Scriptures" (p. 195). This is the only place that Locke has for the traditional doctrine of the work of Christ as a transcendent action in the supramundane sphere : he leaves it, however, as a mystery, and so far as his indications point, inclines rather to the views of the Ancient Church than to any more modern doctrine.

(2) Beyond this, however, Locke urges, as the Greeks and in particular Athanasius had done, that there was need of a fresh Divine revelation. " Though the works of nature in every part of them sufficiently evidence a Deity, yet the world made so little use of their reason, that they saw Him not, where even by the impressions of Himself, He was easy to be found " (p. 196). Christ then brought a fresh revelation of God, and authenticated it by His miracles.

(3) " Next to the knowledge of one God, maker of all things, a clear knowledge of their duty was wanting to mankind. This part of knowledge, though cultivated with some care, by some of the heathen philosophers, yet got little footing among the people " (p. 201). It seems in fact, that " it is too hard a task for unassisted reason to establish morality in all its parts, upon its true foundations, with a clear and convincing light " (p. 202). Hence the need for an inculcation of morality more popular in character. " It is at least a surer and shorter way to the apprehensions of the vulgar, and mass of mankind, that one manifestly sent from God, and coming with visible authority from Him, should, as

a king and lawmaker, tell them their duties, and require their obedience, than leave it to the long and sometimes intricate deductions of reason, to be made out to them " (pp. 202, 203).

(4) Jesus also undertook the reformation of the outward forms of worshipping the Deity ; and, doing away with all useless ceremonies, He introduced a spiritual worship of God.

(5) He also brought a great encouragement to a virtuous and pious life by a clear promise of immortality as its reward.

(6) Finally, He brought to men the promise of the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Locke here admits a mystical element into his otherwise (save only for the vague indication of a transcendent mystery in the work of Christ) clear and rationalistic scheme.

With this the positive statement of doctrine closes. There remains, however, a possible objection. " If the belief of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah, together with those concomitant articles of His resurrection, rule, and coming again to judge the world, be all the faith required as necessary to justification, to what purpose were the Epistles written ? I say, if the belief of these many doctrines contained in them be not also necessary to salvation ; and if what is there delivered, a Christian may believe or disbelieve, and yet, nevertheless be a member of Christ's Church, and one of the faithful ? " (p. 221).

Here enters the really novel part of Locke's doctrinal method. The close correspondence of the matter of doctrine with that of the Greek Apologists, Clement and Origen, and still more with that of Socinus, is apparent. But he is not writing, like the Apologists, prior to the fixing of the New Testament Canon. Nor does he adopt, like Clement and Origen, to justify his theology,

the allegorical method. Nor yet, again, like Socinus, does he compel the New Testament to serve his purpose by a forced exegesis. In contrast with all these theologians, he deliberately makes the basis of his doctrine a critical distinction between one part of the New Testament and another. He harps upon the "occasional" character of the Epistles. A great deal in them was simply said by way of accommodation of the Christian truth to the special needs of the readers, and has no more than a temporary value.

"It is not in the Epistles we are to learn what are the fundamental articles of faith, where they are promiscuously and without distinction mixed with other truths in discourses that were (though for edification indeed, yet) only occasional. We shall find and observe these great and necessary points best in the preaching of our Saviour and the Apostles, to those who were strangers, and ignorant of the faith, to bring them in and convert them to it. And what that was, we have seen already out of the history of the Evangelists, and the Acts, where they are plainly laid down, so that nobody can mistake them" (pp. 224, 225).

Such a distinction consciously made between different stages in the doctrine of the New Testament is of immense importance. Though present here as yet only in an elementary form it contains the principle of the modern science of Biblical theology, which, instead of treating the whole New Testament, and to a considerable extent indeed the whole Bible, as upon the same level, as did the traditional theology of the Church, notes everywhere advance and development, differences and shades of doctrinal apprehension of Christianity, and furnishes dogmatic theology with an entirely remodelled Scriptural basis from which to operate.

Locke does not work out in detail the consequences

of his principle of accommodation. But he indicates its possibilities for the doctrine of the work of Christ, when he says that "The setting out and conforming of the Christian faith to the Hebrews, in the Epistle to them, is by allusions and arguments, from the ceremonies, sacrifices, and œconomy of the Jews, and reference to the records of the Old Testament" (p. 225). Here we have a principle stated, which, if admitted, must carry us far indeed in the restatement of the doctrine of the work of Christ. It has affinity indeed with the principle under which Clement and Origen tended to regard some of the theologumena of the New Testament as more or less allegorical, and has still more affinity with the doctrine of Socinus as to the metaphorical character of many New Testament doctrinal passages. But it substitutes for the arbitrariness of the allegorical method, and the arbitrariness which Socinus often used in working out his metaphorical principle, the methodic science of historical criticism.

§ 3. CHUBB

To what the critical principles of Locke were destined to lead, begins to appear in the writings of Thomas Chubb (d. A.D. 1747). Chubb, one of the later Deists, concerns himself, like Locke, more than the early Deists with the Christian revelation and not merely with the religion of reason. He certainly agrees with them that "whatever is mysterious and unintelligible, so far as it is unintelligible, cannot be revelation in any sense".¹ Still he seems to admit that Divine revelation may disclose to us things beyond what we might otherwise have known. "There are a multitude of propositions worthy of the Deity, which are knowable and promulgable, independent of divine

¹ "Posthumous Works," London, 1748, Vol. II, p. 4.

revelation " (p. 8). On the other hand " there must be something disclosed and made known, that was not known before, to constitute revelation strictly and properly so called " (p. 3). The mere bringing to remembrance, or awakening of the attention to propositions, which otherwise would have been forgotten or neglected, or would not have been sufficiently attended to, can only be called revelation in a loose and improper sense.

Chubb accepts (after consideration) the mission of Jesus Christ and His Gospel as a Divine revelation ; while he takes up at the same time a very different attitude to the revelation of the Old Testament, the particularism of which offends him. He says on the one hand : " It appears, that the Jewish revelation in the gross (whatever may be the case of some particular branches of it) cannot well be admitted as Divine, without offering some kind of violence to the human mind " (p. 29). On the other hand he says : " It is probable that Christ's mission was Divine ; by which I mean, it is probable that Jesus Christ was sent of God to be an adviser and an instructor to mankind, by communicating such useful knowledge to them as otherwise they might not have attained to, and by refreshing their memories, and awakening their attention to such propositions as otherwise might have been greatly neglected by them, even where the highest interest is concerned " (p. 45).

The great question to be determined, then, in regard of the Divine mission of Christ is, what was the message entrusted to Him. Speculation as to His Person Chubb puts aside as irrelevant and misdirected. The transference of attention in the Christian Church from the message brought by Jesus Christ to the Person of the Messenger has brought about nothing but contention, confusion, and manifold mischief, " Whereas this is a point that we are not interested in, nor concerned

with ; seeing Christ's message and its importance to us are just the same, whatever His personal character may be . . . the great question with us is, or at least ought to be, what is that important message, which Christ was sent of God to deliver to the world ? " (p. 56).

To determine exactly the content of this message is, however, a matter of difficulty. History shows us nothing but conflict of one Christian theology with another, while the New Testament itself, recognized since the establishment of the Canon as the authoritative source of Christian knowledge, is now seen by the critical reason to offer no single answer to the question, What is Christianity ?

"Christ's message has been so loosely and indeterminately delivered to the world, that nothing but contention and confusion has attended it, from its first promulgation down to this time, insomuch that what has been deemed to be Christianity in one age, and by one people, has not been so, in and by another. And, as to the books of the New Testament, they have been so far from being a remedy to this evil, that they have been partly the disease, or at least they have contributed to it, as the most opposite and contrary doctrines are capable of being grounded, and have been grounded upon them " (p. 57).

The truth is, that the Christian revelation has come to us entirely through the hands of men, and has been constantly modified in the process of tradition. The oral tradition, which the Church of Rome adds to the written tradition of the New Testament, in order to obtain a sufficient support for the stately edifice of its doctrine, has indeed been rejected by Protestantism ; and this was a great advance. But criticism must go farther, and, recognizing that the process of modification was at work from the very origins of Christianity,

distinguish between different elements in the New Testament itself. "I say, the Christian revelation is to be collected or gathered from these writings ; for as Christ's message is not particularly specified nor ascertained in these books, nor can they in the gross be considered as such ; so, consequently, that message can only be gathered or collected from them. The books of the New Testament contain a great deal of matter which is perfectly distinct from, independent of, and quite irrelative to Christ's message ; and therefore those books, in the gross, cannot, with any propriety or truth, be called the Christian revelation " (p. 71).

Chubb now distinguishes four parts in the New Testament : (1) the Gospels, containing the history of the ministry of Christ ; (2) the Acts of the Apostles, with the history of the ministry of the Apostles ; (3) the Epistles, containing apostolic counsel or advice to certain persons or churches ; (4) the Revelation, a kind of visionary prophecy of things to come, which he confesses he does not understand, and must therefore leave out of consideration. Of these four parts the Gospels alone form an adequate basis for the determination of Christ's message.

"From these books, I think, the Christian revelation is to be chiefly, if not wholly collected ; because they are furnished with materials for that purpose, which are not to be met with elsewhere. In these books we have an account at large of Christ's discourses and parables, and what He from time to time delivered as the will of His Father, of which we have no such particular and full account in any other parts of the New Testament. And what we have in these books is at first hand, as from Christ Himself, without anyone's comment upon it, supposing these records to be originally true history, and to have sustained no injury through its conveyance

to us : whence, what we have from the Apostles, touching this matter, is at second hand, as from Christ through them, who to say the least were liable to misunderstand their master, as I shall have occasion to show more at large hereafter ; nor does the history of their ministry clear up, but rather darken and perplex the subject : so that what is Christ's message, or what is the Christian revelation, strictly and properly so called ; this must be chiefly, if not wholly collected from the histories of Christ's ministry, as we have not materials elsewhere to gather it from " (pp. 72, 73).

There is to be observed here the emergence of an immensely important and significant principle. Here is already, in this later Deism, the distinction between the Gospel of Jesus Himself and the Gospel of His Apostles, which constitutes one of the fundamental problems of modern theology. Chubb is indeed following out the return *ad fontes* as recommended by Locke, but he goes farther than the great philosopher. If the latter would have us go back from Paulinism to the pre-Pauline Messianic Christianity of the primitive Jewish Church, Chubb invites us to pass behind even this, and build simply and solely upon the record of the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels. Of course in neither case, in the rough and ready discrimination of the sources, is there as yet an understanding of the complexity of the problems involved ; nevertheless there is already the whole programme of criticism, and the outline of the questions which were henceforward to occupy it.

His basis thus critically fixed, Chubb proceeds to sum up in three particulars the substance of Christ's message. (1) Nothing but conformity to the eternal rule of right will render men acceptable to God. (2) If men have greatly departed from it, and have thereby

rendered themselves the proper objects of Divine revenge; nothing but repentance and reformation will render them the proper objects of, and will be the ground and reason for, God's mercy to them. (3) God will judge the world in righteousness, and render to every man according to his works.

"These propositions appear, to me, to contain the sum and substance of Christ's ministry: and, as they are altogether worthy of the supreme Deity; so, I think, they may with propriety and truth be called the Gospel of Jesus Christ, or the Christian revelation" (p. 83).

The Acts of the Apostles do not add anything at all to this determination of the Christian message. It is only clear from them that the Apostles limited Christianity to the Jews, and regarded it as nothing but a graft upon Judaism, till St. Paul put an end to this state of things by his opposition to such principles. This opposition, however, did not arise out of any special revelation which St. Paul had received for abolishing the Jewish law, "but from the nature of the thing itself, as it obviously appeared to be a law of carnal commandments, which carried with them such a yoke of bondage as was unbearable, and therefore ought to be abolished" (p. 85).

It is to be observed, however, that the doctrine Paul employed to this end, viz. that Christ had abolished the law of ceremonies and nailed them to the cross, is no part of the original Christianity. Otherwise the Apostles could not have viewed Judaism as they did before St. Paul's conversion. The same applies to the doctrines that the law was a type of the Gospel and that the Gospel was the completion of the law. Moreover, Jesus Himself never taught so.

With these reflections Chubb obtains a standpoint

whence he can deal with the Epistles, especially those of St. Paul. "A great deal of them is altogether irrelative to that message, or else upon some account or other, plainly appears not to have been contained in it. Thus, a great part of St. Paul's Epistles consists in showing the weakness and unprofitableness of the Jewish law, and in persuading the people not to submit to it; which surely cannot be conceived to be any part of that Gospel which Christ preached to the Jews in His own person; because, according to the history, He was so far from discharging men from paying obedience to that law, that, on the contrary, He seems rather to have pressed their obedience to it. Nor can what St. Paul has said upon this point be any part of the Gospel which Christ gave in charge to His Apostles to publish to the world, because, if that had been the case, then, surely, the Apostles and first Christians would not have maintained the contrary, as we find they did, for some time, viz. till after the conversion of St. Paul" (pp. 111, 112).

What, then, of the orthodox Protestant doctrines of the work of Christ, which are supposed to be grounded upon the Epistles, "such as that men are rendered acceptable to God, and that sinners are recommended to His mercy, either through the perfect obedience, or the meritorious sufferings, or the prevailing intercession of Christ, or through one or other, or all of these?" (p. 112).

Even if men of learning say that these doctrines are plainly contained in the words of the Apostles, they are still to be rejected as contrary to reason and the moral sense; "and therefore, surely, may fairly be presumed to be no parts of the Christian revelation, whatsoever book they may be contained in, or whomsoever they may have been taught by" (p. 113).

Some learned men indeed (i.e. the Socinians) aver

that the above doctrines were not taught by the Apostles. Chubb professes that he is no judge in this matter: only in any case he knows that he cannot receive the Epistles, except so far as they are not contrary to reason, and thus one way or another is under no obligation to believe such doctrines. He is not, however, content to leave the matter here. In order to form a critical estimate of the apostolic teaching he makes use of the idea of accommodation, which we have already observed as thrown out in this connexion by Locke, but which our author applies to the subject in much fuller detail than Locke has done.

“As to the writings of the Apostles, they plainly appear to have been written occasionally, and seem suitable to the exigencies of those upon whose account and for whose sakes they were written; and, as such, it is not unlikely that some of the arguments contained in those writings were arguments only to those to whom they were sent, as they might affect their respective cases only, and as it were reasoning with them upon their own principles” (p. 301).

In fact, the Apostles, in endeavouring to commend the Gospel to the Jews, drew a parallel between the Law and the Gospel. “For example: As the Jews had their temple, their altar, their high priest, their sacrifices, and the like; so the Apostles, in order to make Christianity bear a resemblance to, and as it were tally with Judaism, found out something or other in Christianity, which they by a figure of speech called by those names” (p. 303). Upon this figurative language, however, some of their followers have built doctrines that are plainly repugnant to truth and reason. “For example: upon the figurative language of the Apostle this doctrine has been grounded, viz. that God was made placable or merciful to mankind by the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ;

which doctrine cannot possibly be true, because God's disposition to show mercy to the proper objects of mercy, arises wholly from His own innate goodness or mercifulness, and not from anything external to Him, whether it be the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ or otherwise" (p. 304).

Let it be observed, as in the case of Locke, only now with more reason, that here is a method of dealing with the traditional doctrine of the work of Christ very different from that of Socinus. Socinus and Chubb indeed agree in repudiating the orthodox doctrine. But their reasons are different. Instead of referring to the legal impossibilities, which Socinus finds in the orthodox theory, Chubb rests his case solely on its moral incompatibility with the idea of God's mercy. But this conception of God's necessary mercifulness is different from the Socinian notion of God, where His mercy flows simply from His arbitrary will.¹ This latter conception of God, which played so great a part in the patristic and mediaeval doctrine as one of its governing principles till Duns Scotus raised it to the rank of the absolute and only true principle of theology as a whole, Chubb critically disallows just in the same way as he rejects the ideas of placation and satisfaction. The introduction of this principle in Rom. ix. is simply an accommodation to Jewish thought. "The Jews considered God as an absolute sovereign, who makes mere capricious humour and arbitrary will the rule and measure of His actions in His dealings with mankind" (p. 304). This Jewish principle, however, inflicts great dishonour upon the Deity and is false, "seeing God is so far from making capricious humour, at any time, or in any instance, the rule of His conduct, that on the contrary, He makes the eternal rule of right and wrong the measure of His

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 16.

actions, and in consequence of the rectitude of this Divine conduct, in every nation under heaven, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of Him " (p. 305).

Nevertheless, Paul, though no doubt reasoning from other principles in other parts of his writings, has employed this principle in Rom. ix. What then? "This doctrine, surely, is false; though taught by that great Apostle St. Paul" (p. 314). It is "a difficult thing for men wholly to shake off those principles they have been educated in; and, therefore, they are apt sometimes to reason from those principles, and that seems to have been the case of St. Paul here" (p. 314).

§ 4. BUTLER

The great English defence of traditional Christianity against the Deists is Butler's work, "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature".¹ The text of the treatise is taken from Origen: "He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of Nature".² Butler seeks to show that all evidence of religion is a matter of probability, which can only lead to moral certainty. It is upon such evidence that we accept the truths of natural religion, and so upon such evidence we may well accept revealed religion, i.e. the orthodox system of doctrine as contained in Scripture. The importance of Christianity is, that it is not only a republication of the religion of nature, but also an account of a particular dispensation, carried on by the Son and Holy Spirit for the redemption of mankind, not discoverable by reason,

¹ Butler, A.D. 1692-1752, "The Analogy," A.D. 1736.

² Butler's Works, Oxford, 1897, Vol. I, p. 8.

and involving new duties and new precepts. Objections to the scheme of Christianity are to be answered from the analogy that may be perceived between it and nature. This argument Butler works out with regard both to the Christian revelation as a whole, and to its parts in detail.

His argument in the former general reference has been summarized as follows:—

“There is no presumption from analogy against the general scheme of Christianity. We are acquainted only with a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe. It is, then, no presumption against the truth of what is revealed that it lay beyond the reach of our natural faculties.”¹

Butler’s defence of the doctrine of the mediation of Christ against the Deists is contained in “Analogy,” Pt. II, chap. v.²

“There is not, I think, anything relating to Christianity, which has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon consideration there seems nothing less justly liable to it” (p. 207). In the first place the principle of mediation belongs to the order of nature. “There is, then, no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity” (p. 208).

For the further justification of the doctrine of Christ’s mediation, however, it is necessary to go back to that system of natural religion, which revelation presupposes. It is a system of Divine moral government, in which vice is punished, either in this world or the next. Analogy leads us to suppose that the future punishments of wickedness may be like those of the

¹ Hunt, “Religious Thought in England,” III. p. 136.

² Works, Oxford, 1897, Vol. I, p. 207.

present, which take place in the way of natural consequence. However, in the present order the natural consequences of wickedness do not always automatically follow, but may to some extent be avoided by the personal action of the delinquent or by the help of others. There is no reason then to suppose, that with regard to the future punishments of wickedness a relaxation may not be possible. We can hardly, however, imagine that of our own ability we can avert these consequences ; even in this world we seldom do this. Analogy leads us to believe that our reformation will be, not indeed useless, but yet insufficient to prevent future punishment. As to the current idea (of the Deists) that repentance is enough, the general tendency among the heathen to supplement it by propitiatory sacrifices seems to show that the Deist view is contrary to common sense.

“ Upon the whole, then : Had the laws, the general laws of God’s government, been permitted to operate, without any interposition on our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding anything we could have done to prevent it ” (p. 214).

Here revelation enters, and confirms our fears as to the unprevented results of wickedness ; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin (which supposition, if not provable by reason, is not contrary to it) ; but finally teaches, what nature might have led us to hope, that the moral government of the universe is not so rigid that there is no room for interposition, and proclaims the interposition of Christ for our salvation through the love of God and His own love. Here there is nothing inconsistent with the Divine goodness. There is, indeed, the strange ruin of mankind. “ But it is not Christianity, which has put us into this state ”

(p. 216). Moreover, the Scriptural explanation of its origin is not unreasonable. "That the crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural Providence" (p. 217).

The Scriptural mode of redemption through the mediation of Christ has already been shown to be in general accordant with the analogy of nature. It now remains to consider the particular type of mediation of which Scripture speaks. Christ is there described as the Revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense. He is also a propitiatory sacrifice, and as He voluntarily offered Himself, is our High-Priest. The view that the latter descriptions are an accommodation to the Jewish point of view is unscriptural. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Old Testament sacrifices were rather intended to suggest and point forward to the great sacrifice of Christ.

Divines accordingly are wont to treat of the office of Christ under three heads :—

(1) "He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet. . . . He published anew the law of nature, which men had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us authoritatively to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it ; the evidence of testimony. He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future life. . . . To which it is to be added that He set us a perfect example, that we should follow His steps" (p. 219).

(2) "He has a kingdom which is not of this world. He founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and invitation to it, which He promised to be with always even to the end. He exercised an invisible government over it Himself, and by His Spirit : over that part of it, which is here militant on earth, a government of discipline. . . . Of this Church all persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to His laws, are members. For these He is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them unto Himself, that where He is they may be also, and reign with Him for ever and ever ; and likewise to take vengeance on them that know not God and obey not His Gospel" (p. 220).

All objections to the above two heads of doctrine are met by the general considerations in favour of mediation at the beginning of the chapter. There remains, however, the third and most disputed head of doctrine, the priestly office of Christ.

(3) Christ's sacrifice "was, in the highest degree and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and with regard to some persons. How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain : but I do not find that Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonements to be made, i.e. pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as it surely has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ, mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. . . . Some

have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized ; others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining His office as Redeemer of the world to His instruction, example, and government of the Church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that He taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy which it is, by what He did and suffered for us ; that He obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life : not only that He revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; but moreover that He put them into this capacity of salvation by what He did and suffered for them ; put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, without disputing how it was obtained on His " (p. 221).

We are not to judge, antecedently to revelation, whether a Mediator was, or was not, necessary to obtain the remission of eternal punishment ; and so neither are we to judge, antecedently to revelation, of the manner in which Christ's mediation may have operated in this matter. It is no objection that we do not see how it was conducive to the end of remission : as long as it cannot be shown to be positively unreasonable, the Scriptural doctrine must stand fast.

As to the objection, that in the revealed scheme of redemption the innocent is punished for the guilty, there is nothing here that is not illustrated continually in the order of nature. Vicarious punishment belongs to this order and is often redemptive. Besides Christ undertook His sufferings voluntarily ; whereas in the order of

nature those who suffer vicariously often suffer of necessity. Thus the whole objection is worth nothing.

Finally, there is yet another argument to show the folly of human objections to the infinite scheme of redemption, because the utility of the parts is not to us apparent. This is, that our objections are laid against a part of the scheme in which we are not directly concerned. It is in the order of grace, as it is in the order of nature. In both we are instructed in our own duty, not in the secrets of Divine counsels. "The doctrine of a Mediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done on God's part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none of us can complain for want of information" (p. 226).

Four points are particularly worthy of note in Butler's reply to the Deists with reference to the doctrine of the work of Christ. The first is the stress which he lays on man's incapacity to understand the transcendent side of redemption, while its practical side lies open to him. Here we may trace the influence of the philosophy of Locke. The second point, which is of great interest, is the treatment of the idea of sacrifice. The *rationale* of ancient sacrifice was, in and about the period when Butler wrote, being subjected to fresh investigation.¹ Butler is not so sure as was the older theology, that we fully understand the theory of ancient sacrifice. If indeed he traces its probable origin in general to revelation, still its *rationale*

¹ Outram, "De Sacrificiis," 1677; Spencer, "De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus," lib. III., "De ratione et origine sacrificiorum," 1727; Sykes, "Essay on the Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices," 1748.

is not evident. Scripture has not explained it. "We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made, i.e. pardon to be obtained by sacrifices" (p. 221). This view, of course, fits in with Butler's general scepticism as to our understanding the *rationale* of atonement in the case of Christ; but it is interesting as the precursor of the new investigation of the idea of sacrifice, which has done so much in the nineteenth century to undermine the traditional basis of the orthodox doctrine of atonement. Butler here carries us beyond the Deists. They accepted the traditional interpretation of sacrifice, obviating by their doctrine of accommodation the usual argument drawn from it in support of the orthodox theory. Butler's doubt of that interpretation, however, leaves the way open for further investigation of the idea of sacrifice in general, with the result of the possibility of a consequent modification in the understanding of the New Testament material of the doctrine of the work of Christ.

Thirdly, another noteworthy point in Butler's argument is his justification of the principle of vicarious punishment not from any system of law but from the order of nature: it is forgotten "that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience" (p. 224). We observe here the introduction of a new argument, destined to take a large place in modern theology.

Finally, another point, closely associated with that just spoken of, is Butler's stress upon the natural consequences of wrongdoing. It was, indeed, no new thought that sin brings suffering according to the very order of nature. But it is a distinct mark of the influence of modern science that this mode of conception should, as it were, be separated from the religious thought of

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God, and so the natural consequences of sin be distinguished from God's direct punishment of it.

§ 5. JONATHAN EDWARDS

Jonathan Edwards (A.D. 1703-1758), the true founder of a distinctive American theology, is interesting, because he too, like Butler, states the doctrine of the work of Christ in view of the Deist controversy. It is, however, a very different line of argument from that of Butler, which he develops in his discourse "Concerning the Necessity and Reasonableness of the Christian Doctrine of Satisfaction for Sin".¹ Edwards argues as follows :—

(1) "Justice requires that sin be punished, because sin deserves punishment" (p. 458). Greater sins deserve greater punishment, less sins less punishment; but all sins require punishment according to their demerit.

(2) Sin, viewed as an offence against God, is, however, of an infinite demerit. God must therefore punish it with infinite punishment, "unless there be something in some measure to balance this desert" (p. 459). Human repentance or sorrow for sin can, however, never reverse the existing balance, since sin is infinite, and there can be no infinite sorrow for sin in finite creatures. To propose that God should pardon sin because of human repentance is no different from asking that He should pardon it with no repentance at all. Repentance is required when sin is pardoned, not as amends for sin, but in view of compensation already made.

(3) Sin strikes at God; it would, if it could, annihilate Him. It must therefore be repaid by God with enmity. As the Ruler of the universe, He must main-

¹ "Remarks on important theological controversies," chap. vi., Works, London, 1817, Vol. VIII, pp. 458 ff.

tain order and decorum in His Kingdom. This is what His justice means.

(4) God's holiness also demands the punishment of sin. As Holy, God is opposed to sin, and must be at enmity with the sinner.

(5, 6) God's antipathy to sin must be visibly manifested. "If there had been only a declaration of God's abhorrence and displeasure against sin, the creature might have believed it, but could not have seen it, unless He should also take vengeance for it" (p. 462).

(7) God's honour requires the punishment of sin. "If we consider sin as levelled against God, not only compensative justice to the sinner, but justice to Himself, requires that God should punish sin with infinite punishment" (p. 463). The majesty of God must be vindicated by punishment; "unless there could be such a thing as a repentance, humiliation, and sorrow, proportionable to the greatness of the majesty despised" (*ibid.*).

(8-10) The Divine law demands the punishment of sin: without a sanction it would be not law, but only counsel. Moreover, the punishment threatened by the law must be executed: otherwise the law is implicitly abrogated. Dispensation is so far forth abrogation.

(11-17) God therefore cannot abrogate His law or dispense with it. It would be indecent if the law were to give way to the sinner. To abrogate it would be a slur on its perfection. God's authority would be set aside, and His truth violated by the abrogation of the law.

(18, 19) "The satisfaction of Christ by His death is certainly a very rational thing" (p. 471). In fact the principle of mediation is a natural principle. It is also a Scriptural principle, since Christ is said to have borne our sins for us.¹

¹ Is. LIII. 4, 11, 12; Heb. IX. 28; 1 Pet. II. 24.

(20) Some definitions require to be promised.

“By *merit*, I mean anything whatsoever in any person or belonging to him, which appearing in the view of another is a recommendation of him to that other’s regard, esteem, or affection” (p. 472). Merit, in short, is whatever recommends, irrespective of intrinsic worth.

“By *patron*, I mean a person of superior dignity or merit, that stands for and espouses the interest of another, interposes between him and a third person or party, in that capacity to maintain, secure, or promote the interest of that other by his influence with the third person, improving his merit with him, or interest in his esteem and regard for that end. And by *client*, I mean that other person whose interest the patron thus expresses, and in this manner endeavours to maintain and promote” (p. 473).

(21) These things premised, Edwards now argues :—

(i) It is not unreasonable, that respect should be shown to one person in view of his union with another, or, what is the same thing, on account of that second person’s merit.

(ii) In such a case the merit of the second person is imputed or transferred to the first ; and these persons are so far substituted, the one for the other.

(iii) This will fitly take place, in proportion to the closeness of the union between the two persons.

(iv) It will take place, above all, where the union is the closest possible.

(22) The union is perfect, when the patron’s love puts him so fully in sympathy with the client, that he is willing even to be destroyed for his sake.

(23) The patron’s intercession will especially avail, if he has manifested his interest in his client at his own expense. His hardships are calculated to purchase good for his client.

(24) Such benefit will accrue to the client, if, above all, the patron pleads his cause, and appeals for him to one by whom the patron is highly regarded : this last person will naturally make the condition that the client should gratefully recognize the great service of the patron. In the special case, where the patron's merit appears in the expense of his own welfare for the good of the client, such expense is in itself the price of the client's welfare ; but the merit of the patron is added to the price and gives it moral value. The acceptance of the patron will above all be natural, where the patron goes so far as to take the place of the client, so far as may be consistent with keeping his merit inviolable.

(25) If the client be an offender, the intercession of the patron must be such as to conserve, both his own merit and virtue, and his union with his client. His union with his client must be accompanied by circumstances demonstrating regard for his friend and also for virtue and holiness.

"There is no way that this can be so thoroughly and fully done, as by undertaking himself to pay the debt to the honour and rights of his injured friend, and to honour the rule of virtue and righteousness the client has violated, by putting himself instead of the offender, into subjection to the injured rights and violated authority of his offended friend, and under the violated law and rule of righteousness belonging to one in the client's state ; and so for the sake of the honour of his friend's authority, and the honour of the rule of righteousness, suffering the whole penalty due to the offender " (p. 477).

(26-27) The dignity of the patron will naturally be considered. The degree of union with the client required will be in inverse proportion to this dignity of the patron.

(28) The amount of suffering required of the patron will obey a similar rule. The client will be regarded as a member of his body, whom he loves as himself, yet not equally with himself.

“A man loves his little finger as himself, but not equally with the head; but yet with the same love he bears for himself, according to the place, measure, and capacity of the little finger” (p. 479).

The value of the welfare parted with must, therefore, be equal to the value of the welfare obtained, due regard being had to the persons involved.

(29) The last requisite is a perfect cohesion of the client with the patron, or in a word, he must have complete faith in him. Then the intercession of the patron can have no improper consequences.

(30) These things apply to the case of mediation between God and man. The Mediator here must undertake the debt of men, and bear its penalty.

(31) This Christ did.

“Christ suffered the wrath of God for men’s sins in such a way as He was capable of, being an infinitely holy Person, who knew that God was not angry with Him personally, but infinitely loved Him” (p. 481).

He could not bear the wrath of God in the same sense as the wicked in hell, who realize God’s hatred of them. “Christ therefore could bear the wrath of God in no other but these two ways, viz. in having a great and clear sight of the infinite wrath of God against the sins of men, and the punishment they deserved; and in enduring the effects of that wrath” (p. 481).

As to the first point, Christ doubtless had a clear view in His last suffering, both of the hateful nature of the sin of man, and of the dreadful punishment of sin. For, on the one hand, the malignity of sin was never so

apparent as when men crucified the Son of God. On the other hand, the sight of the evil of sin, the enduring of temporal death with such extreme pain, God hiding His face, the dying a death that was by God's appointment an accursed death, the having a sight of the malice and triumph of devils, and the being forsaken of His friends, all combined to present to Christ a striking view of the punishment of sin.

"Now the clear view of each of these things must of necessity be inexpressibly terrible to the man Christ Jesus" (p. 482).

This clear view of sin, unbalanced by the sense of God's love (since God forsook Christ), was infinite pain to Him. This was His bearing of our sins, in distinction from His bearing the Divine wrath, which consisted in His sense of the dreadfulfulness of the punishment of sin.

(32) The latter Christ bore through His pity for, and sympathy with, the elect, fixing the idea of their punishment in His mind as if it were His own; and here, again, He was un comforted by any sense of the Divine love.

(33) The same ideas, however, which so distressed the soul of Christ, were the motive power of His endurance of such suffering. The more He hated sin, and pitied the elect, the more was He engaged to honour God, and to save the elect by His suffering.

(34) Christ was personally sanctified in His sufferings, His enmity to sin being increased by His experience of its bitterness, and the exercise of His obedience or holiness tending to increase the root of it in His nature.

"Though the furnace purged away no dross, yet it increased the preciousness of the gold; it added to the finite holiness of the human nature of Christ" (p. 485).

Thus He was sanctified,¹ or made perfect in His

¹ Jn. xvii. 19.

sufferings,¹ and so was prepared for that high degree of glory and joy to which He was to be exalted.

(35) Christ also endured the effects of God's wrath. "There was a very visible hand of God in letting men and devils loose upon Him at such a rate, and in separating Him from His own disciples. . . . Besides, it was an effect of God's wrath, that He forsook Christ" (p. 485).

(36) The only explanation of the sacrificial system of the Old Testament is that it was ordained as a type of the sacrifice of Christ. For there could be no real atonement in the Old Testament sacrifices, yet they were organized to be performed with the greatest pomp, expense, and trouble; what could be the reason for it, but that they were typical of the true atonement?

(37-38) If God's honour ought to be maintained in a degree, why not perfectly? It cannot be argued that God is above receiving satisfaction; He is not above being injured by sin.

(39) "The satisfaction of Christ, by suffering the punishment of sin, is properly to be distinguished, as being in its own nature different from the merit of Christ" (p. 488).

The idea of satisfaction involves only the equivalence of the punishment suffered, and the union between Christ and others which made it possible for Him to be their representative. By Christ's satisfaction the law is fulfilled independently of His merit or excellency.

(40) "The blood of Christ washes away sin. So it is represented in the Scripture. But, although the blood of Christ washes away our guilt, it is the Spirit of Christ that washes away the pollution and stain of sin. However, the blood of Christ washes also from the filth of sin, as it purchases sanctification; it makes way

¹ Heb. II. 10, v. 9; Lk. XIII. 32.

for it by satisfying, and purchases it by the merit of obedience implied in it" (p. 489).

(41) "Late philosophers seem ready enough to own the great importance of God's maintaining steady and inviolate the laws of the natural world. It may be worthy to be considered, whether it is not of as great, or greater importance, that the law of God, that great rule of righteousness between the supreme moral Governor and His subjects, should be maintained inviolate" (p. 489).

No argument against the necessity of strict satisfaction can be drawn from the fact that human rulers sometimes dispense with their own laws, forbear to execute them, and pardon offenders without the suffering of a substitute. Human justice is imperfect: Divine is perfect.

Edwards' discourse is no mere reproduction of the traditional Protestant theology. It contains the following germinal thoughts, all of which have resulted in important developments in modern theology:—

(1) A perfect repentance on man's part might have sufficed to satisfy for sin: of such a repentance sinful man was, however, incapable.

(2) Christ's sufferings in bearing the Divine wrath and the burden of human sin are to be understood *psychologically* through His sympathy with, and pity for, men. It was not, however, possible for Him, as an infinitely holy person, to bear the very pains of hell to be endured by the damned.¹

(3) Christ Himself was perfected by His sufferings, "the exercise of His obedience or holiness tending to increase the root of it in His nature".

¹ Cf. Thomas, "Summa Theol." III. qu. 46, art. 6.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMANY

§ 1. STEINBART

THE ideas which we have found in inception in Locke and Chubb are carried to a further development in the remarkable work of the German "Aufklärer," Steinbart (d. A.D. 1809): "System der reinen Philosophie oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums" (1778). The "Aufklärung," or Illumination, in Germany was, as is well known, largely fed and nourished from English sources. During the eighteenth century English philosophical and theological literature, and in particular the literature of Deism, was freely translated into German, and exercised great influence upon the thought of Germany. Steinbart himself acknowledges his indebtedness in particular to the writings of Locke and Foster.¹ The latter was a General Baptist minister of liberal tendencies, who wrote as his chief work a defence of Christianity against Tindal, entitled "The Usefulness, Truth, and Excellency of the Christian Revelation Defended" (1731). His views, so far as they concern us, were as follows: He maintained the necessity of revelation because of the corruption of human reason.

"Reason may be able to find out many duties of natural religion, but Christianity makes them clearer and gives them authority. We have also in Christianity

¹ "Glückseligkeitslehre," 3rd ed. 1786, p. xi.

the revelation of atonement for sin. Christ's death is the ground of forgiveness. This does not mean that Christ appeased His Father, or even that He made reparation to offended justice. It is explained simply that God pardons man for Christ's death, because this was the method He chose to appoint."¹

Foster thought "that an institution so rational and excellent as Christianity ought to commend itself to the approbation of all sincere men. The reason why it did not was found in the corrupt doctrine and superstitious worship that prevailed throughout Christendom" (loc. cit.).

Foster, it will be perceived, is nearer to orthodoxy than either Locke or Chubb. Yet he has much in common with the Deists. He made, however, a strong point against Tindal in maintaining that there was nothing irrational in Christianity containing, not merely a republication of the law of nature, but also certain positive precepts. The influence of some of his ideas is clearly traceable in Steinbart's "Glückseligkeitslehre".²

Steinbart, however, has made a considerable advance upon his English predecessors, both in the way in which he approaches the problems of Christian theology, and in the fulness of material which he brings to their solution. Above all, it is important that on the one hand he introduces a new philosophic starting-point, whence to approach the subject of Christianity, viz. the question of human happiness; and that on the other hand he reduces the content of the Christian revelation itself to one and one only fundamental principle, which he states with the utmost energy, viz. the Fatherhood of God.

In the first place, then, Steinbart investigates what

¹ Hunt, "Religious Thought in England," Vol. III, p. 253.

² Cf. further on Foster, Leslie Stephen, "History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century," 1876, Vol. I, pp. 146 f.

are the conditions of human happiness, and how far it is realized in this world. On the whole his view is optimistic, as might be expected from an eighteenth-century writer.¹ This is a good world, and the occasions of happiness in it exceed those of unhappiness, if only we will duly weigh and consider them. All that Steinbart asks is that there should be an excess of happiness over unhappiness: with the sobriety of the *Aufklärung* he does not require a perfect happiness. Nevertheless, to the higher happiness, which goes beyond that of the senses and is that of the reason, there are many hindrances. The gratification of the senses cannot bring us true happiness, yet the instincts develop before the reason. Hence the need of an authority, and of moral education. Then, again, men are impressed by the apparent exceptions in the world to the rule that a rational life is the happiest. They are also impressed beyond measure by particular troubles, and cannot rise above them. There is a general lack of reflection. There are bad examples. Finally, there are false religious ideas, which bring much unhappiness. There prevails among men a false conception of God, constructed after the analogy of a human potentate, or of their own selves, viz. that He is an arbitrary and capricious will; so that men torture themselves in order to placate Him. It is easy enough indeed to see how this idea arises.

“The first fundamental conception of the Supreme Being, in which all peoples agree, is the conception of an absolutely all-controlling Power. Every one, then, either abstracts from the mode of action of the potent-

¹ The optimism of the English Deism is expressed in the formula of Pope, “Whatever is, is right”; while the German *Aufklärung* was dominated by the optimism of Leibnitz, whose formula was, “This is the best of all possible worlds”. Cf. Fairbairn, “The Philosophy of the Christian Religion,” 1902, pp. 104 ff.

ates of his country the type of thought, which he gives the Deity credit for ; or he judges according to his own character, and believes that the Deity acts, as he would act himself, if he had almighty power " (p. 68).

The idea of arbitrariness in God is, however, the prime error in theology. " All that is arbitrary leads us away from the natural and true way to happiness, confuses the conscience, and necessarily produces a multitude of inner conflicts and therefrom increasing moral anguish " (p. 69). Here, then, to meet these needs and difficulties, and to help men to happiness, enters the Christian revelation.

(1) " In the first place Christ has sought entirely to remove the practical prejudices concerning arbitrary demands of God upon men, which generally obtained among the Jewish people at the time of His teaching ministry " (p. 71). Paul too has described Moses as a teacher of children, who dealt with men in their minority by sensuous laws and sensuous punishments, till the time of their majority should come, when they might be entrusted to act according to right reason. The heathen also, in spite of the sound doctrine of a few philosophers, were in like manner enslaved to ceremonies, and needed a similar deliverance.

Christianity, moreover, contradicts not only the false notions of God then obtaining, but all such notions.

" This involves : that God according to the teaching of Jesus is entirely to be thought of as a loving Father, therefore Christians are not to be baptized in the name of the Ruler of the World, but of the universal Father ; ¹ that the spirit of Christianity is called a spirit of sonship and freedom, and that there is expressly demanded as the true character of a Christian a confident love entirely free from all fear " (p. 73). Steinbart is in tremendous

¹ Mt. xxviii. 19.

earnest with the idea of the Fatherhood of God. He is prepared to use it in a most thorough way as a critical principle, by which to try all religious doctrines.

“Even a human father, when his own needs do not perchance compel him thereto, does not require service from his children ; but keeps them only to such practices, whereby they may make themselves more perfect and happier. God, who Himself gives to every one life, breath, and all things, can therefore still less demand any service of His children ” (p. 73).

Steinbart means, as the context shows, that God will demand no service, merely for His own gratification, apart from its benefit to His children. The actual Christian law is in fact nothing but love to God and man ; nor is asceticism of any value. Christianity does nothing but strengthen and confirm nature and reason : its aim is to stimulate the reason to reflection.

(2) Besides this, however, Christianity “conveys a supremely excellent and complete morality in a way intelligible to every one ” (p. 78). It also introduces this morality with a Divine authority, and enhances the natural motives to virtue with the view of the persistence of the consequences of good and evil in eternity, removing the difficulty raised by the apparent exceptions, where in this life these consequences are not visible. Besides, it offers to unselfish well-doing rewards entirely beyond its merit. Again, it gives us the motive of imitating God our Father. By its prospect into the future it also alleviates our troubles, and assures us that particular troubles, seen in the context of the whole, are nothing but goods.

(3) Finally, Christianity assists the simple by clothing spiritual truth in sensuous and historical forms. Among such forms are to be reckoned the conceptions of Christ as the Incarnate Logos, and as an example

of patience duly rewarded by God, and again the conception of His sacrifice on behalf of men, whereby God has reconciled the world through Him to Himself, so that no satisfactions for sin are necessary for anyone who repents, nor has he to fear any evils except the necessary natural evil consequences of his transgressions, which God never removes, but man can himself gradually lessen by his own industry. Finally, Christ rose on the third day from the dead, which is a greater guarantee of our future resurrection than any philosophical demonstration. In all these instances it appears how beneficial, especially for the multitude, is the clothing of the higher truths of religion in the forms of history. There is, it may be said, no religious or moral need, which the Scriptures do not thus meet; nor must it be forgotten that the whole life of Jesus offers for our imitation the highest pattern of perfection.

“It follows, therefore, that for men practised in thinking the Christian philosophy contains the completest system of directions to happiness, beyond which in the space of eighteen centuries no one has been able to add by thought, or to discover, anything new or better; and that the clothing of these directions in history is for the great multitudes of men the only and safest way to make these higher doctrines of wisdom intelligible and certain ” (p. 93).

The simplicity of Christian truth has, however, been obscured by various arbitrary hypotheses, which hinder the influence of Christianity in promoting happiness. Amongst these are the Augustinian doctrines of original sin and of predestination, and the Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction with its later Protestant developments in the doctrine of Christ's twofold obedience, and finally the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. We meet with a new phenomenon in the method by

which Steinbart criticizes these doctrines. "The history of dogma," says Loofs,¹ "is a child of the age of the German Illumination." Steinbart, in fact, is no longer content to appeal for the purposes of his criticism merely to texts of Scripture or grounds of reason. In dependence upon Semler,² that great father of the historical method, he sets in motion the mode of inquiry which is so familiar to us to-day, but which was in his time a new and powerful engine of assault. He explains Augustine's doctrine of original sin as the total corruption of humanity through Adam's fall as a survival of his Manichæism.³ The older and true Christian doctrine was that maintained by Pelagius and the Greeks.⁴ Steinbart shows further that Augustinianism had never been accepted by the whole Church either Catholic or Protestant. Luther's acceptance of it was due to the fact that he was an Augustinian monk. Steinbart again endeavours to show that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's guilt is neither Biblical nor rational. Amongst his arguments the following may be noticed. There is no mention in Scripture of any contract, whereby Adam became our representative : besides, if he were our representative, then not merely his sin would be imputed to us, but also his endurance of its penalty, so that we should be free.

A good deal of the ground of the orthodox doctrine of the work of Christ is certainly cut away by this rejection of Augustinianism. Steinbart, however, proceeds to a direct criticism of the doctrine itself. He begins with an attack on the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. If this, as is admitted, was

¹ "Dogmengeschichte," ⁴, p. 1.

² Cf. the reference to him in "Glückseligkeitslehre," p. 105. Semler born A.D. 1725, died A.D. 1791.

³ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 115, n. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 118, n. 3.

originated by Luther, it is the natural consequence of the Augustinian exegesis and principles.

“For, according to the very same principles, upon which an imputation of the sin of Adam is deduced from Rom. v., the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is also based thereon ; and according to the same reasons of law, upon which an alien guilt is imputed to us, an alien righteousness is to be ascribed to us also ” (p. 125).

A criticism of these principles is most necessary, if the whole purpose of Christ’s religion is not to fail. The source of the confusion of the whole doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ is to be found in the false, or at least obscure, idea of the reason and purpose of the Divine demands upon men. “All precepts, which God can give to men, and every father give to his children, either are merely fatherly counsels, by following which the children themselves become more perfect and happy, or are demands of service, whose fulfilment is of no advantage to the children themselves ” (p. 126).

The laws of the first class must necessarily be fulfilled by the children themselves ; nor can any third party fulfil them on their behalf. The others, which are mere arbitrary demands, may be fulfilled by another. The question now is, whether God has made, and still makes, such demands of service upon men. The Mosaic law indeed contained such precepts : these, however, were simply relevant to the existence of the Jewish state. The Jewish law has, as Paul teaches, no hold upon Christians. What then Paul means by saying, that Christ redeemed us from the Mosaic law, is not that His fulfilment of it was imputed to us, but that He delivered us from the superstition that God demanded such service of us.

Steinbart (p. 130) appeals upon this point to the work of "my reverend teacher and predecessor in office, Dr. Töllner," entitled "Die thätige Gehorsam Christi untersucht". This work, published in 1768, had renewed Piscator's objection to the doctrine of Christ's active obedience. Ritschl recognizes it as marking the first stage of the German Illumination, while Steinbart himself marks a completer development of its principles. Töllner had not denied the doctrine of the passive obedience, though he no longer followed the orthodox interpretation of it as a satisfaction to the Divine justice, but explained it along lines, which are partly Socinian, partly Arminian, and partly new.

"Instead of accepting the forensic idea of righteousness handed down by orthodox tradition, Töllner avows his preference for the idea propounded by Leibnitz that it is goodness tempered by wisdom. From this point of view, he finds satisfaction of God's righteousness to be accomplished in the institution of a representative of men, an institution which partly maintains motives to obedience which arise from the punishment of disobedience, that is to say, in penal example ; partly, by instituting an exemplary obedience, makes men worthy and capable of receiving grace, and thus provides for their sanctification. More closely considered, however, the satisfaction given in Christ's passion is not so much an immediate condition of God's bestowal of grace upon men, as it is a means for that sanctification of men upon which the bestowal of grace immediately depends. For that Christ has borne the penalties of sin which we have merited does not free us from the natural punishments which are inseparable from actual sin ; this last, therefore, must first be removed in sanctification, before the full bestowal of grace is complete. Sanctification, on the other hand, can again arise only

out of the restoration of our confidence in God, which is hindered by the apprehension of the punishments due for sin ; Christ's endurance of suffering accordingly is not merely a penal example, but also the guarantee that punishments no longer impend on account of our sins." ¹

What is particularly noteworthy in the above doctrine of Töllner is the conception of the natural consequences of sin, which are inevitable. Here, as in Butler, ² we recognize the direct influence of modern science upon the sphere of our doctrine. Steinbart also makes use of this conception, but applies it to go beyond Töllner and repudiate the doctrine of Christ's passive obedience altogether.

What is necessary, he says, is first of all to obtain clear ideas as to the nature of punishment. We must distinguish in every action a physical and a moral side : each has its own consequences. The physical consequences of an action are the same, whether it is an act of moral obedience or of disobedience. The moral consequences require a further distinction : they are either natural or arbitrary. The natural moral consequences are the inward results of the consciousness of having obeyed or disobeyed. The arbitrary are such rewards and punishments as a law-giver chooses to impose : they must be carefully distinguished from the physical consequences which happen independently of any such action on his part. The physical consequences, being independent of the moral quality of the action, can in no way belong to its penalties : apart from the fact of its impossibility, there is consequently no point in the idea that Christ has suffered the physical consequences of sin on our behalf. These consequences can only be ameliorated by our amendment. Christ has redeemed us from them,

¹ Ritschl, "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 352.

² *Supra*, p. 181.

in so far as He has called us to forsake sin. The natural moral consequences of sin are again of two kinds. Apart from our relation to the Lawgiver, there is our inner remorse: this natural penalty of sin is, however, highly beneficial to us, as it makes against further sin. Christ cannot, therefore, have freed us from it. Then, with reference to the Lawgiver, along with the consciousness of having offended Him, various disagreeable ideas arise within us, however we conceive Him. If we think of Him as a tyrant, we are afraid: if as a loving Father, we are truly contrite. We can therefore explain Christ's great work of redemption, as follows:—

He has redeemed the Jews from the idea of God as a tyrant, which was their thought of Him, and from all slavish fear. He has also by His death destroyed the idea of a Satan, or prince of death, such as the Jews had believed in. With respect to the Gentiles, it is not said in Scripture that they were redeemed from punishment; but that God overlooked the time of their ignorance. But to both Jews and Gentiles alike Christ has brought what they needed—to the Greeks Divine wisdom, to the Jews deliverance from legalism, and to both the abolition of the barrier between them.

So much, then, for Christ's relation to the natural moral consequences of our sins. There remain the arbitrary penalties. Has Christ redeemed us from these by a vicarious endurance of them? This idea, says Steinbart, is a very late outgrowth of Augustine's peculiar opinions. It was first brought into the Church at the end of the eleventh century by Anselm, a zealous disciple of Augustine, who based his theory, not upon Scripture, but upon proof *a priori*. Abelard, however, pointed a better way, and, in spite of its general acceptance by the Reformers, Anselm's theory has never wanted opposition. In order to clear up the point, it must be

inquired, whether a wise father ever inflicts evils upon his children, except for their amelioration. No theologian will affirm this outside his system. Nevertheless it is contended, that in God there are attributes which are opposed to His goodness, viz. His righteousness and holiness, and that such actions as would in an earthly father be unreason and appalling severity, in God are the expression of a perfect righteousness and holiness. However much God desires to make men happy, His infinite holiness demands satisfaction for the injury done to it.

“Here we have,” says Steinbart, “the good and evil principle of the Manichees united in our God ; two attributes of equal infinity striving against each other, according to which God is impelled equally strongly, in virtue of the one to ameliorate and perfect His rebellious children, in virtue of the other to overwhelm them in misery and ruin. Thus there is in God Himself an eternal contradiction !” (p. 146).

The extreme to which this contradiction can be carried is, however, only apparent when God is conceived in different Persons, in order that He as Father may receive satisfaction from Himself as Son incarnate in Christ. The Bible, however, teaches very differently. Even the Old Testament represents God as merciful and gracious ; His holiness and righteousness do not appear as a hindrance to His forgiving sins without satisfaction. The Old Testament sacrifices were not ordained for sinful intentions, but merely for external uncleanness and transgressions. Jesus presents to us God as the Father, without any limitation of His fatherly love. “Did Christ, who came out of the bosom of the Father, know Him less than Anselm of Canterbury ?” (p. 149). Finally, Scripture on all its pages presents the entire mission of Jesus, and all that

He has done, not as the cause, but as the effect of the universal grace and love of God.

The theory of Grotius is an improvement on Anselm's ; it does not darken God's loveliness so much. But it, too, is against Scripture and reason. Everything depends upon obtaining clear ideas of the holiness and righteousness of God. God's holiness is no special perfection, but simply the absence in Him of any defects in His understanding or goodness. Righteousness is not opposed to goodness, but is a goodness proportionate to the reciprocity of its object, or a wise goodness. Steinbart says, like Thomas Aquinas,¹ that in thinking of God we must not compare Him to a subordinate judge under law, but must remember that He is the Supreme Sovereign. There is, then, a proportionateness in God's gifts, in His laws, and in His punishments. His very punishments are calculated in perfect wisdom, and cease, as soon as they are no longer needed. Such, and no other, is the righteousness of God, truly conceived ; and there is no opposition to it in His love. It is only the wisdom with which His love carries out its purpose of leading men to happiness. The difference between God and human rulers is, that His wisdom, as well as His power, is absolute, and that His dealings with men are therefore always perfect. In the end, therefore, every spirit will attain to the greatest possible happiness ; it would detract from the glory of God, if even one were condemned to endless misery. The whole Augustinian and Anselmic philosophy is, therefore, to be rejected. God through the death of Christ, Whom He gave up for us, has declared all propitiation of Himself superfluous, and asks nothing of us, but gladly to receive and enjoy the good which He bestows.

"Thus Christ has by His death for ever freed and

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 281.

delivered, not only the Jews, but all men who believe on Him, from the greatest moral unhappiness, which arises from the torturing ideas of a Deity enraged against us; so that we have nothing more to fear than the natural consequences of our follies, whereby we ourselves, in opposition to God's plan, make ourselves miserable and incapable of higher blessings; just as at the same time by His doctrines He has shown us the way to ever higher stages of happiness, and has illuminated the same by His own life" (p. 161).

Steinbart concludes this discussion, by saying that the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction is the great hindrance to the acceptance of the Christian revelation among thinking men. It is, however, contrary to reason. "For, no one that has clear ideas of an absolutely perfect righteousness, can possibly be persuaded that the Father of the world will ever inflict on anyone other penal evils, than such as are necessary for his amendment" (p. 162). Nor is the doctrine Scriptural. The simple doctrine of Scripture is, that Christ has redeemed all, and by His death has guaranteed to them the grace of God and the forgiveness of sins, on condition of amendment. We must not raise the questions, which Scripture leaves undetermined, why Christ suffered and died? what was its necessity? etc. "If a complete knowledge of these things were necessary for salvation, they would have been so clearly explained in the Holy Scriptures that no controversies could arise on the subject" (p. 162).

Steinbart later on in his treatise gives the explanation, which we have already found in Locke and Chubb, of the Scriptural references to Christ's priesthood and sacrifice as an accommodation to the Jews. He points out that the early patristic doctrine, however, connected itself rather with the Scripture representations of Christ's death as the means of redemption from the power of

the angel of death or the devil. In any case the modern Christian is not bound by the idea of Christ's death as a sacrifice. "The doctrine of the sacrificial death of Jesus is the bridge for all those who stand where the Jews were in the time of the Apostles; our thinking Christians already dwell on this side of the water" (p. 288).

At the conclusion of his work Steinbart touches briefly on the relation of Christianity to other religions. A variety of religions appears to lie in the Divine plan of the world; history knows of no time of uniformity in religion. What God values is the development of reason from within, and all revelations are given proportionately to existing knowledge. All religions perform the function of religion, i.e. they yield peace of mind in view of the future, conscientiousness and virtue, though there are many stages of virtue. Not all religions, however, are on the same level, or lead with equal rapidity to the appointed goal. Here, then, is the place of Christianity. "After the cultured peoples had attained some maturity of reason, Christ appeared, and taught a more spiritual religion" (p. 315).

The above full account of Steinbart's "Glückseligkeitslehre," so far as it touches our subject, has been given, because it appears to the writer to explain, as does no other book with which he is acquainted, the genesis of the existing problems of modern theology. It was above all in the German Aufklärung that these came into existence. A great deal in Steinbart indeed goes back, as we have seen, to the principles of the English Deism. From that is derived the Biblico-theological method with its distinction of various strata of doctrine in the New Testament. From the later Deism, as exemplified in Chubb, is adopted also the emphasis on the doctrine of God's Fatherhood, as taught by Jesus Himself; though Steinbart makes it even more central

and fundamental than does Chubb. From the Deists, too, is taken the principle of the essential oneness of Christianity with the light of reason : Chubb and Steinbart, moreover, both assume that reason teaches the absolute benevolence of God. From Locke and the later Deism also comes the idea of accommodation, with which Steinbart makes so much play. It may be added that, as has already been observed, the important principle of the natural consequences of sin, derived by Steinbart from Töllner, is also utilized in Butler's reply to the Deists in his " Analogy ".

But, as over against the English writers, the following points appear to be new. In the first place the critical Biblical theology is supplemented by a critical history of doctrine. Then, secondly, Steinbart abandons the Deist idea of an original perfect religion, and adopts instead the notion of an evolutionary religious development and a Divine education of the human race.¹

§ 2. THE THEOLOGY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The theology of the English Deism and the German Aufklärung was essentially a return,—with, of course, suitable adaptation to new circumstances,—from the dogma of the Church, as developed in all its forms from Irenæus onwards, to the moral theology of the Apologists ; while the new doctrine of accommodation also is a similarly modified revival of the way in which Clement and Origen harmonized Paulinism with their rational theology. The divergences of the eighteenth-century theology from the Apologists, Clement and Origen, are that the speculative Logos doctrine is abandoned, and a Messianic or anthropocentric is substituted for a pneumatic or theocentric Christology ;

¹ Lessing's famous " Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts," 1780, contains similar thoughts.

and, again, that the moral theology of the Apologists is enriched by the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, as taught by Jesus Himself.

Just as, however, the theology of the Apologists, and even that of Clement and Origen was found inadequate by the Church as a complete expression of the Christian religion, and accordingly had to be supplemented by the dogma of the creeds ; so again the age of the Illumination gives place to an age of renewed interest in and reinterpretation of the ancient dogma and its mediaeval developments. The clear rationality of the *Aufklärung* makes way for a Romanticism, which finds rationalism shallow and unsatisfying, and which, in the endeavour to look more deeply into the human mind and heart and to interpret the world by what it reads there, returns with a renewed interest to those very doctrines of the past, which the *Aufklärung* had rejected as irrational. The Romanticist theology substitutes, for the use of the principle of accommodation by the *Aufklärung* in order to bring Paulinism and the ecclesiastical dogma down to the level of a rational theology, a method of "penetrative imagination" (to borrow a phrase from Ruskin),¹ which discovers an inner essence in the heart of the dogma altogether transcending mere rationalism. The mysticism of the Greek Church, and the irrationalism of Luther and the Protestant theology, become the principle of a higher reason (*Vernunft*), which regards the logical understanding (*Verstand*) as upon a lower and inferior level of thought. Nevertheless, the new theology has all the same the rationalism of the *Aufklärung* in its blood. It cannot restore or revive the old doctrines, as though the *Aufklärung* had never been. On the contrary, its problems are everywhere set by the *Aufklärung* ; and

¹ Cf. "Modern Painters," Part III, § 2, chap. III.

even if it seeks to overcome the latter, it has to do so by first recognizing it, and by making use of its methods. Adopting the historical criticism of the *Aufklärung*, it no longer holds to the forms of the ancient dogma, but dissolves these in favour of a higher truth for which they stand. This truth is, however, not the rational religion of the *Aufklärung*, but something deeper and more vital.

We have now to give an account of this new theology. It is very commonly called "modern" theology, since it claims as its own the whole of the nineteenth century; nor has there yet been any further theological development, which falls outside of the lines above described.¹ We are still moving, in theology, between the poles of the *Aufklärung* and the Romanticism which succeeded it. The primary movement of this modern theology belongs to Germany. Baur² hardly speaks too strongly when he says: "The centre of the new movement is the German Protestant Church, and the history of dogma in its last stage coincides altogether with the history of German Protestant theology". Baur, indeed, is wrong in so far as he refers in the above statement to the whole theological movement from the beginning of the eighteenth century, for he does not sufficiently recognize the importance of the beginnings made in the English Deism; but from the time of the German *Aufklärung* in the middle of the eighteenth century, what he says is true. There have been, however, important parallel secondary theological movements in England, Scotland, and America, largely dependent, though not entirely so, upon the German development. We shall consider, therefore, first the

¹ For the wider sense of the term "modern theology," cf., however, *supra*, p. 153.

² "Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte," 3, 1867, p. 343.

German, then the English, Scotch, and American theology. There is one fundamental difference between the two movements, in which the primacy of the German movement is manifest, even apart from its historical priority. Speaking generally, we may say that German theology alone in this modern period is fully systematic, in that it aims always at a total view, in which the particular doctrines find their place in a wider connexion. Much of the best English, Scotch, and American theology dealing with the work of Christ is monographic. The German theology alone carries on the great tradition of the mediaeval and the Protestant scholasticism, while the English-speaking theology of the nineteenth century, like the older English theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reverts to the patristic method of doctrinal monographs.

§ 3. KANT

In giving an account of the theology of the nineteenth century, we are met by the difficulty of choosing, out of a whole galaxy of theological luminaries, the best and most sufficient representatives of the movement. But there can be no doubt about our starting-point, which is fixed, just at the end of the eighteenth century, in Kant (A.D. 1724-1804), the great historical connecting link between the *Aufklärung* and Romanticism. Kant is universally recognized as having introduced a new epoch of thought. Nowhere, however, is the influence of the Kantian philosophy more observable than in the fresh theological development resulting from it.

"Kant," says Jodl,¹ "has become the second Luther. In him is rooted the philosophy of Romanticism, whence the restoration of the historical Church-matters received its final impulses and its scientific formulæ."

¹ "Geschichte der Ethik," I.², p. 552.

Bruno Bauch¹ has shown how true it is that Kant was a second Luther, in other words how many of Luther's fundamental moral and religious convictions were renewed by him in philosophic form. Finally, C. H. Weisse² says of Kant :—

“The epoch-making act of philosophical speculation, by means of which was made possible to the same³ the creation of such an instrument as the science of the Christian Faith needed for its self-formation, is none other than that great act, which speculation has accomplished through Immanuel Kant, of reflection upon the relation of the pure knowledge of the reason to experience and to the science to be created out of experience, and upon the tasks which are through this relation proposed to the former⁴ with reference to the latter.”⁵

Weisse, in fact, recognizes in the advent of the Kantian philosophy the beginning of the creation by Christianity of a philosophy “out of its own midst and out of the depths of its own consciousness,” in other words, of a philosophy adequate to its own self-exposition.⁶

The peculiar feature of the Kantian philosophy is, as indicated in the above quotation from Weisse, its careful discrimination of the *a priori*, or purely rational, elements in knowledge from those which are empirical in their origin, and its endeavour exactly to determine the relation between these diverse elements. In his philosophy of religion, accordingly, Kant neither, like the Apologists and the Deists, at once assumes the

¹ “Luther and Kant,” 1904.

² “Philosophische Dogmatik,” I. § 261, p. 245.

³ I.e. philosophical speculation.

⁴ The pure knowledge of the reason.

⁵ The science to be created out of experience.

⁶ Op. cit. I. §§ 9-13, pp. 7-10.

fundamental religious ideas as rational, nor yet, like the Fathers, the mediaeval Schoolmen, the Protestant theologians, and even Locke, Chubb, and Steinbart, appeals for them, beyond reason, to the external authority of the Scriptures ; but, on the contrary, he analyses them at every point into their original, rational, and empirical elements, deducing them, on the one hand, from the moral law as given by reason,¹ and, on the other hand, from the empirical facts, not only of man's need for happiness,² but also of his natural contrariety to the moral law.³ We have now to see the way in which Kant, on these bases, built up his philosophy of religion.

In his "Critique of Pure Reason" (1781), Kant recognized the idea of natural law even more fully than the Aufklärung had done ; but he broke with the confidence of the Aufklärung as to the complete rationality of religion. He found that the rational proofs for the existence of God were not demonstrative, having no sufficient basis in experience. In the "Critique of Practical Reason" (1788), Kant, however, recognized that man is not only as a part of the world subject to natural law, but also as a spiritual being subject to a moral law given in his conscience. He therefore found that the practical reason requires us to believe in our freedom to obey the moral law, in immortality, that we may have time to attain to the infinite perfection which it requires, and in a God, who may reconcile the absolute demand which morality makes upon us with our natural and necessary need of happiness, by causing virtue and happiness to coincide in the supreme good, with which

¹ At this point Kant touches the Apologists and the Deists.

² Here Steinbart had shown the way ; cf. *supra*, p. 191.

³ It is the recognition of this fact that, above all, makes Kant "the second Luther".

Kant connects the Scriptural name of the Kingdom of God.

"The Kingdom of God is thus that intelligible, moral world, that system through which the co-existence of virtue and happiness is made possible. It cannot therefore, strictly speaking, be said that the Kingdom of God is in the opinion of Kant the highest good ; it is rather that supersensuous order of things, through which the highest good is made possible and can come into the possession of men. Men are to 'possess' 'work,' 'bring in,' the highest good, i.e. virtue and happiness : it is God who makes this possible through the order of His Kingdom."¹

Kant was able to establish further points of connexion with Christian doctrine, especially in its Protestant formulation. In his book "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft" (1793), the great philosopher recognizes the existence in man, in spite of his reverence for the moral law, of a rooted tendency to disobey it. In opposition, therefore, to the Pelagianism of the Aufklärung Kant declares himself essentially on the side of Augustine and Luther, though he cannot accept the Augustinian derivation of the sinful tendency from Adam, but prefers to view it as the result in every case of an "intelligible act, prior to all experience".² Each man, that is to say, is responsible for his own transgression, but no empirical explanation is sufficient to account for the fact that, from first to last, he is a transgressor.

The question now is, whether and how man, thus discovered to be by nature bad, can be made good.

¹ J. Weiss, "Die Idee des Reiches Gottes in der Theologie," 1901, p. 86. By *intelligible* (in the Kantian sense) is meant, that which is discerned, not by the senses, but by the intellect, or reason, alone.

² For the meaning of "intelligible" see preceding note.

This is not so easy a question as the *Aufklärung* found it. There is an antinomy here involved. The offender cannot begin to be a good man, as long as he is troubled with the distress of conscience occasioned by his guilt ; on the other hand, he cannot be freed from this distress until he has amended his ways. The solution of the antinomy Kant states as follows :—¹

Nothing but a perfect humanity can please God, and so attain felicity. This humanity, well-pleasing to God, is His Only-Begotten Son, the Word, the Brightness of His glory, etc. It is our duty to raise ourselves to this ideal of human perfection, for which duty the ideal itself can give us strength. But because this ideal is not of our creation, we may say that it has come down to us from heaven, and assumed our humanity. We can only think of it under the form of a man, who not only practises all duties, and by doctrine and example spreads goodness about him, but also is ready for the good of the world to endure all sufferings.

“ In practical faith in this Son of God (so far as He is represented as if He had assumed human nature) man can now hope to become acceptable to God, and therewith also blessed ” (p. 67). By such faith is meant man’s trust in his own allegiance to the ideal, and his willingness to endure all sufferings in pursuit of it.

What now is to be said as to the objective reality of this idea ? Kant answers : “ The idea has its reality, in the practical reference, entirely in itself. For it lies in our reason in its capacity as a moral lawgiver ” (p. 68). Since, however, we must believe in the possibility of the realization of the idea, an experience must be possible in which an actual example of humanity corresponding to it may be given. If such a man ever really

¹ “ Die Religion,” etc., “ Zweites Stück, Erster Abschnitt,” ed. Vorländer, 1903, pp. 66 f.

existed, it would not be necessary to think of him as supernaturally born. In fact he would thereby cease to be an example for us, since he would not be in the same circumstances as ours.

Kant now proceeds to certain difficulties as to the realization of the ideal in us, and to their solution. The first difficulty which appears to hinder the realization in us of the ideal of humanity, has reference to the holiness of the Lawgiver and our own lack of righteousness. It is solved, in that God first accepts in us the disposition to holiness, until by degrees we realize actual holiness. The second difficulty is to know how we can be sure of the constancy of our good disposition. The solution is, that the disposition itself is the "Comforter," which confirms us in our faith in its own perseverance, and that this inner witness is guaranteed by our actual progress in good. The third and apparently greatest difficulty is as follows: However in any man the acquisition of a good disposition may have taken place, and whatever perseverance he may show in it, still he began from evil, and his guilt is not extinguished. Even if after his regeneration he commits no more sins, he has not paid for the old ones. Nor is any excess of merit possible, since he can never exceed his duty. The solution here is, that the regenerate man is, in his moral disposition (as an intelligible essence¹), morally another before his Divine Judge. This new man, who is one with the Son of God, whom he has received into himself, bears as substitute the guilt of the sins of the old man, in so far as the natural consequences of the latter's sins, of which he is guiltless, come upon him, and he willingly endures them as a sacrifice.

Kant goes on to say² that Scripture represents the

¹ The moral disposition is the "essence," which reason perceives to underlie the acts apparent to the senses.

² "Zweites Stück, Zweiter Abschnitt," pp. 88 ff.

conflict between the good and evil principles under a figure. The world by the Fall became a kingdom of Satan, whose end began with the death of Jesus, who by His example of virtue and self-sacrifice founds a new ethical community.

This Scriptural doctrine, however, contains an element, which is not found in Kant's previous doctrine, of faith in the ideal Son of God. It is, in its reference, not merely individual but social. Kant also recognized a social element in his philosophical doctrine of religion, which he proceeds now to describe.¹

A merely individual view of the conflict of good and evil is not sufficient. The evil principle is socially embodied, and thus maintains its mastery over humanity. The good principle therefore must also be socially embodied. The idea of an ethical community is, however, the idea of a people of God under ethical laws, and can be realized only as a Church, "which, so far as it is no object of possible experience, is called the invisible Church" (p. 115). In the natural order of things the Church always takes its rise from a historical faith, held to be based on revelation. Such a faith may be called an ecclesiastical faith, and is best based upon a holy Scripture. The ecclesiastical faith has, however, as its highest interpreter the faith of pure natural religion. Finally, the gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith into the form of a pure rational faith is the approach of the Kingdom of God. Kant concludes by showing how these general principles correspond to the actual history of religion in Judaism and Christianity. He says:—

"If it now be asked : Which age of the entire Church history that we know up to the present is the best, I have no hesitation in replying : It is the present, and that just because the germ of true religious faith, as it is

¹ "Drittes Stück," pp. 105 ff.

now planted within Christianity, only indeed by some individuals, but still publicly, is permitted more and more to develop unhindered, so that there may be expected to result from it a continuous approximation to that Church uniting all men for ever, which is the visible representation (or *schema*) of an invisible Kingdom of God upon earth" (p. 152).

J. Weiss¹ has pointed out that, except for one or two passages where the doctrine of the highest good in the "Critique of Practical Reason" is reproduced, the idea of the Kingdom of God in the "Religion" is different from that former doctrine. Kant now conceives it simply as an ethical society, whose aim is to establish the supremacy of the good principle over the evil in the world. Reinhard had already in his "Versuch über den Plan, welchen der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der Menschheit entwarf" (1781) developed the idea of the Kingdom of God as an ethical community founded by Jesus, a brotherhood for moral ends. Kant, however, only follows Reinhard exactly so far as to recognize his doctrine as a Biblical idea: in his own philosophical doctrine of religion he releases the notion of the Kingdom of God from its connexion with the historical figure of Jesus, and presents it as a universal ethical ideal.

Both conceptions of the Kingdom of God, the view of it as the highest good, an order of things in which under God virtue and happiness are united, and the view of it again as a human community striving for moral ends, now descend as a legacy to the theology of the nineteenth century. It is clear that neither entirely corresponds to the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God, which is primarily eschatological.² Nevertheless Kant's conceptions touch the Biblical idea closely at certain

¹ Op. cit. p. 87.

² "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 44 ff.

points,¹ and prepare for its further extended use in theology.

As regards the religious doctrine of Kant in general, it is clear that he has carried the separation of Christian doctrine from the historic Christ even farther than Steinbart. He is thus the father of all Modernism, which, distinguishing between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history, finds the doctrines of the Church profoundly true as ideas, though untrue if understood literally as referring to the historical Jesus.

§ 4. HEGEL

Before proceeding to the theological development proper in nineteenth-century Germany, we must consider yet one other philosopher, who, along with Kant, has had great influence upon theology. This is Hegel (A.D. 1770-1832), who, following upon lines initiated by Fichte and Schelling, endeavoured to reduce the whole of the Kantian doctrine to a single principle, and out of this principle by a necessary development of thought to explain the universe. This principle is no other than the *coincidentia oppositorum*, which was the unconscious principle of Luther's theology, now raised, however, to the rank of a conscious philosophical principle. For Hegel the ultimate truth of philosophy is the identity of the Infinite and the finite. The Infinite inevitably develops the finite out of itself, and equally inevitably the finite returns into the Infinite. Every finite attempt to express the Infinite proclaims its own insufficiency, and calls for a further endeavour. The forms of abstract logic give place to those of matter and of organic nature, while these in turn give way to the forms of the spiritual life, of which religion is the

¹ Holtzmann, "Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie," ², I, pp. 248 ff. Cf. in particular p. 265, n. 1.

highest, short of the absolute truth of philosophy. In religion the fundamental truth of the identity of the Infinite and the finite appears in a form adapted to the needs of the common consciousness, in the Christian doctrines of the Person and Work of Christ. Man has in religion an immediate consciousness of his finitude, which being felt by him as separation from the Infinite, manifests itself in the consciousness of sin and guilt, which occasions him the keenest pain. Yet the finite spirit cannot from itself, by its own action, attain reconciliation with the Infinite : it must find the reconciliation as already given and existing, and must accept it as the basis of all its action.

“The unity of subjectivity and objectivity,” says Hegel, “this Divine unity must be as the presupposition for my positing : then first has this a content, which content is Spirit, concrete content—otherwise it is subjective, formal ; thus first it obtains true, substantial content.”¹

This fundamental unity, as has been stated, exists according to Hegel as the ultimate truth of things. Nevertheless in this form it can only be grasped by means of an elevation to the philosophic standpoint, and is not at once apparent to the common consciousness. It must become thus apparent ; but how ? Not merely as a thought, for what is only a thought remains subjective and powerless ; but as a reality perceivable by the senses, instantly and evidently apparent for the consciousness.

“Thus must this unity show itself for the consciousness in an entirely temporal, perfectly ordinary

¹ “Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion,” ed. Bolland, 1901, p. 638. Hegel means that unless there is first given in reality a unity of the Infinite and the finite, or, what is the same, of the Object with the subject, any mere *thought* of such reconciliation on the part of the subject will be illusory.

manifestation of reality, in a man who is 'this man,' who may at the same time become known as a Divine Idea, not only as a higher being in general, but as the highest, the Absolute Idea, as the Son of God " (p. 641).

This manifestation, however, is not merely necessary, it has become actuality. This has taken place in the Christian Church, in that by its faith Jesus Christ has been recognized as the God-man. This amazing phenomenon has two sides. The essential truth contained in it is the ultimate unity of the Divine and human nature. The form which it takes is the faith of the Church in the Divinity of Christ. "Manifestation is Being for another; this other is the Church" (p. 645).

There are now two views of this historical manifestation. There is first that which is common to all humanity, apart from a religious faith. Here Jesus appears as a human teacher, bringing the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. This doctrine, however, in itself is merely the abstract presupposition of the new religion. It is not the new religion itself. In the new religion it is transformed by being taken up into a concrete whole. "Christ's doctrine cannot, in its immediacy, be Christian Dogmatic, or Church Doctrine. When the community is founded, and the kingdom of God has attained to its reality, its actuality, then this doctrine can no longer have the same determination as before"¹ (p. 646).

Along with this doctrine of the human Christ belong His moral commandments, which centre in the one commandment of love. To the human aspect of His life also belong the example of Christ and His martyr-death. "The first point of all is the abstract conformity of the doing, acting, and suffering of this teacher

¹ The doctrine now enters into new relations, which determine its meaning afresh.

to His doctrine itself,¹ that His life is entirely devoted to it, that He did not fear death, and by His death sealed this faith" (p. 652).

These are the chief moments of the human manifestation of Christ. But now comes the other and higher point of view, that of Christian faith. "If we say no more of Christ, than that He is the teacher of humanity and martyr for the truth, we are not yet at the Christian standpoint, not at that of true religion" (p. 645).

What then is this standpoint? Hegel fixes it as follows:—"Through faith this individual is recognized as of Divine nature, whereby the transcendence of God is done away" (p. 645). From this higher point of view in fact all that Jesus does becomes a revelation of God: it is God Himself Who draws near to us and touches us in Him, and so takes us up into the Divine consciousness.

This transformation of the consciousness from human to Divine begins with the death of Christ. "The death of Christ is the centre about which it turns; in the conception of it lies the difference between the external point of view and that of faith, i.e. the contemplation of it with the spirit, in the spirit of truth, in the Holy Spirit" (p. 653). It is not indeed only with regard to the death of Christ that faith, directed by the Spirit, transforms the common view of His earthly manifestation. The doctrine, the miracles, the whole history, are also conceived and understood from the point of view of faith. But the view of the death is the central point of all. "The death is, so to speak, the touchstone by which faith proves itself, in that here is

¹ That is, the *conformity*, which reflection perceives, when it *abstracts* first Christ's doctrine, and then His doing and suffering from His total reality, and finally compares them.

essentially expressed its understanding of the manifestation of Christ" (p. 655). On the one hand it is the lot of finite humanity, to which Christ has submitted: His humanity is thus absolutely proved. More than this, the death He died was a death of shame upon the cross: "humanity is manifested in Him up to the extremest point" (*ibid.*). On the other hand, however, faith recognizes that in this death God is revealed, and that the Divine and human natures are one. Thus the significance of death is transformed; the Cross is glorified, and becomes the banner of the new religion.

"There enters now, however, a further determination. God has died, God is dead—this is the most terrifying thought, that all that is eternal, all that is true, is not, the negation itself exists in God: the greatest pain, the feeling of absolute hopelessness, the abandonment of all that is higher is bound up therewith. The process, however, does not stop here, but there follows the transformation. God in fact maintains Himself in this process, and it (the process) is only the death of death. God rises again to life, thus there is a change to the very opposite. The resurrection belongs equally essentially to faith: Christ appeared after His ascension only to His friends: this is not external history for unbelief, this manifestation is rather only for faith. Upon the resurrection follows the glorification of Christ, and the triumph of His exaltation to the right hand of God closes this history, which in this consciousness is the unfolding of the Divine nature itself"¹ (p. 656).

But now what does this mean? It means that for those who attain to this higher point of view, death is dead, finitude is consumed by being taken up into

¹ The history of Christ, as taken up into, and interpreted by the above process of consciousness, appears as the unfolding of the Divine nature.

infinity. But herewith evil and sin too are overcome, for they belong only to the finite in separation from God. In this victory over sin and evil the Divine love is manifested.

“Christ has assumed human finitude, and that in all its forms, the finitude which in its extremest point is evil. . . . He has, however, assumed it, in order by His death to slay it. . . . Herein is infinite love, that God has identified Himself with what is alien to Himself, in order to slay it—such is the significance of the death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the world, has reconciled God, so it is said” (p. 658).

The process, however, is the necessary process of the Divine life. Consequently, what is done, is universal in character. Christ does not make satisfaction to God for our sins, as one independent moral person, acting as a substitute for others. On the contrary the satisfaction to God consists in this, that finitude, evil, and sin are in themselves overcome.

“This now is how it stands with regard to the satisfaction made for us. What is fundamental therein is this, that that satisfaction has happened in and for itself: it is not that an alien sacrifice has been brought, not that another has been punished (simply) in order that punishment may have taken place” (p. 660).

Here, however, a difficulty arises. “Suffering and dying in such a sense is contrary to the idea of moral imputation, according to which each individual has to stand for himself only, each one is the doer of his own deeds” (p. 661).

The solution of the difficulty, however, is at hand. The Christian faith lifts us above the sphere where imputation obtains, viz. the field of finitude.

“In the field of finitude the fixed rule is, that every one remains what he is: if he has done what is evil, then

he is evil : the evil is in him as his quality. But already in the sphere of morality, still more in that of religion, the spirit is recognized as free, as affirmative in itself, so that this limitation in it, which proceeds even to that which is evil, is for the infinity of the spirit a non-entity : the spirit can make the done undone, the deed remains indeed in the memory, but the spirit disowns it. Imputation, therefore, does not reach up to this sphere" (*ibid.*).¹

Such is Hegel's very remarkable interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the work of Christ. It brings together the humanitarianism of the *Aufklärung* and the idealism of Kant, and relates them to one another as successive stages of truth, in which the lower is only fully understood by the higher. The "*Umkehrung des Bewusstseins*," which is characteristic of Hegel, carries us in fact from the standpoint of the *Aufklärung* to that of Kant. We pass from the history of the human Jesus to that of the Divine Idea, expressed in Him in order that it may be apprehended by us. "First . . . that which is natural, then that which is spiritual."² It may be freely granted that Hegel has given a most sympathetic interpretation of Christian doctrine, and has done his best by an act of penetrative imagination to arrive at its very essence. He has been able to work into his completed philosophical construction strands from the entire history of Christian doctrine, and to bring them into new relations which cast a great deal of light on their nature. Especially interesting is the way in which

¹ The field of finitude is the domain of the ordinary consciousness, where the spirit is limited in thought and action by existing facts. The spirit is, however, free, in so far as it affirms as true and real its own infinite moral ideals, and refuses to recognize the limitation of facts, including even its own misdeeds. The free spirit thus rises above its past, and rids itself of responsibility for it.

² 1 Cor. xv. 46.

he meets the Socinian criticism of the doctrine of satisfaction by passing on to the Pauline doctrine of mystical identification with Christ, as establishing a higher point of view at which the Socinian objections are no longer valid.

The crucial point in Hegel's reconstruction is, however, that of the connexion of the idealism of faith with the historical figure of Jesus. Hegel has indeed striven very hard to show the necessity for the Incarnation of the Divine Idea in the one individual.

"This individual, who is for the rest the manifestation of the Idea, is 'this' unique individual—not certain individuals, for as realized in certain individuals the Divinity becomes an abstraction. 'Certain' individuals mean an unsatisfactory excess of reflection, an excess because contrary to the idea of the individual subjectivity. Once is in (the realm of) the concept always, and the Subject must without a choice be realized in one subjectivity. In the eternal Idea there is only one Son; so there is only one, exclusive of the rest, in whom the absolute Idea appears. This perfecting of reality up to the point of immediate unique individuality is the most beautiful point of the Christian religion, and the absolute glorification of finitude is brought to view in it" (p. 643).¹

The meaning is that, as there is only one eternal Idea, so it must be reflected for us in sensuous form in one point only. Hegel therefore here undoubtedly associates the development of the true religion more closely

¹ This difficult passage may perhaps be paraphrased as follows:—As there is only One Infinite Object, it requires in strictness to be *reflected* in only One Subject. A multiplicity of subjects means an unnecessary "excess of reflection". The concept of the Object, once formed, is a timeless reality: if *repeated* in time, it appears no more than an abstraction. Thus as there is only One Divine Son in idea, there can be only one, in the strict sense, in history.

with the individual figure of Jesus than does Kant. Nevertheless his final view seems to be that this stage of faith is after all only a beginning, and that when the "Umkehrung des Bewusstseins" takes place, the Idea in its higher form becomes universalized, so that its association with Jesus is now only symbolical.

If then, on the one hand, the *Aufklärung* may in general be regarded as having renewed in an immanental form (i.e. without the *theologumenon* of the transcendent Logos) the doctrine of the Apologists, that Christianity is the republication of the moral religion of reason, Kant and Hegel may, on the other hand, be viewed as having revived, also in an immanental form, the Gnostic religion of redemption. Like the Gnostics, they have separated the Divine principle of redemption from the historic Jesus, but it is for them no transcendent *Æon Christus*, but an idea immanent in the human mind. We have next, however, to deal with a theologian, who, in opposition to these new Apologists and new Gnostics, renews in immanental form the theology of Irenæus and Athanasius, making the Incarnation of the Divine in the historical Jesus the central point of the Christian religion. This theologian is Schleiermacher, who, a contemporary of Hegel, also starts like him from the Kantian standpoint, but develops his ideas in a different direction.

CHAPTER III

THE CENTRE OF THE MODERN THEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT

§ 1. SCHLEIERMACHER

SCHLEIERMACHER (A.D. 1768-1834) is deservedly called the father of modern theology. His great systematic work, "Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche in Zusammenhange dargestellt" (1st ed. 1821, 2nd ed. 1831), is the basis of almost all that is best in theology since his time. Kant had indeed in his ethical doctrine given to the modern world a standpoint, whence the ideas of justification and vicarious sacrifice could be understood and appreciated, as they had not been by the Aufklärung. He had also established in his doctrine of the Kingdom of God a point of connexion of great moment between philosophy and the Christian religion. Nevertheless in all this it was only the ideas of Christianity which he regarded as of permanent significance. Its historical elements he viewed as no more than a temporary scaffolding, which had in the history of human thought done good service towards the building of the temple of the Idea in humanity. With Schleiermacher, however, there is a great change. History has for him a deeper meaning than it had for Kant. Christianity is a religion the very essence of which lies in the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth ("Der Christliche Glaube," 2nd ed., § 11).

What did Schleiermacher mean by this, and how did

he understand the idea of redemption? He begins at precisely the same point as Kant. He accepts the results produced by the influence of natural science upon philosophy. Man is a part of nature. His knowledge of the world in detail is dependent upon his senses. There are also within him natural impulses belonging to this life of the senses. But a spark disturbs his clod. He is also capable of a higher consciousness. That which altogether transcends the senses, the Absolute, the Infinite, makes itself known in him in the feeling of absolute dependence (*schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*) (*ibid.* § 4). This feeling Schleiermacher speaks of as the consciousness of God (*Gottesbewusstsein*), and identifies with the essence of religion, and of all religions. The consciousness of God is intended to permeate the whole of the lower consciousness, and to direct and control it at every point. When it does so completely, there is harmony, joy, and peace in the soul; when it struggles to overcome the lower consciousness there is disharmony, pain, and trouble (§ 5). In humanity in general, however, the ideal state of harmony is not realized. The consciousness of God develops in men more slowly than the lower consciousness (§ 67). Nevertheless so soon as the consciousness of God stirs within us at all, we know that it ought to pervade and control our life; and thus there is no peace for us, as long as it is oppressed and thwarted in its development by the lower consciousness (§ 83). Yet this oppression and hindrance we cannot ourselves overcome, nor can we liberate the consciousness of God in ourselves, so that it attains its rightful position in the soul (§ 86). This is the state of sin and consciousness of guilt.

At this point enters the figure of Jesus as the Redeemer. Redemption is the liberation of the consciousness of God from its oppression by the lower conscious-

ness and the establishment of it in its due supremacy over the soul (§ 11, 2). Jesus is the archetypal man, in whom the God-consciousness from the first controls the lower consciousness (§ 93). He is supernatural, in so far as He transcends common humanity; nevertheless His life is not contrary to the true idea of humanity, but is rather the perfect realization of it (§ 94). Hence, though He is supernatural, He acts naturally in the world by His personal influence, transmitted through the historical channel of the Church. His action is to make others in measure like Himself, to liberate the consciousness of God in them, and to enable it to dominate the lower consciousness, as it did in Him (§ 88). This is the redemption which He brings. Schleiermacher calls the state of redemption, in opposition to the state of sin, the state of grace.

Further light is cast upon the way in which he understands the Christian redemption, by the distinction which he makes between Christianity and other religions. All religions aim at the development of the consciousness of God and the harmony which ensues therefrom. In the lower stages of the evolution of religion, however, the unity of God is seen as refracted into a multiplicity through the variety of nature: at this level, therefore, religion is polytheistic. Christianity, however, is a monotheistic religion (§ 8). Some religions, again, aim simply at establishing harmony in the inner life without affecting our action in the world, which they leave simply to the control of the lower impulses as before. Others aim at controlling conduct as well as feeling. The former are æsthetic, the latter teleological (or ethical) religions. Christianity belongs to the latter class. It aims at the control of the whole life, our actions as well as our feeling. Here Schleiermacher, like Kant, makes connexion with the idea of the Kingdom of God. This

is the ultimate aim of the Christian redemption, and individuals are redeemed by Christ to take part in it (§ 9).

The complete definition of Christianity is, then, that it is the monotheistic and teleological religion in which everything is referred to the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth (§ 11). From the Christian standpoint, moreover, it is not to be thought of that in the full sense of the word there can be any other redemption than this which Jesus has brought (§ 14).

Such in broad outline is Schleiermacher's view of the work of Christ. He is the Redeemer in that He establishes the supremacy of the consciousness of God in humanity, and thereby founds the Kingdom of God. We have now to examine in detail the way in which Schleiermacher works out this view. In order to do this satisfactorily we must consider in his "*Der Christliche Glaube*" (2nd edition) not only §§ 100-105, in which he formally treats of the work of Christ, but also §§ 86-88, where he deals with the general basis of this and of the other associated doctrines of grace. The first point to be observed in studying those sections is the nature of the proof advanced. The method of Schleiermacher is to appeal, in the first place, not to Scripture, but to Christian experience (§ 15), of which in his view Scriptural and ecclesiastical doctrine are alike formulations, only that the doctrine of Scripture is more poetical and rhetorical, while dogmatic theology is more didactic and scientific (§ 16). For the old method of direct proof from Scripture, therefore, Schleiermacher substitutes in reality the attempt to place oneself by sympathy at the point whence Scripture is intelligible as a natural manifestation of the Christian spirit. He can thus allow for the figurative element in Scripture, and avoid the difficulties which the Socinian criticism had shown to follow from the attempt to argue logically

from the express words of Scripture. Schleiermacher establishes as the basis of modern theology a new attitude to Scripture, involving no longer only a grammatico-historical, but also a psychological, exegesis. His method is in essence a return to the "spiritual" exegesis of Origen, only that the gains of the grammatico-historical exegesis are conserved, in so far as the figures of Scripture are more carefully interpreted. Schleiermacher also, however, employs as proof of doctrine the Creeds and Confessions generally accepted by the Protestant Church (§ 27). His method is to treat them, along with the orthodox Protestant theology which interprets them, as a prior scientific formulation of the Christian experience, which, however, requires criticism and correction. The fundamental principle of Schleiermacher's theology throughout is that objective doctrine and subjective experience must correspond. So far then as doctrine mirrors experience, it is right: so far as it fails to do so, it is, if not absolutely wrong, mere speculation (§ 16, Zusatz).

An important part therefore of Schleiermacher's doctrinal proof consists in the endeavour to show that his positive statement is but the development to its proper consequences of that religious view which is indicated in the Protestant symbols. The complete title of his great dogmatic work in fact is "*Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*". (The Christian faith systematically presented according to the fundamental principles of the Evangelical Church.) By the Evangelical Church Schleiermacher meant, not only the Lutheran, but also the Reformed Church. He regarded both branches of Protestantism as being, in spite of their differences, substantially in unity. He stood on the ground of the union of the two Churches,

which was initiated in Prussia in 1817. As regards the relation of Protestantism to Catholicism he lays down the following important proposition:—

(§ 24, Leitsatz) “So far as the Reformation was not merely a purification and return from abuses that had stolen in, but there has proceeded from it a peculiar formation of the Christian community, we may by anticipation so conceive the opposition between Protestantism and Catholicism, in such a way that the first makes the relation of the individual to the Church dependent on his relation to Christ, while the latter makes the relation of the individual to Christ dependent on his relation to the Church.

We are now in a position to proceed with the sections of “Der Christliche Glaube” above mentioned. Each contains a general proposition or Thesis (Leitsatz), which is followed by a detailed exposition. The “Leitsatz” of § 87 is as follows:—

“We are all of us conscious of approximations to the state of blessedness which manifest themselves in the Christian life, as grounded in a new Divinely-established common life, which counteracts the common life of sin and the misery therein developed.”

Schleiermacher's view of sin, it should be explained, does not end simply with the inability of the individual to free the consciousness of God in him from the hindrance of the lower life. There is a common life of sin, due to the interaction of individuals one upon another, and transmitted as a social tradition from the past (§ 71).¹ This life is the natural state of humanity, to meet which God has established the remedy of the common life of the Church, deriving itself from the life of Jesus.

Upon the above-mentioned experience of an ap-

¹ This doctrine of inherited sin (Erbsünde) is Schleiermacher's substitute for the traditional doctrine of original sin.

proximation to beatitude Schleiermacher now undertakes to establish his doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ. One difficulty is, that he postulates in Christ a perfect supremacy of the consciousness of God. "In this common life, which goes back to the work of Jesus, redemption is accomplished by Him by virtue of the communication of His sinless perfection" (§ 88, *Leit-satz*). Yet experience can testify only to approximations in our case to beatitude. Can we ever by means of an imperfect result demonstrate a perfect cause? Schleiermacher feels the difficulty, but he says:—

"We, nevertheless, hold to this conception (of the absolute perfection of Christ) as the original one and that which has been handed down from the primitive Church to our own, and as at the same time that which both most definitely excludes all surreptitious self-satisfaction, and also is alone consistent with a more serious view of the common life in the state of sin" (§ 88, 1).

In other words, once we undervalue the Redeemer, we begin to undervalue redemption and so to think lightly of sin. Schleiermacher does not, however, deny that a lower view of redemption may still be Christian, provided that we trace to Christ all such experience of blessedness as we have. No strict proof can, however, here be given. For one thing different impressions may be made by the same fact on the various members of the Christian community, so that ultimately we have only our own conviction to point to. Cannot we, however, escape this subjectivity by proof from Scripture? In the first place, most of the Scriptural forms of expression are capable of various interpretation. In the second place, proof from Scripture only shows agreement with the primitive form of Christian faith. This method of proof does not meet our need. All that is possible is psychologically to show how, entirely apart

from an external compulsion by means of prophecy or miracle or the like, the belief originally arose and still arises "that Jesus possesses a sinless perfection, and that in the communion founded by Him there is a communication of the same" (88, 2). If we establish this, then it follows of itself that this conviction will involve an ever-increasing beatitude in the community.

What then is here necessary? Firstly, to point out that the doctrine stated does not mean that it is our faith that makes Jesus the Redeemer—faith is no mere subjective view which we take of Him without a sufficient basis in the objective reality of His Person. Secondly, however, we must not say on the one hand that there is in Jesus a perfect consciousness of God, while we yet on the other hand attribute our faith in Him to our own yearning for peace of mind. On the contrary, faith is His work. The founding of the community is not a separate act apart from His consciousness of God. They are indivisibly one and the same. Just as the consciousness of God is in reality an act, so the founding of the community is essentially involved in it. Schleiermacher presupposes the intelligibility of all this in the case of the first disciples, but raises the question, How does Jesus still continue after all these centuries to act in the community of His foundation so as still to create the same faith as that of the primitive Church? The answer is, that His personal activity is replaced by that of the community itself "in so far as also the picture of Him which we still have in the Scriptures came to be, and still maintains itself, through the community" (88, 2).

No single person in the community indeed is capable of this work. Moreover, the whole community shares in the life of sin. Nevertheless the direct impression of the life of Christ is experienced in it. The

individual finds in it the picture of Christ ; and in its common life pure impulses from the original source of Christ's sinless perfection continually break forth, even though in action they lose force and become corrupted.

Such then is Schleiermacher's proof of his general view of Christ as Redeemer. It is led entirely from experience : the Scriptures do no more than manifest the agreement of the view with the primitive Christian consciousness. Upon the foundation so laid he now raises the edifice of his doctrine proper of the work or office of Christ (*Von dem Geschäft Christi*), §§ 100-105. In the first place he makes a further distinction. He now uses "Redemption" in a narrower sense than heretofore, and opposes it to "Reconciliation," defining these two aspects of the work of Christ as follows :—

"The Redeemer receives believers into the power of His consciousness of God, and this is His redemptive activity" (§ 100, *Leitsatz*).

"The Redeemer receives believers into the fellowship of His undisturbed beatitude, and this is His reconciling activity" (§ 101, *Leitsatz*).

(§ 100, 1) The first of these aspects has the logical priority. Since Christianity is an ethical religion, the work of the Redeemer upon us is to be understood as a stimulation of us to free action of our own, which action, however, all the same is His. The more proper activity of the Redeemer is, however, the receiving us into and maintaining us in a state of grace, apart from our activity in the world resulting from this. Schleiermacher repeats that this activity of the Redeemer is through the energy of His sinless perfection or the supremacy of the consciousness of God in Him. But he now adds the important thought that Christ can only direct His consciousness of God against sin, in so far as He enters into the common life of humanity, and in sympathy

shares our consciousness of sin, doing this at the same time with a view to its being conquered by Him. We too, as we share in His life, come to share in His victory over sin.

(2) Christ's work in the communication of the consciousness of God is a Divine work, and so is creative. Here Schleiermacher makes play with an idea, which dominates his doctrine of the Person of Christ (§§ 92-99), viz. that the consciousness of God in Christ is the same thing as the immanence of God in Him. (It may be observed that this notion is his equivalent for the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos.) Christ, then, like God, creates in us free will, a very inexplicable thing. His will creates a will to be received, or rather to acquiesce in His operation. It must be thought of as a permeative, or better as an attractive power, and like the Divine creative power employed in the origin of the Person of Christ Himself, it is person-forming. Again, like the creative power of God in the world, it is not concerned with individuals except as parts of a whole: it is in fact a continuation of the creative activity by which God created Christ, the ultimate purpose of which was the immanence of God in the entirety of humanity.

(3) Schleiermacher distinguishes his view as mystical, and as the golden mean between the two extremes of a magical and a purely empirical view. The magical view is that which attributes conversion to a personal operation of the Divine Christ, without, however, giving any psychological explanation of it, or assigning any natural channel for it. This has been the view of the sectaries (the mystical sects),¹ but others (i.e. orthodoxy

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 12, n. 1. Schleiermacher's statement may be illustrated from Schwenkfeld and from the Quaker theologian, Barclay. Schwenkfeld (as quoted by Baur, "Lehre von der Versöhnung," p. 461 n.)

in its doctrine of the kingly office) have come dangerously near it, though qualifying it with the idea that the Scriptures are a *sine qua non* of the Divine operation. On the other hand the empirical view (that of the Aufklärung) regards Christ as achieving increasing perfection in us by means of doctrine and example. This view, however, thinks too meanly of Christ. Even if His doctrine and example be regarded as perfect, there is wanting the specifically Christian idea of the forgiveness of sins through Him, or comfort is obtained by general means, such as the idea of the mercy of God. At most Christ only serves to bid men cease offering surrogates for the lack of perfection. The whole view is at fault in that it sets philosophy above faith and regards the latter as only a transitional stage.

Throughout § 100 Schleiermacher appeals (in his own sense, of course, of what the appeal means) to Scripture proofs. He views his doctrine as identical above all with the Pauline mystical doctrine of Christ in us, and of our union with Him, whereby we die to sin and live to righteousness (§ 101, 1).

Next comes the discussion of Christ's reconciling work. If His reconciling activity had no connexion with His activity in our redemption, or if reconciliation preceded redemption, the ethical character of Christianity

says: "Justifying faith comes not from preaching, but from God in heaven, it does not rest in the fact that Christ has shed His blood for us and paid for our sins, for such faith is an historical, powerless faith, but true faith rests in Christ in God Himself, it stands upon essential Being, and holds to the eternal Truth". Barclay (A.D. 1648-1690) explicitly teaches that "the evangelical and saving light and grace" of Christ, though it is "the purchase of His blood," is yet absolutely universal and essentially independent of a knowledge of the gospel history. He reprimands the Arminians, because they, though teaching a universal redemption, yet made the fruition of it by the individual depend on an historical knowledge ("Apology for the True Christian Divinity," E.T., 1869, Props. V, VI, and VII, Ex. 3).

would be affected. As, however, the activity of Christ implies a receptivity or longing in us, His redeeming activity necessarily precedes His activity in reconciliation. For our longing for redemption flows from the consciousness of sin itself, not from the idea of it as a cause of evil (i.e. pain or hindrance to life). [This statement Schleiermacher supports by saying that it must be so "since evil is not for the individual in any direct connexion with his sin". In order to clear up this point we must for a moment turn to his doctrine of evil (§§ 75-78). He regards sin in the world (i.e. the supremacy of the sense consciousness over the God-consciousness) as disturbing the ideal order of the world. In the first place, it implies as we have seen, a sinful society, actuated throughout by bad principles, which result in the existence of social evils. Secondly, however, though the laws of nature are not altered by sin, the harmony of the soul with the world is affected, inasmuch as the universe is not viewed as a whole as the God-consciousness would prompt, but is regarded simply in its relation to the life of the empirical individual. Thus between sin in humanity in general and evil in the world in general a direct connexion obtains. There is, however, no immediate connexion between the sin of the individual and the particular evils he experiences.] The reconciling moment in Christ's activity (that which removes our sense of evil) must therefore follow upon and out of the redemptive moment in it (that which lifts us out of the state of sin). Nevertheless the two are in the closest connexion, and one is not given without the other.

(2) Reconciliation in fact follows upon redemption in this way. As in Christ the consciousness of God is the centre of His Being, and hindrances of His activity come only from without, and appear merely as temporal

determinations of His activity, so is it with the believer in union with Him. Evils remain for him only as an indication of the direction of his action, and occasion no unhappiness. They do not belong to his new life in Christ.

But there is again the deeper question of the consciousness of sin, as it is still present in the believer. He relates it, however, to the common life of universal sinfulness which still has a place in him, and not to his new life.

“As then the redeeming activity of Christ establishes for all believers a common activity corresponding to the immanence of God in Christ; so the reconciling element in Him, viz. the beatitude of God’s immanence in Him, establishes a common feeling of beatitude for all believers and for each one in particular. In such an one there dies at the same time the former personality, so far as it meant the isolation of feeling in a bodily unity of life, to which isolation all sympathetic feeling for others and for the community remained subordinated. What, however, remains over as the individuality of the person is the peculiar mode of conception and sensation, which incorporates itself in that new common life as an individualized intelligence, so that the activity of Christ in relation to this element also is person-forming, in that an old man is put off and a new man put on.”

We may, perhaps, distinguish two stages in the process. “The beginning is the disappearance of the old man with his relation to evil and sin, and thus the disappearance of the consciousness of desert of punishment; so that the first element in reconciliation is the forgiveness of sins. For in the unity of life with Christ all relation to the law ceases, in that there begins the general tendency in opposition to sin, which proceeds from Him.”

The continuation of the process is in the settled possession of beatitude, in that Christ is now the centre of the life, while we recognize that this possession is His gift, who wills that we should enjoy His blessing and His peace. The above distinction, however, does not amount to a real separation of the two elements in the process. Forgiveness implies the blessedness of union with Christ, while the latter also always involves the former, since the general presence of sin continues.

(3) This position is once more mystical, in contrast with the empirical and magical points of view. The empirical point of view makes beatitude to result from amendment; but, as a matter of fact, the evils belonging to the common life of sin do not disappear. Thus beatitude remains only a hope, and is scarcely ever a possession; so that here Christianity has no special advantage over other religions. Neither, if we make beatitude originate only indirectly from Christ, through His bringing about amendment, do we assign to Him any very marked difference from other men.

Magical are all those views of the reconciling activity of Christ, which make the communication of His beatitude independent of reception into fellowship with Him. "Forgiveness of sins is in fact deduced from the punishment Christ bore, and the beatitude of men itself depicted as a reward, which God grants Christ for that penal suffering." Schleiermacher does not wish to reject altogether the idea that our blessedness is Christ's reward, nor that there is a connexion between His sufferings and the forgiveness of sins. Both conceptions are, however, magical, if not interpreted through our fellowship with Christ.

"For in this fellowship the communication of beatitude is, as above explained, natural, without it the reward of Christ is an arbitrary Divine act. And this is always

something magical, especially when so entirely inward a thing as beatitude is to be brought about from without apart from being established from within. For if it be independent of life in Christ, it can, since the recipient has no source of beatitude in himself, only be in some way infused into each individual from without. Just as magically is the forgiveness of sins wrought, if the consciousness of desert of punishment is to cease, because another has borne the penalty. That indeed in this way the expectation of punishment might be removed, may be thought ; but this is only the sensuous element of the forgiveness of sins, and there would still remain the properly ethical element, viz. the consciousness of desert of penalty, which therefore must vanish without any reason, as if removed by enchantment."

(4) In the above doctrine of redemption and reconciliation the suffering of Christ has not been mentioned. It is in fact only a secondary element in both cases, as is clear from the fact that fellowship with Christ was possible even before His sufferings and death. So far as it does come in, Christ's suffering belongs more immediately to reconciliation, but only mediately to redemption. Schleiermacher, however, takes first its relation to redemption.

"The activity of Christ in founding the new common life could only in reality be manifested in all its perfection—although faith in this perfection could be present even apart from this—if it yielded to no opposition, not even that which might bring about the destruction of the person. The perfection here is not to be found properly and immediately in the suffering itself, but only in the surrender to the same."

If, however, this climax of suffering is isolated, and the essence of Christ's redeeming activity is viewed as a surrender to suffering for suffering's sake, then we have

in this distortion a magical view of Christ's work, since the founding of the new common life is left out of account.

"But now again as regards reconciliation it was for our presentation (of the matter) self-explanatory, that in order to bring about their reception into the fellowship of Christ's beatitude, the longing of those who were conscious of their misery must first be directed to Christ by the impression which they receive of His beatitude. And here the state of things is, that faith in this beatitude could be present without this,¹ but that Christ's beatitude nevertheless was only manifested in its perfection, in that it was not overcome by the plenitude of His suffering, and this all the more as, since this suffering proceeded from the opposition of sin, the sympathy with misery, which everywhere, though without disturbing His beatitude, accompanied the Redeemer since He had entered into the life of sin, must here set in at its highest point. Here it is not the surrender to suffering such as belongs to the redeeming activity, but the suffering itself which becomes the complete confirmation of faith in the beatitude of the Redeemer."

It is once more, however, a magical distortion of this truth when the absolute necessity of an invincible beatitude in Christ is overlooked, and the reconciling power of His passion is deduced from His voluntary abandonment of beatitude, though but for a moment.

But now there is a further point which follows from the close association of reconciliation and redemption in Schleiermacher's theology.

"The fact that we regard His sympathy with men's misery as the climax of Christ's suffering, already involves that no suffering which does not belong to the

¹ I.e. without the manifestation of Christ's beatitude in its perfection.

redeeming work of Christ can be viewed as belonging to His work of reconciliation, since any such suffering would have no connexion with the reaction of the Redeemer against men's misery, and so could only be reckoned to the work of reconciliation in a magical way."

The whole suffering of Christ, however, viewed as one, can be regarded as having this connexion with His work of redemption. But to isolate any particular part of Christ's suffering from the whole, and assign to it a special reconciling value, comes near superstition.

"Least of all is it fitting to set such a special reconciling value upon the bodily sufferings, since these not only in and by themselves stand in the most distant connexion with Christ's reaction against sin, but also according to the testimony of our own feelings it is even now the reward of a temperate moral development and strong piety, that in connexion with a joyous spiritual consciousness, whether it is a personal or a common emotion, bodily sufferings are often entirely removed, or at least never penetrate that consciousness and lessen one moment's content of beatitude."

Finally, Schleiermacher points out that through the twofold work of redemption and reconciliation is realized the perfection of the creation of human nature. The process that began with the forming of the Person of Christ by the immanence of the consciousness of God in Him is continued by every intensive exaltation of the thus formed Divine-human life in its relation to the disappearing common life of sin. In this new life the original destination of humanity is reached, beyond which for a nature like ours there is nothing to be thought of or experienced.

The principal Scripture references in § 101 are to Rom. VIII. 1; 1 Jn. I. 8-9; II. 1-2; Gal. II. 19-21; v. 22-24.

In §§ 102-105 Schleiermacher, according to the theological method already described, further establishes his doctrine by a comparison with that of the Protestant orthodoxy.

“The doctrine of the Church distributes the entire activity of Christ under His three offices, the prophetic, high-priestly, and kingly” (§ 102, *Leitsatz*).

The division, says Schleiermacher, might at first sight appear arbitrary. We seem to have merely a collection of figures, and not all of these the most obviously suggested by the New Testament. Figurative expressions submit with difficulty to proper limitation, and often create trouble in systematic theology. It turns out, however, on examination that these particular figures are not arbitrarily chosen, but will serve to exhibit the Christian consciousness in terms of the Old Covenant. Because of this historical connexion they are of value, and are not to be neglected; the use of them establishes a connexion with primitive Christianity. On the other hand we no longer stand in the same relation to primitive Christianity as did Judaism, and it is not satisfactory for the modern Christian to be limited to such forms of doctrine only. Hence the need of a restatement of doctrine such as Schleiermacher has already given. What is now requisite is to show the essential unity of that statement “with that which earlier Christians formed, in that they present the offices of Christ as potentiated transformations of those, through which God’s rule was manifested under the Old Covenant”.¹ Schleiermacher says that this unity can only be demonstrated if we take all the three offices together.

“The prophetic office of Christ consists in teaching,

¹ Christ’s offices are those of the Old Covenant, transformed by being raised to a higher potency.

prediction, and in the working of miracles" (§ 103, Leitsatz). Christ's teaching, which for the people extended up to His being taken prisoner, but for His disciples up to the ascension, had as its source neither the Jewish law, nor yet, as the empirical school teach, human reason in general ; it sprang from His own immediate consciousness of God, which permeated and controlled all His thought. The law and the Messianic expectation were naturally the point of connexion for His proclamation of the Kingdom of God, to be established by Him.

As to the content of His teaching everything was essential, in so far as it belonged to His own presentation of Himself. For only the manifestation of His own proper dignity can effectively invite men into fellowship with Himself. Thus the essence of Christ's doctrine is the doctrine of His Person, which outwardly is the doctrine of His vocation, or of the communication of eternal life in the Kingdom of God, and inwardly the doctrine of His relation to Him Who sent Him, or of God as the Father, Who reveals Himself to and through Him. Christ further speaks of His destination to bring men to God and rule them in the Kingdom of God. What He says, moreover, is not to be dissociated from the "total impression" of His Person. The immanence of God in Him manifests itself not only in words, but in every form of self-expression. Once more, the predictive element in the teaching of Christ is not really different from the rest of His teaching ; for in it He could speak only of what was being already fulfilled in His own Person as the Messiah.

Finally, with regard to the miracles of Christ, these no doubt served to confirm His teaching to those who heard Him. But miracles can only perform such a function where they are immediately observed : im-

mediate observation, however, is no longer possible to those who are separated by space and time from the miracles. For us, therefore, the observation of the miracles is replaced by the sight of Christ's spiritual operation in history, which was denied to the first believers. The miracles of Christ in fact did but herald the advent of a new supernatural life: we live in the age when this life is all around us.

"The high-priestly office of Christ includes in itself His complete fulfilment of the law or His active obedience, His reconciling death or His passive obedience, and the representation of believers before the Father" (§ 104, Leitsatz). Here Schleiermacher gives a warning against separating the active and passive obedience, as though the active obedience had filled the life of Christ, while the passive obedience only began with His being taken a prisoner. On the contrary, in all His life the activity of His consciousness of God was present. Moreover, everywhere it was called out by definite occasions which involve passivity, and in action it was limited by hindrances which were felt as suffering. These occasions and these hindrances both came to Christ from the common life of sin, and in the suffering they occasioned Him He felt by sympathy and bore the sin of the world; so that this suffering accompanied Him throughout His whole life. The active and passive obedience were therefore, to speak strictly, united in every moment of His life. The latter signifies the receptivity in Christ, well-pleasing to God and perfectly satisfactory to Him, by which in feeling He entered into the life of sin, the former the activity and sympathy, equally well-pleasing and satisfactory to God, by which He reacted against it in carrying out His Divine vocation.

The essential high-priestly value of Christ's active

obedience is as follows : His action alone perfectly corresponds to the Divine will, and purely and entirely expresses the supremacy of the consciousness of God in human nature. This, however, is the basis of our peculiar relation to Him as Redeemer. "Apart from union with Christ neither any individual man, nor yet any definite part of the common life of humanity, can in and by itself in any period of time whatever be righteous before God or an object of the Divine good pleasure." No one in living fellowship with Christ is, however, regarded by God, as he is in himself, but as he is inspired by Christ and is a part of His work still in process of development ; so that what is not yet united to Christ is nevertheless viewed as related to the same inspiring process of His life, as that which presently is to be inspired thereby. This is the true sense of the often-misunderstood expression, that Christ's obedience is our righteousness, or that His righteousness is imputed to us.

At this point, then, we can distinguish between the prophetic and the high-priestly value of Christ's obedience. To the prophetic office belongs everything of the nature of revelation and self-manifestation both by word and deed, and everything which is directed to men with reference to the opposition between Christ and them, with a view to make them receptive for union with Him. The high-priestly value of Christ's obedience, however, has reference to His union with us, so far as His pure will to do the will of God is effective in us by means of our fellowship with Him, and so far as, therefore, we share His perfection, if not in completion yet in germ ; so that our union with Him, though not yet fully apparent, is by God reckoned as absolute and eternal, and is so recognized also by our faith.

There are, however, two points to be guarded

against in the usual statement. Firstly, the active obedience of Christ is said to be a perfect fulfilment of the Divine law. The idea of law implies an opposition between a higher commanding and a subordinate imperfect will. In this sense Christ could not be under the law, and even if we say that He voluntarily subjected Himself to the law, yet the idea of opposition between Him and it is left. We must therefore say that the active obedience of Christ was the perfect fulfilment, not of the law, but of the Divine will. So far as the outward precepts of the Mosaic law are concerned, Christ was indeed personally subject to them, but not voluntarily. (Schleiermacher appears to mean that He was subject to them by His birth as a Jew.) His fulfilment of them was therefore only part of His high-priestly work, in so far as it was a part of His fulfilment of the Divine will.

The second point of divergence is this. We must not say that Christ fulfilled the Divine will "in our place or for our advantage". At least we must not say "in our place" in the sense that we are thereby delivered from the fulfilment of the Divine will; for the chief work of Christ is to inspire us to an ever completer fulfilment of the Divine will. Nor yet must we say it in the sense that a lack of acceptability to God in us can be covered by an excess of acceptability in Christ. For since only the perfect man can stand before God, Christ Himself has nothing in excess to bestow on us.

Nor, again, must we say "for our advantage" in the sense that Christ's obedience in itself had in any way altered our condition. On the contrary, Christ's entire obedience only avails for us, as it becomes the motive principle of our obedience in fellowship with Him, just as the sin of Adam only results in our con-

demnation, in so far as it impels us, in our fellowship of nature with him, ourselves to sin.

As regards the passive obedience of Christ we have to remember, first of all, that the connexion in human society between sins and evils is general and not particular. Humanity suffers for the sins of humanity, not each individual for his own. Hence vicarious suffering is possible, in so far as the evils which come upon us are due to others' sins. Christ, then, though sinless, in entering into the common life of sinful humanity vicariously suffered for others. His suffering, moreover, was for the sins of universal humanity, because in accordance with the purpose of His life He felt a general sympathy with the sin of humanity. This sympathy reached its climax, when Jews and Gentiles alike, representing entire humanity, conspired together against His innocence.

"As now this sympathy with human guilt and desert of punishment was the original impulse that set redemption in motion, in so far as every definite human conscious activity is preceded by a determining impression: so now also the maximum increase of this very sympathy was Christ's immediate inspiration to the greatest moment in His office of redemption. And just as from this has proceeded His victory over sin, and as with sin its connexion with evil is also overcome: so we can put like together with like and say that through the suffering of Christ the penalty (of sin) is removed, since in the fellowship of His life of beatitude the evil which is now for the first time in process of disappearance is also at least no longer accepted as punishment."

This is the true Christian sense of the so much disputed doctrine, that Christ by His free self-surrender to suffering and death has satisfied the Divine righteous-

ness, as that wherein is founded the connexion between sin and evil, and has thereby redeemed us from the penalty of sin. It is now also clear how, apart from the exemplary character of the sufferings of Christ which belongs to His prophetic office, the appropriation of them has always been so fruitful in Christian piety. We can also understand the one-sidedness which concentrates the whole of redemption in this one point.

“For in Christ’s suffering even unto death, as occasioned by His faithfulness, is manifested to us His absolutely self-denying love; and in this is present to us in the fullest visibility the mode and manner in which God was in Him, in order to reconcile the world to Himself, as also we feel by sympathy most perfectly through His suffering, how invincible was His beatitude.”

We must not, however, dwell on the mere sufferings of Christ apart from His activity in them, nor again substitute, for the correct formula that Christ by His sufferings has taken away the penalties of sin, the incorrect idea that He has borne the penalty of sin (in the sense of an equivalent for our punishment), in order to satisfy the Divine righteousness. Apart from all other objections, this doctrine breaks down at the point where Christ is supposed to have experienced the Divine wrath.

“For this theory on the one hand takes away all human reality in the human consciousness of Christ, if He is to have possessed as His personal consciousness what in the nature of the case could only exist in Him as sympathy; on the other hand there is undoubtedly here at bottom the presupposition of an absolute necessity of Divine punishments, even apart from a reference to their natural connexion with wickedness, while this notion again is hardly to be distinguished from such a

conception of the Divine righteousness as is transferred to God from the rudest human conditions."

In a footnote Schleiermacher says that he has read with pleasure, that the late J. J. Hess¹ also could not view Mt. xxvii. 46 as a description by Christ of His own misery, but only as the beginning of the Psalm, which He only quoted with a view to what follows in it.

It is to be observed, that in the above passage Schleiermacher accepts the idea of natural law even more thoroughly than the Aufklärer Steinbart, who still leaves room for arbitrary Divine punishments in addition to punishment fixed by the order of nature.²

Schleiermacher goes on to express his disapproval of the gathering up of the doctrine of the high-priestly work of Christ in the phrase "vicarious satisfaction". He offers his criticism of it, however, in the form of a suggestion as to how it may be modified. "Instead of relating it, as it stands as a whole, both to the active and passive obedience equally, we must rather divide it, and relate the vicarious element only to the passive obedience, the satisfactory element, on the other hand, only to the active obedience."

Christ did indeed by His entire work make satisfaction for us: He did it, not, however, instead of us, but rather as the source of our spiritual life. On the other hand His suffering was vicarious, both as regards His sympathy with sinners and in regard to the evils He suffered, which in a general sense, as has been before explained, may be said to have been vicarious.³ But this vicariousness was not satisfactory; for those who as yet do not suffer for sin must do so, if they are to be united to Christ; and again Christ's suffering of evils does not exclude that of others, but on the contrary

¹ Of Zürich, A.D. 1741-1828.

² *Supra*, p. 199.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 247.

those who enter into fellowship with Him must enter into the fellowship of His sufferings, and suffer vicariously with Him for the sins of humanity. If we wish to find one expression for the whole of Christ's high-priestly work we may exactly reverse the traditional phrase, and call Him our "satisfactory vicar," in the sense that He, by His archetypal position in His redeeming activity, so presents before God the completion of human nature, that God by reason of our union with Him only regards us as we are in Him; and again, in the sense that His sympathy with sin, which impelled Him to the work of redemption, and was most perfectly manifested in His death, serves to supplement and perfect our imperfect consciousness of sin. We must, however, be very careful to make clear also that Christ's self-surrender to death is nothing different from His perseverance in the work of redemption. It was no arbitrary act outside of this, such as a voluntary self-infliction of pain to meet the necessity of punishment, a mode of conduct which has been already recognized as contrary to reason.¹ Christ's death was no pattern for the voluntary penances of Romanism, which are transferable from one to another.

As to the intercession of Christ, Schleiermacher says that it is difficult to see how Christ's obtaining goods by intercession from the Father can differ from His bestowal of them as King. A distinction may, however, be observed, if Christ's intercession be supposed to apply to what is properly outside His Kingdom, as for example that men should by the Father's general providence be added to it, or that those already in it may obtain from God's general providence spiritual gifts

¹ The reference is to § 86, 1, where Schleiermacher points out that, since every moment has its duty, time can only be given to self-chastisement at the expense of neglecting duty.

outside His special Kingdom of grace. Christ's intercession must be thought of as having begun during His lifetime ; and, in its continuance beyond this, does not depend upon any particular revelation to us of His present condition, but only on the already established content of His personality and on the worth of it to God. What Schleiermacher appears to mean, is that the Spirit of Christ in us directs and makes effective our prayers, even when they are for spiritual blessings in the domain of general providence, and also that the Person and work of Christ, in their cosmic significance, constitute a continual appeal to God to perfect the work begun in Him.

"The kingly office of Christ consists in this, that all which the community of believers requires for its welfare continually proceeds from Him" (§ 105, Leitsatz).

The Kingdom of Christ means, first of all, that the intention of Christ was to form a society, of which He is the one Head and Founder. Again, this kingdom is according to His own testimony not of the world. This means that its sphere is in the hearts of men, and that its government is not by external force, or even by sensuous allurements or punishments. Christ's Kingdom is not to be thought of as beginning after He left this earth, or as a kingdom beyond it. Nor is there any difference between His Kingdom as expressed in His earthly life and as it now exists. The rules and directions which He gave then abide now ; and His spiritual presence is still mediated by the written Word, with the picture which it contains of His character and work.

The chief difficulty in regard to this office of Christ is rightly to relate it to the general providence of God. The usual division into the kingdom of power, the kingdom of grace, and the kingdom of glory, is here ineffective. In the first place, a kingdom of power apart

from the kingdom of grace is not to be admitted as part of our doctrine. It has at least nothing to do with the redeeming activity of Christ, and therefore, even if the idea is found in the New Testament, it is no proper part of the Christian religion. If, again, we interpret Christ's authority as God-man and Redeemer¹ as co-extensive with God's general providence, we come into opposition with the Scriptural passages which represent Him as praying to the Father, and as wishing to establish, in the intercourse of believers with the Father, a direct relation between prayer and its answer. The power of Christ then means only that He inaugurates the kingdom of grace ; and it is essentially exhausted in this. It is a power over the world, in so far as believers are taken out of the world to form part of the kingdom of grace ; but the power to determine what portion of the world shall be so chosen remains with the Father. As regards the traditional kingdom of glory, Schleiermacher finds no place for this either. Christ is the pattern of our future spiritual glory ; but this relation to the Church is not fitly described as a kingdom. Our future glorification proceeds, together with His, from the Father.

"There remains, therefore, only the one kingdom of grace as a true Kingdom of Christ, which is now also the only one of which we have a real consciousness in our religious states of mind, and of which we also alone, since our active faith must be directed towards it, need a guiding knowledge." The other two names of the usual division can only be employed, better to define the kingdom of grace. The name, the kingdom of power, may serve to illustrate the universal destiny and scope of the kingdom of grace. The name, kingdom of glory, may indicate the goal of beatitude, to which, as it increases in perfection, the kingdom of grace may advance.

¹ Cf. Mt. xi. 27.

Schleiermacher has applied himself, even more thoroughly and also more successfully than Kant or Hegel, to discover the "essence" or "principle" of the Christian religion.

"The expression 'principle,'" says Troeltsch,¹ "belongs only to the modern science of religion, inasmuch as it originates in general only from our refined modern psychology and the historical thought conditioned by it. It signifies nothing else than the conception of the fundamental impulse that lies behind the individual psychological phenomena and facts, or of the fundamental force which produces them² as a unity of spiritual process only recognizable by intuition and divination, yet quite well to be felt: it means the reduction of a connected circle of psychological phenomena to a single fundamental, mostly only instinctive, force, expressing and developing itself in them, which follows in its development an inner tendency of its own, and which only produces its complete content out of its tendency in adaptation and conflict, and yet also is on every side subject to crossing and degeneration."

These words of Troeltsch exactly describe the way in which, on the *formal* side, Schleiermacher conceives the inner essence of Christianity. His *material* conception of it turns essentially on the notion of personality: it is conceived as a unity, not of logic, but of personal experience, in which the objective and subjective aspects everywhere necessarily correspond to each other. Moreover for him personality is not an exclusive but an inclusive idea. The fundamental notion of his whole view is that of immanence, the immanence first of God

¹ "Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart." Art. "Prinzip, religiöses," 1.

² The text has "which they produce". But the sense seems to require us to read *hervorbringt* instead of *hervorbringen*.

in Christ, and then of Christ and so of God in us. From this point of view Schleiermacher accordingly finds the doctrine of the Ancient Church "magical" in so far as its notion of salvation is fundamentally objective and outside of experience, and is only personalized through its application in the sacraments. In so far as the Reformation theology, while adopting the doctrine of salvation through the personal experience of faith, yet maintained at the same time the old objective conception of a salvation independent of experience, Schleiermacher finds this view also "magical" and unsatisfactory. On the other hand his criticism of the empirical school (*viz.* the individualistic tendency that runs through the mediaeval criticism on to Socinianism and the *Aufklärung*) is that it fails to recognize the inclusiveness of personality, and so to find a proper place for the immanence of God and Christ in us.

Schleiermacher has undertaken, on the basis of his central position, a complete reconstruction of theology. His method implies the abandonment of the attempt to put together the Scripture data in an external way, as is done in the great scholastic systems alike of Catholicism and Protestantism. We have instead the endeavour to reconstruct the whole from within by an organic process. The old structures are abandoned to criticism: it is astonishing how largely Socinus is reproduced in this respect by Schleiermacher. Yet the elements of the old theology recur in the new construction, only now in a new context, and united by a fresh set of mediating ideas, many of which are drawn from Kant's reinterpretation of the ecclesiastical dogma. The whole, however, constitutes a revolution in theology. Schleiermacher carries through his immanental view of Christianity in a most thoroughgoing way. Since for him Christianity is entirely a spiritual essence, he has no place in doctrine

for the resurrection and ascension of Christ as external facts (§ 99). Similarly, he dispenses with Christ's Kingdom of power and glory, and retains only His Kingdom of grace. Any idea, that may be found in the New Testament, but which has no direct relation to experience, does not belong to the sphere of Christian doctrine. Schleiermacher would treat such ideas as merely traditional, or at best speculative.

In estimating the value of the theology of Schleiermacher two questions naturally appear to arise. The first is: Is he, and with him modern theology in general, justified in attempting to reduce Christianity to a "principle"? The second is: If he is to be justified on this point, has he correctly defined the principle of Christianity? Now as regards the first question, there can be no doubt that if there is to-day to be a theology at all, it must follow the line adopted by Kant and Hegel, and more thoroughly by Schleiermacher, and must endeavour to reduce Christianity to an essence or principle. The previous history of theology shows that the attempt to treat the Scripture upon any other basis is doomed to failure. All systems, which attempt the concatenation of the various logical developments derived from different Scriptural texts, in the end destroy themselves by a process of immanent criticism, which is only the carrying out to its consequences of their own logic.

As regards the second question, there are three points above all to be observed:—

(1) Schleiermacher includes in the essence of Christianity, in opposition to Kant and Hegel, the historical Jesus. Christianity is the religion, in which everything is referred to the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth. The inclusion of a historical element in a religious principle has been found unthinkable by the

modern liberal theology, of which Biedermann's "Christliche Dogmatik" is the most outstanding example.¹ Biedermann's watchword is the necessity of separating the principle of Christianity from the Person of Jesus.² In defence of Schleiermacher it may, however, be pointed out with Heim in his books "Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher" (1911) and "Leitfaden der Dogmatik" (1912) that the principle of the *coincidentia oppositorum*, which governs not only the whole philosophy of Hegel, but also the philosophy of religion of Kant, in so far as it centres in the thought of the identification through faith of the sinner with the ideal son of God, appears to justify also the identification of abstract and concrete, principle and Person.³ In other words, if the *coincidentia oppositorum* is to be the principle of the higher reason, then Schleiermacher's doctrine appears to be justified by it.

(2) Schleiermacher has been criticized on the other hand by the modern orthodoxy, which finds its most outstanding representatives in the Erlangen school, because of his critical positivism, which allows no transcendental, but only immanent elements in Christian doctrine. It has been argued that his anthropocentric Christology does not guarantee the true Divinity of Christ, and that only a transcendental and theocentric Christology can do so. Was Schleiermacher justified in regarding the perfection of the consciousness of God in Christ as "ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm,"

¹ Cf. *infra*, p. 262.

² Cf. especially "Christliche Dogmatik," § 605: "The fundamental contradiction in the ecclesiastical Christology . . . is rooted herein, that the Christian principle is immediately identified with the historical personality, whose religious life is the revelation of it in history, and that therefore a spiritual principle is described as a Person. . . ."

³ Cf. Heim, "Das Gewissheitsproblem," pp. 220-59, also the same writer, "Leitfaden der Dogmatik," pp. 29-32.

when it appears to be only the supreme case of the Divine immanence in humanity in general?¹ This is a crucial question; but it may at least be pointed out that Schleiermacher was absolutely in earnest with the ascription of Divinity to Christ. The way in which he distinguished the immanence of God in Christ from His immanence in humanity in general, was as follows (§ 94, 2):—He regarded the former as related to the latter, in the same way as the latter is related to God's general immanence in nature. Just as the immanence of God in nature is raised in man to the potency of consciousness, so His immanence in man is raised in Christ to the potency of complete energy, i.e. to a complete domination of the lower consciousness. Accordingly Schleiermacher justifies the restriction of the name "Sein Gottes" to the Divine immanence in Christ on the ground that God's immanence elsewhere is only partial, and is consequently only a suggestion or an idea of God, not God Himself. Till God is realized in the perfection in which He is found in Christ, we have less than God. Nature only contains a suggestion of Him, humanity an idea of Him: in Christ He dwells completely, so that the Divine essence is one with His innermost self.

(3) Schleiermacher has also been criticized, above all by Ritschl, for his treatment of the ideas of redemption and reconciliation, on the ground that he has at this point been unfaithful to the central principle of the Reformation, inasmuch as he has, in agreement with Catholicism, made reconciliation dependent upon renewal instead of, as Luther taught, renewal upon recon-

¹ Cf. § 94, Leitsatz: "The Redeemer is accordingly like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but is distinguished from all by the constant energy of His consciousness of God, which was a proper Being of God in Him".

ciliation.¹ It may be worth while, on this important point, to give Schleiermacher's own words (§ 101, 1) :—

“If this reception into the fellowship of Christ's beatitude were anything independent of our reception into the power of His consciousness of God, or if the latter were supposed to follow from the former,² then the teleological³ character of Christianity would be altered. As, however, in God beatitude and omnipotence are given equal place being mutually interconditioned, and yet also independent of one another : so must also in the Person of Christ the beatitude and the power of His consciousness of God be given equal place in the same way, each conditioning the other, and each independent of the other. Accordingly, we ought to be in a position to say, it must be in the same manner with the activity of Christ, and this would either be simply recognized, or there would be two opposed conceptions of Christianity, the one representing it as an endeavour after beatitude for the sake of the power of the consciousness of God, the other reversing this order, which two conceptions supplemented each other. But since the activity of Christ only arises in so far as a receptivity or a longing precedes it in its object : so also the reconciling activity can only express itself in sequence upon the redeeming activity, since the consciousness of sin in itself, and not of sin as the ground of evil, must be the ground of this longing, since evil, for the individual, does not stand in relation with sin. If therefore we think of the activity of the Redeemer as an influence upon the individual, we can only allow the reconciling moment to follow upon,

¹ Cf. Ritschl, “Justification and Reconciliation,” I. E.T. pp. 485-93.

² The context forbids the natural rendering : if the *former* were to follow from the *latter*.

³ I.e. ethical, *ut supra*, p. 227.

and out of, the redeeming moment. Yet we give them equal place, in so far as the communication of beatitude, no less than the communication of perfection, is immediately given in our reception into fellowship of life with Christ."

It is, if we are to be governed by the principles of the Reformation, at this point that Schleiermacher's view is most vulnerable. No doubt the ideal theological statement would be one which showed how Christ at the same moment takes us up into both the blessedness and the power of His consciousness of God. But if there is to be a priority, the evangelical attitude of mind seems to require that power should follow upon beatitude, rather than *vice versa*. We shall presently see how, while the majority of the theologians of the nineteenth century have followed Schleiermacher on this head, some, and especially Ritschl, have endeavoured to modify his doctrine in the evangelical direction. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher's idea of reconciliation turns, not as we should expect on the removal of the consciousness of guilt (or the experience of the forgiveness of sins), but rather upon the removal of the sense of evils. What he thinks of is, as Ritschl has pointed out, rather reconciliation with the evils of the world than reconciliation with God.¹ The root of the defect lies in Schleiermacher's thought of God, whom he thinks of rather simply as the Absolute than as also Personal Spirit.²

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," 1. E.T. p. 473.

² Cf. "Der Christliche Glaube," § 8, Zusatz 2, where Schleiermacher says that, since God is only known as mirrored in the religious feeling of absolute dependence, it is impossible from a religious point of view to accord to Theism any advantage over Pantheism. From such a basis no true idea of reconciliation with God can be reached. Ritschl indeed rightly says (*loc. cit. supra*), that in so far as Schleiermacher's idea of redemption implies that the uplifting of the God-consciousness is the free act of the believer, it also implies that he is reconciled to God by

§ 2. GERMAN THEOLOGY AFTER SCHLEIERMACHER

The whole of the German theology of the nineteenth century bears the imprint of Schleiermacher. But some of it reproduces his system with less, some with more, modification. It is difficult to find an adequate principle of arrangement, since there is a certain crossing of tendencies as between one school and another. But perhaps we may sufficiently represent the most important movements, as regards the doctrine of the work of Christ, by the following method of treatment:—

(1) We shall take first Biedermann as the representative of the Liberal theology, which, while influenced by Schleiermacher, reverts on the most important point of all, the separation of the principle of Christianity from the historical person of Jesus, to the method of Kant and Hegel.

(2) We shall consider next two theologians, Schweizer and Rothe, who have reproduced without essential deviation the system of Schleiermacher. The former, however, has endeavoured to interpret it through the doctrine, introduced by the *Aufklärung*, of the Fatherhood of God; the latter has endeavoured to approximate it verbally, at least, to orthodoxy, so that he is sometimes reckoned to the “mediating theology” which is characterized just by the aim of mediating between Schleiermacher and orthodoxy. Rothe accordingly naturally leads on to Dorner who is without doubt a genuine mediating theologian, and as Pfeiderer says, “the type of the whole school”.¹ We shall therefore consider Dorner next after Rothe.

(3) We shall take in the third place, the very rethis surrender to Him. But, if we keep within the lines of Schleiermacher’s system, this implication cannot be made explicit, just for the want of the idea of God as Personal.

¹ “The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant,” p. 156.

markable synthesis between orthodoxy and the theology of Schleiermacher established in various forms by the school of Erlangen. The difference here from the previous types is constituted by a genuine return to the patristic notion of the Incarnation as a ferment in humanity. The school aims at a real revival of the ecclesiastical Christology, in such a form as may be possible in the modern age.

(4) We shall consider next the theology of Ritschl, who out of all the theologians previously mentioned has perhaps his nearest forerunner in Schweizer, but is generally recognized as the initiator of a new and highly distinctive, as well as important, type of theology.

(5) Finally, in order to bring out the peculiarity of the Ritschlian theology, we shall compare with it the work of the contemporary theologians, Lipsius and Kähler.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERAL AND THE MEDIATING THEOLOGY

§ 1. BIEDERMANN

BIEDERMANN (A.D. 1819-1885),¹ though in agreement with Hegel that the Absolute and the Finite Spirit are ultimately one, and that this union is practically realized in religion, does not regard religion merely as a lower form of the philosophical consciousness. "Precisely because religious faith is something other than a mere form of secondary knowledge, it can never be rendered obsolete and replaced by any higher kind of knowledge, such as philosophy. Philosophy can exercise a purifying influence upon the theoretical side of religion,—on the various modes of conceiving the contents of faith,—but can never replace the distinctly religious act of faith itself—the practical elevation of the man to God."²

If, however, in religion the practical union of the finite spirit with the Infinite is achieved, what is Christianity? What is its special *differentia* as a religion? Biedermann answers:—³

"The Christian religion has its historical basis and fountain-head in the Person of Jesus. This gives both Christianity and its dogma its historically determined,

¹ Biedermann's great theological work is his "Christliche Dogmatik,"
¹, 1869, ², 1885.

² Pfeiderer, "The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant,"
p. 140.

³ "Christliche Dogmatik," ², § 158.
(262)

i.e. its positive, character. Indeed the religious principle of Christianity is to be more exactly defined as the religious personality of Jesus, i.e. as that relation between God and the human ego, which in the religious self-consciousness of Jesus has entered as a new religious fact with faith-inspiring power into the history of humanity, and has founded in it the religious community of Christianity."

The metaphysical basis of this historical foundation-fact of Christianity is the self-manifestation of the Absolute Spirit in the human finite ego of Jesus. The religious relation which appears in this fact is the principle of divine sonship, which manifests itself in the immediate self-expression of the religious consciousness of Jesus. This is the Real-principle of the Christian religion.

"The content of this conception is the content of the Christian principle: Christianity is the religion of the divine sonship which was actually disclosed for mankind in Jesus, and at the same time of the Kingdom of God, which realizes itself in this divine sonship, as the final purpose of humanity" (§ 160).

Christ's Messianic consciousness expresses the historical connexion of the new Divine revelation with the Old Testament, as its fulfilment and end.

"The history of the Christian dogma, in the first place that of the dogma of the Person and Work of Christ, secondarily that of the remaining dogmas, which have for content the postulates and consequences of that central dogma, is the historical formulation of the content of that principle into the expression of the faith of the Christian community" (§ 162).

The content of the Christian principle is, however, given in no single historical form which it has taken in the course of its development, but is unfolded in the

whole history of dogma. The aim of the science of dogmatic theology is, nevertheless, to express this content in the form of pure thought. Each new dogmatic system is justified, in so far as it is a step towards this goal.

From this point of view Biedermann treats the doctrine of the work of Christ (§ 829 ff.). The ecclesiastical doctrine of this subject presents to the imagination the operative power of the Christian principle. The truth of the different moments of the doctrine first becomes apparent by reduction to this essential meaning. As, however, the ecclesiastical doctrine has obtained its form by development from the historical life of Jesus, so as a matter of fact this history forms the original and universally exemplary proof of the doctrine.

“The essence of the doctrine of Christ’s *munus propheticum* is the truth, that in the absoluteness of the religious self-consciousness is given for all further historical development the principle of all true religious knowledge, and this in such a way that the historical personality of Jesus, in its definite historical setting, is the exemplary illustration of this truth” (§ 830).

The doctrine of the further mediation of Christ’s prophetic office in the Church through the Holy Spirit is the expression of the truth, that the development of religious knowledge from the Christian principle is not complete in any particular historical form, but is a continuous process in which the principle itself is the absolute norm, and each historical form of doctrine only a relative expression of it.

“The essence of the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ’s *munus sacerdotale* is the truth that the absoluteness of the Spirit, at the same time that it becomes the religious consciousness of man, manifests itself in him as the power to remove the contradiction between the natural ego and its destination (i.e. for spiritual freedom).—The

historical death of Jesus as a sacrifice (in an ethical sense) occasioned the expression of this moment of the Christian principle in the sensuous form of the idea of sacrifice derived from the Old Testament, while it is in essence the abolition of this idea" (§ 832).

"Along with this the moment of Christ's vicarious sacrifice is the expression of the truth, that the *causa efficiens* of reconciliation is not the subjective self-consciousness of the human ego itself, but rather the absoluteness of the Spirit disclosing itself in it for subjective appropriation. Besides this there is the more general ethical truth of the redeeming power of the activity of the innocent in sympathy with the guilty, of which the figure of the Old Testament, and the history of the New Testament, 'Servant of God,' is the great example" (833).

"The essence of the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ's *munus regium* is the truth that the absoluteness of the Spirit, disclosing itself within the human self-consciousness, is the effective principle of the continuous domination of nature in the comprehensive meaning of the word, and therewith of the glorification of natural humanity to a Kingdom of God. Of this the Person of Jesus is the individual confirmatory example, and the historical effect of Jesus, viz. Christianity, is the general realization, fulfilling itself by degrees in the process of the history of the world" (835).

Such are Biedermann's results. His method of proof is given in the whole course of his book, in which he expounds, first the Biblical doctrines of Christianity, and then the ecclesiastical doctrines, as their completion and development: next, he submits the ecclesiastical doctrines to a criticism, the purpose of which is to show that they fail to express the Christian principle and result in insoluble antinomies, because they start upon

the wrong philosophical hypothesis of the mutual exclusiveness of God and man: finally, we have the restatement of doctrine, above given, upon the basis of the mutual inclusiveness of the Divine and the human spirit.

§ 2. ALEXANDER SCHWEIZER

Schweizer (A.D. 1808-1888)¹ begins from the position of Schleiermacher, that religion is absolute dependence upon God. He seeks, however, to improve upon his master by representing this dependence as passing through the three successive stages of the religion of nature, the religion of morality, and the religion of redemption. In the religion of nature God is known simply as the Omnipotent Being, on whom the world depends. Where there is no further development to the religion of morality, the religion of nature issues in paganism. When, however, this next development ensues, God is known as the Moral Lawgiver and Ruler of the Universe. This type of religion is most perfectly realized in Judaism: if there is no still further development, it issues in a hard legalism like the Pharisaism under which St. Paul groaned, a religion of works and merits, and of fear of the Divine judgment. The final stage of religion, however, for which such legalism prepares the way, is the religion of redemption, in which God is known as the Father, Who establishes in the world the kingdom of His grace. This religion of redemption is Christianity. The work of Christ is its historical realization. In Him the Christian principle of faith in God as the Father was first incarnate, in order that by the work of the Spirit it might be realized in the Church.

¹ Schweizer's theological system is given in his work "*Die Christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen*," ¹, 1863 f., ², 1877.

Schweizer makes clear his general position as to the relation of Christ to the Christian religion in the following propositions :—¹

(§ 112, Leitsatz) "The religion of redemption is in principle completely revealed in Christ, so that it is neither capable of, nor in need of, a further development ; the advancing process of its appropriation, however, remains in need of, and is capable of, a continuous development."

(§ 116, Leitsatz) "The Christian religious consciousness finds itself in its possession of salvation absolutely dependent upon God as the Father through Christ as the Son of God, who is therefore the only Mediator." The name "Son of God" is here to be understood, not in a metaphysical, but in an ethico-religious sense. Jesus is the Son of God, because in Him first of all the principle of the religion of redemption was absolutely realized. The principle of redemption (or Logos) had, however, a development before Christ in the anticipations and prophecies of Christ, in which are to be recognized "the endeavour of the Logos to become man, a process which accomplishes itself imperfectly and temporarily in the prophets, finally and lastingly in Christ" (§ 116, 1). Once, however, the Logos was thus incarnated in Christ, the principle of redemption and Jesus remain indissolubly one. The notion that the two can be separated rests upon an unsatisfactory view of religion as mere doctrine. The progress of the religion of redemption is in fact inseparable from the continuous influence of the personality of Jesus. It is this, indeed, which gives to the Person of Jesus its peculiar worth.

(§ 118, Leitsatz) "While an unhistorical, simply con-

¹ "Die Christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen,"², 1877.

ceptual, ideal of human perfection could have value only for the religion of law, Christianity as the religion of redemption rests upon the historical Christ as united with the Christ-Idea."

There are, however, two modes of the union of the historical Christ with the redemptive Idea.

(§ 123, Leitsatz) "The process of the unification of Christ with the Christ-Idea manifests itself in His earthly existence, as so faithful a devotion to the increasing burden of His vocation, that the Idea works unhindered through Him; in reward of this faithfulness it appears as a completely accomplished unification with the Absolute Idea in the state of exaltation."

In opposition to Schleiermacher, Schweizer regards the exaltation of Christ as having high value for faith. The scientific historical life of Christ may end with His death; but our faith, like that of the early Church, must believe in His victory over the world and death, and in the continuance of His personality, not merely in that of the Idea of Christianity. The permanent identification of His personality with the latter is the fit reward of His faithfulness.

We are now in a position to pass on to the special doctrine of the work of Christ.

(§ 125, Leitsatz) "The work or the redeeming activity of Christ is entirely and completely summed up in His regenerating communication of the religion of redemption, which is represented to the imagination as the exercise of the three offices, and is a redemption of man, not of God."

Schweizer first points out that the communication of religion must be carefully distinguished from the inculcation of doctrine. He next observes that the communication of religion, as a work of Jesus upon men, is not to be supplemented by any work upon God, so as

to change His mind towards them. All Christ's work is in fact the outcome of the Father's love. The Reformed Dogmatic rightly saw that Christ in His work was the instrument of the Father's grace, though it was prevented by the force of tradition from carrying this idea completely through. Schweizer endeavours to show that the New Testament passages, upon which the idea of propitiation of, or satisfaction to, God is founded, will not bear the weight of the dogmatic superstructure which has been raised upon them.

(§ 126, Leitsatz) "Redemption is negatively deliverance from the religion of the law, which rejects sinful men to condemnation, and positively regeneration, through the principle of redemption revealing itself in fulfilment in Christ."

Schweizer interprets the passages in the New Testament, especially in Paul, which speak of redemption from the law, etc., in the sense that their real import is deliverance from the *religion* of the law. He opposes vehemently the notion that such redemption is only subjective. "As existence within the religion of law is no imagination, but corresponds to the real relation of the reasonable creature to God as Lawgiver and Judge, or as Author and Controller of the moral order of the world, so also life in the religion of redemption is the subjective expression of the relationship in which the sonship awakened in us really stands to the fully revealed Fatherhood of God. The influence of Christ as the Revealer and Mediator of this higher principle, therefore, manifests itself as a very real communication of life—which He does not achieve without a heavy day's work, in that He has at the costly ransom-price of His blood redeemed His own out of the religion of the law and saved them by bringing them into the religion of redemption, to make them children of God,

to redeem them from the bondage of the law, of sin and its condemnation, and to reconcile them with God—which influence of Christ only regeneratively passes over to the individual, in that the idea of redemption realizes itself in him, containing in itself as it does also reconciliation, justification, and sanctification” (§ 127, 2).

Reconciliation to God must not, however, be understood in the sense that any change takes place in Him. “Christ becomes through His life and death the object of the Divine favour, but only because God remains unchangeably the same, and similarly Christ makes all those regenerated by Him into objects of the Divine favour and grace, since God with eternal unchangeableness graciously receives the men who thus come to Him, in fact His lost sons. Similarly again Christ represents with His complete realization of the Christian principle His followers who imperfectly realize it, in that He presents them in Himself before God and covers their imperfection; for His perfection guarantees the complete saving power of the life, which is as yet imperfectly realized by them, as that of a life, which also is permeating them and is destined to final victory. Similarly also Christ stands as our Vicar, feeling all human misery due to sin more completely than we do; nay, what is more, He stands making satisfaction instead of His own, as surety for the principle of life, which in them is still imperfect, and is yet operative and destined to victory. In fact, He reconciles God, in so far as the complete sacrifice of His obedience, or of His faithfulness to His vocation, wins the absolute favour of God, in which His people share, though only if they do not leave Him to exercise faithfulness instead of themselves. In one word, this tendency of Dogmatic—to present Christ as Him who wins for us access and acceptance with God, as the Mediator who precedes us before His

throne of grace and introduces us there, as the altogether uniquely sublime Patron and Advocate who successfully represents our cause before God—rests on the religious feeling, how much even we, though apprehended and regenerated by Christ, fall short in the full working out of the Christian principle and of its sanctification of all that is within us, and therefore found our confidence in this saving life, not upon our imperfect working out of it, but upon that which has completely appeared in Christ, not upon our own but upon His righteousness, especially upon its most valuable, because most arduous, achievement in the accepted death of the cross" (§ 127, 2).

In accordance with the above general principles, Schweizer now restates the doctrine of the threefold office as follows:—

(§ 128, Leitsatz) "Since Christ has performed in its fulfilment for all men, what the prophets performed for the Old Covenant, His redemptive work is described as the prophetic office. It consists essentially in the communication of the saving truth.

(§ 129, Leitsatz) "To the prophetic office of Christ in accordance with the pattern of Old Testament prophecy also belongs prediction, and that in such fulfilment as corresponds to His Messianic consciousness as Son."

(§ 130, Leitsatz) "According to the Old Testament pattern the working of miracles is also reckoned to the prophetic office as a co-operative support of the Messianic mission, it is, however, at the same time ennobled by this. Although Christ did no absolute miracles, He has yet achieved works which appeared as miracles."

In his repudiation of absolute miracles Schweizer is anxious to conserve the true humanity of Christ and

the spiritual character of His mission. Like Schleiermacher he views the Divine indwelling in Him as immanent, not transcendent.

(§ 131, Leitsatz) "What the priesthood performed Levitically, and therefore imperfectly, for the people of the Old Covenant, Christ in the New Covenant performs ethically and perfectly for humanity. His high-priestly office represents to the imagination as a completed sacrifice Christ's complete self-surrender to the vocation assigned Him by the Father, including an obedience which is everywhere active as well as passive, and is not servile but filial obedience."

(§ 132, Leitsatz) "Christ's merit in our behalf can only consist in His accomplished fidelity in His vocation or in His entire obedience up to His death on the cross, but also if we relate this merit to God and conceive it as a satisfaction, it could not dispose the unchangeable God differently from what He was before, since it must itself be ordained as a means of salvation or expiation by the Father's will of love which is eternally one with the Divine righteousness."

Schweizer refers here with approval to the Reformed tradition which subordinates the merit of Christ to the Divine grace¹ and to the words of Zwingli:—

"The Son of God therefore is given to us in proof of God's mercy, as a pledge of pardon . . . that He might certify us of the grace of God."²

(§ 133, Leitsatz) "Christ's suffering even unto the death of the cross is effective not only as the highest proof of His redeeming love and fidelity in His vocation, which draws us away from evil and awakes us to thankful love in return, not only as the completed moral

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 110, Vol. I, pp. 435 f.

² Zwingli, "Fidei Expositio," § 1. Cf. also the similar ideas in the "Commentarius de Vera et Falsa Religione," *supra*, Vol. I, p. 391.

sacrifice of entire surrender to God and His will ; but it also effects the decisive liberation of the Christian religion from the legal religion of Judaism."

Here Schweizer refers to Abelard as having in contrast with Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction developed the true doctrine of redemption. The passages in the New Testament which speak of redemption are to be understood of redemption from the religion of the law, with all that it involves. As regards the New Testament idea of sacrifice, nothing is farther from Paul's thought than the orthodox idea that sin could only be expiated by a bloody sacrifice. "On the contrary he speaks of an expiatory sacrifice of Christ in quite another sense, in fact just as also the Apostle himself speaks of himself as a sacrifice in virtue of his self-surrender to his vocation and its suffering, and requires of every Christian that he should similarly present himself as a sacrifice to God " ¹ (§ 133, 1). Schweizer refers also to Rom. xv. 16, where Paul speaks of himself as a priest of the Gospel, presenting to God a sacrifice of the Gentiles : he further quotes Phil. ii. 17 ; 2 Tim. iv. 6 ; 2 Cor. xii. 15 ; Col. i. 24.

(§ 134, Leitsatz) "The Kingdom of Christ is His personal spiritual power, which, though in the state of humiliation it is present in concealment, yet is only manifested in Christ's exaltation. The apocryphal descent into hell is, according as the expression is interpreted, to be, or not to be, reckoned to the kingly office."

Schweizer, however, himself considers 1 Pet. iii. 19 too uncertain a basis for a dogma, and is inclined to let the doctrine of the descent into hell go altogether.

(§ 135, Leitsatz) "Christ has attained to full kingly power in the state of exaltation in the life which He,

¹ Rom. xii. 1.

through the surrender of His life, has won as the Risen One, exalted in heaven to the right hand of God."

(§ 136, Leitsatz) "Christ exercises His kingly power, not only through His word and Spirit, but also through His glorified Personality represented in both, ruling the community as the One who is set at God's right hand or has a share in the Divine attributes, also as the One who has become the Measure and Judge of all men."

The Scriptural doctrines of Christ's exaltation at God's right hand, and of His second coming to Judgment, are pictorial representations of His spiritual sovereignty and immanent power of judgment, as one with the principle of the religion of redemption.

Schweizer adds: (§ 137) "The redemptive, and as such also reconciling, activity of Christ is united with the principle of the religion of redemption, just as His Person has become one with it."

Seeberg¹ has spoken of Schweizer's "brilliant system-building," and has predicted a renewal of interest in his theology.² While in the main he faithfully follows his master Schleiermacher, the following points of difference deserve notice:—

(1) Schleiermacher stood on the ground of the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and endeavoured to connect his doctrine with the classic theology of both confessions.³ While Schweizer also occupied the same ground,⁴ he attached his doctrine especially to the Reformed theology of the sixteenth and seven-

¹ "Die Kirche Deutschlands im neunzehnten Jahrhundert," 1904, pp. 250 ff.

² A revived interest in Biedermann is also prophesied. Seeberg says (loc. cit.): "The works of Biedermann and Schweizer belong without a doubt to the most remarkable phenomena of nineteenth century theology".

³ *Supra*, p. 229.

⁴ *Op. cit.* 92.

teenth centuries, of which he wrote a most thorough and masterly historical account, enriched with abundant original extracts.¹ In this latter work Schweizer presents Schleiermacher himself as the true follower of the Reformed doctrinal tradition.²

(2) Schweizer has improved upon Schleiermacher in that he has paid great attention to the reinterpretation, not only of the older Protestant doctrines, but also of the Biblical proof-texts themselves, so as to bring out their religious meaning when viewed through the whole context of the Christian religion. It is a defect in Schleiermacher that, while he has abundantly reinterpreted the ecclesiastical doctrines, he has done much less for the less scientific, more figurative phraseology of the Bible. Here then Schweizer marks a distinct advance on his master.

(3) While Schleiermacher views redemption as the communication by Jesus of the God-consciousness, Schweizer further defines it as the communication of the Christian religion, the central idea of which is the Fatherhood of God. Accordingly he has made a connexion between his own doctrine of the work of Christ and that of Abelard, and has pointed out that both represent Jesus as in the first place the revealer of the Divine love, Who awakes an answering love in return.³ Ritschl⁴ has called attention to Schweizer's notice of Abelard, but is disposed to view not only Schweizer's but also Schleiermacher's doctrine of the work of Christ as a revival of the Abelardian form of doctrine. This view, however, appears to me incorrect. Schleiermacher thinks of Jesus as communicating the Divine life or the

¹ "Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt," 1844-1847.

² Vol. I, pp. 133 f.

³ "Die christliche Glaubenslehre," § 133.

⁴ "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 509.

consciousness of God, but this is not in itself Abelard's doctrine, but is rather a revival of the Johannine and Irenæan theology in one of its main aspects. It is the differentiation of the consciousness of God as the consciousness of God's fatherly love which brings Schweizer so close to Abelard, whom he rightly remembers as the protagonist of his line of thought.

§ 3. RICHARD ROTHE

The system of Rothe (1799-1867 A.D.) is given in his great work "Theologische Ethik" (2nd ed. 1867-1871). Rothe shows himself a disciple of Schleiermacher, in that he begins from the same point as his master, viz. the consciousness of God as given in the feeling of absolute dependence (§§ 16-17). But Rothe seeks to establish upon this basis a more definite and concrete conception of God by means of the speculative notion of the *causa sui* (§ 23). In this way he reaches a distinction in God between His personality and His nature, corresponding to the distinction in humanity between the ego as the self-determinative principle and the psychical organism of instincts, tendencies, and dispositions, which is its instrument (§§ 27 ff.). According to Rothe only the two in harmonious combination, nature as controlled by personality, constitute concrete spirit (§ 29 Anm. 3).

God has created man in order to develop in him the likeness of Himself, in other words in order to communicate to him His own Spirit (§ 114). But man has sinned—as was indeed inevitable, because of his association with matter—humanity has taken the wrong development (§§ 459 ff.). Redemption, however, enters through a new head of humanity, whom Rothe calls after Paul the "Second Adam" (§ 519); it could not be, he says, that God should abandon His creation (§ 515). The

Second Adam is (as with Schleiermacher)¹ a miracle rising out of the midst of sinful humanity (§ 533). He is the Archetype of humanity, in whom first begins the perfecting of the creation ; and who is destined to be the Head of a new humanity, in which this perfecting process is brought to completion. As Rothe, unlike Schleiermacher,² accepts the perpetuation of the sinful tendency in humanity through heredity and the physical organism (§ 484), he adopts as the explanation of the miracle of Christ's sinlessness the doctrine of the Virgin Birth (§ 534), for which Schleiermacher had no need.³

The Second Adam grows up in an atmosphere already prepared for Him by prior revelation, and the process of His religious and moral development is "at once essentially both, a continuous incarnation of God and a continuous deification of man (that is, of the Second Adam), in that the tendency is equally on both sides to become absolutely one with the other" (§ 538, *Anmerkung*). In this way "His whole life is an absolutely pure and essential revelation of God" (§ 539). This is the beginning of His redeeming activity, for the precondition of every other redeeming operation upon sinful humanity must necessarily be the purification and awakening of its consciousness of God. But this part of His work involves no special activity beyond that of His life itself : His whole life is itself the revelation (§ 541). The special vocation of the Second Adam is, however, to be the Redeemer of sinful humanity, that is to bring about its redemption from sin, or to destroy first

¹ *Supra*, p. 227.

² *Ibid.* p. 230.

³ Cf. "Der Christliche Glaube," ², § 97, 2. Schleiermacher says : "The general notion of supernatural generation remains therefore essential and necessary, if the peculiar pre-eminence of the Redeemer is to remain undiminished ; but the closer definition of the same as generation without co-operation of a man has no connexion with the essential elements of the peculiar dignity of the Redeemer, and is therefore in and for itself no part of Christian doctrine".

the power of sin over it, and thereby next sin itself within it. This can only be achieved through the establishment of an effective fellowship between God and humanity ; for only God is able to destroy sin and its power. The Second Adam has therefore to establish a fellowship between God and humanity in spite of the sin of the latter. In order to do this He has, on the one hand, to maintain His own fellowship with God ; this is His *religious* task. On the other hand, He has to establish, by the power of an absolute love for humanity, a bond of union with it ; this is His *moral* task. He must without stint or limit give Himself up absolutely to the service of humanity. He must give up all that is His own, even His sensuous life (§ 542). This task is defined for the Second Adam, as it is in the case of every man, by His particular situation in the world. As over against the sinful world He has, on the one hand, to witness for God, on the other, to witness against its sin. This witness inevitably rouses against Him the hate of sinful humanity, and behind that the enmity of the powers of darkness, the demons which rule over sinful humanity. This opposition presents itself to Him as a temptation hindering the development of His life in His vocation, which He has to overcome by persisting in His vocation even to death (§ 543). Thereby He overcame in principle the power of sin and the demons over the world, and this not for Himself, but for and instead of humanity, in other words as its Vicar (§ 544). Along with this completion of His fellowship with sinful humanity, there is included in the task of the Second Adam the establishment of a historical connexion between Him and it through the founding of a special fellowship of redemption (§§ 550, 551). On the other hand, His death sets free from the bonds of matter His perfected spirit, i.e. a personality with a completely developed

psychical organism as its instrument. The Resurrection and Exaltation of Christ are virtually one; only that the Exalted Christ continued for a while to make use of His discarded material body. The Exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit are one and the same (§ 548). The double condition for the continuance of Christ in the world is thus given. On the one hand, there is the historical channel of the Church, on the other, the continuance of His perfected Spirit, which through the historical channel finds its way to men's hearts.

We have now, however, to see how redemption is finally accomplished. "In so far as the Second Adam has through His own religious and moral development essentially qualified Himself, in the sense above explained, to be the Redeemer of sinful humanity, He has herewith immediately at the same time brought about the expiation of human sin" (§ 557). What is meant by this Rothe explains as follows:—In the removal of sin two things are involved. There is first the removal of its consequences for the sinner in his relation to God, viz. guilt and punishment, which can only take place through forgiveness. There is also the actual destruction of sin in the sinner, and the establishment in him of a normal religious and moral condition. Each aspect of the matter, however, conditions the other. On the one hand, God cannot forgive one who is still under the power of sin. On the contrary, so long as sin remains in him, God's anger must go forth against it, and manifest itself in the sinner as the consciousness of guilt and alienation from God. On the other hand, a real freedom from sin is impossible apart from the experience of forgiveness. So long as there is a separation from God and a consciousness of guilt, there can be no power to overcome sin. "Here is an antinomy, the solution of which is absolutely demanded by the very holiness and

righteousness of God" (*ibid.*). These attributes of God in fact must necessarily oppose themselves to sin. But this means, not the destruction of the creature, if any other way to destroy sin can be found, but rather the destruction of sin in the creature, for destruction of the creature would spell the failure of God's plan in creation.

"The removal of sin in the sinner without the annihilation of the latter himself must therefore be in itself a possibility for God;—but if this is absolutely conditioned, as was shown before by a previous forgiveness of sins, then God's holiness and righteousness inevitably require the latter. Only they require at the same time equally inexorably that the anticipatory forgiveness take place in such a way that in it the negating reaction of God against sin shall be included, i.e. (they require) that in themselves the holiness and righteousness of God be absolutely maintained. What is here demanded as the solution of the just exposed antinomy is exactly the expiation, i.e. the making forgivable, of sin (which therefore is just as essentially a necessity for God Himself as a necessity for the sinner), i.e. such a modification of the position towards God of the sinner, unholy as he is on account of his sinfulness, as that, in virtue of it, God in spite of His holiness and righteousness can forgive the sin which still actually clings to him, and disregarding it can enter into fellowship with him" (*ibid.*).

This expiation can only take a concrete form by God's establishment of a surety, whereby it is guaranteed that in the forgiven sinner the actual removal of sin will follow upon his forgiveness,—whereby in fact it is guaranteed that the very forgiveness itself will set in motion the train of events ending in the complete destruction of sin and all its consequences. Just this guarantee, however, is given by the work of the Redeemer as above

defined, by His actual victory over sin in His own life and by the establishment of the conditions whereby His Spirit can be transmitted to subsequent humanity. "To put it in the most general form, that whereby the Second Adam has expiated the sin of humanity, is, therefore, that He has qualified Himself to be the Redeemer of humanity" (*ibid.*). The sacrifice of the Redeemer, as above described, now appears as an expiatory sacrifice, and His perfected personal life as an incomparably great and absolutely universal instrument for humanity in the achieving of its moral task. In other words, it has become both a moral fact and a Divine sacrament. In this way the net result of the life of the Second Adam can be described as *merit*. It has absolute worth as the guarantee of the accomplishment of our religious and moral development; and in so far as God looks at us through this guarantee the forgiveness of sins takes place through the imputation of His merit to us. It is to be observed, however, that the imputation of Christ's merit has to do with a merit established in His relations, not to God, but to us, the members of the old sinful community. The doctrine of Christ's intercession is a symbolic representation of the same idea, that He is our guarantee (§ 558). Finally, in the establishment of an expiation for sin, the Second Adam establishes also a reconciliation between God and sinful humanity, and founds a New Covenant, the first true covenant between God and man.

"This New Covenant rests therefore expressly on the expiation of sin by the Redeemer, and therewith ultimately on the sacrificial death of the latter, as does also the reconciliation" (*loc. cit.*).

Though Rothe's ideas are fundamentally those of Schleiermacher, his theological method in the "Theologische Ethik" is notably different. Instead of developing each individual set of doctrines from the common matrix

of Christian experience, he adopts, when once his starting-point is taken, the method of *a priori* speculation, and resembles Anselm in the way in which he develops the whole of doctrine in one single sequence.¹ Like Anselm Rothe deduces both the necessity of redemption and the necessary characteristics of the Redeemer from the idea of God and His end in the creation of man. The Redeemer is of course at once identified with Jesus. "Historically we know this Second Adam as Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Mary" (§ 533, Anm.). But even the historical preparation for Christ in the revelation given to Israel is by Rothe speculatively deduced (§§ 520-532).

It is to be observed that in his reinterpretation of the ecclesiastical doctrines Rothe follows Kant² and Schleiermacher. But it is noteworthy that he has abandoned the ecclesiastical term satisfaction for the Biblical word expiation, for which he refers to 1 Jn. II. 2, IV. 10; Rom. III. 25 (§ 557, Anm. 1). One is reminded of the Arminian preference for the Biblical and vaguer phraseology.

Rothe offers another treatment of Christian doctrine in his posthumous "Dogmatik" (1870), where, instead of a speculative construction, there is, after the manner of Schleiermacher, a statement and criticism of the doctrines of the Church, with a view to educing from them their essential principle. But Rothe regards the speculative method as the higher: the empirical or critical method has, however, its use in preparing the way for the acceptance of the results of speculation, since the critical treatment of the Church doctrine brings it nearer to the purely speculative science of the "Theologische Ethik".³

¹ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 156.

² Cf. the reference to him by name, § 557, note on p. 161.

³ Cf. Rothe, "Zur Dogmatik,"², pp. 52 f.

Rothe has also developed in his book "Zur Dogmatik" (2 A, 1869) ideas upon the nature of the Scripture proof of Christian doctrine, intended to meet the situation in theology produced by the criticism of the *Aufklärung*, by the utilization of the new basis found for theology by Schleiermacher in Christian experience. Rothe would have us regard the Biblical history itself as the Divine revelation, from which, in its gradual development as a living whole, proof must be led, and not from any isolated individual proof texts.

§ 4. DÖRNER

According to Dörner (A.D. 1809-1884), the point from which Dogmatics starts as its immediate source of knowledge is Christian experience or Christian faith. "The aim, or the problem is to bring the immediate and matter-of-fact certainty, which faith possesses of its contents, to scientific cognition, or to the consciousness of the internal coherence and the objective verification of these contents."¹

The method to be followed is defined as a mean between empirical reflection (Schleiermacher) and productive speculation (Rothe).

"The method of Christian dogmatic theology must not be simply productive, but rather reproductive: still it must not be merely empirical and reflective, but also constructive and progressive. When the enlightened Christian mind is in harmony by its faith and experience with objective Christianity, which faith knows to be its own origin, and which is also attested by the Scriptures and the Scriptural faith of the Church, then such a mind has to justify and develop its religious knowledge in a systematic form" (§ 13).²

¹ "System of Christian Doctrine," E.T. (1888), § 1.

² The translation of this section is taken from Pfeiderer, "The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant" (1893), p. 157. In all

Dorner distinguishes the doctrines of Christianity into the fundamental and the special. The fundamental doctrines are those of God, man, and religion, together with that of the God-man as a necessary *a priori* truth following from the nature of man as created by God. Dorner regards the idea of God, including that of the Trinity, as rational; but by the Trinity he means the doctrine of the ethically Necessary, the ethically Free, and the Love uniting both, as three aspects of One absolute Personality. Man, as created by God, is on the one hand a part of nature, on the other an immortal spirit destined for union with God.

The special doctrines of Christianity are those of sin and salvation. Dorner teaches that man, though he was good by his original creation, yet became the cause of evil by an act of free will. The evil thus generated became a permanent corruption of human nature, and was handed down according to the laws of heredity from our first parents to the rest of mankind. Dorner holds that this inherited generic sin implies a general need of salvation. It is not, however, personal guilt, and does not settle a man's final destiny, which depends rather upon his own free decision. The salvation of man as thus involved in the sin of the race is, however, only possible in view of the Incarnation. We have already noticed that Dorner held the Incarnation to be necessary in any case apart from sin. It was required, if man was to attain full communion with God and form a united organism under a central head. As Pfeiderer¹ states the doctrine of Dorner on this point:—

“Such a universal head, in whom all the limitations

other cases the reference is to E.T. as above, n. 1. The general statement of Dorner's position, up to the point where the direct references to his “System” begin, is also based upon Pfeiderer (op. cit. pp. 157-162).

¹ “The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant,” p. 162.

of human individuality are done away, can only be a man in whom God's communication of Himself to mankind is absolutely and universally realized, or in whom God as Logos has become man."

By God as Logos, however, Dorner does not mean a personal Logos, hypostatically distinct from the Father, but God Himself in His loving will to reveal and communicate Himself to mankind.

To sum up: the Incarnation was necessary even apart from sin, that Christ might be the true and perfect Head of humanity in its relation to God, it was doubly necessary, in order that He might deliver humanity from the state of sin induced by the fall of Adam.

The process of the Incarnation Dorner conceives as follows:—There is first a *natural* God-manhood. By an absolute creative act (involving birth from a virgin) God called Christ into being as the Second Adam, a human nature from the first united to God, and thus capable of presenting at every stage of development an archetypal human life (§ 105). Next follows an *ethical* God-manhood. In the course of His life from His birth till His baptism by John, "Christ's holy nature became a perfect Divine-human character" (§ 107). Finally, we have an *official* God-manhood.

"From the time of His baptism, Christ's matured Divine-human personality passes over into His official God-manhood. Thenceforward, He knows and wills His personal perfection as the absolute revelation of God to the world, making it His obligatory life-work or office by self-revelation and self-communication to be the perfect organ of God's redeeming and perfecting revelation" (§ 108).

Dorner (§ 109) accepts the scheme of the threefold office, if rightly understood, as justifiable both historically and intrinsically. In spite of the difference between

the usage of the Old and New Testaments as to the titles of King, Prophet, and Priest, a common element is left which justifies their use in Christian theology, on the basis of history. It is, however, important from the point of view of their intrinsic justification to note how the three offices mutually interpenetrate in Christ's action, how each of them requires the aid of the others for its own completion. The offices are not simply co-ordinative or accumulative, but absolutely mutually interpenetrative, both in the state of humiliation and in the state of exaltation ; and all Christ's speaking and acting, doing and suffering are to be regarded as belonging to Christ's entire office, and are consequently to be considered under each of the three aspects.

In dealing with the offices in particular, Dorner takes first the kingly office.

"Christ has the full power of the true Messianic King, as even His name affirms (i.e. of King in the Divine Kingdom), although in His state of humiliation He exercises it in great measure only in veiled form. He is a king who must first acquire His kingdom ; and this cannot be done by mere demonstration of power. Still less are glory and dominion His absolute end ; but He places the regal power which He possesses at the service of the spiritual redemption, the result of which will be the kingdom of glory on the consummation" (§ 110).

Dorner says that the usual method, of beginning with the prophetic, and ending with the kingly office, implies that we do not contemplate Christ's work under the view-point of His official Divine Sonship, and therefore do not connect His Person and work sufficiently close. According to this ordinary method of treatment then Christ's kingly office on earth is abridged ; and the stress falls almost wholly on His heavenly

Kingship. The true view of Christ's work, however, requires us to exhibit Christ's kingly consciousness in His earthly life, and also to present His history as the revelation of His Kingship, supplying the fitting attestation that He is the Head of God's Kingdom, in fact the King of Kings. "His very love itself must needs reveal the *power* of His Person, so far as this was compatible with the ethical character of the process, into which He desires to draw men, and with the suffering which this free process must bring to Him" (§ 110, 1). Christ then begins His official life with the possession of a kingly consciousness. He knows Himself, as united with the creative Logos, to be the true King of men. He displays His power in His gathering of a circle of disciples, and in His appointing for them the office of the Word, Baptism, the Holy Supper, and Church discipline. He also exercises the power of miracles for ethical ends. "Finally, His high-priestly action and passion also are encompassed by His free power" (§ 110, 2).

At the same time, Christ will only carry out His work with respect for human freedom. "Hence He will not and cannot at once exhibit the kingdom of heaven as a kingdom of power and glory. The motives for adhering to Him must not be corrupt, which would be inevitable, if He had based it at once on sight, instead of on faith in His person. . . . The soul of His kingly office is *Love*. It demands and initiates a process, the end of which will be the glory and visible triumph of the Kingdom of God" (§ 110, 3).

The kingly office in its working out leads to the prophetic and high-priestly offices. "Christ is the Prophet as Revealer of Divine truth. He has perfectly revealed as well as fulfilled the Divine Law, and is the consummation as well as the end of prophecy. He is all this because the Divine knowledge is His knowledge,

or His Divine-human wisdom ; nay, His testimony to the Divine is a testimony to and setting forth of Himself" (§ 111).

Dorner says that in relation to Christ's prophetic office we are not to think of the communication of particular rules and doctrines, but of a totality of self-revelation which presents itself to the spiritual contemplation and lays hold of man in a living way. As to Christ's relation to the Old Testament, He is the perfect prophet, inasmuch as His teaching springs not from isolated workings of the Spirit, but from His Divine-human essence. Christ developed the law by reducing its multiplicity to unity, and making it live in Himself. He is also the end and consummation of Old Testament prediction. So far as He still predicted, He only predicted results already implicitly given in His Person.

Christ's high-priestly office Dorner treats with special fulness. He deals first with the Biblical doctrine. "The Old Testament does not profess to be the perfected religion of atonement,¹ but to predict it. It predicts that religion in such a way that at the same time it prepares for it by revealing on the one hand the Divine holiness and justice, and on the other the grace which seeks their interpenetration typically in sacrifice, prophetically in the Messianic idea" (§ 112).

"It is the unanimous doctrine of the New Testament, that in Christ alone the atonement is found, and with it the basis for perfect redemption. The means thereto described is the God-pleasing self-sacrifice, offered by Christ for the world in accordance with God's loving will, which desires to see the world reconciled with

¹ "Versöhnung," cf. § 114, note in E.T., Vol. IV, p. 1. I have elsewhere rendered "reconciliation," which I think preferable. E.T. also occasionally adopts the same translation. The point requires to be noted for the sake of continuity in study.

Himself through the sacrifice. Christ's sacrifice is not considered as a mere attestation of His righteousness and holiness, or as an instructive indication of the fact of God's eternal reconciliation with sinners, or of His eternal readiness to forgive, but rather as the effective cause of our salvation, especially of the forgiveness of sins, so that without prejudice to the pragmatico-historical necessity of His death, a Divine necessity of an official nature also resides in it" (§ 113).

After giving a full history of the ecclesiastical doctrine, Dorner works out his own reasoned apprehension of the above Biblical doctrines as follows (§ 119 ff.). Divine justice demands expiation, apart from which mankind is exposed to the Divine retribution, which moreover has no ameliorative effect, but quite the reverse. Sin and guilt, therefore, hinder God's loving purpose of perfecting man in holiness and blessedness.

"But as justice and love exist eternally in God in harmonious interpenetration, so God wills the world to be the scene of the combined revelation of the two so long and so far as the world is still capable of redemption. This is His eternal purpose of atonement, i.e. His purpose to give humanity the possibility of atonement. This possibility is implanted in humanity by the Divine Incarnation in Christ" (§ 119).

Dorner reaches the centre of his theme in § 120, where also he puts forward the idea which is specially characteristic of his doctrine. It is to be observed that it is an extension of Butler's position, that vicarious punishment belongs to the order of nature;¹ Dorner argues more generally that the principle of *vicarious influence* belongs to the order of nature; but he adds that the principle has its supreme application with reference to the relation of Christ to humanity.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 181.

"Atonement is only possible through the fact that there are *substitutionary* forces at work for the good of humanity and receptiveness in humanity for those forces. As the Second Adam, or Representative of humanity before God, Christ is the Substitute for humanity outside Him, so far as humanity is defective in religious personality" (§ 120, Leitsatz).

Dorner endeavours to show how widely the principle of substitution is operative within humanity. In the first place it is to be found in the sphere of law, as when one person pays another's debts. Then again it is evident in organic nature, as when one organ suffers in sympathy with another. So also the unborn child has no independent life, but the mother lives vicariously for it, shaping it to independence and maturity. Finally, the principle of substitution is operative in the spiritual domain. All education turns on this principle. The parent's reason lives vicariously in the child, till the latter reaches independence. The receptivity for substitutionary forces is indeed different at different stages of life, and it is possible that forces which are beneficial at one stage may at another injure our individuality. We can, however, never reach a point where there is no receptiveness for Christ. He is the central individual of the race; so that, though His personality cannot absorb our individuality, yet, as we have receptivity for God, so we must have receptivity for Him as the revelation of God and true ideal of humanity.

"This is the meaning of *believing* in Him, the only way in which an evil subjective life-tendency can be plunged, so to speak, into the sacred depths of vital powers possessed of creative force, into the love of One who, belonging to the human race and concentrating its powers in Himself, is mighty to save us and to originate a new life in us" (§ 120, 3).

All this, however, is hardly doubted by any. Substitution and receptivity are generally conceded in the sense that in place of the old man the holy principle that was in Christ must be imparted to us, in order that His life may take the place of the old man.

“But all this has reference merely to the life of sanctification, not of reconciliation. And thus the main question is left : Is not the operation of substitution excluded where the matter in question is the guilt of the subject ? It seems as if every one must answer for his free acts, and there were no room therefore for substitution ” (loc. cit.).

At this critical point Dorner diverges from Schleiermacher,¹ and reverts, though not completely, to the orthodox view.

“It must be frankly confessed, that a substitutionary work of Christ is not possible for every possible sin and guilt, namely, not for the sin of rejecting Him, for the *finale repudium solutis*, and therefore not for the sin which cannot be regarded at all as the effect of generic sin, because, on the contrary, it is purely personal in kind. Guilt exclusively, and in the full sense personal, God cannot do otherwise than visit on the sinner Himself. . . . On the other hand, all other sin and guilt, however great and penal it may otherwise be, is not personal in the full sense: it does not impart this *character indelebilis* ; the general state has an ambiguity in it which does not exclude hope. To it, therefore, the Divine justice stands in a different attitude, and not merely is long-suffering compatible therewith, but also the admission of substitutionary powers” (loc. cit.).

Just here is the distinction between human and Divine justice. Human justice can only take cognizance of the act of the individual. God views the individual

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 248.

as a part of the race, and sees how far his responsibility is personal, how far generic.

"The first consequence of this is a far stricter and more deeply penetrating judgment of God on the evil in the world, to wit, the view that on account of the universality of sin and its power, a common guilt exists, and that even judges, nay, the society that demands the execution of law and justice, are implicated in the common guilt which in God's sight is not appearance but reality. . . . Consequently before the Divine judgment seat, antecedent to the rejection of Christ, all sinners are equal in so far as this, that the difference in the degree of their guilt is not finally decisive, but to the Divine view vanishes again in essential equality as to the universal need of atonement and redemption" (loc. cit.).

But, secondly, the same fact, which unites all in a common condemnation, is also the reason of the hope of salvation.

"We affirm therefore: Substitution still has its place where and in so far as evil is either the result of the inherited evil bias of the race, or may be still included under the common guilt in which we are all implicated, where, therefore, the subject has not yet incurred *the* guilt, which can no longer be reckoned at all part of the generic guilt, because it is purely personal in kind, derivable neither from a corrupt nature nor from temptation by the common spirit of evil, but altogether from free decision. . . . Thus man's capacity for redemption is now defined as receptivity for the substitutionary forces of atonement. . . . The possibility of salvation is restored by this, that humanity in some way carries within itself a saving personal force of universal significance side by side with its common sin and guilt, whose effect is a common punishment. This saving force is

able to answer for the whole, because God Himself lives in it, as conversely every individual has receptiveness for it. And this power to make satisfaction in the name of the genus to God's punitive justice, which has reference to the genus, is conferred on the genus by the Son whom God's love vouchsafes to it. He through the act of Divine Incarnation has Divine power to answer for humanity, while He also became a true scion of humanity, as the Son of man, having universal relation to humanity. The fact that humanity in Him transformed this power of satisfaction into reality, thus not merely rendering the Divine forgiveness possible, but actually reconciling God with the world—this is the meaning of His office, which represents at once His ability and right, i.e. His *ἐξουσία*. The means by which He discharges His office is, that He is able to effect and does effect the satisfaction which is the law of His life as the Centre and Representative of humanity" (loc. cit.).

But what now is the satisfaction which Christ is to make? It is an expiation which "consists not primarily in righteousness of life, but in voluntary subjection to that law of the Divine justice, which imposes just sufferings on sin and guilt, the centre of which is the Divine displeasure" (§ 121).

This subjection Christ makes, in that He not merely knows the culpability of the world, but by substitutionary love feels with intensest pain the guilt of the world.

"In loving sympathy for us He will feel and bear the penal desert of sin, in a word feel and bear the curse that lies upon us, and the justice of the Divine displeasure with us. To this displeasure He will give the honour due to it in everything which it does and will do, in order by what He does and suffers to vindicate its eternal truth and sacred majesty" (§ 121, 3).

Such honouring of the Divine righteousness is im-

possible to sinful man, who, firstly, cannot realize the full guilt of sin, and, secondly, is repelled by the Divine justice.

“But what is impossible to man is achieved by the Divine-human Mediator, because He sympathizingly takes our place, and by His Person and work represents to God the expiatory power of humanity” (loc. cit.).

Dorner next considers (*a*) the subjective purpose of Christ in making the atonement, (*b*) its objective worth before God. In obedience to God Christ undertook to fulfil the Divine purpose of atonement, which involved the interblending of God’s justice and love. The means by which He undertakes this fulfilment is in His sympathy, which transfers itself into the place of humanity so as to bear the Divine displeasure against its sin and guilt (§ 122*a*). Although, however, His sympathy with humanity and His sufferings through fellowship with sinners ran through His whole life, still His atoning passion was not spread uniformly over His whole life. On the contrary, it came to pass through the historical development of His life, that at the end of it He came into such relation with the sin of the world, as became for Him the point of transition to His high-priestly suffering in the stricter sense, viz. His suffering for the sins of the world. “The sin of the Jewish and Gentile worlds—and, therefore, the sin of *the world*—here revealed itself in its fundamental forms, confronting Him in typical shape. How does He behave in its presence? . . . He knows what they (men) know not in their conduct, that they stand under God’s displeasure and condemnation for hating and reproaching Him. He enters into this condemnation of theirs in feeling, sorrowfully acknowledging it to be just in His deepest soul, and so far, therefore, subjecting Himself to the Divine condemnation, which He recognizes” (122*a*, 3).

Christ's purpose of atonement and action in pursuance of it has, moreover, objective worth.

"Contemplating humanity in Christ as making satisfaction to the Divine justice, God sees in Him, who suffered for us, and in love to the Divine justice offered Himself a sacrifice to God, that perfect security for the world, for the sake of which not merely free forgiveness and immunity from punishment, but also life and blessedness, may now be proclaimed and offered to it" (§ 122-6).

With Christ's death His earthly work was finished, but at the same time His Person was spiritually consummated. Thus the lowest stage of His humiliation is also the beginning of His exaltation (§ 123). His descent into Hades marks His attainment of a spiritual form of existence, in which He is independent of space and time (§ 124). Dorner refers to 1 Pet. III. 19, to show how Christ, freed from the limitations of His mortal body, found fresh scope for His ministry of the Word. The resurrection is the beginning of Christ's transition to a state of heavenly glory, which qualifies Him for the administration of His heavenly office (§ 125). In the ascension of Christ, or His absolute exaltation, the resurrection finds its conclusion, inasmuch as the exalted God-man is raised above the limits of space and time, the humanity of Jesus having become the free adequate organ of the Logos. This state of exaltation is figuratively expressed as the sitting at the right hand of the Father (§ 126). The glorification of Christ's Person is also the glorification of His threefold office, which is now raised to eternal significance, so as in the process of history to triumph over the limits of space and time. In this office, which He alone carries on and retains as the living Head of God's Kingdom, is realized in the course of history His constantly renewed, spiritual and invisible

Second Advent, which, however, will one day visibly burst forth upon us in order to the consummation of His Kingdom (§ 127, 1).

Dorner is a true follower of Schleiermacher, in so far as he endeavours to understand the work of Christ, above all through His communication of life. He differs from Schleiermacher on the important point, that he conceives it possible for Christ so to identify Himself with humanity as to share its consciousness of guilt. Schleiermacher admitted the sympathy of Christ with human sin, but would not allow to Him a consciousness of guilt, and refused to regard His vicarious suffering as satisfactory; Christ's satisfaction he placed in His perfect obedience, which is through our fellowship of life with Christ the guarantee of our obedience also. Rothe, virtually agreeing with Schleiermacher, prefers, however, to call this guaranteeing obedience of Christ by the name of expiation; it is what makes our sin forgivable. But Dorner makes the satisfaction or expiation consist above all in Christ's vicarious suffering, or His entrance into humanity's consciousness of guilt and condemnation; in so far, therefore, he approximates to the orthodox Protestant view of satisfaction, only that he abandons the idea of equivalence between Christ's sufferings and ours (§ 121, 3). It is important, however, to observe that, according to Dorner, the expiation is made only for generic, not for fully personal sin: the destruction of personal sin belongs to Christ's prophetic and kingly work, by which He takes men into a fellowship of life with Himself.

CHAPTER V

THE ERLANGEN SCHOOL

§ 1. HOFMANN

ANOTHER line of development from Schleiermacher begins with the Erlangen theologian, J. Chr. K. von Hofmann (A.D. 1810-1877), whose chief dogmatic work is his book "*Der Schriftbeweis*" (2 A, 1857-1860).

Hofmann speculatively deduces the whole of Christian theology from the fact of our fellowship with God, as it is grounded upon the fellowship of Jesus Christ with God. In this latter fellowship is expressed the ideal relation between God and man, which as ideal must have a metaphysical basis in the life of God Himself. The eternal will of God is in fact the creation of a Divine humanity, and in the historical Jesus Christ is begun the consummation of this will. But Christ existed in God before the Incarnation: the historical communion of Jesus with God is based upon the inner communion of the Persons in the Trinity.

A first stage towards the final consummation was given in the very creation of man, in that he was made in the Divine image. But the development was broken off, in that man fell through the temptation of the devil. Nevertheless the ideal relation between God and humanity was not utterly destroyed; but it continued to manifest itself in the pre-Christian revelation, which prepared the way for the coming of Christ.

Hofmann's doctrine of the saving work of Christ is

given in the "Fünftes Lehrstück" of the "Lehrganze," which contains in outline, at the outset of the "Schriftbeweis," the whole of his system.¹

We stand in personal communion with God by means of a self-determination on our part, which is the result of an operation proceeding from the man Jesus. "This operation points back to a self-determination of Jesus, by means of which He became the Mediator of the fellowship of God and humanity, not merely in any one relation within His human existence, but in His very existence as an individual man" (§ 1).

In other words, the saving work of Christ begins in the very act of the Incarnation itself. It begins with, and rests ultimately upon, the act of the pre-existent Christ in taking upon Himself human nature. The purpose of this act is, first of all, to establish within humanity that same fellowship with God which belongs eternally to Christ in His pre-existence. In order, however, to establish this fellowship within humanity, Jesus must enter into a fellowship with humanity, whereby He can communicate to it His own fellowship with God.

"He must, therefore, so have made human nature His own, that He belonged in it to humanity, as it was in consequence of sin, yet without being sinful, and that He possessed it as a means of exercising His eternal fellowship with God, yet an exercising of it, which took place under the conditions of human nature as fixed by creation and by sin" (§ 2). Hofmann, like Rothe and Dorner, considers that the sinlessness of Christ demands His virgin-birth.

The history resulting from the Incarnation follows partly from the form in which the inner relation within God is expressed in it, partly from the purpose for which this relation was thus expressed. In entering

¹ "Der Schriftbeweis," Vol. I, p. 45 ff.

into fellowship with sinful humanity Jesus comes under the consequences of sin, and under the wrath of God, as this impends over sinful humanity ; nevertheless He maintains to the end His personal communion with the Father under all the consequences of sin, even up to the point of sin's last consequence, which is death. The contradiction between God's love and His wrath against sinners is thus expressed in His life, till it is dissolved in His death. The particular way in which this contradiction worked itself out depended upon Christ's historical place in Israel. Inasmuch as the aim of His life was to express perfect fellowship with God in a sinful world, it was His work first to demand a repentant faith, in fact a faith in the accomplished restoration in Him of the fellowship between God and man. This, however, demanded that He should testify of His own relation to the Father ; which accordingly He did. Since, however, Israel rejected this testimony the necessary issue was " that Jesus suffered death at the hands of His people in their rebellion against the obedience of faith, and indeed, since it was as a people that they opposed Him, the death of a criminal " (§ 5).

Thus came to a climax the contradiction between God's love and God's wrath as expressed in the life of the Incarnate Christ ; and at the same time Christ's own fellowship with sinful humanity, in virtue of which He came under all the consequences of sin, also reached its climax. The Father allowed the Son to experience the utmost of what sinful man on his nature-side can experience through the wrath of God, the instrument employed being the hate of the Evil One operative against God in wicked men. Inasmuch as, however, Jesus preserved under all these consequences of sin His personal fellowship with God, there was here dissolved the contradiction between God's eternal will of love and the

sin of humanity in its provocation of His wrath ; “ since there was now realized a relation between God and humanity, for which the guilt of sin and the wrath of God no longer existed, and which was no more exposed to the power of the Evil One, in that it was no longer determined by the hereditary sin of humanity, but by the righteousness of the Son of God, as it had been maintained even to the end within sinful humanity and under all the consequences of sin ” (§ 6).

Finally : “ Since death as the deserved consequence of sin belonged to the relation of God and humanity now come to an end, Jesus, in whose Person humanity has become the object of a love of God the Father, which excludes from God Himself wrath because of sin and from humanity the power of the Evil One, cannot have remained subject to death ” (§ 7). Yet Christ must remain man, since it is as man that He has brought about the new relation of humanity to God, and therefore He Himself as man must first of all experience its results. Thus Christ’s death can be for Him only the transition to a new state of existence in which His human nature becomes the instrument of the communion now both eternally and historically perfected between Himself and the Father, so that in Him an unlimited communion between God and humanity is now realized and this very realization in Him is the means of its realization in others.

Such is Hofmann’s theory. If we express it in terms of the orthodox Protestant doctrine, we may say that for him the work of Christ is essentially an active rather than a passive obedience. It is the active realization of the true relation between God and humanity in the life of Christ on which the emphasis immediately falls, rather than on the endurance of the penalties of human sin. Nevertheless, in the second place, these

come in also, in so far as Christ has to realize this perfect relation to God under the conditions of sinful humanity, so that He actually experiences the consequences of sin as inflicted by the Divine wrath upon humanity. But this is in order that He may be able actually to establish the new relation to God within humanity, rather than because the bearing of these consequences is an end in itself. He bears them in order to come near to man, and in order to overcome them for man's sake, that man may overcome them also, rather than because an abstract justice requires that they should be borne, before mercy can be shown. Hofmann here follows essentially the line of Schleiermacher and stands close also to Rothe: in the stress, however, which he lays on the notion of the Evil One as the instrument of the Divine wrath he goes back to Luther and the patristic theology.

Hofmann drew out the connexion between his doctrine and that of Luther in the second of his "Schutzschriften für eine neue Weise alte Wahrheit zu lehren," in which he replied to certain theologians of his time, who accused him of unfaithfulness to the principles of the older Protestant doctrine, in that he had abandoned the principle of the *satisfactio vicaria*.¹ In the "Schrift-

¹ There were four "Schutzschriften," I, 1856, II, 1857, III and IV, 1859. Hofmann says of Luther in II, p. 78: "With him the work of Christ's satisfaction is something quite other than the substitutionary suffering of the punishment, which we ought to have suffered. . . . He so presents the work of Christ's satisfaction, as that God has sent into the world His Son, Who loves Him, in order that, through His love of God and His neighbour, with which He accomplished the work commanded Him, He might fulfil the legal will of God valid for us sinners, and in such righteousness might let come on Him, that He might overcome it, everything which is against us because of our unrighteousness. . . . The question why Christ had to undergo the suffering of death, Luther had no occasion at all to raise, since it was self-evident to him, that Christ, after He had by His Incarnation come under the wrath of God against sinful humanity, must experience all that in virtue of the wrath of God the devil could do against human nature."

beweis," however, he confines himself, as the name of the book implies, to the attempt to prove his doctrine from Scripture. It was his purpose to do this, avoiding the atomistic method of proof texts, by an appeal rather to the development of the Divine revelation in the history of the Old and New Testaments as a whole. His aim is, in other words, to exhibit his "Lehrganze" as the essence of the Biblical revelation, gradually unfolded more and more clearly by successive stages in both Testaments.

§ 2. THOMASIUS

One of the critics of Hofmann was G. Thomasius (A.D. 1802-1875), himself also an Erlangen theologian, who, however, sought, while employing like Hofmann the theological method of Schleiermacher, to obtain by means of it essentially a "repristination" of the old Protestant Orthodoxy. The system of Thomasius is given in his book "Christi Person und Werk: Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus" (2 A, 1856-1863). It is noteworthy that Thomasius writes, not like Schleiermacher from the standpoint of the Union, but from that of the Lutheran confessions. His statement of our doctrine begins as follows:—

(Einleitung, § 1) The appearance of Jesus Christ in the world is the centre both of the history of salvation and of the history of the world. Its essential significance is that it is the reconciliation of the world with God, and the beginning of a new life within humanity. The reconciling and restoring significance of this fact entirely depends upon the Incarnation. Christ's work is based upon His Person, for it is nothing but His self-manifestation: Person and work are one. What is given to humanity in the indivisible unity of the Person and

work of Christ is appropriated to the individual through justifying faith, which is the personal union of man, as apprehended by the Divine Spirit, with the Mediator.

(§ 2) As the Person and work of Christ are together the centre of Christianity, and the essential content of the Christian faith, both have always been the object and centre of Christian knowledge. This knowledge-of-faith (Glaubenserkenntniss) of the Christian Church is summarized in the confession "that Jesus Christ is God and man in One Person, and that He is the God-man, and as this the Redeemer and Regenerator of humanity". The Ancient Church has, upon the basis of its faith, formed the individual moments of this confession and fixed it in the creeds. The Lutheran Church has reshaped it and gathered it together into a true unity. In view, however, of the infinite depth of the matter, it is the work of theology continually to reproduce the Church's Christology in a living way. Such reproduction can only take place in connexion with the delineation of the entire Christian doctrine of salvation, of which the Christology is the centre, with all other doctrines as its presuppositions and consequences.

(§ 3) Three methods of treatment are possible. We may proceed from Scripture, from the ecclesiastical dogma, or from the fact of personal faith. A fourth conceivable way, the purely speculative *a priori* method, Thomasius does not recognize as possible in theology. Of the three admitted methods, the first would involve our obtaining from Scripture a total intuition, which we should then have to prove from it in detail. The total view of the individual, however, depends on his environment. We are thus led next to the second, or historical, method. This method Thomasius rejects, since it does not lead to the development of the Christology together with its presuppositions and conse-

quences, these not being immediately given in the dogma. There remains, therefore, as the only possible method, the procedure from justifying faith or its essential content, the actual communion of the Christian with God (§§ 4, 5). This communion between God and man is more exactly defined as personal, as mediated through Jesus Christ, and as restored. The method of procedure will be to start from this actual communion, then to prove the propositions originating from it from Scripture, finally to prove them from the ecclesiastical consensus. Scripture proof is to be from the spirit, not the letter: ecclesiastical proof, again, it is to be from the movement of thought in the formation of dogma. The following account of the doctrine of Thomasius is restricted to the argument from experience: it is to be understood that in his system each section has its corresponding Scriptural and dogmatico-historical proof.

The presuppositions of the Christology (§§ 6-33) are on the one hand eternal, on the other historical. The former are: (1) the Christian idea of God, including the Trinity; (2) the Divine idea of man; (3) the Divine decree of the Incarnation (independently of the Fall). The latter are: (1) the original state and task of man as destined for fellowship with God; (2) his sin, causing the Divine wrath, and his need of redemption; (3) God's relation in Christ to sinful humanity, in virtue of which the eternal decree of Incarnation becomes a decree of reconciliation.

In the Christology (§§ 34-47) Thomasius has made himself famous as the representative of a Kenotic theory, according to which, at the Incarnation, in His entrance into the state of humiliation, the Eternal Logos, retaining His immanent, or moral, Divine attributes of absolute power or freedom, holiness, truth, and love, divested Himself temporarily of His relative, or physical, attri-

butes of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, in order truly to enter into the form of human life, resuming, however, these relative attributes after the resurrection in the state of exaltation.

(§ 48) In opening the subject of the work of Christ, Thomasius redefines his experimental starting-point in the light of his previous discussion (§§ 6-47). "It is . . . a relation of communion of love and life, in virtue of which we, though we are sinners and as sinners are guilty before God, are yet received into His Divine good pleasure, and accepted by Him to grace, and therefore know ourselves reconciled with God, and in faith in this His free love, love Him in return." This relation is then a reciprocal relation, and is on both sides mediated through Christ, in fact through the exalted Christ, who as the incarnate Son of God is the personal Mediator of our communion with God. For us this communion with God has a *beginning* in time, through a Divine act (baptism), which lies beyond our personal consciousness, and whose significance appears in justifying faith: it has an *end* beyond this present life. Between these two points moves our whole Christian life. Each of these points, however, refers itself to an act of the Mediator, which, while distinct from His continual mediation, is closely joined with it. The first refers back to the past act, by which the relation of God to men has been objectively restored: the second refers forward to the future act, which shall complete this renewed relation. The former act is the sacrifice of the cross: the latter act is Christ's coming again in glory.

(§ 49) In order to a further development of the doctrine of the work of Christ, Thomasius now proceeds from the Christian consciousness of communion with God, in its specification as a consciousness of reconciliation, or of the forgiveness of sins. The question here

risers : What is the nature of forgiveness, and how far is sin actually removed for the believer in it ? The answer is : Not as a state, nor as a punishment, nor as the power of the Evil One, but only as guilt. Yet in the consciousness of the removal of guilt is the beginning of a new life of victory over sin, death, and the Evil One.

(§ 50) From the nature of guilt it is evident that reconciliation is an urgent necessity of man, but is only possible through an act of God's free love. This appears on the subjective side from the consciousness of guilt. The sinner feels himself alienated from God, under the Divine wrath, and unable in any way to approach God. This consciousness of guilt constitutes the subjective right of dominion of sin, death, and the Devil. But the subjective experience is only the reflex in consciousness of an objective truth. God's holiness cannot allow Him to overlook sin, without negating Himself. But, again, only an act of the Divine free love or grace can make reconciliation possible. God, however, can only intend the removal of guilt along with the further intention of the destruction of the power of sin, death, and the devil. A forgiveness of sins, which left man under the dominion of these powers without conversion and regeneration, is as contrary to the love of the Holy God as it is to the human conscience.

(§ 51) The nature of guilt, however, also makes it clear that the Divine saving act must be one of satisfaction. The consciousness of guilt is most closely united with that of the desert of punishment. It has led to innumerable attempts on man's part to propitiate the gods, which, however, are felt to be insufficient. Only a Divine act, therefore, can suffice. This act must be no mere declaration of indulgence or amnesty : such an act would not satisfy conscience, but would destroy respect for the law and faith in the righteousness and holiness of

God, which would be the destruction of the last bond between the sinner and God. This subjective necessity is again the reflex of an objective truth. Our consciousness of desert of punishment is the manifestation in us of the Divine penal justice, which is the necessary consequence of the Divine holiness. God cannot remove guilt without satisfying His holiness.

(§ 52) A satisfaction through the accomplishment of punishment, viz. the penalty of death, and a removal of guilt in forgiving love seem mutually exclusive. They are, in fact, the extremest contradictions; yet they are found together in the consciousness of the reconciled. Moreover, the difficulty is not merely subjective, but exists also for God. There is in God Himself an inner conflict between love and holiness. The relation between these two Divine attributes is not one of identity, but is a unity which has the principle of difference within it, and is a living harmony. If the two were identical, then holiness would be only another form of love, i.e. educative love (a position which, says Thomasius, here requires no further refutation). If, on the other hand, the two were absolutely opposed, God Himself would be governed by the dualism of His attributes, and there would hence exist for Him the necessity of the realization of both in a twofold predestination. "But since both are harmoniously one in God, it follows, that, as soon as they externally come into a real conflict, an inner opposition threatens to rise between them—yet indeed only at once to be removed by God Himself. For a real opposition, God, as one with Himself, cannot allow. . . . This removal is the inner essence of reconciliation: it is, therefore, not only a Divine but an intra-Divine act."

As regards the historical execution of this act, a theory would here be premature, but so much may certainly be affirmed:—

“God can in His eternal love only so will (or have willed) the restoration of the communion between Himself and humanity destroyed by sin, as that satisfaction takes place at the same time to His holiness, which demands obedience, and His righteousness, which judges the sinner, i.e. only so as that both His love and His holiness, His grace and His righteousness, come to full realization and therewith to a mutual balance.” The Divine act can consist neither in the mere remission of sin, nor yet in the mere endurance of the penalty of eternal death, the endurance of which by the sinner would be his ruin : it can only be a third act, in which the Divine sentence is executed, and yet human guilt and the Divine wrath are removed, and the reconciliation of God and the world effected.

“This is expiation. It is distinguished from punishment, in that in it punishment is not merely undergone, but undergone in order to the removal of guilt, and so undergone that this end is thereby attained. While punishment in and for itself delivers over to death him on whom it falls, and therewith excludes him from a blessed communion with God, expiation aims at restoring his relation to the moral order, or if we look deeper still, his relation to God, and therefore to free him from guilt, and therewith from the punishment based upon it.”

Such an expiation for sin, not merely individual, but universal, is beyond the power of sinful humanity. Nothing remains but for God Himself to undertake it, which He does in His love by sending His Son.

(§ 53) The execution of the Divine decree of salvation begins with the Incarnation. The Incarnation itself is already the establishment within humanity of communion with God. In Christ the ideal of humanity is realized. But the Incarnation is not in itself the

communion of God with sinful humanity, or reconciliation. The holiness of the God-man is rather only the immediate presupposition or *causa sine qua non* of such communion. Christ's actual holiness is an essential moment of restoration, but only in that it manifests itself in His passive obedience, through which alone restoration can take place, and which is the proper task which brought the Redeemer into the world.

(§ 54) Consequently, neither is Christ's prophetic self-manifestation in itself reconciling; it has rather as its purpose the enabling of mankind to appropriate salvation, and the working within it of faith and repentance. Yet, though it is only Christ's sacrificial death which is reconciling, this death must not be separated from the preceding life.

"It forms with the latter one whole; and just because Christ's death is the offering of this holy life, is it the death of reconciliation. But the expiatory moment is nevertheless in the latter point, in the surrender, in the sacrifice. The preceding life only comes into consideration, in so far as it is one great act of sacrificial passive obedience, which has its climax in the death. In fact, the chief stress so much lies upon the sacrifice that the death (the blood) can almost be spoken of as the whole, through which reconciliation is effected."

(§ 55) We have then to consider more fully this passive obedience unto death, through which Christ has accomplished reconciliation. It is both a passion and a free action of the Lord. It is a passion, in which Christ suffered from the hate of the world, behind which worked secretly the power of Satan. But there also operated the Divine sentence. God did not merely permit the action of the world and the Devil, but Himself used the powers of the world to execute upon the

innocent Christ His wrath against sinful humanity. Moreover, this was not a mere external act.

“What Christ suffers is death, in the fullest and deepest sense of the word, without abatement or reduction, the entire bitterness of this last enemy, bodily and spiritual torment, even to the point of being forsaken of God, i.e. even to that point of separation from God, which could possibly intervene, without destroying the bond of His community of essence with God.”

On the other hand, this suffering of Christ is also His own free act. He sees the necessity of it and freely accepts it. “Thus He makes the suffering His own act.” It is an act of complete obedience towards God, and holy love towards men, for whose sake He suffers and dies.

“In so far indeed this His act is the absolutely perfect fulfilment of the Divine law, and Christ therein completely and universally satisfies its demands on humanity, though in the form of passive obedience and upon the way of a Saviour’s vocation.”

Christ’s fulfilment of the law consequently takes the shape of a conflict with sin, death, and the Devil, which was at the same time a conflict with God Himself. Christ had to undergo the Divine wrath, and yet maintain a communion of love with God, in the terrors of judgment keep His hold on the hidden Divine will of salvation, and win mercy from God’s penal justice, blessing from His wrath. In this conflict Christ manifested, not only the most perfect righteousness, but an absolute self-sacrifice whereby He was perfected.

“In so far His suffering was of another kind than that in which the unconverted sinner suffers and must suffer, and it was an obedience of another kind than that which the law demands of man as such. It is comparable with repentance in so far as the penitent

receives the will of God, which judges sin, into his own will, and voluntarily submits to His judgment. But it is not completely identical with repentance, since the penitent is laden with his own personal sin. It was a great, holy, ethical behaviour, a manifestation of righteousness, such as sinful humanity ought to perform, but could not, and which He alone, the Holy One of God, could."

(§ 56) We obtain, however, full light upon this great act through reflection upon the Person, whose act it is. Since Christ is God, the reconciliation is a Divine act, as it has been shown that it needed to be; and, since He is man, it also belongs to the race to be redeemed, and is a human act. Then, again, Christ is the God-man, and is as such the representative of humanity before God. Though a single member of humanity, He is also the centre of the entire organism, the realization of the ideal of humanity.

"In this position, into which He has brought Himself out of holy love, He knows Himself one in solidarity with the race to be represented by Him, whose cause He has made His own. In this position, though personally innocent, He yet assumes the guilt of humanity—not merely that of this or that man: He rather receives the entire guilt of humanity into His own consciousness. He feels the entire opposition to God of human sin as His own pain, infinitely more purely and deeply than any sinful man could feel it, and therewith, in order to expiate it in holy obedience to the eternal will of God, He subjects Himself personally to the wrath of God against sinful humanity, which breaks over Him in His doom of suffering.

"In this position, again, the Father, who has destined Him to it, regards Him as one with the race represented by Him, and imputes to Him its sin: He regards

it as represented in Him, and imputes to Him the sin of the world. . . .

“ . . . Because of this position His action and passion is substitutionary : substitutionary, not in the sense that He externally came into the place of what mankind must do and suffer, nor as if it was an alien equivalent for this, it is rather mankind's doing and suffering, mankind's obedience, which it performs in its Substitute, its sacrifice, which He offers in its name, and which just therefore belongs to it. It has as an individual act at the same time the significance of a common act of humanity : it has this value before God. . . .”

Christ's self-surrender is, moreover, substitutionary, both as Divine and human, in the union of these moments, not, however, as if this significance were an after-thought, in that the metaphysical worth of His Person was afterwards added to the ethical worth of His deed. It has its worth just in that it is the act of this Person.

“If we now unite this knowledge with that previously obtained, viz. that Christ's passion and death was a Divine judgment upon Him, and also His own voluntary act, and again, in the union of these two moments, a sacrifice, we obtain the result : it is the substitutionary sacrifice for the sins of the world. Since it is this, there is accomplished in it the restoration once for all of the sin-disturbed communion between God and man. The moments, however, through which it is accomplished are : satisfaction, expiation, and reconciliation.”

(§ 57) It is, above all, a satisfaction. In that the Redeemer gives Himself up for us, He satisfies the claims of the Divine righteousness upon sinful humanity. He endures the punishment which we ought to have endured, death in the completest sense, or what is the

same thing, the essence of eternal death, "for death is separation, separation of the body and the soul, separation of the whole man from life and from God, and this separation is in itself an eternal one".

Next, Christ's self-surrender is an expiation. "Expiation has the aim of removing guilt by undoing sin. Sin, however, is undone, in that its punishment is—not indeed escaped—but so suffered, that the suffering is at the same time the victory over the opposition between the Divine holiness and human sin, which reaches its climax in (the consciousness of) guilt. Expiation therefore has punishment as an essential moment within it, for it is an endurance of the same, yet it differs from punishment, in that (in it) punishment is freely accepted and endured with a recognition of its absolute justification, and with a full accord in the righteousness and holiness manifesting themselves in it—in other words, just in that it is a sacrifice."

Christ's self-surrender is also our reconciliation.

"Reconciliation is the result, or the consequence, of the foregoing. For since now on the side of humanity in its Substitute, satisfaction is made to both the Divine penal justice and holiness, and such satisfaction as that sin is made good, and guilt is expiated, so also the objective opposition against sinful mankind based upon God's holiness, viz. His wrath (as His absolute reaction against the sinner), is removed, since the negation which provokes it is absorbed, since human guilt is paid for by the blood of Christ, and by Him perfect righteousness is accomplished. The hindrance, which made it impossible for the Divine love to turn to the world with complacency, is done away; it can now without harm to holiness and righteousness turn to it in grace: thus the relation of God to mankind, which was disturbed by sin, is restored in the death of the Lord. Enmity is changed

to a relation of peaceful communion. This is reconciliation. This great fact finds its simplest expression in the twofold utterance: 'the world is reconciled with God,' and 'Christ has reconciled God with the world'. . . . In Him, its Surety and Representative, through whom it is reconciled with Him, the Father regards and loves it, as freed from sin, delivered from the desert of death, become righteous in accordance with His will of grace."

Finally, in this great act is accomplished the inner harmonization of the conflicting essential attributes of God, His holiness and righteousness on the one hand, and His love on the other. The reconciliation of the world is on the one hand the expression of His hatred of sin and wrath against the sinner: it is on the other hand the highest act of His love. Thus the opposition between the Divine attributes, which has its basis in the reaction upon God of human sin, is overcome, not by a one-sided expression of either, but by the full exercise of both.

(§ 58) The same act which has established reconciliation is, in its effect, also redemption from the power of sin, death, and the Devil; yet in such a way that redemption from this threefold result of man's fall from God has as its presupposition the removal of guilt, and is accomplished through it. This takes place, first, objectively, in so far as reconciliation delivers from captivity under these powers; then, subjectively, in so far as victory over them on the part of man is conditioned by the acceptance of reconciliation in faith. Sin is removed as guilt, and its power is broken, in so far as the connexion between it and the Divine wrath is brought to an end; but it is not destroyed altogether at once. Death also remains as bodily death, though its power to separate from God is removed by reconciliation: its energy in

this direction lies in the wrath of God : thus expiation also involves victory over death. Finally, as regards Satan, sin makes him ruler, and guilt accuser, of mankind, and God permits both in order to punish mankind. Christ, however, redeems us both from his accusation by the expiation, from his power by the overcoming, of sin.

(§ 59) In order now, next, to pass from the objective to the subjective side of the matter, it is to be observed that the wrath of God is not entirely removed by reconciliation, but remains upon unbelievers. What has been changed is not the actual relation of individuals to God, but that of humanity. But the changed relation of God to humanity is the basis of His changed behaviour to it. "His will of grace, accomplished through reconciliation, becomes an actual manifestation of grace to it." This manifestation spreads, since the accomplished reconciliation is eternally present to the Divine regard, both forwards and backwards ; backwards in God's patience and suspension of wrath towards the ancient world ; forwards, in that with the historical fulfilment of the Divine purpose begins a new economy of salvation and grace ; the promise of salvation becoming the gospel of the grace of God in Christ. The new relation of God to humanity, moreover, makes possible a new relation of it to Him, one of trust and repentance, involving an inner communion with the death of Christ and victory over sin.

(§ 60) With the objective reconciliation, through which humanity has become the object of the Divine grace, arises for the individual members of humanity the possibility of actual reconciliation with God. "But this possibility ought to become actuality." This is the aim of the whole process of salvation.

"That this aim ought in accordance with their des-

tiny to be reached by all, follows from the universality of the Divine will of love in Christ." It is, however, actually realized, though not completely, yet essentially, in the actual communion with God through faith in Christ, which was our starting-point (§ 48). How does this come about? It cannot originate from sinful man.

"It comes into existence through the activity of the same Mediator, who has objectively re-established the (above) communion, and that by a continuous action on His part: He mediates it to us as the Exalted Christ."

Its objective presuppositions are partly in the fact of the reconciliation once for all accomplished, partly in the relations in which Christ is placed to God and the world by His exaltation. Its immediate precondition, however, is in the resurrection as the point of transition to His glorification.

"The resurrection as the act of God upon Him is the Divine justification and sealing of His entire work of redemption in word and deed, the actual confirmation (to the world) of the same, and in particular of the reconciliation accomplished by it—it is the Divine seal upon all this. In so far it is the ground of the possibility and right of faith therein. . . . The question, whether in the work of reconciliation and redemption the eternal will of God has realized itself, and if man may venture to base his salvation upon it—is answered solemnly, openly, irrefutably by the resurrection of the Lord."

The resurrection was also the glorification of Christ's Person, which constitutes Him the eternal High Priest and Head of the Church. As High Priest, He manifests Himself to God as our Representative: as the Head of the Church, He communicates Himself to us.

(§ 61) Christ is the eternal High Priest and Mediator between God and man on the basis of His sacrifice once for all. As such He is the embodied reconciliation,

and in His Person presents humanity as acceptable to God. More than this He intercedes for the redeemed, which act may be described as an individualizing continuation of His High-priestly activity, having the purpose of applying to the individual the grace of God won by His sacrifice. As He has determined once for all the relation of God to humanity, so now He seeks to determine similarly God's relation to the individual members of the redeemed race.

(§ 62) Christ is the Head of the Church on the basis of His exaltation, since this raises Him from the conditions of earthly life to the life of the Spirit and constitutes Him the organizing centre of a new humanity. This new humanity is in principle given in His Person, but He now directs His activity to unite individuals with Himself and make them participate in communion with God. In that He unites them with Himself as Head, He unites them with one another : both acts are one.

(§§ 63-65) His work in the application of salvation takes place through an inner spiritual working upon us, of which the first fundamental effect is the establishment of the Church, and of the means of grace, the word and the sacraments. A Divine activity accompanies all the human activities herein implied.

(§ 66) In the word Christ clothes His spiritual manifestation in human form, and makes in it the past history of salvation a living present, His Spirit being immanent in the word. It is the work of the word to create faith and repentance.

(§ 71) As by the word He communicates Himself psychologically to the conscious nature of man, so by the sacraments He communicates Himself to the whole nature of man "geist-leiblich". Baptism plants men into the organism of the Church, the body of the exalted

Christ, the Lord's Supper deepens communion with Him. The word and sacrament apply to the whole man the whole salvation. Without the word the sacrament would be a silent enigma: the word creates the faith which alone saves, and which can save, in case of necessity, even without the sacrament. But the sacrament gives to subjective faith the seal of an objective Divine act, and gives the spiritual life a basis in nature.

I have given the above extended account of the doctrine of Thomasius, because of its importance as a serious effort to justify, from the new standpoint of Schleiermacher, the old Protestant doctrine of the work of Christ. Thomasius has endeavoured to present the essential principle of the old doctrine as the necessary presupposition of our communion with God. In so doing he interprets the sacrifice of Christ, once more in the history of theology, as virtually a vicarious penitence.¹ Like Dorner, he conceives it possible for Christ so to enter into our human consciousness of guilt as to feel Himself one with the Divine condemnation of humanity: in His assent to this condemnation is the essence of the sacrifice by which he expiates sin.² But Thomasius goes further than Dorner in that he views this act of Christ as an expiation, not only of generic, but of all sin.³ The point of difference between Thomasius and the older theology is in his insistence on the absolute identification of Christ with humanity in His sacrifice; here he reverts to the mysticism of the Fathers⁴ in order to escape the critical difficulties involved in the

¹ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 236, 334. Thomasius, however, understands penitence in the Protestant sense (*supra*, Vol. I, p. 371). The doctrine of Thomasius is naturally quite independent of the suggestion of Edwards (*supra*, p. 183), which has so greatly influenced British theology (*infra*, p. 392).

² Cf. *supra*, p. 293 f.

³ *Ibid.* p. 296.

⁴ *Ibid.* Vol. I, pp. 65, 82, 111.

scholastic notion of Christ's satisfaction as an equivalent for what mankind ought to have suffered.

§ 3. FRANK

The third name of the Erlangen school is that of Fr. H. R. Frank (A.D. 1827-1894). In his "System der christlichen Gewissheit" (2 A, 1884) he derives the elements of Christian doctrine, including the Trinity, by a process of regressive inference from the experienced fact of regeneration. In his "System der christlichen Wahrheit" (3 A, 1894) he undertakes a systematic arrangement of these elements, which is of a speculative character, and proceeds from the central idea of the purpose of God to create a Divine humanity.

"The Christian truth is the complex of all the realities, which come to be recognized by the Christian as relative to the establishment of a Divine humanity, this aim itself included" (I. p. 46).

The *principium essendi* of this system is God Himself: the *principium cognoscendi* is the believing consciousness.

"In this believing consciousness is given and presupposed subjection to the supreme standard of Holy Scripture, and agreement with the testimony of the Church corresponding to it" (p. 83).

It is to be observed that Frank, like Thomasius, writes as a confessional Lutheran.

The Divine humanity is the common purpose both of creation and redemption, which are thus in a sense the execution of a single idea. The necessity of redemption lies in the fact of the Fall. Thus there are actually, including the Fall, three stages in the development of the Divine humanity. Frank calls them respectively: Generation, Degeneration, Regeneration.

The first germs of the development of a Divine

humanity are already present in a Divine redemptive revelation before Christ, of which there are obscure traces in heathendom, but which is manifest in the history of Israel, the people chosen to realize the Divine Sonship. In the Incarnation, however, the Second Person of the Trinity actually became man, and through an act of self-emptying transformed His filial consciousness into the forms of a finite developing human consciousness, without, however, losing the consciousness that He was the Son of God, or breaking the identity of His pre-incarnate and incarnate states.

“The Incarnation and self-emptying of the Son of God was necessary in order to the performance of His expiatory obedience, as Mediator of salvation, in His humiliation during His whole earthly life up to the death of the cross. . . . This obedience, involving Christ’s temptability and actual temptation, but also His complete sinlessness, was as such, over against the law as at once injunctive and penal, in all points both active and passive, and therewith expiatory” (II. p. 161).

The necessity of the work of Christ is a necessity only in view of the Divine purpose of redemption. Supporting himself upon various passages of Scripture and on the “Formula of Concord,” Frank takes as the central description of the work of Christ the idea of obedience, applying this idea to the work of His whole life so as to include both His action and passion. . Next, however, he proceeds from this idea, by way of the conception of merit, to the notion of expiation. Nothing is clearer in Scripture or in the Christian consciousness than the notion of Christ’s merit. The idea that Christ’s obedience is only a revelation of the Divine love is absolutely opposed to Scripture. Nor is the notion of merit in any way opposed to the doctrine of the grace of God. The revelation of God’s grace is in the meritorious work of Christ.

The next point, however, is to bring in the suffering of Christ. If the work of Christ has been rightly characterized as obedience and merit, then His suffering enters into it, not as such, but as involved in His obedience. This is made clear by the Scriptural idea of the work of Christ as a victory over the devil, and also by the Scriptural emphasis on His Person as the ground of our righteousness. Here Frank refers for support to Luther.

Then, again, to bring out the full force of what is implied, we must remember that Christ is the Second Adam. By His Incarnation He entered into the lot of the human race, as it lay after the Fall under the weight of the Divine condemnation. This is seen in His circumcision and in His bearing the yoke of the law, which was given as a counteraction of sin, though at the same time as a preparation for salvation. It is seen further in the work of His earthly vocation, in His temptation by Satan and in the hardships of His ministry, and finally in His supreme passion, which is not to be separated from the rest of the sufferings of His life. Moreover, in the acts of enmity and oppression, to which Christ was subject, we have to see, not merely acts of men, but a Divine counteraction of sin, mediated by Satan and his instruments. Frank takes up the position that there is no evil in the world of whatever kind, which is not ultimately due to the reaction of the Divine holiness against sin.

“In fact, Christ’s subjection to the power of Satan and to that of his instruments, especially to death, whose power is in Satan’s hands,¹ signifies nothing else than subjection to the Divine will in its reaction against sin, to the Divine sentence of punishment, to the curse of the Divine law. For death is ordained for the punish-

¹ Heb. ii. 14.

ment of sin, and can enter nowhere, even though its entrance should anywhere be through the unjust judgment of man, just as it is everywhere through Satan's work and mediation, without such death having to be understood as the reaction of the absolute holy God against the sinful creature" (p. 174).

Christ's death, His supreme passion, undertaken in consequence of His obedience, is moreover the climax of His work: without it all the rest would be incomplete. By it Christ endured the curse of the law in the full sense.¹ Christ's passion was, however, expiatory, not simply in itself as suffering. By suffering in itself, however deep and great, the reaction of God against sin cannot be stayed, but only by suffering undertaken in obedience to the Divine will. In order to understand the expiatory value of Christ's work His active and passive obedience must be taken in the closest unity. This expiatory virtue is now to be more closely defined.

"We understand by the expiation of the Mediator that performance, by which in willing obedience and therefore in sinlessness He took upon Him and satisfied the entire demand of the law, in particular of the offended law, made upon the sinful human race. If we grant the existence of an expiation that takes place in accordance with the demands of the absolute holy God by the coercion of the sinner under the law, to the advantage of the latter but not of the sinner, in contrast with such an expiation that made by Christ is a saving one, to the advantage of the subject of the same, since unity with the Divine will is established in the midst of penal coercion, and therewith the reason of its continuance is taken from the latter" (p. 184).

In other words, Christ in His expiatory obedience

¹ Gal. III. 13.

not only satisfies the claims of the Divine law, but is also the beginning of a new humanity, obedient to God. Frank lays stress on the human character of Christ's work in virtue of the self-emptying involved in the Incarnation.

Does the above view of the work of Christ include the idea of vicarious satisfaction? This, at any rate, says Frank, is not the point at which to begin. Scripture primarily represents Christ in His work as identical with us, not as separate from us. It is in fact an abstraction to separate Christ's work from its propagation to the race. To emphasize this point is to make void the old Socinian cavil, that if Christ has satisfied for us, nothing remains for us to do, while on the other hand, if we have to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling, Christ cannot have made satisfaction for us.¹ The above-mentioned abstraction of the one from the many, of Christ from His people, is, however, natural to human reason, and out of it necessarily grows the idea of substitution, which is in so far a reality as it is a legitimate aspect of reality. But substitution must not be understood as if Christ had endured the sufferings of the lost.

"The substitution of the Saviour becomes a precise and fitting idea, if He has paid the ransom which the prisoners must have paid to escape from captivity—not, however, if it was a matter of bearing what the prisoners would have had to endure, if they had not been redeemed. The thought of substitution is correct, and corresponds to the fact, only so long as it can continually be converted again into that of the identity of the subject, in which it has its roots" (p. 194).

Only when this fundamental identity of Christ with the redeemed is borne in mind can we do justice to the element of truth in the idea of vicarious satisfaction.

¹ Cf. Socinus, "De Servatore," pars iv. cap. v. (*supra*, p. 26).

Christ underwent death, and even separation from God,¹ yet not eternal death. Beneath the sense of separation from God was a deeper sense of union with Him.

“He could feel Himself forsaken of God in His Logos-consciousness, containing within itself His human consciousness, only in that He at the same time remained indissolubly united with God, and confessed Him who had forsaken Him as His God ” (p. 195).

Von Hofmann represents the patristic doctrine of Christ's victory over the Devil, so notably revived by Luther, as irreconcilable with the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction.² The unification just attained of these aspects of doctrine, however, shows his view to be ungrounded.

“The overcoming of the Devil, viz. the reducing of him to impotence, as the one who through sin has power over man, and who as executor of the Divine wrath accomplishes upon him the penalty of death, forms a unity with that vicarious work of expiation, by which man is delivered from his existing state of guilt and penalty ” (p. 196).

The wrath of God and the hostility of Satan are certainly not the same thing, yet they coincide in so far as the one is expressed through the other. Each culminates in Christ's death, so that His free self-subjection to this is at once the final expiation of sin, and the final deliverance from Satan.

“It is a proof of correct understanding of the redemptive work of Christ not to oppose to one another these interrelated moments of its accomplishment ; just as we had formerly to object to appeal being made to the love of God from which the work of redemption proceeds, as though it were irreconcilable with an expiation in itself required by God ” (p. 198).

¹ Mt. xxvii. 46. ·

² Cf. *supra*, p. 301, n 1.

Just as expiation includes vicarious satisfaction and redemption, so also it includes reconciliation. Scripture does not relate these different aspects of Christ's work one to another, but calls the whole work by each name. But dogmatic clearness requires their interrelation, which is as follows. The work of expiation satisfies the demands of the Divine law, and so by an absolute necessity there follows, upon the basis of it, reconciliation, viz. the removal of the tension which existed between the enmity of the sinner towards God and the wrath of God against the sinner. Finally, the work of Christ in all these aspects extends according to the Divine idea to the whole human race. It is the abstraction of its subjective effects from the objective work which has led to the question of its particular or universal extent, which question solves itself so soon as it is remembered that it is based upon an abstraction. If anyone remains outside the circle of redemption, it is by his own self-will.

This ends the positive statement of the doctrine. Frank calls attention, however, to the fact that he has not brought in either the category of sacrifice or that of priesthood. The latter idea, he says, so far as it includes Christ's intercession, presupposes His exaltation, which belongs to a different place in the theological system. The former notion is not well adapted for use in a theological statement. On the one hand the notion of sacrifice is broader than that of expiation, and on the other everything of importance implied by it has already been included.

The scheme of the threefold office Frank also adjudges entirely unfitted for dogmatic purposes. It divides what ought not to be divided, and is altogether illogical. Moreover, so far as the prophetic and kingly work are to be distinguished from the priestly work, they are best treated in connexion with the exalted Christ.

To this last subject, therefore, Frank now proceeds. Christ's exaltation is the reversal of His exinanition. It transforms the human form of consciousness again into the Divine, so that, however, the ego of the Logos is still conscious of Himself as man. Moreover :—

“In the exalted Saviour as the Second Adam the new humanity is in principle given, and all the individual acts in which the life of the Exalted Christ issues have for their purpose the establishment and perfecting of this humanity” (p. 212).

The fundamental function of the exalted state is Christ's Kingship, which, however, is based upon His priestly expiation (p. 161), and includes under itself His priestly intercession and His prophetic work. All these forms of activity had their beginnings in Christ's earthly state, but only with His exaltation do they appear in their perfection (p. 210). In the state of exaltation Christ carries on His prophetic work by means of His ministers. The kingdoms of power and of grace are not to be separated. Christ's power is used in and for the establishment of the new humanity.

Frank rejects the modern view (Schleiermacher) which admits only a work of the historical Christ, and which regards dogmatic assertions as to the work of the exalted Christ as belonging to the realm of the religious imagination.¹ The operations of the exalted Christ are as historical as those of the Jesus of history. On the other hand, it is the historical life of Christ which gives them their reality: without the basis of the incarnate life there would be no guarantee of their existence as a fact.

¹Schleiermacher regards the doctrine of the states of humiliation and exaltation as entirely untenable. “It has its origin in a passage of Scripture (Philipp. II. 6-9), which is of an ascetical (i.e. practical), and, if regard is had to the whole context, rhetorical character, and shows no intention that the expressions found in it should be fixed in the form of doctrine” (“Der christliche Glaube,” § 105, Zusatz).

Frank, the third theologian of the Erlangen school, may be said to mediate between Hofmann and Thomasius, and to express the final result of the development of the Erlangen theology. This theology is marked by an attempt to reintroduce, though its starting-point is made with Schleiermacher in Christian experience, the transcendent element to be found in the older conceptions of the work of Christ, which with him disappears in favour of the immanence of God in Christ. The result is that once more the Divine operation in Christ appears, as in the patristic theology, as a ferment in humanity, proceeding not merely by psychological, but also by mystical, and even sacramental channels to the regeneration of mankind. We have observed the introduction of a sacramentarian element into the doctrine of the work of Christ in Thomasius ; but Hofmann also says that the Church communicates, through baptism, to those who belong to its visible communion, the Spirit of God, which is the operative basis of its common life. He also says that in the Lord's Supper the Church communicates to the participants of the rite the enjoyment of its still future possession of the glorified humanity begun in Christ.¹ Frank also (II. 268) says that the method of Christ's self-communication by the sacraments corresponds to His character as God-man, existing in a spiritual body.

The great object of the Erlangen school is to represent the work of Christ as not merely objective nor subjective, but objective-subjective. It is essentially the realistic mysticism of Irenæus which is revived, as over against a purely spiritual and psychological conception of the work of Christ. To a less extent the same realistic tendency belongs also to Rothe and Dorner, who as standing between Schleiermacher and the older theology

¹ "Der Schriftbeweis, Siebentes Lehrstück," I. 3, 4.

are often called "mediating theologians". But it comes to its most decided expression in the modern theology of Germany through the Erlangen theologians, and this is what gives their theology its peculiar importance.

It is to be observed that Frank, in bringing the Erlangen theology to completion, stands nearer to Hofmann than to Thomasius.

CHAPTER VI

RITSCHL AND THE MODERN SYNTHESIS

§ 1. RITSCHL

It is generally recognized that Albrecht Ritschl (A.D. 1822-1889) is the most important German theologian since Schleiermacher. He has, however, left behind him no completed system ; but his views are to be gathered from his tractate "Unterricht in der christlichen Religion" (³, 1886), which is a kind of modern equivalent of Luther's "Larger Catechism," and from his great work "Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung". The first volume of the latter¹ is historical: the second² is Biblical: the third³ contains the constructive theory. This last volume is almost, though not quite, a system of theology. Ritschl said in the preface to the first edition: "In order to make what is the central doctrine of Christianity intelligible as such, I have been compelled to give an almost complete outline of systematic theology, the remaining parts of which could be easily supplied".

Ritschl's theology starts from the idea of the Christian religion, as based upon Divine revelation.

"Since the Christian religion originates from special revelation, and actually exists in a special community of believers and worshippers of God, its peculiar idea of God must always be conceived in connexion with the

¹ 1st ed. 1870; 2nd ed. 1882; E.T. from first edition, 1872.

² 1st ed. 1874; 3rd ed. 1889, still untranslated.

³ 1st ed. 1874; 3rd ed. 1888; E.T. from third edition, 1900; 2nd ed. 1902.

recognition of the Bearer of this revelation and with the appreciation of the Christian community, to the end that the entire content of Christianity may be rightly understood. A doctrinal statement, which sets either the one or the other of these elements on one side, will turn out faulty.”¹

In the above definition of the basis of Christian theology Ritschl differentiates his position from that of Schleiermacher in three points :—

(1) He begins, not with the consciousness of God in general, but with the special Christian idea of God as given through Jesus Christ. Thus his doctrine has throughout a more positive character than that of Schleiermacher.

(2) Ritschl complains that Schleiermacher, though making use of the idea of the Church in obtaining the basis of his theology, in so far as he founds it upon the Christian experience, not of the individual, but of the community, yet did not do sufficient justice to this idea in working out his theology, inasmuch as he did not in his notion of redemption sufficiently subordinate the individual to the Church. For Ritschl it is, as we shall see, in the first place the Church, and only in the second place the individual, that is the subject of salvation.

(3) The phrase in the above extract, “the valuation of the Christian community,” suggests the philosophical basis which Ritschl gave to his whole theology, in so far as the recognition alike of the Christian revelation, of Christ as the Revealer, and of the Church as the sphere of revelation, is described as a judgment of value. For Ritschl Christianity has a visible and intramundane aspect : this is its historical side. It has also an invisible and supramundane aspect : this is its religious side, which is reached only through the judgment of value

¹ “Unterricht in der christlichen Religion,” iv. 1890, § 1, p. 1.

involved in faith. According to Ritschl all religious beliefs, from faith in God downwards, are judgments of value.¹

In connexion with Ritschl's view of Christianity as a revealed religion is, further, the stress which he lays on the Scriptures as the source of Christian doctrine. Here, however, he defines his position very thoroughly with respect to the problems of historical criticism, both in its application to the Scriptures and to the traditional ecclesiastical theology. Christian theology must indeed, as Schleiermacher says, be stated from the point of view of the Christian community. Inasmuch as, however, in the course of history, the standpoint of the latter has been variously displaced and alien influences have troubled the purity of the Christian faith, it is necessary to go back to the fundamental statement of the New Testament, which, again, for its interpretation, requires an understanding of the Old Testament. Moreover, in the New Testament the Gospels present to us the first cause of the Christian religion in the work of its founder ; while the Epistles give us the faith of the primitive community.² Ritschl entirely rejects the idea of the *Aufklärung* that only the "religion of Jesus" is to be considered true Christianity. On the contrary, especially as regards the doctrines of redemption, the reverse is the case.

"The material of the theological doctrines of forgiveness, justification, and reconciliation is to be sought, not so much directly in the words of Christ, as in the correlative representations of the original consciousness of the community."³

¹ See for Ritschl's theory of value-judgments, "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T.², p. 203 ff.

² See for Ritschl's view of the position of Scripture as the basis of theology, "Unterricht in der christlichen Religion," § 3.

³ "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. p. 3.

Finally, in connexion with Ritschl's emphasis on the Church as the primary subject of the Christian salvation, there is another point in which he feels himself to occupy a different position from Schleiermacher. This is with regard to the ethical and social character of the Christian religion. Schleiermacher had indeed defined Christianity as a teleological religion, i.e. a religion to be understood through its ethical aim.¹ Ritschl complains that in his actual theology Schleiermacher has not done justice to this point of view. He himself seeks to correct Schleiermacher's defect by including in the definition of Christianity, as a most essential element of the same, the idea of the Kingdom of God.

"Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle described from a single centre, but an ellipse determined by two foci."²

These two foci are the ideas of the Kingdom of God and of redemption, as factors of equal moment in the definition of Christianity. Ritschl defines the former of these two ideas as follows:—

"The Kingdom of God is the highest good, as assured by God to the community founded by His revelation in Christ; but it is only to be understood as the highest good, in that it is at the same time to be regarded as the moral ideal, in the realization of which the members of the community are united together by means of a definite mutual mode of action."³

Ritschl, in fact, understands the Kingdom of God in Kant's sense as a community of men under the rule of God serving each other in love. There is no doubt that in assigning to the conception of the Kingdom of God a fundamental place in theology, Ritschl has made an effective return to the religion of the New Testament. His position has been subsequently criticized in that it

¹ *Supra*, p. 228.

² *Op. cit.* p. 11.

³ "Unterricht," § 5.

has been pointed out that Ritschl ignores the apocalyptic element in the Kingdom of God, which is so prominent in the New Testament.¹ This is true ; nevertheless, even when this deduction is made, it remains good that Ritschl has enriched theology with a valuable conception, which if it is not the whole New Testament notion of the Kingdom of God is at any rate a very important, the majority of theologians would say the most important, part of it.

It is further in connexion with the idea of the Kingdom that Ritschl defines the idea of God. He is to be thought of as the Will of love, Who reveals Himself in Christ, in order to realize His Kingdom in the world.² His proper name is "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ".³ He is the Father of men, in so far as His aim is the Kingdom of God.⁴ All Divine attributes are to be understood through the position of God in respect of the world, herein implied, and no otherwise.⁵ God's grace in redemption, or in the forgiveness of sins, is an extension, in accordance with His Fatherly character, of His grace in the establishment of the Kingdom of God.⁶ His grace in both respects becomes operative in Jesus Christ. This leads us to Ritschl's view of the work of Christ. It is, in the first place, to found the Kingdom of God, and, in the second, to establish redemption.⁷

He does both by the perfect revelation of God in His life and death, and also by representing before God, as its Archetype, the community of redemption, which

¹ Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 44 ff., 82 ff.

² Cf. "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. pp. 282, 283.

³ 2 Cor. I. 3 ; XI. 31 ; Rom. xv. 6 ; Col. I. 3 ; Eph. I. 3 ; 1 Pet. I. 3. Cf.

"Unterricht," § 11.

⁴ *Ibid.* §§ 12, 13.

⁵ *Ibid.* § 14.

⁶ "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. p. 318 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 414.

realizes the Divine Kingdom in the world. Ritschl connects his doctrine with the traditional formula of the threefold office.¹ But he operates a complete readjustment of the offices resulting in a most interesting restatement of the doctrine.² In the first place, he subordinates the prophetic and priestly offices to the kingly office, and offers a twofold division, the kingly-prophetic and the kingly-priestly. In the second place, he insists that the whole work should be demonstrated to be essentially contained in Christ's earthly life; so that His activity in His heavenly life can only be conceived as the continuation of His earthly activity. A third point of deviation from tradition is in the distribution of Christ's words, works, sufferings, and death under the offices. Whereas the Protestant orthodoxy divided these in different proportions among the offices, Ritschl insists that, both under the head of Christ's kingly Prophethood, and under that of His kingly Priesthood, the whole material of His life is, though from a special point of view, to be considered. Finally, throughout, Ritschl distinguishes the *ethical* and the *religious* aspects, i.e. the view of Christ's work as a duty undertaken by Him as Founder of the Kingdom of God, and the view of His work as Divinely ordained to this end.

We begin then with the kingly-prophetic office of Christ, and first of all with the ethical view of the same. The first proposition, which Ritschl lays down, is as follows:—

“The fundamental condition of the ethical apprehension of Jesus is contained in the statement, that what Jesus actually was and accomplished, that He is in the first place for Himself. Every intelligent life moves within the lines of a personal self-end.”³

¹ “Justification and Reconciliation,” III. E.T. p. 417 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 428 ff.

³ *Ibid.* p. 442.

But is not Christ's work for us? Does it not operate our salvation? If we make use of the traditional standpoint of merit, we may say that Christ's merit in our behalf follows from the merit which He has obtained for Himself. But the standpoint of merit cannot be the final one; Christ's work was taken up by Him as duty, and duty excludes merit. We must therefore state the case as follows:—

“In so far as Christ, by His duly ordered speech and conduct, realizes His personal self-end, it follows from the special content of the latter that in this form He also realizes the ends of others, i.e. has ministered to the salvation of mankind as a whole” (p. 443).

But what is the special content of the personal self-end of Christ? It is determined by His *ethical vocation*,¹ or special duty as an individual in the world, which was to be the Bearer of God's moral Lordship over men, and Founder of the Kingdom of God. This is the vocation of the Kingly Prophet; and both Christ's obedience to God and His patience and sufferings are to be understood in connexion with His vocation, and not from such extraneous regards as those adopted by the traditional theology, e.g. that Christ was required to keep the law, or to conform to a Divine ordinance demanding His suffering. Both His doing and suffering are proofs of Christ's loyalty to His vocation; “and for Christ Himself alone come into account solely from this point of view” (p. 448).

But now the ethical view must be succeeded by the religious view. “Christ not merely recognizes the business of His vocation to be the Lordship or Kingdom of God, He also recognizes this vocation as the special ordinance of God for Himself, and His activity in fulfil-

¹ Ritschl adopts this term with approval from Schleiermacher (cf. *supra*, p. 243).

ment of it as service rendered to God in God's own cause" (p. 449).

Thus He is led to regard His sufferings, and finally, when the inevitableness of it becomes apparent, His violent death also, as lying in the Divine purpose, and destined under God's appointment to serve the end of establishing the Kingdom of God.

Such then is the doctrine of Christ's Kingly Prophethood, as seen both in the ethical and the religious aspect. It does not depend for proof, however, only on Christ's view of His own vocation and of the sufferings involved in it, but it can be further verified in a double way. It is verified, first, by Christ's actual power over the world, which appears, not so much in His sufferings, as in His patience under suffering, viewed as a victory over the natural limitations of human life.¹ The miracles after all were on quite a limited scale. Christ never attempted any such change in the mechanism of the world as a whole, as had by the prophets been associated with the coming of the Kingdom of God.² Not even in the resurrection does Ritschl seek a proof of Christ's lordship over the world. He accepts it indeed as a consummation, through the power of God, of Christ's life and work, "the logical completion, thoroughly corresponding to the worth of His Person, of the revelation taking place in Him, which is final with reference to the actual will of God and with reference to the destiny of men".³ But Ritschl's view is that the sphere of miracles, not in itself indeed, but because of our lack of the means of explaining it, is withdrawn from scientific explanation. In other words, Christ's miracles and re-

¹ Ritschl refers for support to Bernard of Clairvaux (cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 194).

² Here Ritschl refers to Mt. xvi. 1-4.

³ "Unterricht," § 23, p. 21.

urrection belong rather to the Christian faith than to its verification. Christ's lordship over the world through patience in suffering can, however, be verified not only from the account of it in the Gospels, but from the fact that He has left the same type of lordship over the world to His Church. It is a standing factor in the Apostolic experience, and may be our experience too.

We pass on next to the consideration of Christ's Kingly Priesthood. Here too there are both ethical and religious aspects. The whole doctrine here, however, demands a most thorough remodelling. The old theology attempts only an ethical interpretation of Christ's work as priest, and brings in the religious point of view only indirectly in so far as Christ's priestly work was initiated by God, and its result is recognized by Him; while "a religious significance for us is secured to the content or result of this priestly work only through its being taken up into Christ's prophetic activity, and through the corresponding proclamation in the Church of how Christ has determined God to the grace of forgiveness".¹

The gravest defect in the traditional representation of the priestly work of Christ lies, however, in the particular ethical standpoint adopted for its interpretation, viz. that of law, which is, as a standard of conduct, directly opposed in Christian experience to the standpoint of religion; while "the assumption that in God righteousness and grace work in opposite directions is in so far irreligious, that the unity of the Divine will forms an inviolable condition of all confidence in God" (p. 473). The whole notion in fact of a Divine righteousness which is in conflict with the Divine grace is unscriptural.²

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. p. 473.

² Cf. *supra* p. 17, n. 3.

“God’s righteousness is His self-consistent and un-deviating action in behalf of the salvation of the members of His community; in essence it is identical with His grace. Between the two, therefore, there is no contradiction to be solved” (pp. 473-474).

Ritschl also opposes the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament sacrifices. His own view was that the sacrifices were to be understood, not as a satisfaction to the Divine justice, but as a covering of the finite creature in His approach to God.¹ There here appears in Ritschl’s work a result of the fresh philological and anthropological investigation of the Old Testament ritual, which was so marked a feature of the Biblical scholarship of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Ritschl expresses his opposition to the traditional view of sacrifice, as follows:—

“It is unbiblical to assume that any one of the Old Testament sacrifices, after the analogy of which Christ’s death is judged, is meant to move God from wrath to grace. On the contrary these sacrifices rely implicitly upon the reality of God’s grace to the covenant people, and merely define certain positive conditions which the members of the covenant people must fulfil in order to enjoy the nearness of the God of grace. It is unbiblical to assume that the sacrificial offering includes in itself a penal act, executed not upon the guilty person, but upon the victim who takes his place. Representation by priest and sacrifice² is meant not in any exclusive, but

¹ The protective covering of the offerers, by the priestly actions, from the face of God, includes in general no reference to their sins, but has respect only to the fact that they are perishable men (“Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” II.², p. 204). To translate the Hebrew word *Kipper* (to cover) in the sense of to propitiate is a mistake (*ibid.* pp. 187, 200-3). Cf. Orr, “The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith,” 1897, pp. 152, 153.

² E.T. has by error “sacrament”.

in an inclusive sense. Because the priest draws near to God when he brings near the gift, therefore he represents before God those in whose behalf he is acting; it is not meant that because the priest and the sacrifice come near to God, the others may remain at a distance from God. These relations hold even when it is sins of ignorance which give occasion for sacrifices: in the latter case forgiveness results from the fact, that with the sacrifice, the priest has indirectly brought the sinners also into the presence of God. Lastly, it is unbiblical to assume that a sacrifice has its significance directly for God, and only under certain other conditions also for men. On the contrary, the sacrificial act is just what combines these two relations" (p. 474).

Ritschl's conclusion is accordingly that the orthodox theory of Christ's priesthood cannot stand. It is ethical, without a religious aspect; and the Biblical basis on which it rests is not sound. Moreover, it fails to supply a satisfactory view of Christ's priesthood even from the ethical side, inasmuch as it overlooks what is so clear in the historical picture of Christ in the Bible, viz. that Christ, before He is a priest for others, is first of all a priest in His own behalf. In other words, He is the subject of personal religion exercising a perfect communion with God, which is the absolute precondition of His being able to bring others into the same communion. This communion Christ maintains first of all by prayer. But His faithful activity in His vocation, and especially His willingness for the sake of His faithfulness to endure death, also fall within the view of His priestly approach to God, inasmuch as they can be considered as the elements of a sacrifice which as priest He offers to God.

"His conduct therefore is intelligible to Him as a service rendered to God, which in its own way

brings Him just as near to God as prayer itself" (p. 476).

But how can His sacrifice have value for others? The doctrine of vicarious punishment in any and every form breaks down upon the rock of Christ's personal innocence. Whatever He endured as the consequences of human sin could be for Him only a testing affliction, not a punishment, since the personal consciousness of guilt was wanting. This criticism is entirely independent of the fact that the notion of a *lex talionis* is no rule of the Christian religion.¹ Nor can the doctrine of vicarious punishment be defended by the assumption that a beginning of satisfaction to God's justice is made in Christ, in order that it may be continued in us, as we are crucified with Christ. For the sufferings of the Christian are not penal, but disciplinary; so that on the contrary the connexion supposed to exist between Christ's suffering and ours would only seem to show that His suffering also was disciplinary and not penal. Finally, if it is argued that a religious interest attaches to Christ's sufferings viewed as punishment, in that He is our Surety against the wrath and retributive justice of God, He could only be this Surety if we believed that He had in offering satisfaction consciously offered it for each individual. This, however, is impossible. There is nothing to warrant it in the history of Christ's life—nor is there room for such an omniscience within the limits of His human consciousness. Whatever way we view it, the doctrine of vicarious punishment turns out to be indefensible. We must therefore look for another explanation of the significance of Christ's priestly work for others. This explanation Ritschl finds by considering the necessity for the Christian life of justification or the forgiveness of sins. Both for

¹ *V. infra*, p. 350.

him mean the same thing, viz. the admission of sinners to communion with God. The necessity of justification follows primarily from the direct connexion between justification and eternal life; there is, however, a secondary connexion between justification and the fulfilment of the moral law. Eternal life Ritschl conceives, not as future happiness,¹ nor yet as the mystical vision of God by abstraction from the world,² but as the victory over the world which is given by faith in God as our Father, and exercised especially in patience under suffering. In trusting God as our Father, however, we necessarily accept His final end as our own. But this is His Kingdom, of which accordingly we become loyal members, freely obeying the moral law of love. Justification, or the forgiveness of sins, is now the necessary condition of eternal life; inasmuch as only in communion with God can we have the victory over the world, and in view of our consciousness of guilt we cannot have communion with God except by the knowledge that His mind towards us is one of favour in spite of our sin. It is to be observed that Ritschl recognizes sin in the forms both of the personal consciousness of guilt and of the common life of sin in which sinners influence one another for evil: he names this last the "kingdom of sin" (p. 338). Like Schleiermacher³ he admits no "original sin" beyond this social influence of sinners one upon another. Sin, however, is forgivable, because it is ignorance.

"In so far as men, regarded as sinners both in their individual capacity and as a whole, are objects of the redemption and reconciliation made possible by the love

¹ This is the primitive Christian conception. Cf. "Man, Sin, and Salvation," pp. 44 ff., 82 ff.

² Cf. the doctrine of Thomas, *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 264, 265.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 230.

of God, sin is estimated by God, not as the final purpose of opposition to the known will of God, but as ignorance " (p. 384).

That God should receive sinners into fellowship with Himself is, therefore, possible by an exercise of His will, which takes shape in a favourable judgment of their case. This is justification; and the only way in which we can enjoy communion with God is by accepting this Divine judgment in faith. Love to God cannot be "infused"—our attitude to God can only be changed by the knowledge of His attitude to us.

But further: eternal life or the state of victory over the world, which we enjoy through communion with God in justification, is the only state of mind out of which free obedience to the law of love can issue. It may be added that justification, as thus actualized, is the same thing as reconciliation or adoption. The knowledge that God is our Father makes us His sons.

We are now in a position to investigate the connexion which Ritschl sets up between the forgiveness of sins and the work and sufferings of Christ. The forgiveness of sins is mediated to us directly by Christ's priestly position taken as a whole, in that He is conscious "of standing in the closest conceivable relation to God, and of being called to receive others into the same relation in such a way that their sins shall present no obstacle to their trust in God and God's communion with them" (p. 542).

Inasmuch as Christ's work in His vocation, His sufferings, and death, conditioned, as has already been explained, His nearness to God, they accordingly have value for us as the prerequisite of the exercise of His priesthood. The objection of the Socinians that Christ's sufferings and death cannot condition His exercise of

the forgiveness of sins, since He forgave sins in His lifetime,¹ Ritschl deals with along lines already developed by Schleiermacher.² Christ throughout His life maintained His communion with God—the final perfection of this communion was, however, only established in His death, as constituting its highest proof. The further Socinian objection, that forgiveness was already bestowed by God under the Old Testament dispensation and so can have no necessary connexion with the work of Christ,³ Ritschl meets by pointing out that the consciousness of communion with God was never steady under the Old Testament, as it is in the New Testament, but was subject to fluctuations, as may be seen in the Psalms. Finally, the view of the *Aufklärung* that God's forgiveness is a doctrine of natural theology,⁴ is met by the assertion that history shows that our knowledge of it proceeds from Scriptural revelation.

The primary object of forgiveness, however, is not the individual, but the community, which was the aim of Christ's life-work. The individual enjoys forgiveness as a member of the community. Ritschl accordingly sums up his whole doctrine of Christ's Kingly Prophethood and Priesthood in this connexion as follows:—

“In so far as our aim is to understand forgiveness as proceeding from the living will of God the Father, Who permits sinners to draw nigh to Himself, this will is manifested as the grace and the truth in which Christ

¹ *Supra*, p. 104, n. 4.

² *Ibid.* pp. 239, 240.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 21, 61, n. 2.

⁴ The Deist, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, certainly treats God's forgiveness as a doctrine of natural theology (*supra*, p. 154). The “*Aufklärer*,” Steinbart, however, like the later Deist, Chubb, traces the doctrine to the Christian revelation (*supra*, pp. 169 f., 193 f.), though both certainly regard it as entirely in harmony with reason. Ritschl is hardly fair to the *Aufklärung*, which in part prepared the way for his own view.

represents God for men. On the other hand, when what we want is to see forgiveness become operative as the attribute of a community, this aspect of it is guaranteed by the community's Representative, whose inviolably maintained position towards the love of God, which is distinctive of Him, is imputed by God to those who are to be accounted His" (p. 547).

It is, of course, the identical material of Christ's life which is viewed in this double way. Nevertheless, the two aspects are really different. In order, therefore, that a unity may be established between them, one of them must be subordinated to the other. In fact, the priestly office is subordinated to the prophetic office, so as to be even embraced in it, i.e. Christ's representation of us to God follows from His being first of all God's representative to us. The original communion with God, which makes Him God's revelation to us, makes Him also the Head of the Church. In agreement with this subordination of the priestly to the prophetic office, Ritschl points out that the kingly office of Christ is exercised differently under these two aspects, more widely under the prophetic office, more narrowly under the priestly office, since Christ here is properly only Lord of the Church.

It may be pointed out that Ritschl's doctrine here appears to offer a solution of the old and difficult controversy between the Lutherans and Reformed as to the scope of the work of Christ. Both the universalist and the particularist view are seen to be true, though with a different reference. In Ritschl's historical volume the doctrine of Abelard, Duns, and the Calvinists that Christ died for the elect accordingly meets with a favour very unlike the present attitude to it among English-speaking theologians.

In concluding his exposition Ritschl rejects certain

modern theories of the work of Christ, as he had previously rejected the traditional Protestant doctrine.

(1) There is, first, the idea that Christ, though He did not bear the punishment of our sins, yet performed for us a vicarious penitence. Ritschl refers to Häring's statement of this theory in his book "Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus" (1880).¹ He refutes this theory by the argument that Christ could not repent of sin without personal consciousness of guilt.

(2) There is, secondly, the view that God in Christ's death condemned human sin, in order to bring men to repentance. Häring, abandoning his earlier position, became a sponsor of this theory in his work "Zu Ritschl's Versöhnungslehre" (1888). Ritschl says that this amounts to no more than a revival of the Grotian theory of penal example. He had already² acquiesced in the criticism passed upon this theory by the Socinian Crell, viz. that it fails on the ground that the suffering of the innocent is affliction, not penalty.³

In both these instances, then, Ritschl makes it clear that he altogether repudiates all attempts to give Christ's suffering a penal character, no matter whether He bears the equivalent of the punishment of sinners or not, or whether an external endurance of sin, or an inner acknowledgment of condemnation is in view. Ritschl's view, in fact, is that there can be no punishment of sin where there is no consciousness of guilt. The primary punishment of sin is exclusion from communion with God: the natural and social evils of life are only felt as punishment by the man who is conscious of guilt.

¹ Häring is himself a disciple of Ritschl.

² "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. pp. 311, 312.

³ Crell simply repeated against Grotius the point of view of Socinus (*supra*, p. 25).

It may be added that later Häring, still maintaining his second position, has stated a general view in close agreement with Ritschl. In a noteworthy book, "Zur Versöhnungslehre" (1893), he points out that the New Testament terminology is not adapted to be the means of a scientific doctrine of the work of Christ, and that the Pauline language, in which it is taught that Christ was a sacrifice for us, must be conditioned by the equally Pauline idea that Christ's work is not external to, but inclusive of us. Häring therefore suggests that Christ's work may be best understood under the two heads of Revelation and Representation, the former idea being understood not merely of the communication of doctrine, but of the total effect of His life in bringing men to communion with God. Of these two heads Representation must be subordinated to Revelation. This is essentially Ritschl's doctrine without the formula of the threefold or twofold office.¹

Three things in particular are observable about the Ritschlian theology. The first is its thoroughly *immanental* character, in which it represents a complete return to Schleiermacher as over against the mediating theologians like Rothe and Dorner and still more in opposition to the Erlangen school. This immanental character appears alike in Ritschl's conceptions of the Kingdom of God, of eternal life, and of the work of Christ. All have their essential sphere *within*, not beyond the terms of humanity.

¹ Häring has since published a complete system, "Der Christliche Glaube" (1906). It may be observed that it is not possible here to continue the history of the Ritschlian dogmatic after Ritschl. It would be out of proportion to give an account of all the three works which at present lie before us, Kaftan's "Dogmatik" (1897), Häring's above-mentioned work, and Wendt's "System der Christlichen Lehre" (1907). On the other hand, it is too soon to determine which of these books should be selected as most representative of the line of progress.

Secondly, however, Ritschl's theology is distinctly more Biblical than that of Schleiermacher. He endeavours more definitely than the latter to understand Christianity as a positive revelation. Ritschl here occupies a middle position between Schleiermacher and the older Protestant theology. While the latter conceives the scheme of Christian doctrine to be given in a circle of ideas to be found in the Bible, and the former views it as the reflex of certain definite experiences, Ritschl regards it as given in those Biblical ideas which can be directly verified in experience. This position was to a certain extent anticipated by such theologians as Quenstedt and Heidegger, with their emphasis on the *fides salvifica* as the essence of Christianity; so that it can be well understood how Herrmann, himself leaning more to the point of view of Schleiermacher, has spoken of Ritschl as "in reality the last great representative of the orthodox dogmatic, who makes its two precious elements, faith in the sense of the Reformation and the Scripture principle, shine with a brightness they never had before in this connexion in any previous theologian".¹

Thirdly, in the theology of Ritschl, as in that of Schweizer, the Abelardian type of doctrine receives the preference over that of Anselm. This is the result of his subordination of the principle of Representation to that of Revelation. Ritschl, like Schweizer, was fully conscious of this connexion with Abelard.

In "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 40, he says that "it appears that the advantage in respect of typical character is to be ascribed to Abelard's view and not to that of Anselm". Again, in III. E.T. p. 473, he writes: "The introduction into the theology of Protestantism since Töllner of the fundamental position of Abelard is a distinct advance upon orthodoxy".

¹ "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche," 1907, p. 25.

It is accordingly most of all with Schweizer among previous theologians that Ritschl is in agreement. Like him he conceives the Christian redemption as essentially a transition from the consciousness of sin to the consciousness of grace through the revelation of God's love in Jesus Christ. 2 Cor. v. 19 supplies the centre of this view: the *immanence* of the love of God in Christ is that on which Ritschl lays such emphasis. His criticism of the Protestant orthodoxy is precisely that "the immanence of God's love is not set forth just in the love and obedience of Christ; nor is that immanence allowed to have its due place in the connexion of the doctrine".¹ The difference between Schweizer and Ritschl lies in the further emphasis which the latter lays on the Kingdom of God as the end of the operation of the Divine love. He says of Schweizer:—²

"If there is any defect that one has reason to complain of, it is that he does not carry far enough the ethical normation of the intuition of Christ; particularly, that His importance as central personality (which is recognized in His vocation) is not measured by reference to the thought of the Kingdom of God, and is apprehended apart from that idea and also apart from the relation between the love of God and the Kingdom of God."

Herrmann has commented on the *simplicity* of Ritschl's system.³ Ritschl himself speaks of his work as "an exposition of Christian doctrine which views and judges every part of the system from the standpoint

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," I. E.T. p. 260. (I have, however, substituted "just" for "even," as a better rendering of "selbst".)

² Op. cit. p. 510.

³ "Die Kultur der Gegenwart," I, iv. 2, p. 161: "The system of Ritschl is distinguished by its simplicity. It is his earnest endeavour to limit himself to the thoughts which really belong to religion."

of the redeemed community of Christ".¹ In fact, the modern purpose to reduce the system of Christian theology to the unity of a single principle, nowhere receives a more notable exemplification than in the work of Ritschl. He has endeavoured to bring every part of Christian theology under the control of the central idea of the Christian conception of God as revealed in Christ, with its twofold development in the notions of the Kingdom of God and of reconciliation. He rejects the orthodox dogmatic system, including all modern restitution of the same, on the ground that it is not a unity, but is developed from different and inconsistent principles.

"It takes up its standpoint, first of all, in the far-off domain of man's original perfection, which it makes correlative to a certain rational conception of God, correlative, that is, to the necessary twofold recompense which God awards to men, bound as they are to conform to His law. . . . The traditional doctrine of man's original state, consequently, implies that theology takes up its standpoint within either a natural or a universally rational knowledge of God which has nothing to do with the Christian knowledge of Him, and is consequently indifferent to the question whether the expositor who expounds the doctrine belongs to the Christian community or not. The nature and the extent of sin, accepted as a fact, is thereafter determined by the standard of the first man's original perfection. Passages of Scripture may be used as well, but that makes no difference, for they are not read in the light of the fact that the Apostle Paul's view of the effect on the human race of the first transgression is determined by its contrast to the effect of Christ upon His community. Traditional theology, in using the passage Rom. v. 12, rather

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. p. 5.

keeps to the lines of Augustine, who, on thoroughly rational grounds, deduced original sin from the sin of the human race, and undertakes to deduce from this the necessity of a redemption, the method of which is brought out by comparing sin with the Divine attribute of retributory righteousness in the purely rational style which Anselm has applied to this topic. Then follows, at the third stage of the traditional theological system, the knowledge of Christ's Person and work, and its application to the individual and the fellowship of believers. Not until it has to deal with this topic does theology take up the standpoint of the community, but it does so in such a way that the above-mentioned rational conception of redemption is held to throughout the exposition of its actual course. No system can result from a method which thus traverses three separate points of view in accomplishing the different parts of its task."¹

One is reminded here of Steinbart's attack on Augustine and Anselm from the standpoint of the Christian conception of God.² It is evident how the criticism flowing from the *Aufklärung* is in the veins of the Ritschlian, as indeed of so much modern, theology. Ritschl has particularly attacked the principle of the Divine twofold retribution of rewards and punishments according to merit, as being unfit for use in Christian doctrine. It is in his view an idea of Hellenic religion which was first firmly established within Christianity by the Apologists.³ St. Paul's use of it in Rom. II. 6 f. is merely dialectic: he is arguing with the Roman Christians from their own standpoint.⁴ As has already been observed Ritschl defines the Divine righteousness as the consistency of the Divine grace: this position as well as the dis-

¹ "Justification and Reconciliation," III. E.T. pp. 4, 5.

² *Supra*, p. 200 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 262.

⁴ "Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," II.², p. 319.

inction between punishment and affliction he inherits from Socinianism.¹ He stands, in fact, to the criticism of Socinus and the *Aufklärung* in the same relation as Luther does to that of Duns and the Nominalists.

§ 2. LIPSIUS AND KÄHLER

We can best bring out the full significance of the Ritschlian theology by contrasting it with the work of the two contemporary theologians, Lipsius and Kähler. Kattenbusch² has reckoned Lipsius along with Schweizer and Biedermann to the "liberal" theology: Kähler, on the other hand, he has placed with Rothe and Dorner among the "mediating" theologians. But the two theologians nevertheless, though in different ways, stand very close to Ritschl. A study of their work is therefore of peculiar value in determining the exact point where Ritschl's theology separates itself from the liberal and the mediating schools. Lipsius may be said to represent the liberal school, and Kähler the mediating school, in their nearest approach to Ritschlianism; and yet, after all, each diverges from that system at a critical point.

§ 3. LIPSIUS

Lipsius (A.D. 1830-1892) agrees with Ritschl that religious judgments are value judgments. He differs from the latter, however, in holding that the value judgments of religion, as they proceed from experience to what transcends experience, find support in metaphysical reality.³ Ritschl, on the other hand, refuses any place in theology to metaphysic: he held that any attempt to support religious faith by metaphysical doctrine must

¹ *Supra*, pp. 16, 25.

² "Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl," 3, 1903.

³ Cf. Lipsius, "Philosophie und Religion," 1885.

result in the contamination of religious truth with alien points of view.¹

The general principles on which Lipsius apprehends the work of Christ are laid down in his "Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik" (3, 1893) as follows:—

(§ 639) "God's eternal will of salvation and of the establishment of His Kingdom has become historically an object of common and individual experience in the Christian community by means of faith in the Person and work of Christ. The empirical sphere of its operation, therefore, is to be found in the Christian community and in the peculiar religious and moral consciousness which inspires the same."

(§ 640) Theology must here distinguish between the religious significance of Jesus Christ as the Mediator of the perfect Divine revelation and His ethical significance as the historical Founder of the Kingdom of God and the personal Bearer and Source of the principle inspiring this community. On the other hand, it must justify religious faith in the Divine revelation in Christ by means of the ethical evaluation of His Person as the fundamental embodiment of union with God, or the complete religious relation.

(§ 641) The operation of the religious principle of Christianity or of the Christian spirit in the Church is not immediately identical with the personal work of Christ. On the other hand, however, it is wrong to regard the two as merely accidentally and externally connected, as though the Christian principle had only been first realized in Christ by accident, or as if His work had only provided the external means for symbolizing the general operation of this principle in humanity. On the contrary, the Christian principle is the spirit

¹ Cf. Ritschl, "Theologie und Metaphysik," 3, 1902.

of Christ, and presupposes the complete realization of the religious relation in His Person, and therewith the complete revelation of the Divine will of salvation in His consciousness.

(§ 642) The eternal truth of the Divine economy of salvation and of the reconciling and redeeming love of God does not therefore depend on the historical Person and work of Christ. On the other hand, the Divine will of salvation is not actually effective apart from the historical revelation of God in Christ as the objective basis of the Christian community.

(§ 643) The inner and abiding connexion of the revelation in Christ and of the operation of the religious principle proceeding from Him makes both inseparable for the immediate religious view of the Church, which, though originally based upon the relation of the disciples to Jesus in His earthly life, was only completed with His exaltation to be Lord and Head of the Christian community.

In the above statement it is clear how close is the agreement with Ritschl, from whom, however, Lipsius separates himself when he conceives it possible for theology to leave the standpoint of immediate religious faith and take up a metaphysical standpoint, from which it appears that the eternal truth of the Divine will of salvation is independent of the Person and work of the historical Jesus.

The following discussion accordingly deals with (1) the ethical significance of the historical Person of Jesus and His life-work; (2) the religious significance of the Person and work of Jesus Christ for the community; (3) of the religious content of the salvation mediated by Christ.

The first of these themes is dealt with in §§ 645-660. The empirical view of history recognizes in Jesus of

Nazareth the historical founder of the Christian religion and the Christian Church. The special worth of His Person consists in the peculiar religious content of His self-consciousness, which makes Him as the Son of God the exemplary and creative Founder of the community of the Kingdom of God, and also the Personal realization of the perfect religion and Head of the community. Christ's consciousness of Divine Sonship was at the same time a consciousness of His vocation to found the Kingdom of God, the perfect religious and moral order. His Divine Sonship was, in fact, an immediate unity of religion and morality, of freedom from the world in communion with God, and of the fulfilment of moral duty in love to men.

“Though manifesting itself in the historically and individually conditioned form of a true human consciousness and life, the religious-moral personality of Jesus, as perfected in death, has become the realization of the Christian principle, which is for the community exemplary and creatively fundamental: while His work, which is indivisible from His Person, is simply the execution of His vocational task, viz. by the reception of the community of disciples into the fellowship of His religious relation to God to assure it of its reconciliation with God and its redemption from the world and therewith to found the Kingdom of God” (§ 658).

Christ's historical work of reconciliation and redemption has reference in the first place to the community as a whole; but the inner union with the community and with the Kingdom of God as offered in it, depends on each individual member's personal assurance of reconciliation and redemption. Lipsius here commends the view of Ritschl,¹ whom he defends in a note to § 659

¹ *Supra*, p. 343.

against the accusation that his doctrine leans too much to Catholicism.¹ He says :—

“To find here a catholicizing tendency would only be right under the presupposition of the identification, as in the older theology, of the personal work of Jesus Christ with the influence of the Christian spirit in the community. The fellowship of the individual with Christ’s Person and work is certainly always historically mediated by the Church ; on the other hand, the operation of the Christian principle in the individual is itself nothing historical, but depends upon the administration of an eternal order.”

This, however, is a defence of Ritschl’s position which he himself could not have accepted, since it turns upon the separation, out of the unity of the view of faith, of a historical element on the one hand and a metaphysical element on the other.

Lipsius closes his treatment at this point by observing that in the relation of the historical work of Christ to the community is the justification of the Reformed doctrine that the object of his work is the elect, only that the elect must not be taken to be the personally predestinated.² It may be observed that Lipsius, like Schweizer and Biedermann, stood on the ground of the “Union”.³

There follows next the religious view of the Person and work of Christ (§§ 661-680). This is expressed in the faith of the Church that He is the Christ or the personal Founder of the Kingdom of God and therewith also the religious Reconciler and Redeemer of His

¹ Lipsius (loc. cit.) attributes this criticism to Biedermann. But Biedermann himself says that the Ritschlian only externally, and not really, resembles the Catholic doctrine (“Christliche Dogmatik,”² II. p. 319).

² Cf. the similar view of Ritschl, *supra*, p. 344.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 229 f.

people, who in accordance with the Divine will mediate to them communion with God, and so delivers them from the world, sin, and evil. As personal Mediator of reconciliation, Christ is at once for faith the Representative of God to men or the personal Bearer of the Divine revelation, and the Representative of men before God or the personal Bearer of the perfect religion. Lipsius agrees with Ritschl that the former aspect must have religious priority over the latter.

This religious faith in Christ in both its aspects is based upon the ethical view of His Person previously explained. Faith sees in the historical manifestation of the Person of Christ a Divine deed, through which God reconciles the world with Himself, or in which His eternal will of love has become a historical act of love. It recognizes, therefore, a peculiar immanence of God in Christ, who is at the same time the Man in perfect union with God and Head of the reconciled community.

As Representative of God to men, Christ reveals God both by word and deed. His revelation of God by word is in the gospel of the Kingdom of God and of reconciliation and redemption, which He preaches. His revelation of God by deed is in the maintenance of the consciousness of God's love, in lowly obedience of love to God, and self-denying loving service of men even unto death ; which maintenance at the same time constitutes the actual fulfilment of the Divine will of reconciliation and redemption, through the realization of the perfect fellowship of God in man in the Head of the new community. The revelation of God's love in Christ's word and deed is also as such the revelation in the community of the Divine principle of salvation, and the founding of the Kingdom of God as freedom from the world.

As Representative of humanity before God, Christ

reconciles mankind to God by realizing the perfect life of union with God or perfect righteousness, and at the same time by acknowledging in humility the justice of the Divine condemnation of sin, or offering to God a perfect expiation : in both respects the Head vicariously satisfies for the community founded by Him. In fellowship with Christ the community knows itself as reconciled, since fellowship with Him is also communion with God, and the enjoyment of the forgiveness of sins and Divine Sonship.

"This doctrine of the representation of humanity," says Lipsius, is "the view presented as far back as by Paul, side by side with the juridical idea of substitution, of an ethical representation of the new humanity in Christ, its Head, or the mystical incorporation of believers in Christ.¹ The same thought is expressed by the Reformed doctrine of the *unio cum capite*"² (§ 673).

It is to be observed that Lipsius does not hesitate to adopt the doctrine, which Ritschl rejects,³ of Christ's expiation of sin by an acknowledgment of the Divine condemnation of it as righteous. He here approximates to the mediating theology and Thomasius.⁴

Lipsius gives over the facts of the historical life of Christ to criticism, but considers the religious view of His death and His resurrection independent of all criticism. In the latter, Christ appears to the faith of the community as its exalted Lord and Ruler of the world. The schema of the threefold office is to be accepted as an imperfect form of the doctrine of Christ's work. Lipsius, however, considers that it cannot be successfully carried through in detail.

Finally, we come to the religious content of the salvation mediated through Christ (§§ 681-688). This is

¹ Cf. 2 Cor. v. 14, 15.

² *Supra*, p. 345.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 110, and Vol. I, p. 436.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 293, 311.

the perfect religion of Divine Sonship, corresponding to the Divine order of the Kingdom of God, a principle which is a matter of experience in the Christian community and which energizes in history as a spiritual power. It is experienced as reconciliation with God, in which all fear of Divine punishment vanishes, and as redemption from the world, the law, and sin.

Lipsius has the advantage over Ritschl in conciseness and clearness ; but is inferior to him in creative power and originality. The points of contact and of difference between the two theologians, which we set out to examine, have already been observed in passing.

§ 4. KÄHLER

Kähler (A.D. 1835-1912) has besides his system of theology¹ also contributed a special treatise on the work of Christ.² I shall take my account of his views, however, from the first-mentioned work, both for the sake of succinctness, and also in accordance with my general plan of utilizing, wherever possible, complete systems of theology rather than monographs.

Kähler's general point of view is determined by the title of his book. He seeks to unfold the science of Christian doctrine from the standpoint of the fundamental evangelical article of justification. In assuming this standpoint he is in agreement with Ritschl, as he is also in the emphasis which he lays upon Christianity as a revelation. But whereas Ritschl understands by the Biblical revelation those doctrines of the New Testament which are capable of verification by experience,

¹ "Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre von dem evangelischen Grundartikel aus im Abrisse dargestellt" (3, 1905).

² "Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung," 1898. It is intended as a fuller exposition of the related section of the system. It deals above all with the Scripture proof of the doctrine.

Kähler holds that the Christian experience of justification involves the "confession" (a favourite word with him) of the doctrines which the gospel of reconciliation presupposes.

Moreover, instead of defining the truths of Christian faith as value-judgments with a historical basis, Kähler prefers to recognize in them the union of a historical and a suprahistorical element, in which case, in opposition to the positivism of Ritschl, the metaphysical element of doctrine returns again under a new name. Kähler's substitute for the Ritschlian value-judgments of religion, as the form of theological knowledge, is defined by him as follows:—

"The scientific knowledge of Christianity is, agreeably to its subject, on the one hand, completely conditioned by historical insight, on the other hand, never limited to this. Mere philosophical generalizations of its empirical content cannot rise to the suprahistorical in Christianity: there is required a peculiar total view of the historical together with the facts of the inner life depending upon it" (§ 11).

Kähler is, more than any other German theologian whom we have studied in the period after Schleiermacher, a Biblical theologian. He uses wherever possible Biblical forms of expression, instead of those of ecclesiastical origin. But he recognizes that the Bible, though it is the standard by which the doctrines of the Church are to be tried, does not itself contain the Christian faith in a scientific form. The scientific proof of the individual propositions of theology depends ultimately on the manifestation of their connexion with the fundamental proposition of Christian conviction, which is the centre of the Scriptural religion, viz. the doctrine of justification.

It is then in this connexion that Kähler develops the doctrine of the work of Christ. In the Person

of Christ he recognizes a union of the Godhead with humanity "as a reciprocity of two personal movements, viz. on the one side a generative operation from the standpoint of the eternal Godhead, and on the other a receptive operation from the standpoint of the developing humanity" (§ 388). This is much the same Christology as Dorner's,¹ to whom indeed Kähler appeals (§ 391). It is, according to Kähler, a Christology which is in reality a Soterology, and shows Christ sufficient for all the needs of salvation. But as the true Christology must be a Soterology, so also the true Soteriology must be the same. In the historical Christ God has met our double need of a revelation of God and a representation before Him (§ 393). In dependence upon Old Testament types the significance of Christ for salvation has been stated in the form of the threefold office.

"This presentation expresses the indispensable connexion of the guaranteeing (prophetic) revelation and of the guaranteeing (priestly) representation for the sake of the (kingly) creative regeneration for the Kingdom of God" (§ 398a).

All three offices belong, both to the state of exinanition in which the historical, and to the state of exaltation in which the suprahistorical, character of the work of salvation come to view. Theology has had a difficulty in determining to which of the states Christ's death and resurrection belong: they coincide in fact with the transition from the one to the other.

"Therefore we have first to consider the state of humiliation or the personal development of Jesus under the point of view of His saving work, then His reconciling work of expiation, and finally the state of exaltation or His personal perfecting as the basis of His continuous saving operation" (§ 398c).

¹ *Supra*, p. 285.

To begin with, the Divine self-emptying in the life of Jesus is a special form of the Divine revelation. The Divine self-manifestation is here determined by union with a developing human life, and finds its historical form in Christ's prophetic vocation.

The Divine self-emptying is further manifested in the self-humiliation of the God-man. This consists in Christ's entering without reserve into the relation of humanity to God as determined by finitude and sin.

"His acceptance of the Messianic vocation in baptism demonstrates how He, ripening in faith in spite of temptations, maintained His relation to the Father without disturbance and won complete independence, by means of which He could take up that vocation as prophetic. He comprehended¹ the revelation of God in His manifestation and exercise of a holy love for sinners, but at the same time deepened this love to a representation of sinners in a love unconditionally surrendering itself to God. His revelational activity obtained its confirmation in the Transfiguration, while His representation (of men) issued in to His resolve to suffer death" (§ 404).

This leads us from the consideration of the state of humiliation from the point of view of Christ's saving work on to the historical accomplishment of His "revelatory substitution" ("offenbarende Stellvertretung").

"The end of the earthly life of Jesus appears as His act when we set it in the connexion of the entire history of His Divine-human Person. Yet on the other hand this section of His life definitely stands out from all before it as the historical Divine deed of expiation" (§ 411).

Christ's work of expiation is to be viewed in the

¹ I. e. gathered up.

unity of two complementary aspects. On the one hand, it is the endurance of the Divine condemnation of sin, on the other on voluntary sacrifice. Kähler coins for it the name of "penal sacrifice" ("Strafopfer"). The penal aspect he defines as follows:—

"The deliverance of Christ over to suffering even unto death is a surrender without reservation to the curse pressing upon humanity; His endurance is, however, not only a struggle with powers holding sway in history, but involves an experience of the execution of the Divine wrath. This process has at the same time in the fullest sense the significance of punishment, since it is the means to a restoration of the common life of humanity in correspondence with its destiny; for the judgment is exhausted by the power of the faith of Jesus and His victory is manifested in His resurrection to exaltation, which demonstrates Him as the Beginner of a new humanity" (§ 414).

The sacrificial aspect of the expiatory work again is thus defined:—

"This experience of Jesus bears in itself the essential mark of sacrifice; that is, in it there is accomplished the surrender of His own will to the will of God; it is, however, not complete till the passive obedience or voluntary acceptance of punishment finds its perfecting complement in the active obedience or the surrender of the self to the service of God" (§ 418).

Finally, Kähler sums up both aspects in a section on the substitutionary and revelatory value of the penal sacrifice of Christ. The doctrine of the Church has always connected with the death of Christ the establishment of a new relation of man to God. But it too much separated the work of Christ from the abiding significance of His Person, and allowed it to be forgotten that God is here Himself the Actor.

"This is avoided by an evaluation on all sides of the idea of expiation, for in it revelation can be comprehended together with substitution. Sinners lack the indispensable presuppositions for a life in fellowship with God, since a religious total development of humanity has not taken place and the Divine life-order has not attained to effective validity. God creates in Christ the Substitute in both respects, and this purpose of a substitutionary intervention becomes clear in the Divine dispensation as to the end of Christ's life, if we at the same time take into account the full value of His Person. Just in this surrender of the Son the Triune God accomplishes the full revelation of His holy love" (§ 422).

This brings us to the end of the middle section on the expiatory work of Christ; and we pass on therefore, lastly, to consider the revelatory substitution of the Eternal Mediator, or the manifestation of God's holy love in the perfected Son.

"The founding of the new covenant is not merely the founding of a positive religion, but the abiding opening of access to the Father for all believers, since Christ in the power of His exaltation to the position of equality with God lends an effective presentness to the result of His life-work (*meritum*). The God-man remains the Mediator between humanity and God for all time following, in that He administers His threefold office. The operations of His administration are experienced until His accomplished coming again merely in the appropriation of reconciliation through His Spirit. In their form they constitute the continuation of His prophetic office. Their triumphant success, however, is conditioned by the Exalted Christ's high-priestly representation, and victorious mediation of the communion with God, of every converted sinner, and by His making

in His kingly rule the course of history serviceable for the offer of reconciliation " (§ 432).

Kähler's agreement with, and difference from, Ritschl will now be plain. Besides his general recognition of a suprahistorical element in the Christian revelation, Kähler, while recognizing with Ritschl the necessity for demonstrating the immanence of the love of God in Jesus Christ, yet does not concur in the Ritschlian subordination of Christ's representational to His revelational activity. On the contrary he treats both aspects of His work as of equal dignity, or perhaps even tends to reverse the Ritschlian order, since he speaks of the "deepening" of Christ's work of revelation to one of representation or substitution. Moreover, Kähler is able to conceive of Christ's entering into the position of humanity to the point of entering into the Divine condemnation, a thing Ritschl was unable to do. In spite therefore of his agreement with Ritschl, at this decisive point he remains apart from him. Kähler speaks of his view in his work "*Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung*" as emphasizing the *ethical* character of the atonement.¹ He means by this the same idea which we have so often found before in modern theology, of Christ's doing honour to the Divine holiness and justice, yet in such a way that there is no notion of a quantitative equivalence of punishment.

§ 5. THE MODERN SYNTHESIS

In the German Protestant theology of the nineteenth century, and especially in the work of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, we have to recognize the fourth great doctrinal synthesis, which, as over against the Greek, the mediaeval, and the seventeenth-century Protestant

¹ Op. cit. p. 404 f.

synthesis, we may call "the modern synthesis". This new synthesis has taken up into itself the truth of the evangelical experience of the Reformers, of the Socinian criticism, and of the accommodation-doctrine of the Aufklärung, combining them by means of the new philosophy of self-consciousness, which, emerging first in the form of the Kantian criticism, presently reveals itself in the doctrines of Hegel and of Schleiermacher as a principle of the immanent union and interpenetration of the opposites of common logic, and thus as the principle of a higher logic adequate to the subject-matter of theology.

This modern synthesis appears as the fulfilment of the tendency, already apparent in the Protestant synthesis of the seventeenth century, towards the statement of Christian doctrine as a whole in which every part is the whole over again, and so all doctrine truly one.¹ Moreover, in the theology of Schleiermacher and that of Ritschl, or rather in the ideal to which both point, but neither entirely reaches, we may recognize the fulfilment of the idea, long ago thrown out by Clement and Origen, of a "gnosis," which is the essence of the "pistis" as delivered in Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition.² It is, however, a gnosis which avoids the mistake (repeated, indeed, by Hegel and the liberal theology) of attempting to eliminate the historical from the essence of Christianity. The essence of Christianity, as Kähler puts it, must unite the historical and the suprahistorical in one.

Besides Schleiermacher and Ritschl, who constitute the foci of the new movement, the other theologians whom we have studied contribute their *quota* towards the development, the goal of which has not yet been completely realized. In spite of all differences the

¹ *Supra*, p. 5, and Vol. I, p. 388.

² *Ibid.* p. 50.

whole movement from Schleiermacher to Ritschl is one. In the whole series of theologies studied, Christian doctrine is treated from the point of view of the experience of communion with God in Christ; and also in general the method of Scripture-proof adopted is no longer merely that from proof-texts, but that from the principles of the Biblical religion. It may, however, be pointed out that the treatment of Scripture-proof is, even in modern theology, not always satisfactory. The danger of relapse into the old method is not always overcome, and one of the most urgent theological needs of the present time is a reinterpretation on psychological lines of the Biblical material of doctrine: this applies to no doctrine more than to the work of Christ.

The differences, as well as the unity, of the modern movement are, however, important. We may illustrate, by means of those between Schleiermacher and Ritschl, considered in the light of the rest of the theological development, the main points in which the ideal of the movement still remains unattained.

(1) Schleiermacher has the advantage over Ritschl, in that his theology, over against Ritschl's positivism, has a metaphysical basis. It is true that Schleiermacher separates theology and metaphysic as sharply as does Ritschl. Nevertheless, since the Infinite which unites all differences is the foundation of his metaphysic, and since he views religion, though not in the form of knowledge, yet in that of the feeling of absolute dependence, as touching this Infinite, Schleiermacher's theology possesses in truth a genuine metaphysical basis, and has behind it at every point the background of reality. On the other hand, Ritschl's statement that religious truth is given in the form of value-judgments is unsatisfactory, unless it be added that in these judgments we touch reality. This is the explanation of the opposition to

Ritschl at this decisive point, alike by the liberal, the mediating, and the Erlangen theology. At the present time it is Troeltsch more than any other German theologian who has voiced the demand for a metaphysical basis of religion as a guarantee of its reality.¹ What is needed is not a metaphysic apart from religion, or even merely a religious metaphysic: it is a Christian metaphysic and metaphysic of Christianity, such as was desiderated sixty years ago by C. H. Weisse,² i.e. a philosophy rising out of the midst of Christianity itself, depending upon the intuition of God in Christ, and proceeding to the apprehension of Christianity and the world through it.

(2) On the other hand, Ritschl undoubtedly has the advantage over Schleiermacher in that, while Schleiermacher leaves the question of the personality of God an open one for religion, he makes close connexion with the New Testament idea of God. Schleiermacher's fault lies in the investigation of the doctrine of God in the first place independently of the intuition of God in Christ: the standpoint thus determined Christian theology must maintain and never abandon even for a moment.

Ritschl has also an advantage over Schleiermacher in the use which he makes of the notion of the Kingdom of God. Again, his advantage consists in that he is in closer connexion with the religion of the New Testament.

What has been said so far concerns the modern synthesis in general: we pass on to consider how it affects the doctrine of the work of Christ.

(1) This is in general rightly considered in modern theology from the standpoint of communion with God.

¹ Cf. his "Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft" ("Kultur der Gegenwart," I, iv. 2, esp. p. 32).

² "Philosophische Dogmatik," I, 1885, §§ 9, 10.

The first result of this shifting of the *venue* from the court of authority to that of experience is seen in the altered attitude of Schleiermacher and Ritschl to the question of punishment, which is now apprehended not from without but from within. Since it is only in connexion with the consciousness of guilt that evils appear as penal, the old juristic method of theology, which considered punishment in abstraction from its relation to consciousness, no longer applies. So far as the mediating and Erlangen theology lose sight of this important truth, they are on retrograde lines. It is noteworthy, however, that even they abandon the strict juristic standpoint and attempt no calculus of merits: modern theology, even where it continues to maintain the doctrine of a satisfaction of the Divine justice in the work of Christ, can only maintain a satisfaction in principle, not in strict equivalence.

(2) The Erlangen attempt partially to reintroduce the idea that the operation of Christ is necessarily mediated through the sacraments, appears also a retrogression. When once it is realized that everything must be interpreted from the standpoint of communion with God in Christ, it becomes clear that the sacraments can only have value *within*, not prior to this communion.

(3) From the same standpoint of communion with God in Christ it also becomes clear that Ritschl's subordination in the doctrine of the work of Christ of the category of Representation to that of Revelation is correct. It is from the standpoint of fellowship with God, implying His revelation to us in Christ, that we think of Christ as our Representative and Substitute. Schleiermacher's doctrine is here essentially the same. The most difficult problem that emerges is that of Christ's identification with us in the consciousness of guilt,

which Schleiermacher and Ritschl deny, but the mediating and Erlangen theology affirm. This is a question still awaiting a complete theological solution. On the basis of the concrete conception of personality as the union of opposites, however, the advantage appears to lie with the latter group of theologians. It will be remembered that Lipsius here deviates from Ritschl.

(4) Finally, Ritschl in his endeavour to simplify theology has sometimes forgotten the new concrete conception of personality, and worked too much on the basis of ordinary syllogistic logic. Herrmann has said of him :—¹

"He has not observed that a genuinely religious theology must give up the idea of a system of its thoughts. As soon as a religious thought is developed in its logical consequences, it comes into conflict with another, which also belongs to the life of religion." This opinion of Herrmann is true at any rate in so far as a modern system of theology can no longer be organized upon merely syllogistic lines, but only finally upon the basis of the category of personality. The criticism in consequence to be passed upon Ritschl's theology applies particularly to his entire subsumption of the Divine righteousness in the Divine love, as the *consistency* of the Divine love.² The Divine attributes of righteousness and love are rather immediately given at once in the experience of God in Christ, in whose historical life they are manifested in a personal union.³ Thomasius is here suggestive, when he says that the relation between the Divine holiness and the Divine love is not

¹ "Christliche Protestantische Dogmatik," in "Die Kultur der Gegenwart," I, iv. 2, p. 161.

² The fact that the Scriptural idea of righteousness includes its manifestation not only in punishment, but in mercy (*supra*, p. 17), is not a sufficient basis for the complete subsumption of righteousness in love.

³ Jn. i. 17.

one of identity, but is a unity which has the difference in it, and is a living harmony.¹

In conclusion, I may refer to § III. of my article "Justification"² as suggesting the lines along which, in view of these various criticisms passed on the German theology of the nineteenth century, I think that the doctrine of the work of Christ is to be further developed.

¹ *Supra*, p. 307.

² "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels," I. p. 923.

CHAPTER VII

THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND UP TO 1860

§ 1. S. T. COLERIDGE

COLERIDGE (A.D. 1772-1834) occupies in English theology the same position as Kant in Germany: indeed he first introduced into England many of the principles of Kant, upon which his philosophy, as we have it in his "Aids to Reflection" (1825), is based. Among the objects of the latter work he mentions the following:—

"First, to exhibit the true and Scriptural meaning and intent of several articles of faith that are rightly classed among the mysteries and peculiar doctrines of Christianity. Secondly, to show the perfect rationality of all these doctrines, and their freedom from all just objection, when examined by their proper organs, the reason and conscience of man."¹

There is little difficulty, says Coleridge, among serious and inquiring persons, with articles of faith such as the Trinity, which may be simply above their comprehension.

"It is only where the belief required of them jars with their moral feelings; where a doctrine in the sense in which they have been taught to receive it, appears to contradict their clear notions of right and wrong, or to be at variance with the Divine attributes of Goodness and Justice, that these men are surprised, perplexed, and alas! not seldom offended and alienated. Such are

¹ Ed. Liverpool, 1883, p. 136.

the doctrines of arbitrary election and reprobation ; the sentence to everlasting Torment by an eternal and necessitating decree ; vicarious atonement, and the necessity of the abasement, agony, and ignominious death of a most holy and meritorious Person to appease the wrath of God " (p. 137).

Coleridge, however, is well assured of the essential truth of the Christian doctrine of redemption.

" Where, if not in Christ, is the power that can persuade a sinner to return, that can bring home a heart to God. . . . By the phrase 'in Christ,' I mean all the supernatural aids vouchsafed and conditionally promised in the Christian Dispensation " (p. 138).

The necessitarianism of Jonathan Edwards, which subjects the moral world no less than the physical to the law of cause and effect, must be absolutely repudiated.¹ So also must the other doctrines of Modern Calvinism, as represented by the same divine, namely, the origination of Holiness in power, of justice in the right of property.²

Coleridge stands for the reality of the will, as transcending nature and the law of cause and effect. " If there be aught spiritual in man, the will must be such. If there be a will, there must be a spirituality in man " (p. 117). This is the foundation of all his religious philosophy. He also stands for the originality and ultimate character of the moral law, which cannot be explained in terms of anything else, whether Divine decree or utilitarian philosophy of profit and loss.

¹ Edwards sought to defend the Augustinian doctrine of the bondage of the will (cf. *supra*, Vol. I, p. 117), as followed by Luther (*ibid.* p. 365 f.) and Calvin (*ibid.* p. 424), by resort to a philosophical necessitarianism. " In the room of an acquired slavery of the will, he teaches a determinism belonging to its very nature " (Fisher, " History of Christian Doctrine," 1902, p. 401).

² Cf. Edwards, " Of Satisfaction for Sin," §§ 3-7 (*supra*, p. 182 f.).

From this point of view, then, Coleridge explains the doctrine of original sin. With him as with Kant the corruption of the will is fundamental. But original sin does not mean the inheritance of sin and guilt from Adam, but on the contrary, that, wherever sin exists, it originates from the will, which is not subject to the law of cause and effect, but is free to obey or disobey the moral law.¹

"The phrase, original sin, is a pleonasm. . . . For, if it be sin, it must be original ; and a state or act, that has not its origin in the will, may be calamity, disformity, disease, or mischief ; but a sin it cannot be" (p. 234). Original sin is evil having an origin. "But, inasmuch as it is evil, in God it cannot originate ; and yet in some Spirit (i.e. in some supernatural power) it must. For in nature there is no origin. Sin, therefore, is spiritual evil ; but the spiritual in man is the will. Now, when we do not refer to any particular sins, but to that state and constitution of the will which is the ground, condition, and common cause of all sins ; and when we would further express the truth that this corrupt nature of the will must in some sense or other be considered as its own act, that the corruption must have been self-originated ;—in this case and for this purpose we may, with no less propriety than force, entitle this dire spiritual evil and source of all evil, that is absolutely such, original sin" (p. 237).

As to the derivation of sin from Adam, Coleridge holds the following view :—

"The corruption of my will may very warrantably be spoken of as a consequence of Adam's fall, even as my birth of Adam's existence ; as a consequence, a link in the historical chain of instances, whereof Adam is the first. But that it is on account of Adam, or that this

¹ Cf. the doctrine of Kant (*supra*, p. 211).

evil principle was *a priori*, inserted or infused into my will by the will of another—which is indeed a contradiction in terms, my will in such case being no *will*—this is nowhere asserted in Scripture explicitly or by implication. It belongs to the very essence of the doctrine that in respect of original sin every man is the adequate representative of all men. What wonder then, that where no inward ground of preference existed, the choice should be determined by outward relations, and that the first in time should be taken as the diagram?" (p. 256).

The doctrine of original sin, as the antecedent ground and occasion of Christianity, having been thus stated and explained, the way is open "to proceed to Christianity itself, as the edifice reared on this ground, i.e. to the great constituent article of the Faith in Christ, as the Remedy of the disease—the doctrine of Redemption" (p. 257). Coleridge says: "Christianity and Redemption are equivalent terms" (p. 274).

In order to understand the Christian redemption we must not, however, be led away by the mere word redemption, but look at the thing implied.

"Forgiveness of sin, the abolition of guilt, through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of His perfect obedience during His voluntary assumption of humanity, is expressed, on account of the resemblance in both cases, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer himself had not incurred. Now the impropriation of this metaphor—(i.e. the taking it literally) by transferring the sameness from the consequents to the antecedents, or inferring the identity of the causes from a sameness in the effects—this is the point on which I am at issue; and the view or scheme of Redemption grounded on this confusion I believe to be altogether unscriptural" (p. 282).

In the Christian redemption the Redeemer's act, as the efficient cause and condition of redemption, is transcendent: "Beyond the information contained in the enunciation of the fact, it can be characterized only by the consequences" (p. 283). It is the consequences of the act of redemption which St. Paul endeavours by various metaphors to bring home to the minds and affections of both Jews and Gentiles. A Jew himself, with Jews as his chief opponents, Paul's figures, images, analogies, and references are chiefly of Jewish origin, yet are such also that the most prominent and frequent metaphors are drawn from what was common to the whole Roman world. To this class of images, equally familiar to all, yet having a special interest for Jewish converts, belong the chief metaphors by which Paul illustrates the blessed consequences of Christ's redemption of mankind.

"These are: (1) sin offerings, sacrificial expiation; (2) reconciliation, atonement (*καταλλαγή*); (3) ransom from slavery, redemption, the buying back again, or being bought back, from *re* and *emo*; (4) satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt" (p. 284).

Thus, then, Paul states the consequences of the Christian redemption by means of Jewish metaphors. John, on the other hand, the evangelist according to the spirit, i.e. the inner and substantial truth of the Christian creed, states the fact itself without any metaphor, so far as it is enunciable to the human mind. "In the redeemed it is a regeneration, a birth, a spiritual seed, impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring life, of a spiritual life" (p. 286). This involves also a redemption from spiritual death.

"Respecting the redemptive act itself, and the Divine agent, we know from revelation that He 'was made a quickening (*ζωοποιούν*, *life-making*) Spirit': and that in

order to this it was necessary that God should be manifested in the flesh, that the Eternal Word, through whom and by whom the world (κόσμος, the order, beauty, and sustaining law of visible natures) was and is, should be made flesh, assume our humanity personally, fulfil all righteousness, and so suffer and die for us as in dying to conquer death for as many as should receive Him. More than this, the mode, the possibility, we are not competent to know " (p. 287).

Coleridge follows this up with an explanation of St. Paul's metaphors. As the Jewish sacrifices removed a civil stain, and restored a man to his place in the commonwealth of Israel, so the Christian regeneration removes the worse stain of sin, and restores us to the family of God. We are delivered from sin and death, hence the terms regeneration and redemption. The Christian salvation is, again, a reconciliation of prodigals to the Father by the intercession of Christ. It may also be expressed in terms of satisfaction. Paul would say in effect: " You have incurred a debt of death to the evil nature! You have sold yourself over to sin! and relatively to you, and to all your means and resources, the seal on the bond is the seal of necessity! . . . But the Stranger has appeared, the forgiving Friend has come, even the Son of God from heaven: and to as many as have faith in His name, I say—the debt is paid for you! The satisfaction has been made " (p. 289).

There follows, however, a criticism of the doctrines based on taking these metaphors literally, especially that of satisfaction. The orthodox Protestant doctrine of satisfaction is based on the fundamental error of confounding things and persons. It treats sin as literally a debt that can be paid by another, and represents justice as claiming payment of our sin, since we cannot make it, from Christ. " Is this justice a moral attri-

bute?" asks Coleridge. "Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person" (p. 291). Debts can be transferred, not so the demerit of sin. The effect of Christ's mediation is no doubt similar to the effect of vicarious satisfaction in the case of debt. In both cases there is deliverance from a grievous burden, and that by the grace of another. But the difference is great. The reality of redemption is the regeneration of the sinner brought about by the transcendent operation of the Word "incarnate, tempted, agonizing (Agonistes ἀγωνιζόμενος), crucified, submitting to death, resurgent, communicant of His Spirit, ascendent, and obtaining for His Church the descent, and communion of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter" (p. 297).

Such is Coleridge's doctrine. Its likeness and unlikenesses with those of Butler and Kant are noteworthy and apparent.¹ These may be noted, first, with regard to the presupposition of redemption, viz. human sinfulness. Both Butler and Coleridge make this a fundamental article, asserting it as a fact of experience, altogether prior to the Christian revelation. But, whereas Butler thinks merely of human sin, so far as it entails future punishment and of redemption as remission of penalty, Coleridge thinks of it as a depravation of the will itself, and of redemption as regeneration. Here he is in harmony with Kant, whom indeed in this matter he follows. With regard to the work of Christ, Butler and Coleridge agree in making it essentially a transcendent operation, the critical philosophy of Locke affording Butler similar opportunities for so doing, as the philosophy of Kant, with its distinction between understanding and reason, gave Coleridge.²

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 174 ff., 208 ff.

² Locke, founding his philosophy on experience, naturally viewed the spiritual world as largely transcending the knowledge of reason (cf.

(Kant himself restricts the transcendent operation on the will to the Divine Idea, limiting the work of the historical Christ to instruction and example). There is a difference, however, between Butler and Coleridge in their apprehension of the transcendent nature of the work of Christ. For Butler this virtually amounts to the doctrine of satisfaction, accepted by him as a positive revelation, not in itself indeed unreasonable, but still mysterious. He refuses to allow the doctrine to be explained away by the Deist theory of accommodation. Coleridge, on the other hand, accepts this Deist theory as a chief weapon of his warfare to demolish the orthodox theory, and makes the transcendent operation of Christ consist in His regeneration and renewal of the will.

It is evident, therefore, that in the end Coleridge is fundamentally a harmony, not so much with Kant, as with Schleiermacher, and has introduced into English theology the same type of mysticism as Schleiermacher introduced into the theology of Germany. There is little formal similarity between Coleridge and Schleiermacher: the aphoristic style of the former is very different from the close reasoning of the latter. Nevertheless fundamentally there is agreement inasmuch as both make redemption by Christ the centre of Christianity, and identify redemption with regeneration. English theology, therefore, through the influence of Coleridge enters on the same career as that of Germany through the influence of Schleiermacher.

There is indeed one important difference between Coleridge and Schleiermacher as to the thoroughness with which the Kantian criticism is applied to doctrine.

supra, pp. 155, 161). Kant distinguished between Understanding (*Verstand*) which interprets the data of the senses, and Reason (*Vernunft*) which seeks to complete our view of the world by postulating transcendent principles (cf. *supra*, pp. 206, 209 f.).

While Schleiermacher in consequence of it presents an anthropological Christianity,¹ Coleridge is able to accept the orthodox Christology of the creeds. English theology in general has here followed Coleridge, and is consequently in agreement on the point with the type of theology represented in Germany by the mediating theologians and still more by the Erlangen school, than with that represented by Schweizer and Ritschl which has strictly followed Schleiermacher.

§ 2. ERSKINE

Along with Coleridge Erskine of Linlathen (A.D. 1788-1870) was instrumental in the regeneration of British theology in the nineteenth century. This general tendency has thus been characterized by Tulloch:—²

“Erskine without any indebtedness either to Schleiermacher or Coleridge, and almost as early as either, was in Scotland an apostle of the ‘Christian consciousness’. He led in the great reaction against mere formal orthodoxy, and, for that part of the matter, formal rationalism, which set in with the opening of the third decade of the century. . . . He was rational certainly in comparison with all who saw in Christianity a body of mere doctrines or observances, to be accepted on authority. But he was the very opposite of rationalistic in the sense in which rationalism had prevailed in Germany and England in the eighteenth century. . . . Erskine’s religion was *all heart*. He did not understand religion without the living fire of faith and love and obedience animating it all through. It must be a light in his reason, a guide in his conscience—a life within his life—a spiritual power glowing in his whole conduct. This was ‘internal

¹ *Supra*, pp. 227, 256 f.

² “Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century,” 1885, p. 138.

evidence'—the revelation of Love to love, of Life to life,—of God to man, raising him to Divine communion and reflecting upon the Divine likeness."

Tulloch refers in the words "internal evidence," which he has placed in inverted commas, to the title of Erskine's first book, "Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion" (1820). Erskine wished to show that Christianity must be self-evidencing in view of the harmony existing between the doctrines it teaches and the moral character it demands.

"The reasonableness of a religion seems to me to consist in there being a direct and rational connexion between a believing of the doctrines which it inculcates, and a being formed by these to the character which it recommends. If the belief of the doctrines has no tendency to train a disciple in a more exact and more willing discharge of its moral obligations, there is evidently a very strong probability against the truth of that religion. In other words, the doctrine ought to tally with the precepts, and to contain in their substance some urgent motives for the performance of them; because, if they are not of this description, they are of no use. What is the history of another world to me, unless it have some intelligible relation to my duties and happiness?"¹

Here is the same tendency, as we have already found in Schleiermacher and Coleridge, to view the doctrines of Christianity on their experimental and practical side; though this tendency is expressed by Erskine in a simple and popular way without any appeal to a critical philosophy. We are still further reminded of Schleiermacher by Tulloch's characterization of Erskine, as seeking a middle way towards his experimental doctrine between the formal orthodoxy and the formal rationalism

¹ Op. cit. 10th ed. 1878, p. 58.

of the eighteenth century. It will be remembered that Schleiermacher, describing his conception of Christianity as mystical, regarded it as a *via media* between the magical and the empirical views of the subject.¹

Erskine applied his principles to the study of the work of Christ in a volume entitled "The Brazen Serpent" (1831). The doctrine of this book is historically of great importance, in view of the later development of theology in Britain. The treatise is, however, unsystematic in form, and it is somewhat difficult to give an adequate account of its teaching. There is a great deal of repetition; and yet Erskine seldom repeats himself without saying something fresh. Moreover, there is no complete unification of the doctrine. There is instead a succession of deep glances into the heart of the subject, whose unity is not objective, formal, and logical, but subjective—a unity of the temper, spirit, and experience whence they proceed.

The general basis of Erskine's doctrine is that the Incarnation was a Divine light, a word from God, not, however, a spoken word, but a substantial word, the word made flesh (p. 32). The nature of this word is to be understood from the double reflection that in the Incarnation God has taken human flesh, and that, further, this flesh is human nature in general. "Jesus had no human personality, He had the human nature under the personality of the Son of God" (p. 53). So Erskine teaches, in harmony with the Ancient Church.² Moreover, in thus taking human nature, Christ becomes the Second Adam, or new head of the race. As a consequence, "in the history of the word made flesh, we have a concentrated history of God's actions towards our nature, our flesh; and thus we have a standard by which we may at all times measure the mind of God towards ourselves and

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 234 f., 238 f.

² *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 90.

every individual of the nature. For that which the Divine nature did to the human nature in Christ, was done to Him in character of head and representative of the human nature ; and therefore is to be considered as indicating the mind of God to every man " (p. 32).

What then is the light which the Incarnation sheds upon human life? In Christ is manifested the Divine pardon of human sin, " a forgiving love condemning sin—yet bestowing blessing through penal affliction, and life through penal death " (p. 33).

This is the meaning of the sufferings and death of Christ. He dies a penal death ; yet God loved Him. He is Himself indeed God incarnate : " Why does He thus torture and kill the flesh, which He has assumed into so near and indissoluble connexion with Himself " (p. 33).

The suffering was necessary because the nature, which Christ assumed, was a fallen nature, and He thus condemned sin in the flesh.

" He came into it as a new head, that He might take it out of the fall, and redeem it from sin, and lift it up to God ; and this could be effected only through sorrow and death, manifesting the character of God, and the character of man's rebellion ; manifesting God's abhorrence to sin, and the full sympathy of the new Head of the nature in that abhorrence, and thus eating out the taint of the fall, and making honourable way for the in-pouring of the new life into the rebellious body. Because thus only could there be an open vindication given of the holiness and truth of God, against which the fall was an offence ; and thus only could it become a righteous thing in God, in consideration of this new Head of the nature—who had, in that nature, and in spite of its opposite tendencies, vindicated the character of God, and fulfilled all righteousness, to declare the race partaking

of that nature forgiven, and to lay up in Him, their glorious Head, eternal life for them all, which should flow into each member, just as He believed in the holy love of God which was manifested in the gift and work of Christ" (p. 35).

Such is the summary statement of Erskine's doctrine given by himself. It is further elucidated in the following pages. In the first place, Erskine criticizes the orthodox theory of satisfaction. God has no pleasure in sufferings viewed simply as penal, irrespective of the temper in which they are borne. The sufferings of the rebellious are in fact sin, and as such can give Him no pleasure. But He had pleasure in the sufferings of Christ, first of all in so far as Jesus by them declares the truth of God's character, the holy truth of God to man. He stooped to take our nature. He could be satisfied with nothing less than an exhibition of God's love by actual participation in our humanity.

"God has a personal tender affection for every man, so that He desires union and fellowship with every man. Now the Son declared the love of the Father, by coming into the root of the nature, that part which Adam occupied, and remember that there is a fibre of the root in every branch, in every twig of the tree" (pp. 45, 46).

All Christ's sufferings were the manifestations of Divine love to humanity. "He loved the Father, and He loved the truth, and He loved man, and wherever He was He saw God dishonoured, the truth despised, and man destroying himself" (p. 48). The fire of holy love burned within Him, and He testified for God and the truth against the evil of the world. "He spoke not with His tongue only, He was the life of God made manifest in the flesh—He was the life made light, and He walked up and down in that living light, and as it was in a world of spiritual death and darkness that He

thus walked, the life in Him continually condemned the death, and the light the darkness" (p. 48). At last He drew upon Himself the hatred of men, till they crucified Him.

"They killed Him, but they could not kill His love; that was stronger than death and stronger than hatred. Blessed be His name: His love conquered. Every action of His being was a part of that warfare of love against hatred, and of righteousness against unrighteousness, which He with perfect success, but with uninterrupted sorrow, waged throughout His life. That warfare could not be carried on without sorrow, it was a continual grieving over sin and ruin, and a continual condemnation of those whom He loved unto the death. For He was every man's brother, and the condemnation was not the condemnation of a stranger, but of a brother" (p. 48).

God, therefore, was pleased with the sufferings of Christ, because they thus manifested the Divine love. But He was also pleased, because they exhibited a triumph over sin and the devil, within the terms of human nature.

"He waged this hard and successful warfare under all the disadvantages of the fall, not in the power of His own personal Godhead, but in the power of the Holy Spirit communicated by the Father in continual answer to the continual actings of His faith, as the faith of a dependent creature" (p. 50).

His holiness and His sympathy with men, moreover, make His sufferings expiatory. "God never was rightly glorified by the penal suffering of the fallen nature, until that suffering was undergone in the spirit of holy love by one who partook of the fallen nature, and felt for all its sins as if they had been His own, and yet had not personally partaken of them. . . . Now this is the expiation, this is that which put away sin" (p. 54).

Erskine is, however, careful to point out the difference of his doctrine here from that of orthodoxy.

“He did not suffer *for men*, as an individual standing *out* of them, and doing something in their stead, but as one *in* them, as the head of that mass of which they were all partakers, as the root of that tree of which they were all branches” (p. 55).

“Christ came into Adam’s place. This is the real substitution” (p. 85).

Once more the Divine Person of Jesus gives glory to His work. Not, however, as giving a weight to suffering, but as manifesting the holy love of God and the sinfulness of sin. The resurrection proves that Christ’s death has indeed put away sin.

“As Christ died as the head of the race, so He rose as the head of the race. He rose as the justified head of the race, with the mark of the cross upon Him, showing that the penalty had been sustained by the *race* in the person of their head” (p. 61).

Moreover, He rose as the righteous head of the race, the King of the Kingdom of God, and the future Judge of all living. This headship He merited by His work.

Erskine’s doctrine is completed by his account of the Gospel. The result of Christ’s work is that all men are now under a dispensation of forgiving love, in so far as He is in each of us as the root of our humanity. Adam before the fall was under creation love, we are now under redemption love. Erskine calls this love our “provision”. Christ Himself had a provision, independent of and antecedent to His work, in the strength of which He was to do it—viz. the love and favour of the Father to Himself personally. But our provision is the fruit of His work: it is the federal righteousness which he obtained as a matter not of grace, but of merit.

The Gospel, now, is the declaration of the truth

that Christ is one with us in the flesh, and that the race is pardoned in Him. The Gospel believed conveys us into the Spirit of Christ, conforms us to His sufferings and death. Just as we are all in Adam and derive corruption from him, yet not without our own act, so we are in Christ and from His mercy derive righteousness, but also by our own act.

This provision of pardon is the temporary dispensation under which we now are with a view to judgment. The kingdom is a promise to those who live in the light of the pardon, but to none other. Therefore Christianity has from the first associated these two things together, the kingdom and the sacrifice.

Our position at present is therefore thus described : " It is as if a violent and malicious man were placed in a society of gentle and loving persons, with the intimation ' You are placed here for a year, and during that time nothing that you have hitherto been shall ever be remembered, and every act of violence which you may commit shall be met with love, and every offence shall be met with forgiveness. At the end of the period you shall be tried, and if you shall be found to have acquired the life of love, you shall remain always as a member of that gentle society in an increasing happiness, but if you shall be found still to be possessed by the spirit of malice, you shall be cast into outer darkness ' " (p. 64).

Thus Christianity is a religion of reconciliation, yet a moral religion withal : in it mercy and judgment meet together.

The agreement of Erskine's ideas with many older theological conceptions is apparent. There is a noteworthy casting back in general to the patristic type of thought,¹ and in what he says of Christ as the receiver

¹ It is to be remembered that the patristic tradition never died out in Protestantism (cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 378 ff., 381 f., 427-9.

of grace we are reminded of Thomas Aquinas and Hooker.¹ This idea that forgiveness is preliminary and its full fruition in the possession of the kingdom is conditioned by holiness is also ancient and Catholic.² On the other hand, the patristic and mediæval elements are united in Erskine's theology with elements from the later Calvinism.³ But Erskine seems to have obtained his doctrines by independent Bible study and reflection, and to have been without much knowledge of the previous history of theology. He had no consciousness of the relation of his views to older forms of doctrine.⁴ In many points he anticipates the German Erlangen school ; but there is an immense contrast between his unsystematic treatise and the scientific precision of the Germans.

§ 3. MAURICE

F. D. Maurice (A.D. 1805-1872), who was born a Unitarian, but joined the Church of England, was influenced both by Coleridge and by Erskine, particularly by the latter. Maurice himself acknowledged this indebtedness to Erskine, in dedicating to him the volume "The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament" (1852). Erskine's book, "The Brazen Serpent," particularly attracted Maurice.⁵

Maurice's own doctrine of the work of Christ is summarized in his "Theological Essays" (1853).

In VII, "On the Atonement," the subject is laid out under seven heads (p. 144 ff.).

(1) "It is involved in the very method of theology, as the Bible and the creeds set it forth to us, that the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 125, and Vol. I, p. 274.

² *Supra*, Vol. I, pp. 43, 48.

³ A notable instance is his use of the doctrine of Christ's federal headship (cf. *supra*, pp. 74, 110).

⁴ Tulloch, op. cit. p. 144.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 142.

will of God should be asserted as the ground of all that is right, true, just, gracious. . . . It would be accounted heresy in all orthodox schools to deny that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of men ; that the Father sent forth the Son to be the propitiation for our sins ; that Christ, by His life, proved that God is light, and that in Him is no darkness at all."

These are "fundamental truths, to which all others must do homage, which no other passages can contradict". Maurice demands that this should be fully recognized, that complete control of these principles be established over the whole of theology.

(2) "It is admitted in all schools, Romanist and Protestant, which do not dissent from the creed, that Christ the Son of God was in heaven and earth, one with the Father, one in will, purpose, substance ; and that on earth His whole life was nothing else than an exhibition of this will, an entire submission to it." This principle again must be fully maintained and allowed the controlling influence proper to it.

(3) "It is confessed by all orthodox schools, that Christ was actually the Lord of men, the King of their spirits, the source of all the light which ever visited them, the Person for whom all nations longed as their real Head and Deliverer, the root of Righteousness in each man. The Bible speaks of His being revealed in this character ; of the mystery which had been hid from ages and generations being made known by His Incarnation."

From this admitted doctrine, however, Maurice deduces an important inference :—

"One who appears as the actual representative of humanity, cannot be a formal substitute for it. We deny Him in the first character by claiming the second for Him."

(4) "The Scripture says, 'Because the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself partook of the same'. He became subject to death, that He might destroy him who had the power of death, that is the Devil. Here are reasons assigned for the Incarnation and Death of Christ. He shared the sufferings of those whose head He is. He overcame death, their common enemy, by submitting to it. He delivered them from the power of the Devil."

Christ must not, says Maurice, be put at a distance from us, as bearing sufferings to us inconceivable; it was our actual miseries and griefs into which He entered. He rescued us out of the power of death, an evil accident of our condition, not part of God's original order; out of the power of the devil, our enemy, not out of the hand of God.

(5) "The Scripture says 'The Lamb of God taketh away the *sin* of the world'. All orthodox teachers repeat the lesson. . . . Have we a right to call ourselves Scriptural or orthodox if we change the words, and put 'penalty of sin' for 'sin,' if we suppose that Christ destroyed the connexion between sin and death—the one being the necessary wages of the other—for the sake of benefiting any individual man whatever? If He had, would He have magnified the law and made it honourable? Would He not have destroyed that which he came to fulfil? Those who say the law must execute itself—it must have its penalty, should remember their own words. How does it execute itself, if a person, against whom it is not directed, interposes to bear its punishment?"

(6) "All orthodox schools have said that a perfectly holy and loving Being can be satisfied only with a holiness and love corresponding to His own; that Christ satisfied the Father by presenting the image of His

own holiness and love, that in His sacrifice and death, all that holiness and love came forth completely. . . . How then can we tolerate for an instant that notion of God, which would represent Him as satisfied by the punishment of sin, not by the purity and graciousness of the Son ? ”

(7) Here in a most characteristic passage Maurice sums up his whole view :—

“Supposing all these principles gathered together ; supposing the Father’s will to be a will to all good ; the Son of God, being one with Him, and Lord of man, to obey and fulfil in our flesh that will by entering into the lowest condition into which men had fallen through their sin ;—supposing this Man to be, for this reason, an object of continual complacency to the Father, and that complacency to be drawn out by the death of the Cross ; is not this, in the highest sense, atonement ? Is not the true sinless root of humanity revealed ; is not God in Him reconciled to man ? May not that reconciliation be proclaimed as a gospel to all men ? Is not the Cross the meeting-point between man and man, between man and God ? Is not this meeting-point what men in all places and times have been seeking for ? Did any find it till God declared it ? And are we not bringing our understandings to the foot of this Cross, when we solemnly abjure all schemes and statements, however sanctioned by the arguments of divines, however plausible as implements of declamation, which prevent us from believing and proclaiming that in it all the wisdom and truth and glory of God were manifested to the creature ; that in it man is presented as a holy and acceptable sacrifice to the Creator ? ”

Such is Maurice’s statement, which has been reproduced almost *in extenso*, it being already so summary that it can be little further shortened. The agreement

with Coleridge, but more especially with Erskine, is plain. The latter agreement is particularly noticeable as regards the general practical conception of the gospel resulting from the whole system. Like Erskine, Maurice teaches that in Christ men are already pardoned, reconciled, and redeemed, and need further only a consciousness of this—a subjective experience of the objective Divine fact accomplished for them in Christ. Still within the agreement between Erskine and Maurice there is a difference. While both reject the idea of substitution in favour of that of representation, Erskine lays stress on the Incarnation of Christ in the fallen nature of humanity, in which nature He accepted the condemnation of human sin; but Maurice teaches that the surrender of Christ's will to God reveals the true sinless root of humanity. Here is a British parallel to the difference between Schleiermacher and Thomasius as to Christ's "satisfaction".¹

§ 4. McLEOD CAMPBELL

Another disciple of Erskine's was McLeod Campbell (A.D. 1800-1872), the dependence of whose doctrine of the work of Christ on "The Brazen Serpent" is recognized by Tulloch in the following words:—

"It ('The Brazen Serpent') contains in germ much of the same thinking which afterwards, in the more powerful reflective mind of Dr. McLeod Campbell, expanded into the well-known treatise on the 'Nature of the Atonement'" (op. cit. p. 143).

If, however, Campbell was thus dependent on Erskine, his work, as Tulloch suggests in the above quotation, made a great advance upon his master. "The Brazen Serpent," as has been said, is unsystematic and full of repetition. The "Nature of the Atonement," on the

¹ *Supra*, pp. 249, 312 f.

other hand, is the most systematic and masterly book on the work of Christ, produced by a British theologian in the nineteenth century. Its style indeed is somewhat heavy; nevertheless, in spite of this it has exercised a great influence upon subsequent theology. Another point of advance upon Erskine also is apparent as soon as we open Campbell's treatise. He begins by orientating himself with reference to previous theology. In Luther's bold imaginative presentation of the work of Christ, as contained in his "Commentary on Galatians," Campbell finds a suggestive anticipation of his own line of doctrine.¹ Then the Calvinist doctrine, as represented by Owen and Edwards, is examined. Campbell has a great reverence for this type of theology, and considers that the argument of Owen against the Arminians is from his own premises invincible.² The great fault, however, of the whole system is that the work of Christ is not so presented as to reveal the love of God.³ It makes everything subordinate to the arbitrary act of God in election, and an arbitrary act can never reveal character. Again, the whole view of atonement offered by Owen and Edwards is such that a legal is substituted for a filial standing, as the gift of God to men in Christ. Campbell finds, however, in the remarkable admission of Edwards, that a perfect repentance would have availed as an atonement,⁴ the hint of a true theory. Unfortunately Edwards only put forward this view as a mere hypothesis, and did not work it out as a substantive theory.

The criticism of the orthodox Calvinism is followed by a consideration of the modification which Calvinism

¹ Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 378-382.

² *Supra*, p. 150.

³ Cf. Ritschl's precisely similar criticism of the Protestant orthodoxy (*supra*, p. 348).

⁴ *Supra*, p. 183.

had received in Campbell's own day. Campbell mentions as representatives of this Calvinism the names of Wardlaw, Payne, and Jenkyns.¹ These theologians have abandoned the limitation of the atonement to the elect, and have substituted for the strict satisfaction of justice in the death of Christ by His bearing an exact equivalent of the punishment of sinners, the Grotian notion of an assertion in His death of the principle of the Divine penal righteousness. As a matter of fact, then, by the death of Christ no one is saved, but all may be. These "modern Calvinists" stand in the matter practically where the Arminians stood, with whom Owen was contending when he wrote "The Death of Death". Campbell praises the universalism of the modern school; though he thinks that Owen has the advantage of them in logic. But he finds that they still retain a view of Christ's work which issues in a legal, not a filial, standing being conceived as God's gift to us in Him. Moreover, in the matter of faith they are more legal than the older Calvinists. The latter represented faith as God's gift to us, while the moderns, like the Arminians, make it in the end a work to be performed by man.

Campbell's own theory is based upon a principle obviously derived from Erskine,² which he has stated in the title of Chapter V of his work. It is that *the atonement is to be seen by its own light*. What this means is well illustrated in the following passage:—³

"We know that, though the Gospel alone sheds clear

¹ Campbell refers (see list of works quoted at the end of his book) to Wardlaw, "Discourses on the Nature and Extent of the Atonement of Christ," 1844; Payne, "Lectures on Divine Sovereignty, Election, the Atonement, Justification and Regeneration,"², 1838; Jenkyns, "On the Extent of the Atonement, in its Relation to God, and the Universe,"², 1837.

² Cf. what is said above (p. 381 f.) on the general basis of Erskine's doctrine.

³ "The Nature of the Atonement," 2nd ed. 1867, p. 5.

and perfect light on the evil of man's condition as a sinner, conscience fully recognizes the truth of that revelation of ourselves which the Gospel makes to us. Were it otherwise, assuredly its light would be no light to us. So also as to the gift of eternal life. When that gift is revealed to our faith, its suitableness to us, and fitness to fill all our capacities of well-being as God's offspring, is discerned by us in proportion as we are awakened to true self-consciousness, and learn to separate between what God made us, and what we have become through sin. And in like manner I believe that the atonement, related to it must needs be, retrospectively to the condition of evil from which it is the purpose of God to save us, and prospectively to the condition of good to which it is His purpose to raise us, will commend itself to our faith by the inherent light of its Divine adaptation to accomplish all which it has been intended to accomplish."

The atonement, accordingly, cannot be understood *a priori* (p. 119), nor yet again from the previous history of religion (p. 121 ff.). The Old Testament sacrifices point forward to it as their antitype, but the antitype explains the type, not the type the antitype. Campbell points out, indeed, elsewhere (p. 180) that the consideration of the Old Testament sacrifices might have saved men from the idea that atonement was by way of vicarious punishment: the sacrifices were not intended to deliver from punishment, but to purify for worship. In connexion, however, with the relation between type and antitype, reference is made to Heb. x. 1 ff., where it is made clear that the essence of the atonement was not that in which it resembled the Jewish sacrifices, but Christ's perfect fulfilment of the will of God (p. 123 ff.).

"We have therefore to trace out the fulfilment of this purpose, Lo, I come to do thy will. In what

relation to God and to man did it place the Lord as partaking in humanity?—especially in what relation to men's sins and the evils consequent upon sin to which they were subject?" (p. 125).

Since the second commandment is like the first, "the spirit of sonship in which consists the perfect fulfilment of the first commandment, is one with the spirit of brotherhood which is the fulfilment of the second" (*loc. cit.*). Christ's love of the Father involves His love of His brethren as Himself. Through this twofold love we must understand His work.

It presents two parts: (1) Christ's dealing with man on behalf of God, (2) His dealing with God on behalf of man. Each of these two parts, moreover, is to be considered when we deal with the atonement (*a*) in its retrospective aspect, as a deliverance from sin, (*b*) in its prospective aspect, as the impartation of eternal life (pp. 127, 128).

First, therefore, we have to consider the retrospective aspect of the atonement, and in particular Christ's dealing here with men on behalf of God (p. 129 ff.). This consists in Christ's revelation of the Father, which was, in view of the sinful opposition of men, itself part of His sacrifice. Christ's sufferings were here necessary in order to the vindication of the name of God and the condemnation of human sin.

But how in this retrospective aspect of His work did Christ deal with God on behalf of men? Here Campbell makes use of the idea he has commended in Edwards, viz. that Christ offered on our behalf a vicarious repentance. The wrath of God against sin requires to be appeased: satisfaction is due to Divine justice. These things are true, however much the mode of satisfaction has been misconceived.

"If so, then Christ, in dealing with God on behalf

of men, must be conceived as dealing with the righteous wrath of God against sin, and as according to it that which was due; and this would necessarily precede His intercession for us" (p. 135).

Just as Christ's long-suffering love was the revelation to men of the forgiving love of God, to which Christ's intercession would be addressed, so Christ's own condemnation of our sins, and holy sorrow over them, indicate that dealing with God's just wrath against sin which prepared the way for His intercession.

"That oneness of mind with the Father, which towards men took the form of condemnation of sin, would in the Son's dealing with the Father in relation to our sins take the form of a perfect confession of our sins. This confession, as to its own nature, must have been a perfect *Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man*" (loc. cit.).

Such a condemnation and confession of sin in humanity, which should be a real Amen to the Divine condemnation of sin, only became possible through the Incarnation of the Son of God. Granted this Incarnation, it was, however, not only possible, but inevitable. Though Christ's sufferings must have been very intense, it is not so much their intensity as their nature which is to be considered. They were not penal, but rather a revelation of the nature of God, and hence purifying and cleansing. In them was fulfilled that meeting of sin and righteousness, and that victory of righteousness over sin, of which Luther speaks.¹

The sufferings of Christ were completed by His intercession. In the light of His knowledge of the Father's heart, He not only said Amen to the Divine condemnation of our sin, but also was encouraged to accompany confession by intercession, not indeed an

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 379.

intercession that aimed at effecting a change in the mind of the Father, but one that expressed a hope for man from that love of God, which is deeper than, and indeed is the real root of, His wrath against sin. To understand, therefore, how the sacrifice of Christ was well pleasing to God, we must consider the response in it not only to the Divine condemnation of sin, but also to the Divine love in its yearning over sinners. Christ's intercession made under the pressure of human sin was part of His sacrifice: its power as an element in the atonement lay in the fact that it was the voice of Divine love coming from humanity.

It will help to make clearer Campbell's exact position, if we observe that he cannot admit that Christ was truly forsaken of God on the cross. There was no exception even here to His experience of abiding in the Father's love, because He kept His commandments. Identification with us therefore does not go so far as absolute desolation. Campbell explains that "Why hast thou forsaken me?" in the cry on the cross means simply in accordance with the general idea of Ps. xxii.: "Why hast thou left me in the hands of the wicked?" (p. 277 ff.).¹

We are to consider next the prospective aspect of the atonement, viz. its relation to the Divine end contemplated in it (p. 151 ff.). Both parts of Christ's work, His dealing with us on behalf of God, and with God on our behalf, have a prospective as well as a retrospective aspect. Christ's witnessing for God was not only a light condemning human sin, but a light of life for us. His revelation of the Father had for its object our participation in the life of sonship. The revelation of

¹ Campbell further points out that the Psalm taken as a whole (see especially v. 24) does not support the notion of separation from God. Cf. the view of Schleiermacher (*supra*, p. 249).

God's Fatherhood and of man's sonship are in fact correlative: the one is reflected in the other. This sonship, moreover, is eternal life, which is not some unknown future blessedness beyond the riches we have in Christ, but the life of sonship itself, which is itself unsearchable infinite riches.¹ Again, Christ's confession of sin, as offered to God for us, must have had in view our participation in that confession as an element in our actual redemption from sin. So also His intercession was not merely for the forgiveness of our sins, but that we might have fellowship with God.

Campbell lays great stress on the due consideration of the prospective aspect of Christ's work. All views of it imply that its ultimate reference was prospective. But not in all is this point equally kept in mind. In the traditional view, for example, Christ's satisfaction and merit are regarded as establishing the remission of sins and the right to eternal life, irrespective of any results which are to be effective in those who enter into the covenant of grace. Scripture, however, always has these results directly in view, and the acceptableness to God of the work of Christ can only be fully seen when the end of the whole is kept in view, viz. the gift of eternal life or the establishment of fellowship with God. The perfect righteousness of Christ is in fact not the meritorious cause, through its imputation to us, of the gift to us of eternal life. This is altogether too complicated and artificial a combination. On the contrary, the righteousness of Christ is itself the great gift of God to us. Christ in fact becomes the Head of a new humanity, in which He lives as a quickening Spirit, imparting to it that same attitude to God's love and holiness, which was realized in His own sacrifice. The true equivalent of the doctrine of His merit is that, as the

¹ Cf. Ritschl's immanental view of eternal life (*supra*, p. 341).

root of this new life in humanity, He reveals "an inestimable preciousness which was hidden in humanity, hidden from the inheritors of humanity themselves, but not hid from God, and now brought into manifestation by the Son of God. For the revealer of the Father is also the revealer of man, who was made in God's image" (p. 160).

It is not enough, however, that Christ thus reveals a capacity for righteousness hidden in humanity, He must also have power over humanity to impart eternal life. "Therefore," says Campbell, "there must be a relation between the Son of God and the sons of men, not according to the flesh only, but also according to the spirit,—the Second Adam must be a quickening spirit, and the head of every man be Christ" (*loc. cit.*). When this is kept in view, the air of legal fiction, which has attached to the identification of Christ with us in the atonement will be removed, and this identification will be seen to be real, and "fully justify to the enlightened conscience that constitution of things in which Christ's confession of our sins expiates them, and Christ's righteousness in humanity clothes us with His own interest in the sight of God" (p. 161).

In conclusion, Campbell contrasts his theory with the traditional doctrine, in order to show that, so far from being less morally severe and strict, it is really much more so (p. 188 ff.). Dispensation from justice may, with a view to the general good, be possible to a lawgiver and ruler in the exercise of a righteous rule; but our Father can never be satisfied with any accommodation, but must demand from His sons a complete and perfect holiness of life. The work of Christ in fact, as a whole, is calculated to produce in man exactly that holiness which God demands of sinful humanity. Deliverance from punishment is only a secondary result of deliverance from sin.

Such, then, is the atonement, seen by its own light (p. 191). It precludes all accommodation to sin in view of the nature of God and of man alike. It shuts us up to an absolute necessity of coming to God by Christ. But in so shutting us up, it gives us so great a gift in Him that we rejoice to find ourselves shut up to "so great salvation".

The fundamental agreement of Campbell's theory with the doctrine of Schleiermacher comes out very clearly in this consideration of the prospective aspect of the atonement. The two theologians are here absolutely at one in conceiving salvation as essentially fellowship with God, brought about by the impartation of the Spirit of Christ: there is, however, the difference that, while Schleiermacher with his philosophical conception of religion speaks in general terms of the communication of the God-consciousness, Campbell, like Ritschl, is more Scriptural, in that he conceives God as the Father, and fellowship with Him as the life of sonship.

In dealing with the retrospective aspect of Christ's work, however, Campbell differs decidedly from both Schleiermacher and Ritschl, who reject the doctrine of a vicarious confession of sin on Christ's part as carrying the idea of His sympathy with men to a point where it becomes unreal and untrue in view of His personal innocence.¹ We have found Campbell's idea in German theology, especially in Thomasius, who, moreover, definitely compares Christ's expiation of sin to an act of penitence.² Campbell, however, has expressed the thought of a vicarious repentance with unusual power and wonderful sympathy; it is this element in his theory which gives it a particular distinction amidst cognate forms of doctrine.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 248, 345.

² *Ibid.* p. 310.

CHAPTER VIII

RECENT THEOLOGY IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND

§ 1. BUSHNELL

A SOMEWHAT different type of theory from any of those we have just been studying, though in general agreement with them in attempting to transcend both the traditional orthodoxy and the rationalism of the eighteenth century, is that of the American Congregationalist, Bushnell (A.D. 1802-1876). He was influenced both by Coleridge and Schleiermacher. In "God in Christ" (1849) followed by "Christ in Theology" (1851) he contended for the economic view of the Trinity as the practical and experimental view. His doctrine is thus summarized by Fisher, "History of Christian Doctrine," p. 439:—

"It is through the medium of three modes of personal action that the ineffable One discloses Himself and comes near to the apprehension of His creatures. The Logos is the self-revealing faculty of the Deity ; Father, Son, and Spirit are the *dramatis personæ* through which the hidden Being reveals Himself. In Christ, Bushnell said, God manifests Himself under the limitations of human life—thinking, feeling, suffering with us. The existence of a human spiritual nature, if not expressly denied, was held to be practically of no account."¹

Bushnell's chief work on the atonement is "The

¹ Cf. the doctrine of Apollinaris in the Ancient Church (*supra*, Vol. I, p. 89).

Vicarious Sacrifice" (1866), to which "Forgiveness and Law" (1874) is a supplement. The former book possesses a marked originality. It is the work, not so much of a systematic theologian, but of a great preacher, and has all the force and vigour natural to one who thinks concretely rather than abstractly. The book is full of effective epigrams and phrases. On the other hand, this oratorical power is compensated for by a certain diffuseness and a good deal of repetition.

Bushnell has perhaps more than any other modern theologian reproduced the spirit of Abelard's doctrine of the work of Christ. He begins by laying down the principle, that in vicarious sacrifice there is nothing superlative, or above the universal principles of right and duty. On the contrary, it is of the very nature of love vicariously to suffer in helping and healing and in order to help and heal. A mother so suffers: God, the Holy Spirit, the good angels, all redeemed souls, belong to the fellowship of vicarious suffering.

Thus, then, is the work of Christ to be explained. "Christ," says Bushnell in an epigrammatic sentence, "(is) not here to die, but dies because He is here" (p. 90). He came to heal both the bodies and the souls of men. As He suffered by sympathy in healing human bodies, so also in healing human souls. The healing of bodies, however, was but an outward type of the inner healing: the healing of souls is His great object. He regenerates men, awakens love and patience, and is also the great example. He is not less a regenerator because the Holy Spirit is also a regenerator. The Spirit, in fact, simply continues His influence, and sets men under the impression of His life, character, and death. The question now is: How does Christ achieve this regeneration? Bushnell distinguishes two kinds of power, natural and moral.

“In ordinary cases where a work is undertaken, it signifies nothing more to say that the doer undertakes to be a power to that effect ; for whatever is to be done by action, supposes, of course, a power acting. But where there is something to be done, not by action, but by quality of being, or by the worth, and beauty, and Divine greatness of a character, the action is nothing and the power to be effective thus, in simply being what it is, everything ” (p. 125).

Regeneration demands not *fiat* force, but moral power, a higher kind of potency, which can work through our consent, and without infringing our liberty. Christ, then, operates in regeneration as the *moral power of God*. He is more than an example, more even than a revealer of God’s love, so far as this means simply tender pity and sympathy. In Him the whole moral energy of God is manifested.

There is yet, however, a further distinction. Christ is not merely the moral power of God in the form of a sum of attributes, but in that of the cumulative appeal of a human life. God became incarnate in Him in order to obtain a new kind of power.

“God had a certain kind of power before, viz. that which may be called attribute power. . . . As being infinite and absolute, we ascribe to Him certain attributes or perfections. Such attributes, or perfections, are a kind of abstract excellence, such as we bring out, or generate, by our own intellectual refinements on the idea of God, to answer to our own intellectual demands. Still, as God is infinite, the perfections are distant. We hardly dare think them, if we could, into our finite moulds. We almost reason them away. . . . We make Him great, but we also make Him thin and cold. We feel Him as a platitude, more than as a person. His great attributes become dry words ; a kind of milky way

over our heads, vast enough in the matter of extension, but evanescently dim to our feeling.

“This result had been mitigated, somewhat, by His works and words and Providence, before the coming of Christ. But the tendency was still to carry back all the more genial impressions thus unfolded, and merge them in the attribute-power, by which, as an unseen, infinite Being, we had before contrived to think and measure His character. Till, finally, in the fulness of time, He is constrained to institute a new movement on the world, in the Incarnation of His Son. The undertaking is to obtain through Him, and the facts and processes of His life, a new kind of power, viz. moral power; the same that is obtained by human conduct under human methods. It will be Divine power still, only it will not be attribute power. That is the power of His idea. This new power is to be the power cumulative, gained by Him among men, as truly as they gain it with each other. Only, it will turn out, in the end, to be the grandest, closest to feeling, most impressive, most soul-renovating, and spiritually sublime power that was ever obtained in this or any other world” (pp. 141-43).

This passage contains the very gist of Bushnell's theory. The stress lies above all on the idea that the power of God in Christ is cumulative; it is the total result of His life-history, “all that He was, felt, suffered, and did” (p. 143). We meet here clearly once more with the “total impression” of Schleiermacher;¹ the contrast, however, between attribute power and moral power, between the power of the idea and the power of the Incarnation is Bushnell's own. He goes on to show how this moral power is accumulated in the life-history and death of Christ, though the resurrection first alone sets

¹ *Supra*, p. 243.

it in the true light. It is summed up in the "name" which Christ has won by His achievement.

If now we analyse this power, not into the elements by which it was won, but into the forms which it takes in its effect upon us, we have the following points:—

- (1) Christ humanizes God ;
- (2) He both awakens the sense of guilt, and draws the confidence of the guilty ;
- (3) He makes evident by His vicarious sacrifice that God suffers on account of evil, or with and for all created beings under evil. It is especially in the passion and death of Jesus that this is made apparent to us.

What has been said contains in itself already Bushnell's complete view of the work of Christ. He proceeds, however, to bring out its implications by considering its relations both to law and government, between which he carefully distinguishes. On the one hand, there is the eternal and unchangeable moral law of God, the absolute standard of right and wrong, the ideal of righteousness, to which humanity is to be conformed. On the other hand, there is the Divine government of the universe, which is a means that God uses in a sinful world to bring about this conformity to law. The law is impersonal and abstract ; the government is personal, nay, is essentially God. While righteousness is conformity to law, justice in the sense of the exaction of penalty belongs not to law, but to government. But to government in the larger sense belongs also redemption.

" Legislation wants redemption for its coadjutor, and only through the Divine sacrifice, thus ministered, can it ever hope to consummate the proposed obedience. Redemption also wants legislation, to back its tender appeals of sacrifice, by the stern rigours of law. Both together will compose the state of complete government " (p. 196).

Justice and mercy are, accordingly, not in opposition ; but are collateral means of attaining the same end. Nor does mercy have to satisfy justice before it can do its own work. Justice means in God a deep principle of wrath which girds Him for the infliction of suffering upon wrong-doing. But the principle of wrath is no law to God, that compels Him to inflict so much suffering, till it is satisfied. On the contrary, He has pledged Himself not to give Himself up to wrath, but to exercise mercy. Justice and mercy are, as it were, the two hands of God's constituted government.

"They are to have a properly joint action ; one to work by enforcement and the other by attraction, or moral inspiration ; both having as their end or office to restore and establish the everlasting, impersonal law" (p. 221).

The antagonism between them is formal, not real ; partial, not absolute. As a matter of fact, says Bushnell, both justice and mercy are exercised at once. God dispenses justice, not by direct infliction, but by a law of natural consequences. Now this natural law of retribution is never infringed by mercy ; but mercy only interacts supernaturally with justice.

"His new-creating and delivering work of mercy, operating only as by moral power, falls in conjunctively among the retributive causes of nature, and without any discontinuance turns them to a serviceable office in accomplishing its own great designs" (p. 233).

The compensational contrivances of the traditional theology for the saving of God's justice are therefore unnecessary. Mercy does not contradict justice : it honours both the law and justice. The vicarious sacrifice restores men to the precept of the law, bringing them once more into subjection to it. Christ by it reasserts the law, organizing a kingdom for it in the

world. He again Himself incarnates the precept, and brings it near to men's feelings and convictions by the personal footing he gains for it in humanity. Again, He honours it by His obedience. For what is law but love, and what is love but vicarious sacrifice? Finally, He reveals in His obedience God's obedience to the law. For what is the ultimate ground of the obedience of Christ? The law of love is an eternal necessity for God Himself, prior to His will.

"In this manner we are prepared for the conclusion, and even brought down close upon it, that Christ came into the world as the Incarnate Word and Saviour of sinners, just because the eternal, necessary law of love made it obligatory in Him to be such a Saviour" (p. 255).

Christ's work, therefore, makes visible the eternal necessity of love which lies upon God Himself. Accordingly, an immense honour is done to the law by Christ's obedience. It is, in fact, the very law that man had dishonoured which organizes redemption.

"The violated law comes back upon us to overwhelm us, by showing us, in Christ, just what goodness was in it" (p. 262).

But, further, the Christian redemption does not diminish the penal enforcements of the law. Not only does it take up the natural consequences of sin and turn them to good, but it also presses the enforcements of the law with new emphasis, and even increases the responsibilities enforced. Christianity, in fact, reinforces the natural penalties of sin by a positive promulgation of future judgment: it also increases the crime of disobedience against law, inasmuch as it appears now not only as against law, but against Christ. The Gospel is therefore infinitely stern, while infinitely gracious.

More than this, however, the Christian redemption effectively maintains the rectoral honour of God. Not, however, as the more recent New England theology¹ has taught, in that Christ has shown by His death "the same abhorrence to sin that would have been shown by the punishment of the guilty" (p. 306).

This doctrine Bushnell completely rejects.

"Abhorrence to sin expresses almost nothing that would be expressed by punishment. Abhorrence is a word of recoil simply and not a word of majesty. There is no enforcement, no judicial vigour in it" (p. 308).

Abhorrence is, therefore, no fit substitute for punishment. Equally fatal, however, is the objection that in reality no abhorrence at all of sin is expressed in the death of Christ.

"To what in the transaction of the cross can God's abhorrence, by any possibility, fasten itself? Does God abhor the person of Jesus? No. His character? No. His redeeming office? No. The sins of the world that are upon Him? They are not upon Him, save in a figure, as the burden that His love so Divinely assumes" (p. 309).

The fact is that the abhorrence theory, if it is pressed, ultimately reverts to the idea that Christ's sufferings were

¹ Bushnell refers to the development of theology in New England after Jonathan Edwards. We may illustrate his point by a reference to Jonathan Edwards, Jr. (A.D. 1745-1801), who taught as follows concerning the Atonement: "It is a satisfaction to the *general* justice of God, by which is meant that regard to the greatest good, which leads Him, while bestowing forgiveness, to sustain the authority of law. 'Christ suffered that in the sinner's stead which as effectually tended to discourage or prevent transgression and excite to obedience as the punishment of the transgressor according to the letter of the law would have done.' The end of punishment is the restraining of others from sin. The Atonement does this because it shows God's hatred of sin and His determination to punish it" (Fisher, "History of Christian Doctrine," p. 412).

in some way penal. Only so can they express the Divine abhorrence of sin. The object of the more recent theology has been to escape from the repulsive idea that Christ's suffering was penal : nevertheless this idea is kept in reserve, and forms the true basis of the theory.

With the penal theory of Christ's sufferings, however, Bushnell will hold no terms. Its justice is not just. Moreover, it is not justice or wrath, but righteousness, which is absolute in God. Neither justice nor wrath can claim to be "satisfied" in the sense of the traditional theory.

Nevertheless, Christ has done enough even in the interests of justice. Christ is incarnated into the curse of the world, so far as He comes into an order of things where suffering follows sin, and so far as He suffers the corporate evil with us. In accepting this lot, He recognizes the general course of the Divine justice.

Bushnell rounds off his theory by discussing the idea of justification. He accepts neither the traditional Catholic nor the traditional Protestant theory. Justification is no mere remission of sins or pardon, which latter is in itself "only a kind of formality, or verbal discharge, that carries no discharge at all" (p. 360). It is real redemption. It is our restoration to the law before government, to the normal state of our being.

"When we are justified by faith or by 'yielding our members instruments of righteousness unto God,' which is the same thing . . . we are taken by all the foundations of the world, and the governings, compulsions, fears, and judgments that make up the scaffolding of our existence, and have our relations, with God, only to the law before government : being in it, and the freedom of it, as being in Him and His freedom" (p. 363).

Such justification is the effect of moral power, of Christ operating upon us. Justice still runs its course

upon us, but its effects are transmuted by redemption.

Justification, as above described, is "imputed righteousness," not in the sense that there is any transfer of Christ's merits to us, but in the sense "that the soul, when it is gained to faith, is brought back, according to the degree of faith, into its original, normal relation to God ; to be invested, with God's light, feeling, character—in one word, righteousness—and live derivately from Him " (p. 377).

In other words, the believer is judged, not by his works, but by his general relation of dependence upon God, into which the moral power of Christ lifts him. Luther, Bushnell thinks, felt the truth concerning justification with his heart, but was not capable of bringing it to intellectual expression.

Finally, Bushnell deals with the sacrificial representations of Scripture. It is one of the great merits of his book that throughout there is continual examination of Scripture passages, and Scripture proof. The exegesis indeed is sometimes unsound : on the other hand, at times the meaning is most remarkably brought out. Bushnell defines his position in regard to the sacrificial language, used by the New Testament to describe the work of Christ, as follows :—

"It is very true that the ancient sacrifices were, and were given to be, types of the higher sacrifice of Christ. Not, however, in the sense that they were such to the worshippers in them, but in that common, widely general, always rational sense, that all physical objects and relations, taken up as roots of language, are types, and are designed to be, of the spiritual meanings to be figured by them, or built up into spiritual words upon them. . . . In this sense the ancient sacrifices were no doubt appointed to be types of the higher sacrifices ; visible

forms, or analogies, that, when the time is come, will serve as a figure, or basis of words, to express and bring into familiar use, the sublime facts and world-renewing mysteries of the incarnate life and suffering death of Jesus " (pp. 391, 392).

There is no evidence, says Bushnell, that the ancient sacrificial ritual was based upon the idea of substitution. It was, however, in general lustral: it cleansed away ceremonial uncleanness by the sprinkling of blood. Spiritualizing this, we come to the true meaning of the sacrificial symbolism in regard to the work of Christ, as also of the other Scriptural figures, judicial, political, commercial, and physical.

"The general conclusion is that all the Scripture symbols coincide, as nearly as may be, in the one ruling conception, that Christ is here in the world to be a power on character—to cleanse, wash, purify, to regenerate, new-create, make free, invest in the righteousness of God, the guilty souls of mankind " (p. 412).

But what of the other ideas connected with sacrifice, such as expiation, atonement, propitiation? Expiation, says Bushnell, is no Scriptural idea at all. Atonement, both in the Old and New Testaments, means the reconciliation of God to the offender, but is used in Christianity only by way of accommodation to the point of view of the sinner.

"Propitiation is an objective conception, by which that change taking place in us is spoken of as occurring representatively in God. Just as guilty minds, thrown off from God, glass their feeling representatively in God; or just as we say that the sun rises, instead of saying, what would be so very awkward to us, and yet is the real truth, that we ourselves rise to the sun " (p. 450).

Such objectification of our inner feelings is common outside of religion.

“ We say that a thing is painful, because we suffer pain from it ; putting the pain into the thing, which is really in ourselves ” (p. 464).

So “ the devil is that objective person, whose reality is the sum of all subjective seductions or temptations to evil ” (p. 465).

This objectification of our inner states has an important use.

“ If we represented everything subjectively which is subjective, we could do it only by using the most awkward and tedious circumlocutions. In one view these outward projections of what is within are not true, and yet they are all the more vigorously true for that reason ” (p. 467).

They take us off from ourselves and our inner states and make us think of God. Thus the altar symbols in particular—

“ Compose for us a kind of objective religion ; that is, a religion operated for us and before us. In one view they are not true, just as the ten thousand objective expressions of language referred to, are not, and yet there is nothing so sublimely, healthfully true, in the practical and free uses of faith, because we are so simple in them, and so completely carried out of ourselves ” (p. 467).

The sacrificial system is, therefore, necessary ; but must be kept free from abuse. It is the work of theology to dissipate the wrong associations which have in the course of history gathered around the altar terminology.

Bushnell's later volume “ Forgiveness and Law ” (1874) has only secondary importance. He wrote it to correct his former explanation of propitiation. He here attempts to present an objective conception of this point by emphasizing the unity of God and Christ in the suffer-

ing on the cross. The meaning of propitiation here is, that God by suffering works down and out His own anger against sinners. It is a psychological fact that in striving to help another and suffering for him we cease to be angry with him. We do not of course undertake sacrifice to reduce our anger, but to help others : nevertheless the effect surely follows. True forgiveness, therefore, is by way of propitiation. For it must needs be forgiveness, not in word merely, but in deed. It must be not negative, but positive, expressing itself in redemptive action, which in the circumstances inevitably means suffering and sacrifice. But this, as has been shown, brings about propitiation ; thus propitiation is proved to be implied in true forgiveness. There is, however, no expiation. Bushnell is still as much as ever against this idea.

It is a question whether this new doctrine of propitiation, with its extremely anthropomorphic doctrine of God, is any improvement on the former conception. In the following remarks on Bushnell's theology, I shall regard only its original form. The doctrine of the American theologian comes nearer than any other in the English language to that of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. There is the difference, that, as has already been observed, we have in it the work not of a strictly systematic theologian, but of an ardent preacher and evangelist. There are minor inconsistencies, which, with more care, might have been smoothed away. For example, Bushnell's account of the relation of God to penalty is not altogether clear. He seems sometimes to think of His action here as altogether personal, the amount of penalty exacted or remitted in each case being determined by His wisdom. At other times he represents Him as acting entirely through natural law ; so that penalty is automatic and irremissible. But, in spite of such

minor blemishes, Bushnell's doctrine in general forms a noble and consistent whole. Its likeness is perhaps greatest to that of Schleiermacher, with whom Bushnell is in the main in point to point agreement, in spite of the difference in the form of expression. In the interest which he takes in showing how the work of Christ carries out the demand of the moral law, Bushnell approximates to Ritschl: he is more "teleological" and less "æsthetic" in his view of the work of Christ than Schleiermacher.¹ In the doctrine of justification, however, he agrees with Schleiermacher, not with Ritschl; yet the way in which he explains the idea of propitiation has affinity with Ritschl's doctrine of justification as the reconciliation of the sinner to God, not of God to the sinner.

§ 2. DALE

Dale's work, "The Atonement" (1875), falls next to be considered (I use the 19th ed. 1897); for in it the author had Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice" continually in view. Dale (A.D. 1829-1895) founds his method on a distinction which reminds us at once of Butler, viz. the distinction between the fact and the theory of the atonement.² The fact of the atonement means that there is "a direct relation between the Death of Christ and the remission of sins" (p. 19), or again, that it is "the objective ground on which God absolves us from sin and delivers us from eternal destruction" (loc. cit.). The theory must unfold the principle and grounds of the above-mentioned relation, or explain why the death of Christ is the basis of the Divine forgiveness.

A great part of Dale's book is devoted to the presentation of the Scripture proof of the fact of the atone-

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 227, 332.

² *Ibid.* pp. 178-9.

ment. He seeks to establish an improved method of Scripture proof, which takes account of the critical view of things begun by Locke.¹ The "proof texts" for the traditional doctrines have been collected and examined so often that no improvement here is possible. Yet proof texts alone, after all, in view of the "occasional" character of the New Testament writings, prove very little.

"The frequency and distinctness with which a doctrine is asserted in the apostolic writings is, therefore, no test of its importance. It might even be contended with considerable plausibility that the importance of a doctrine is likely to be in the inverse ratio of the number of passages in which it is directly taught; for the central and most characteristic truths of the Christian Faith are precisely those which the Churches were least likely to abandon" (p. 21).

A new method of proof, therefore, is necessary, which shall consider the New Testament in a broader manner:—

"That the Apostles regarded the Death of Christ as a Sacrifice and Propitiation for the sins of the world appears in many passages which yield no direct testimony to this doctrine. It sometimes determines the form and structure of an elaborate argument, which falls to pieces if this truth is denied. At other times it gives pathos and power to a practical appeal. It accounts for some of the misconceptions and misrepresentations of apostolic teaching. It explains the absence from the apostolic writings of much that we should certainly have found in them if the Apostles had not believed that for Christ's sake, and not merely because of the effect on our hearts of what Christ has revealed, God grants us remission of sins. It penetrates the whole substance of their theology

¹ *Supra*, p. 164.

and ethical teaching and is the very root of their religious life" (p. 25).

Dale has worked out this thesis at great length and in a very masterly way. After some notice of the history of the doctrine of the atonement, he then proceeds to give his own theory, i.e. his explanation of the relation between the death of Christ and the remission of sins. First, however, he discusses the question whether the remission of sins is possible. The view that the penalties of sin work themselves out automatically seems to forbid this. Dale follows the line of Butler¹ in showing that we ourselves are able to modify the consequences of wrongdoing, both in our own case and in that of others. God also is to be thought of as working personally and directly; He by no means gives over the conduct of the universe to an automatically working system of laws. Remission is therefore possible. But it is also a thing of moment. Dale reprehends Bushnell for his undervaluing of the remission of sins, and his absorption of the idea in the wider idea of regeneration. It is true that remission without regeneration would be in vain. Nevertheless, to say that remission is a mere formality is altogether to undervalue it. The instinct that has made theologians distinguish remission and regeneration is a sound one. The wrath of God is real; and remission of sins, as escape from it, is real also.

We are free, then, to discuss the relation between the death of Christ and the remission of sins. Dale acknowledges that the history of doctrine has shown that the attempt to work out a theory from any one of the Scripture representations of the death of Christ, as ransom, vicarious death, or propitiation, goes astray. These representations are metaphors, which will not bear the weight of a theological theory, but, if pressed,

¹ *Supra*, p. 176.

lead us into contradictions. To construct a theory, therefore, "we must put these descriptions aside, and consider the death of Christ itself, in its real relation to God and man" (p. 359). The Scripture figures will then constitute the authoritative tests of the accuracy of such a theory: "a theory is false if it does not account for and explain these descriptions" (*loc. cit.*).

Can we, then, discover in the death of our Lord Jesus Christ anything which promises to throw light on its expiatory power?

"There are three considerations which invest the death of Christ with unique and tragic interest:—

"(1) It was the Death of the Son of God manifest in the flesh.

"(2) It was a voluntary Death. He came into the world to die. . . .

"(3) Immediately before His Death, He was forsaken of God: when we remember the original glory in which He dwelt with the Father, His faultless perfection, and His unbroken communion with the Father during His life on earth, this is a great and awful, mystery" (p. 360).

In investigating the connexion between this mysterious death and the remission of the sins of men, Dale proposes to inquire into two questions:—

"(1) Whether this connexion can be explained by the existence of any original relation existing between the Lord Jesus Christ and the penalties of sin, or—to state the question more generally—between the Lord Jesus Christ and the eternal law of righteousness, of which sin is the transgression?

"(2) Whether this connexion can be explained by any original relation existing between the Lord Jesus Christ and the race whose sin needed remission?" (p. 361).

The answer to the former question is, firstly, that

He is the Judge of the world. But, secondly, He is also the Eternal Word, through whom God made the world. His relation to the eternal law of righteousness is, therefore, wrapped up in that of God Himself to His law. It is an old question, whether the law depends on the will of God, or God, like us, upon the law. Neither is true: the relation between God and the law is unique.

“He is not, as we are, bound by its authority: in Him its authority is actively asserted. . . . In God the law is *alive*: it reigns on His throne, sways His sceptre, is crowned with His glory” (p. 372).

What, again, is the relation between God and the penalties of sin? The end of punishment is not the amelioration of the criminal, nor the deterring of others from similar crime. Punishment, whether Divine or human, is just retribution. God’s punishment is not the assertion of His personal honour against injury, but the vindication of the law which lives in Him. The remission of punishment is therefore impossible, unless the law be otherwise vindicated.

“If the punishment of sin is a Divine act—an act in which the identity between the will of God and the eternal law of righteousness is asserted and expressed—it would appear that, if in any case the penalties of sin are remitted, some other Divine act of at least equal intensity, and in which the ill desert of sin is expressed with at least equal energy, must take its place” (p. 391).

The Christian atonement fulfils this necessity. The principle that sin must be punished is not suppressed. It would have been adequately asserted, had God inflicted upon mankind the penalties of transgression. It was asserted in a still grander form by the suffering on the cross of Christ, the Moral Ruler and Judge of men.

Nor is this all. The love of the Eternal Father for the Son gives unique value to the work of Christ.

"The mysterious unity of the Father and the Son rendered it possible for God at once to endure and to inflict penal suffering, and to do both under wider conditions which constitute the infliction and the endurance the grandest moment in the moral history of God" (p. 393).

We have not, therefore, here to do with a pardon of sins compensated by the punishment of an innocent man: it is God Himself in Christ who endures suffering instead of inflicting it. It may be noted at this point that Dale in the exegetical part of his book lays great stress on the cry on the cross,¹ which he interprets in the sense that Christ was in reality forsaken of God and takes as establishing the penal character of His sufferings (p. 60 ff.).

There remains the second great question, whether the connexion between the death of Christ and the remission of sins depends on His relation to the human race.

It is not God alone who is concerned in the sacrifice of Christ. It was a sacrifice for us, in which Christ was our Representative. This aspect has not been brought out in the partial conception of the subject already gained. This partial conception, moreover, taken alone seems to suggest that the value of the death of Christ lies in its dramatic character. The theory appears to be somewhat "in the air".

"If it can be shown that the original and ideal relation of the Lord Jesus Christ to the human race constitutes a reason why He should become a Sacrifice and Propitiation for our sins, the conception of His Death illustrated in the preceding lecture will rest on more solid and secure foundations" (p. 402).

¹ Mt. XXVII. 46.

Christ is, however, according to Scripture, not merely the Word, through whom God has created the world, but stands in a particular relation to the human race as the ideal and root of humanity.

The following propositions, therefore, hold good :—

(1) Christ's submission in the cross to the law is the expression of ours and carries ours with it. He did not submit to the law, that we might be released from its authority, but only from its penalties.

(2) The death of Christ is the objective ground of the remission of sins, because it restored the ideal relation of humanity to God, which had been destroyed by sin.

(3) Also because it involved the actual destruction of sin in all those who believe upon Him.

If to these propositions be added the previously established truth (4) that Christ's death vindicated the eternal law of righteousness and so made possible the remission of sins, then we have a sufficient explanation of all the New Testament metaphors, such as expiation, vicarious death, representative death, ransom, satisfaction, sacrifice for sin. Each is seen to express some one or other aspect of the whole truth.

Dale's powerful book may be said to be perhaps the most forcible restatement in English of the orthodox theory of the atonement. Yet it is by no means the doctrine of the traditional orthodoxy which reappears in it. There is no talk of an equivalence in substituted punishment; what we find is rather in essence the Grotian idea of penal example, though Dale himself does not appear to recognize the affinity of his theory with that of Grotius, for which, though he admits that it has had a great influence on the modern theology of English Nonconformity, he has no good word. He speaks (p. 294) of Grotius, as expressing most perfectly,

by expressing in an exaggerated and degraded form, the true character of the Reformation theory. This certainly is not a correct historical judgment; but the passage shows Dale's opinion of Grotius. Yet, as Ritschl has pointed out, the doctrine which explains the death of Christ as a vindication in principle of the Divine justice, without raising the question of the strict equivalence of the sufferings of Christ with those which would have been suffered by sinners, cannot logically be distinguished from the doctrine that the death of Christ was a penal example.¹ The truth is that Dale stood nearer to the "modern theory of English Nonconformity," as represented by Wardlaw, Payné, etc., than he realized.² There is, however, one noteworthy point of difference between Dale's theory and that of Grotius, viz. in the emphasis which Dale lays on the 'moral unity of the Father and the Son, so that it is God who suffers in the sufferings of Christ.

In the above remarks that aspect of Dale's theory has alone been considered which bulks largest in it, viz. the conception of the death of Christ as a vindication of the Divine righteousness. The other aspects, which are added to this, and are connected with the thought of Christ as the Representative of humanity, are less fully delineated by Dale. We have in them essentially a continuation of the doctrine of Erskine and Maurice. No real connexion is, however, established between this part of Dale's theory and the foregoing, but the two are simply added together. There is no doubt that it is the first-mentioned aspect of doctrine, upon which Dale has spent so much labour, which remains really characteristic of his book. It is this element of his theory also, which is essentially implied in the part of the book, which professes to deal

¹ *Supra*, p. 345.

² *Ibid.* p. 393.

with the Scripture proof of the fact of the atonement. A careful study of this part, probably the strongest and best of the whole work, will show that the supposed distinction between the fact and the theory of the atonement is not sound. The only distinction is between a less or more explicit statement of what is really the same theory throughout. Dale himself admits that the fundamental question, whether the death of Christ has a direct relation to the remission of sins, or whether it was simply a great appeal of God's love to the human race, is a question of theory (p. 10 ff.). Yet in what follows, to establish that for the Apostles the death of Christ had a direct relation to the remission of sins is regarded as the establishment of the existence for them, not of a theory, but of the fact of the atonement (p. 19 ff.). The fundamental value of Dale's book, then, remains the establishment by means of a better form of Scripture proof of the place in primitive Christianity of the conception, in however indeterminate a form, of substitutionary and expiatory sacrifice. This is a point to be reckoned with by all theories of the school of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, so far as they attempt to establish a connexion with the religion of the New Testament. But, on the other hand, Dale seems to show little appreciation of the work of systematic theology, as the Germans understand it, viz. as the attempt to reproduce the religion of the New Testament in the form of, as Hegel would say, a "concrete conception," i.e. a conception in which all the parts contribute to the unity of the whole, and are themselves modified in so doing. The establishment of the existence of an idea in the New Testament is, according to this understanding of the matter, not the end as far as theology is concerned. There remains the question, how the idea is modified, when it is associated with and controlled by other ideas, and

above all the question, as to which idea is to dominate all the rest. If, for example, the idea of the Fatherhood of God, or, again, that of the Kingdom of God, is to be supreme, then all that Dale says of the New Testament may be true, and yet in the ultimate construction of Christianity as a religion the idea of substitutionary sacrifice may emerge radically modified by the wider context into which it is brought. The "penetrative imagination,"¹ which seeks to apprehend Christianity as a whole, cannot stop at any single idea, however firmly established in the New Testament, as ultimate, unless indeed it be the idea which, after due reflection, is accepted as the dominant principle of the whole; and even that will have to be understood by the way in which it lights up and interprets all the related religious conceptions, which with it compose the religious organism.

§ 3. WESTCOTT

Westcott's book "The Victory of the Cross" (1888) is slight in form, being simply six sermons preached during Holy Week. Nevertheless it deserves mention, inasmuch as it contains, though not as clearly stated as would be desirable, a conception of the work of Christ, which is unusual: it has, however, affinities with the doctrine of Rothe. Westcott (A.D. 1825-1901) bases his theory on the representations in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Christ's sufferings are spoken of as disciplinary for Himself, as purifying for the humanity with which He has become one in the Incarnation, and as perfecting for both.² The general point of view implied in Westcott's book is that of the world as a place of discipline for sinful souls, a view which reminds us

¹ *Supra*, p. 206 (cf. p. 253).

² Cf. Heb. II. 9-18; IV. 14-v. 10; X. 1-18.

of Origen,¹ with whose theology Westcott felt great sympathy.²

Westcott begins in a way reminiscent of Butler (who, it will be remembered, took the motto of his "Analogy" from Origen) by considering, first, the scheme of nature as a key to that of grace. He finds that there is in the world a natural fellowship of humanity, and, next, that nature itself shows that the condition of redemption is sacrifice. Then he emphasizes the Scriptural doctrine of the unity of humanity in Christ. The Incarnation is the fulfilment of the promise of the creation.

"Humanity however broken into fragments in our eyes is still one. And this one humanity, not the personal manhood of an individual, Christ took to Himself. He fulfilled for man fallen the destiny which was provided for man unfallen. He realized absolutely under the conditions of earth the Divine likeness which neither one man nor all men could reach. He gained for the race that for which they were made" (p. 43).

Christ's life, Westcott says accordingly, was universal in character and experience, and was a Divine life, a life lived in God. In this life, however, the members of Christ's body share: they share it, moreover, that they may reveal it.

But now comes in the place of suffering in the life of Christ. He was perfected through sufferings. He learned obedience by the things which He suffered.

"He learned obedience: He did not learn to obey. There was no disobedience to be conquered, but only the Divine will to be realized. So He carried to the uttermost the virtue of obeying. He fulfilled in action the law

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 54.

² Cf. his essay "Origen and the Beginnings of Christian Philosophy," in "Religious Thought in the West" (1891), pp. 194 ff.

which God had laid down for the being whom He had made in His image: He endured in His Passion every penalty which the righteousness of God had connected with the sins which He made His own. He offered the absolute self-surrender of service and of suffering, through life and through death, fulfilling in spite of the Fall the original destiny of man, and rising in His glorified humanity to the throne of God" (p. 61).

Christ's sufferings, says Westcott, were complete in range and form; were voluntary, were foreseen, and were recognized in their full intensity and in their unnaturalness, as not belonging to the true order of the world, but as being the result of the Fall.

"He gathers into one supreme sacrifice the bitterness of death, the last penalty of sin, knowing all it means, and bearing it as He knows. We indeed can see but little, but we can see this, that He alone, the sinless Son of God who knew perfectly the mind and will of His Father, could bring to Him the offering of perfect obedience and perfect sorrow. He who made every human power, and every human sin, His own by the innermost fellowship of spiritual life could render to God the tribute of absolute service and bear the consequences of every transgression as entering into the Divine law of purifying chastisement" (pp. 68-9).

The Passion, as it was inflicted, is a revelation of human wrongdoing.

"The Passion as it was borne is a revelation of the inexorable sternness of infinite love which, while it gives to pain a potentiality of cleansing grace, requires to the uttermost that retribution which may become a blessing" (p. 69).

Sufferings in themselves, says Westcott (p. 81), are nothing worth. Self-inflicted suffering is simply partial suicide. But sufferings accepted as they come to us

by the will of God purify the creature and illuminate life.

"In this sense sufferings are a revelation of the Fatherhood of God Who brings back His children to Himself in righteousness and love. In this sense Christ suffered, knowing the nature of sin, knowing the judgment of God, realizing in every pain the healing power of a Father's wisdom" (p. 82).

Westcott's position is made clearer by what he says of the nature of punishment in general. We materialize spiritual things. We forget that the real punishment of sin is sinfulness.

"So it is we are tempted to regard chastisement as the expression of anger and not as the tender discipline of wisdom. We fail to discern that righteousness and love are, if I may so speak, the two sides of unchangeable holiness as it is seen in relation to the condition of men and in relation to the purpose of God" (p. 77).

Hence we misunderstand the New Testament. Where Christ and the Apostles speak of sin, we think of punishment.

"They represent evil as a barrier which hinders the outflow of Divine love upon the guilty: we think of it as that which entails painful retribution" (p. 78).

When, however, the true view of things, taken in Scripture, is allowed to speak for itself, the traditional theory of satisfaction is seen to be an impossible doctrine of the work of Christ. It falls below the wholeness and simplicity of the Scripture view, which is simply this:—

"Christ who took humanity to Himself was able to fulfil the will of God under the conditions of our present earthly life, both actively and passively, raising to its highest perfection every faculty of man, and bearing

every suffering through which alone fallen man could attain his destiny " (p. 79).

Christ, however, as the Head of humanity, by the energy of the one life which we all live, could communicate to all who share His nature the fruit of His perfect obedience. His sufferings were not "outside us".

"They were the sufferings of One in Whom we live and Who lives in us. Christ gathering the race into Himself suffered for all by the will of God; and in correspondence with this revelation of God's grace, we confess, when we listen to the secret whisperings of our souls, that we need the blessing which it brings, and that it avails for our utmost necessity" (p. 80).

This it does in the following ways: (1) Christ, having exhausted all suffering, bearing it according to the will and mind of God, is able to communicate the virtue of His passion to us. (2) The example of His suffering teaches us self-renunciation, and we have a present sense of His sympathy in our labours. (3) Again, the example of Christ's suffering assures us of a Father's love. Nor is it merely His example, but the power of His life, which brings us into communion with God, vivifying and purifying us at once.

"True forgiveness is indeed the energy of love answered by love. The forgiveness which remits a punishment may leave the heart untouched. The forgiveness which remits a sin includes by its very nature the return of responsive gratitude. The believer makes Christ's work his own, and God sees him in the Son of Man. He dies daily, dies into life" (p. 85).

(4) Finally, in sharing Christ's sufferings we also share His joy.

Christ's Kingdom is realized through His cross, His sovereignty is a spiritual, universal, present, Divine, and effective sovereignty, exercised through His people.

The complete fulfilment of it, however, is not yet ; but for it we wait.

The connexion of Westcott's doctrine with that of Erskine and Maurice is clear. It has also affinity with that of Campbell, only that for the notion of a vicarious repentance is substituted the unity of Christ with us in purifying suffering. As over against Dale, Westcott stands out as fully modern in his conception of punishment. He has firmly grasped the principle, so fundamental for Ritschl, that Divine punishment is not a material but a spiritual thing, no mere external act, but a process in human consciousness.

§ 4. MOBERLEY

The last English theologian that I shall consider is Moberley (A.D. 1845-1903), whose book, "Atonement and Personality" (1901), continues the line of McLeod Campbell, but restates his theory in terms of modern philosophy, and in view of more recent theological discussions. Moberley also attempts to supplement Campbell's doctrine in points where he considers it defective.

The book begins with a discussion of some fundamental conception, viz. Punishment, Penitence, and Forgiveness. Dale's view that punishment is essentially retributive, not reformatory, is rejected. True punishment as the effect of righteousness must deal with persons as individuals and aim at their reformation. The retributive aspect of punishment simply belongs to the imperfection of human justice which cannot deal with individuals, but only with the average. The "equation" theory of punishment is a corollary from the retributive theory, which reveals the imperfection of the latter.

All punishment, however, is not in experience restorative. Even though it is meant to be so and

begins as moral discipline, where it meets with opposition to the discipline, it fails of being reformatory, and becomes simply retribution. Endurance of retribution, says Moberley, in agreement with Erskine, has no atoning tendency whatever.¹ Where, however, punishment is accepted and taken up into the suffering personality as penitence, it really tends to diminish guiltiness.

A corollary from this doctrine is that punishment, as retributive, cannot be predicated of Christ, who was not rebellious against the suffering laid upon Him.

Penitence, in its idea, is a real change of self. A perfect penitence would be such a change of self as would make the past dead, and re-identify the self with righteousness. Righteousness and love would be one in embracing it. Nevertheless such perfect penitence does not exist even in Christians, though Christian penitence points towards it. Yet the existence of even an imperfect penitence is impossible to sinful nature in itself. How then does it exist in Christians? The answer is: it is the indwelling Spirit of the Crucified. It may be observed that the method of argument here reminds us of Schleiermacher, who similarly argues back from the imperfect Christian consciousness of God to a perfect God-consciousness as its source.²

Moberley continues: Divine forgiveness, again, is not simply remission of penalty. It is not simply not punishing, or treating as innocent. It is an attitude of a Person to a person: there must be a justification for it in the personality of the forgiven. He must be "forgivable". God, then, Himself must make the man forgivable. But, again, all experienced forgiveness is provisional. Love is called forgiveness where it is anticipatory, i.e. where it values the desert of any real correspondence with love. Forgiveness is in fact a means to an end, viz. the creation

¹ *Supra*, p. 383.

² *Ibid.* p. 230 ff.

of holiness ; and is contingent on the accomplishment of this end. When the end is attained forgiveness is wholly merged in love. Strictly, therefore, forgiveness is a hope equivalent with the hope of personal holiness.

If before we were reminded of Schleiermacher, here we meet with the ideas of Kant. Moberley solves the antinomy of justification in the Kantian way, by the view that justification or forgiveness anticipates sanctification in order that sanctification may be possible, and is ultimately justified by the achievement of sanctification.¹

The above considerations prepare the way for an understanding of the work of Christ. The fundamental objection to the Christian doctrine is that in the creation of holiness mediation is impossible. It is not clear, first of all, how the unholy can become holy, but in any case—

“ How is it conceivable (the mind asks) that any Redeemer’s work, or endurance, or goodness, be it what it may, seeing that it is outside of the personalities of men, should touch the point of pressing necessity, which is an essential alteration of what men are? What is wanted is not that there should be a wonderful exhibition somewhere of obedience, or that somebody should be holy : not even that the amount or value of holiness should balance and perhaps outweigh the huge volume of unholiness. What is wanted is that all these particular personalities should be holy, which are in fact the reverse. How can the particular thing which is required be touched by the introduction of another? Here, if anywhere in the world, there can be no question of a fictitious transaction, or an unreal imagining ; here, if anywhere, whatever is not vitally and personally real is both mockery and despair ” (p. 74).

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 213.

Moberley appeals to experience. That shows that a friend who will suffer for a sinner is the best hope of his reformation. Logic, in abstracting from experience, here over-reaches itself. The objection is, however, not yet fully answered.

"It will be felt that, even if it be not fundamentally impossible, the idea of an atoning mediator is, and must be, incompatible with any profound sense of justice" (p. 76).

This difficulty Moberley meets by demanding, like Hegel, that we rise from the forensic point of view, where personalities are conceived atomically as absolutely separate individuals, to the higher level of thought, where the identification of personalities is seen to be possible.¹ This is illustrated even in our relation to our fellows, which is not so atomic as the forensic point of view assumes. But the identification of the sinner with Christ stands again on a higher level. The Catholic doctrine teaches that Christ is not only identically one with God, but is man, inclusively, not generically.² Only Adam can here be compared with Him, but there is a difference.

"What Adam is to the flesh, and, through the flesh, indirectly to the spirit also ; that is Christ to the spirit, and, through the spirit, indirectly also to the flesh, of all those, who, as they are partakers, in flesh, of Adam, are made capable of becoming partakers, in Spirit, of Christ" (p. 89).

It is clear that Moberley moves here on a Hegelian basis. The creeds are interpreted by the ideas, first, that the Infinite Spirit is immanent in the finite spirit,

¹ *Supra*, p. 221.

² Cf. *supra*, Vol. I, pp. 87-90. Moberley says: "His relation to the human race is not that He was another specimen, differing, by being another, from everyone except Himself. His relation to the race was not a differentiating but a consummating relation" (p. 86).

and again that the finite spirit expresses itself in the flesh as its inevitable and necessary other.¹ There is, we are told, no absolute antithesis between spirit and body.

“Neither is body without spirit, nor spirit without body” (loc. cit.).

And again :—

“That complete indwelling and possessing of even one other, which the yearnings of man towards man imperfectly approaches, is only possible, in any fulness of the words, to that Spirit of Man which is the Spirit of God : to the Spirit of God, become through the Incarnation the Spirit of Man. No mere man indwells, in Spirit, in, or as, the Spirit of another. Whatever near approach there may seem to be toward this, is really mediated through the Spirit of Christ” (loc. cit.).

In view of this reinterpretation of the creeds we are not surprised to discover that Moberley teaches next, in opposition to the Ancient Church,² that the humanity of Christ is not impersonal. Rather is He Himself personally expressed in and through humanity. The personal expression of God must of necessity be human. Christ in the Incarnation is not two, God and man ; but one, God as man. Consequently, says Moberley, in agreement with McLeod Campbell, He reveals not only the truth of the Divine character, but also the truth of the human character.³ This He does by His life of obedience to and dependence upon God. Instead of seeking to be independent, which is the essence of sin, He seeks only to reflect the Father. The revelation He makes is not primarily that of the relation of the pre-existent Christ to the Father, but of the Incarnate Christ to God.

The agreement of all this with the immanental

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 216.

² *Supra*, Vol. I, pp. 90, 143.

³ *Ibid.* p. 397.

theology of Germany is noteworthy. The pre-existence of Christ indeed remains unquestioned, but the practical view of the Incarnation is immanent rather than transcendental. Christ is not conceived as the Divine Person clothed with humanity, but the Man who perfectly reveals God. Here then is the possibility of understanding how He was made sin, how He condemned sin in the flesh. The two impossibilities which would restore man to God are both realized in Him, perfect holiness and perfect penitence. Both are finally accomplished by His death. In the first place, in His dependence by prayer on God in His active obedience, Christ is the perfect reflection of God. His death was necessary for the completion of this aspect of His character, and was the climax of the discipline by which He learned obedience.

But, again, in Christ's death He performed an act of vicarious penitence on behalf of sinners. Vicarious penitence is a fact of experience, when those, who are one with the sinner in nature and love, suffer with and for him in his sin. But perfect penitence is only possible to the perfectly holy; since the perfectly holy alone can see sin as God sees it. Christ then made Himself one with us in nature, and in love performed the perfect penitence.

"He voluntarily stood in the place of the utterly contrite—accepting insult, shame, anguish, death—death possible only by His own assent—yet outwardly inflicted as penal; nay, more, in His own inner consciousness, accepting the ideal consciousness of the contrite—which is the one form of the penitent's righteousness. . . . He did, in fact and in full, that which would in the sinner constitute perfect atonement, but which has for ever become impossible to the sinner, just in proportion as it is true that he has sinned" (p. 130).

In this vicarious suffering of Christ there is nothing properly penal.

“What would have been punishment *till it became penitence*, is, in the perfectly contrite, only as penitence” (p. 131).

There is, then, in the sacrifice of Calvary really no question of retribution, no external equation of sin and penalty. Christ did not endure the vengeance of God or the damnation of sin. But He accepted death “as the necessary climax of an experience of spiritual desolation, which, but to the inherently holy, would have been not only material but spiritual death” (p. 133).

But the result was, that, while sin thus slew the mortal element in Christ, it slew itself.

“Where penitence has been consummated quite perfectly, that very consciousness which was heaviness of spirit for sin has become the consciousness of sin crushed and dead” (p. 133).

The question now, however, is how this atonement of Christ can be related to us. As historical, it appears to be outside of us. The objective and the subjective are, however, not opposites, but correlative and inseparable. The atonement was first objective that it might become subjective; it was historical fact that it might become personal experience. How can this be? Belief passes into contemplation and contemplation into love; and by love the objective atonement is made personal experience. What we love ceases to be altogether outside us. Yet the atonement is not a mere appeal to the emotions, nor is an adequate emotional response to it within our power. What is here needed is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the indwelling Spirit of Christ; only this can satisfactorily explain the relation of the atonement to man. While the Holy Spirit is personal, He is practically revealed to us as a gift, as the indwelling Spirit of the Incarnate Christ. It is observable how closely Moberley here again, while

conserving the Trinitarian metaphysic, in practice follows the Hegelian exposition of the work of Christ.¹

Finally, the Spirit is ours through the sacraments, which are at once vehicle and symbol ; everything here is, in reality, not material, but spiritual.

It is clear that the core and centre of Moberley's theory is inherited from McLeod Campbell. Nevertheless Moberley intends his doctrine to be an advance upon that of Campbell. Admitting that Campbell's theory "in its real completeness is a very grand one," he finds that it suffers from an "undue assumption of distinction and antithesis between Christ and ourselves" (p. 406). This shows itself, first, in the tendency to tone down the true idea of a vicarious repentance suggested by Edwards to that of a vicarious confession of sin. It also leads to an explanation of Christ's mental anguish in His passion,² such as may seem to match His individual consciousness, as a holy man suffering, rather than what may be called His representative consciousness, as humanity realizing penitential holiness (loc. cit.).

Whereas, in fact, Dale misconceives the desolation of Christ on the cross in one direction, understanding it as penal retribution ;³ Campbell equally misconceives it in the opposite direction, denying that Christ was ever truly forsaken of God. Further, Campbell's treatment lacks a reference to the Holy Spirit as the means of our personal identification with Christ, and equally to the sacraments as its vehicle. These defects Moberley has endeavoured to correct by a closer connexion with Catholic tradition on the one hand, and on the other by a more adequate conception of personality. The philosophical medium in which he works is, as has already been pointed out, that of Hegelianism. It is this doctrine, with its general view of the world as the manifes-

¹ *Supra*, p. 219.

² *Ibid.* p. 397.

³ *Ibid.* p. 419.

tation, at different stages, of one Spirit, which enables Moberley to correct McLeod Campbell's view of the separateness and distinctness of Christ as a human individual (the characteristically Western view of His Person)¹ by the idea of Him as an inclusive and pervasive Spirit. It is, again, the Hegelian view of matter as undeveloped spirit which enables Moberley to treat punishment as the first stage in the evolution of penitence, and the sacraments in like manner as the vehicles and symbols of the Spirit. Thus in Moberley's reversion to the Catholic tradition the realistic mysticism of the typical Greek theology is replaced by an idealistic mysticism.²

§ 5. MODERN THEOLOGY IN ENGLISH

The theology in the English language, which we have just been studying, forms an interesting and valuable parallel to the German theology from Schleiermacher to Ritschl. The fact that the doctrine of the work of Christ is treated mainly in monographs, instead of as in the German theology as a part of a complete theological system, is of less detriment to the value of the English work than might be anticipated, since, especially in the greatest English theories, those of Campbell, Bushnell and Moberley, the subject is treated essentially from the point of view of the whole of doctrine. As, however, with one exception no new principles emerge in the English work, which have not already been considered in our review of modern German theology, I may refer the reader here for all essential criticism in general to that review. The exception is in the case of Westcott's theory, where in so remarkable a way is developed the idea of Christ's suffering as a purifying discipline for

¹ *Supra*, Vol. I, p. 141.

² As had been the intention of Origen (*supra*, Vol. I, pp. 60, 61).

Christ Himself. Westcott's book is too slight for a satisfactory estimate of the value of his idea, which in further working out would certainly need considerable elucidation and clearing from objections. But I regard it as a service of real value that Westcott has called attention to the Biblical material existing for our subject in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which has been in the past either too little utilized, or too much interpreted without regard to its peculiar and distinctive character.

RETROSPECT

It has been a long and perhaps sometimes a tedious way that I have led the reader. But without a sufficient attention to detail it is impossible to gain a real understanding of the progress of theology. He, however, who will not be discouraged by the mass of material, but will patiently seek to master and understand it, will discover that there has been and is progress in theology.

*Vexilla regis prodeunt
Fulget crucis mysterium.*

These words of the Hymn for the Eve of Passion Sunday happily suggest the goal towards which theology is tending, a view in which the work of Christ and the Christian revelation as a whole shall be seen luminous "by its own light".

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
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